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 Abstract 
 
Mark Ellis Swartzburg: The Call for America: German-American Relations and the 
European Crisis, 1921-1924/25 
(Under the direction of Konrad H. Jarausch) 
 
 This study examines German-American relations during the European general crisis of 
1921-1924/5.  After World War I, Germany’s primary foreign policy goal was to engage the 
United States, whose assistance was seen as essential for the economic and diplomatic 
rehabilitation of Germany.  America recognized that the rehabilitation of Germany was 
necessary for its long range goal of aiding peaceful European reconstruction through private 
loans and investments.  Having failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, America had to 
establish bilateral relations with Germany.   However the complex interplay of domestic and 
international politics in each nation resulted in a relationship which proceeded in a series of 
steps characterized by expediency imposed by the domestic politics of the United States.  
Following this pattern were the Treaty of Berlin of 1921 (which established a separate peace 
with Germany), the Mixed Claims Agreement of 1922 (which was created to resolve war 
claims), and the Commercial Treaty of 1924.  
 The American–German relationship was also central to the resolution of the complex 
international problem of war debts and reparations.  Political conflict in Germany over 
distribution of the war’s costs among various social and economic groups kept it from 
making credible reparations proposals and engaging the United States, which disengaged 
further in response to the January 1923 French/Belgian occupation of the Ruhr and 
 iii 
Germany’s reactive  policy of passive resistance.  Due to optimism over Germany’s ending 
of passive resistance and institution of domestic economic reforms together with concern 
about the chaos in Germany caused by the occupation, American opinion shifted and the 
Coolidge administration called for an inquiry into the reparation problem by a committee of 
experts.  The resulting 1924 Dawes Plan and the London agreements established a 
reparations settlement and modification the Versailles Treaty on Anglo-American terms.  
This opened the way for American financial underwriting of German reconstruction and the 
resolution of the European crisis. 
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 Introduction and Prologue 
 
Introduction 
 During the twentieth century the United States and Germany have twice been opponents 
in world wars.  In both the United States played a decisive role in defeating Germany and 
following both, the United States was active in the reconstruction of Germany and Europe.  
The United States was crucial to Germany at the end of both wars, and the question of 
Germany was a major factor in the development of American policy towards Europe in both 
post war periods.  The United States' engagement of Germany, was, however, significantly 
different in the two post war periods. 
 At the end of the First World War, Germany was a revisionist power which had not 
accepted its defeat and which looked to the United States for assistance in altering the 
Versailles settlement in its favor.  The American rejection of the Treaty of Versailles in 1920 
both slowed and limited its involvement with Germany and Europe.  The difficulties 
surrounding the Peace created political constraints which needed to be worked through 
before America could re-engage with its former enemy and play the leading role in the post 
war stabilization.  By contrast, at the Second World War ended, Germany was a thoroughly 
defeated nation and the United States fully engaged Germany politically, economically and 
militarily. 
 This study examines the German-American relationship between 1921 and 1924. This was a 
period of crisis for Germany, beginning in May 1921 with the Allied demand that it pay the 
reparations required by the Versailles treaty and continuing through the separate peace treaty 
negotiated between the United States and Germany in August 1921, after persistent U.S. refusal 
to ratify the Treaty of Versailles.  Successive German governments, burdened by the financial, 
political and social consequences of defeat and the nation’s reconstitution as a democratic 
republic, also struggled to find a way to reduce the reparation payments, culminating in a 
continental crisis in January 1923 when France and Belgium occupied the Ruhr after Germany 
failed to muster the political will to solve the reparations question. 
 From the beginning of its disputes with the Allies over its ability to pay reparations, Germany 
had appealed to America for aid and intervention. But Washington, although it sought a peaceful 
and reconstructed Europe, was reluctant to become directly involved in European crises.  In 
December 1922, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes did propose a plan for a committee of 
experts to formulate a solution to the reparation crisis, but it was rejected by France.  After the 
French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr, the United States waited upon events, not becoming 
directly involved until late 1923, when, faced with the potential collapse of Germany, the U.S. 
and Britain pressured France into accepting the expert committee (led by an American, Charles 
E. Dawes). 
 The period of reparations-related crises ended in 1924, when the committee’s plan to 
stabilize Germany’s economy and also allow for reparation payments was accepted, with 
American participation, at the London Conference in July and August 1924; subsequently, 
France and Belgium agreed to withdraw from the Ruhr and the so-called “golden years” of the 
late 1920s began.  
 These years of crisis, when America and Germany were re-establishing relations, have been 
relatively neglected by scholars; few studies examine German-American engagement prior to 
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U.S. involvement in the Dawes Plan, which ushered in the more extensively studied period of 
stability. However, the nascent relationship between the new German republic and the United 
States was perhaps the most crucial relationship in the international system of the early 1920s.  
Following the First World War, Germany represented the greatest challenge to the international 
system while the United States, which had emerged as a dominant economic power, represented 
the logical solution to the problems of European security and reconstruction.  Through analysis 
of the period of instability and crisis that existed between 1921 and 1924, motivations and 
priorities are revealed and the basis of both nations’ foreign policy goals can be seen.  
 There is a large literature on the general post world war problems of Europe and 
Germany itself.  There are also a number of studies that focus on America’s relationship with 
Britain and France.  There are few studies that focus on the evolution of the crucial 
American-German relationship during this entire period and those that exist are often limited 
by their interpretive and theoretical framework.  This study, while paying attention to the 
economic issues, adopts the viewpoint that these issues play themselves out in the political 
realm and therefore adopts a political viewpoint throughout its analysis.   
 For many historians the thesis of William Appleman Williams, who argued that 
American policies were shaped by the structural requirements of a capitalistic political 
economy that demanded overseas markets, has provided a unifying conceptual model for 
American diplomacy in the 1920's.  The older view, which focused on American 
isolationism, gave way to an emphasis on the centrality of economic diplomacy during the 
1920's, and the debate has revolved around on the nature of American economic policy.1 
                                                 
 1 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, (Cleveland: World 
Publishing Co.,1959).  While not covering the 1920s, Walter LaFeber’s The New Empire: 
An Interpretation of American Expansion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1963) has also 
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This so-called revisionist school, stressed the United State’s economic engagement with the 
rest of the world, regarding isolationism as a factor in American foreign relations as 
overstated by earlier historians.  As a whole, the revisionist school views the 1920's as a 
period of American economic empire building. 
 Werner Link’s influential study of American stabilization policies towards Germany, Die 
amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik in Deutschland, 1921-32, is one of the few works to 
study the German-American relationship of this period in depth.  Link follows William 
Appleman Williams lead and agues that Germany was important to the United States both as 
a competitive market for goods and as an area for economic penetration through loans and 
investments.  Link views Germany as becoming a cooperating partner in American efforts to 
establish a liberal world order.   He argues that America was at the same time very concerned 
about German competition and the possibility of the creation of a Franco-German economic 
block.  This, Link maintains, explains the reasons behind America’s periods of withdrawal 
and then sudden intervention. This hard line economic determinism at times diminishes the 
usefulness of the work as it obscures an understanding of the political determinants of 
American policy and the influence of the personalities involved.  Link’s later works 
continued to examine America relations with Germany in this period, most notably in regard 
                                                                                                                                                       
strongly influenced the revisionist interpretation.  Carl P. Parrini also emphasizes the 
continuity of economic policy between the Wilson and Harding administrations, stressing the 
importance of Anglo-American economic and financial rivalry during the 1920s. Carl P. 
Parrini, Heir to Empire: United States Economic Diplomacy: 1916-1923 (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press,1969).  Frank Costigliola argues that during the1919-1933 
period the United States relied upon economic intervention to foster peaceful change as a 
means of combating revolution and Bolshevism and also that American policy during the 
interwar years, while accepting right-wing forces in the interest of stability, nevertheless had 
the virtue of avoiding the combined use of military and economic. (Frank Costigliola, 
Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 
1919-1933 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). 
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to the Ruhr crisis of 1923, and retain the heavy emphasis on economic determinants.  Despite 
the limited focus, Link’s works remain very valuable studies of American relations with 
Germany.2
 This hard economic determinist line has been questioned by historians who argue for a 
more complex relationship between government and business and have expanded to include 
other special interest groups who may also play a role in setting the American foreign policy 
agenda.3   A later version of this emphasis on the economic aspects of diplomacy is that of 
what Michael Hogan terms “corporatism” and which softens the more strict determinism of 
Williams’s approach.  Hogan sees corporatism as being a political-economic system founded 
organizationally on officially recognized economic or functional groups including organized 
labor, business, and agriculture. Institutional regulating, coordinating, and planning 
mechanisms integrate these groups into a consensus bloc that blurs boundaries between the 
private and the public sectors.  Elites from each sector collaborated as they engaged in a 
search for stability and progress as American leaders sought to adapt the earlier liberal 
institutions to the imperatives of organized capitalism. He argues that this model has an 
international parallel as corporate liberals sought to apply a system of international planning 
                                                 
 2 Werner Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik in Deutschland 1921-32 
(Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1970); "Die Beziehungen zwischen der Weimarer Republik und 
den USA," Die Weimarer Republik, ed. Michael Stürmer ( Königstein/Ts: Verlagsgruppe 
Athenäum, Hain, Scriptor, Hanstein, 1980), pp. 62-93; “Die Vereinigten Staaten und der 
Ruhrkonflikt” in Die Ruhrkrise1923, ed. Klaus Schwabe (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1985), pp. 
39-51. 
 3 Joan Hoff Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy, 1920-1933 (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1971); Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: 
American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982). 
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that would decrease the competitive system of liberal capitalism.  Hogan sees this corporatist 
pattern emerging in the 1920s.4   
 Michael Hogan, challenging the view that the United States sought a world economic 
order based on competitive free trade, calls attention to the cooperative and corporative 
aspects of Anglo-American relations after 1923 and argues that this Anglo-American 
cooperation, instrumental in the 1924 resolution of the Franco-German struggle, created a 
"cooperationalist" order that characterized the later 1920s. Hogan, however, has been 
criticized by John Lewis Gaddis for ignoring the geopolitical dimension of foreign policy and 
for underrating the role of distinctive personalities and the media.5   The limitations of the 
corporatist analysis as it relates to American relations with Germany will be examined in the 
relevant chapters.  
 For German historians, corporatism is not a theoretical paradigm through which to view 
policy, but rather a real cultural institution itself worthy of study.6   Werner Abelshauser 
notes that in its efforts to overcome economic backwardness, Germany “was almost 
predestined to become the first post-liberal nation through setting up modern interest group 
policies, market regulations and a framework for bargaining between state and interest 
groups.”  The corporatist nature of German policy development was a considerable factor in 
                                                 
 4 Michael J. Hogan, Informal Entente: The Private Structure in Anglo-American 
Economic Diplomacy, 1918-1928 (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1977); 
Hogan, “Corporatism: A Positive Appraisal,” Diplomatic History 10 (Fall 1986), pp. 363-72. 
 5 Ibid., pp. 363-67; John Lewis Gaddis, “The Corporatist Synthesis: A Skeptical View,” 
Diplomatic History 10 (Fall 1986), pp. 357-63. 
 6 Werner Abelshauser, “The First Post-Liberal Nation: Stages in the Development of 
Modern Corporatism in Germany,” European History Quarterly 14 (July 1984) pp. 285-317, 
quote on 311; Ulrich Nocken, “Corporatism and Pluralism in Modern German History,” 
Industrielle Gesellschaft und politisches System, ed. Dirk Stegmann, Bernd-Jürgen Wendt 
and Peter-Christian Witt (Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1978), pp. 37-56.  
 6 
German relations with the United States, and in the case of the negotiations over the 
commercial treaty could significantly impact those relations.  The dismay and displeasure 
with which the State Department greeted its encounters with German institutionalized 
corporatism indicates the remoteness of such ideas to those charged with executing American 
foreign policy.  
 More recently, William C. McNeil has called attention to the importance of American 
capital in influencing political developments in Europe in the latter 1920s.  Other scholars, 
however, have challenged this emphasis on economic imperatives in American diplomacy 
during the 1919-1933 period.  Melvyn P. Leffler, seeking to bridge the gap between the 
revisionist and traditionalist studies of American foreign policy, cogently argues that 
American policy toward Europe and Germany was the product of compromises between 
competing branches of government which were internally divided by conflicting pressures 
and irreconcilable goals and states that the American desire for foreign markets was 
counterbalanced by fiscal and partisan political goals as well as strategic considerations.  
Stephen A. Schuker also emphasizes the political dimension of American stabilization 
policy.7    
  While there are significant differences among scholarly interpretations of the 1919-1933 
period as a whole, differences in viewpoints regarding the 1921-1924 period are less 
                                                 
 7 William C. McNeil, American Money and the Weimar Republic: Economics and 
Politics on the Eve of the Great Depression (New York: Colombia University Press, 1986);  
Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and French 
Security, 1919-1933 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979). See also 
Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Origins of Republican War Debt Policy, 1921-1923: A Case Study 
in the Applicability of the Open Door Interpretation," Journal of American History 59 
(December 1972), pp. 585-601; Stephen A. Schuker, "Origins of American Stabilization 
Policy in Europe," Confrontation and Cooperation: Germany and the United States in the Era 
of World War I, 1900-1924, Germany and the United States, The Krefeld Historical 
Symposia, ed. Hans-Jürgen Schröder (Providence and Oxford: Berg, 1993), pp. 377-403. 
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pronounced due to a general agreement that economic ties between America and Germany 
did not begin to flourish until the political conflicts of 1922-1923 were temporarily resolved 
by the Dawes plan and London Conference of 1924.8  Nevertheless, many scholars of 
American-German relations tend to view the 1921-1924  period primarily as a prelude to the 
post-1924 period and stress the importance of the confluence of economic interests between 
the United States and Germany.  Manfred Jonas characterizes American-German relations 
during this period as defined by "a mutuality of interests."9   Elisabeth Glaser-Schmidt, in her 
examination of American-German relations in the early 1920s, recognizes the barriers to 
American-German cooperation, but still emphasizes America's long-term interests in 
establishing a liberal international order, observing that in order to gain the larger benefits of 
a trade system based on equal treatment, Germany was consistently forced to accept 
agreements on American terms as the United States strove to implement its economic goals. 
But like other scholars of the period, Glaser-Schmidt acknowledges that the close 
cooperation that Germany hoped for did not emerge until after 1924.10
                                                 
 8 Costigliola dates the formation of a loose alliance between "government officials, 
central bankers, and top private businessmen" to the 1923-1924 period (Heir to Empire, 
p.19).  Hogan sees the Anglo-American accord reached between 1923 and 1925 as the 
beginning of what he terms the "Anglo-American Creditor Entente" (Informal Entente, pp. 
38-9).  Link notes that American capital could not begin to flow into Germany until Germany 
had resolved its twin problems of reparations and inflation (Die amerikanische 
Stabilisierungspolitik in Deutschland, 1921-32, p. 63). 
 
 9 Manfred Jonas,  The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1984).  
 10 Elizabeth Glaser-Schmidt, "Von Versailles nach Berlin. Überlegungen zur 
Neugestaltung der deutsh-amerikanischen Beziehungen in der Ära Harding," Liberalitas: 
Festschrift für Erich Angermann zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Norbert Finzsch and Hermann 
Wellenreuther, (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1992), pp. 319-342; see also by the same 
author, "German and American Concepts to Restore a Liberal World Trading System after 
World War I," Confrontation and Cooperation: Germany and the United States in the Era of 
World War I, 1900-1924, ed. Hans-Jürgen Schröder, (Oxford: Berg, 1993), pp. 353-76. 
 8 
 A greater emphasis on the political dimension of American-German relations can be 
found in Klaus Schwabe's study of the 1918-1919 period, which provides a detailed 
examination of American-German relations during the Paris Peace Conference, whereas  
Peter Grupp emphasizes the role the United States played in the thinking of the German 
foreign office during the same time.  Following the period of instability and crisis over the 
reparations problem and the Ruhr occupation, Stephen A. Schuker provides a comprehensive 
account of the economic and political factors involved in the formation of the Dawes Plan 
and the settlement created by the London Conference of 1924.  For the period following 
America’s re-engagement with Germany and Europe, Manfred Berg’s study of Gustav 
Stresemann and the United States of America does an excellent job of explaining how the 
German Foreign Minister used stabilized relations with America to further his revisionist 
policies.11
 Michael H. Hunt warns that the complexity of international history does not lend itself 
well to overarching theoretical frameworks, noting that international history is “a highly 
dynamic and interactive process.” He suggests the useful approach of recognizing that policy 
makers’ narratives accounting for the behavior of others seldom converge but rather 
intertwine as they interact, resulting in a web of evolving narratives that creates complexity 
                                                 
 11 Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-
1919: Missionary Diplomacy and the Realities of Power (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 1985); Peter Grupp, Deutsche Aussenpolitik im Schatten von 
Versailles, 1918-1920 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1988); Manfred Berg, Gustav Stresemann und 
die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika: Weltwirtschaftliche Verflechtung und 
Revisionspolitik, 1907-1929 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschft, 1990);  Stephen A. 
Schuker, The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the 
Adoption of the Dawes Plan (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1976). 
 9 
in and of itself.  For an examination of German-American relations and multilateral 
American interactions with Europe at a period of crisis, Hunt’s approach is valuable.12
 Any study of this period necessitates opening the Pandora's box of German reparations. 
Traditional historiography of the question views the 1921 London Schedule of reparations as 
beyond Germany’s capacity to pay.13   France is also blamed for an intransigent policy that 
frustrated British attempts to find a solution and led to the occupation of the Ruhr.  In 
reaction, spurred by the opening of the French archives, a revisionist historiography 
developed in the 1970s that finds French policy more reasonable and argues it was the 
Germans who, aided and abetted by Britain, undermined French efforts to find a reasonable 
solution.  While acknowledging that it is unknown to what extent the transfer of purchasing 
power between Germany and its creditors could have been possible without significant 
damage to the European economy, revisionist scholarship argues that Germany could have 
found a way to pay reparations had it been willing to accept its responsibility.  In this view, 
the fundamental issue is the lack of German political will to accept responsibility for the 
payment of reparations.14   
                                                 
 12 Michael H. Hunt, “Internationalizing U.S. Diplomatic History: A Practical Agenda,” 
Diplomatic History 15 (1991), pp. 1-11. 
 13 The London Conference of 1921 set the total sum as 132 billion gold marks, of which 
50 billion in A and B bonds were to be paid in fixed annuities.  The remaining 82 billion 
marks, the C Bonds, were only to be issued if Germany grew more prosperous.  This 
traditional view is most pronounced in the Anglo-American literature, but also appears in the 
German literature.  See Ludwig Zimmermann, Frankreichs Ruhrpolitik von Versailles bis 
zum Dawesplan, (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1971). 
 14 Sally Marks sees the C bonds as chimerical, arguing that Germany could have paid the 
50 billion gold marks that it was actually obliged to pay but did not have the will to do so.  
Sally Marks, “The Myth of Reparations,” Central European History 11 (September 1978), 
pp. 231-55). Mark Trachtenberg also agrees that Germany could have paid reparations but 
did not have the political will do so. Mark Trachtenberg, Reparations in World Politics (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1980) pp. 337-42.  See also Walter A. McDougall, 
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 Other scholars, German specialists in particular, argue that political capacity was not 
solely limited by German unwillingness to pay but by domestic political and social 
constraints as well.15  German political willingness to pay reparations was also very much 
influenced by German perceptions that both the United States and Britain wanted to revise 
the payment schedule.  Since both Britain and France were prepared to reduce German 
reparations if the United States would in turn reduce Allied war debts, American policy 
regarding war debts became a major factor in the reparation crisis of 1922.  A major task of 
this study is to explore the interactions between Germany and the United States regarding the 
reparation question and to demonstrate that it impacted almost all aspects of American-
German relations. 
 While recognizing that America had important economic and financial interests in 
European recovery from the war, this study emphasizes the political determinants of 
American policy at both domestic and international levels.  Consistent with this approach, the 
study will attend to how policy formation was influenced by the perceptions and 
misperceptions that each nation held regarding the other.  For Germany as well, domestic 
politics were the essential determinants of foreign policy; it was Berlin’s inability to resolve 
                                                                                                                                                       
France’s Rhineland Diplomacy, 1914-1924 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); 
Schuker, The End of French Predominance in Europe. 
 15 Gerald D. Feldman, The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics, and Society in the 
German Inflation, 1914-1924 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); 
Manfred Berg, "Trade, Debts, and Reparations: Economic Concepts and Political 
Constraints," in Hans-Jürgen Schröder, ed., Confrontation and Cooperation: Germany and 
the United States in the Era of World War I, 1900-1924; Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich's review of 
Stephen A. Schuker's American "Reparations" to Germany, Historishe Zeitschrift 251 
(1990), pp.468-71; Klaus Schwabe, “Comment on Trachtenberg and Mc Dougall,” Journal of 
Modern History 51 (March 1979), pp. 68-73; Peter Kruger, “Das Reparationsproblem der 
Weimarer Republik in fragwürdiger Sicht,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 29 (1981), 
pp. 21-47. 
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its internal political, economic and social conflicts as well as its international problems that 
made it so desperate to secure aid from America.  This focus on the political departs from the 
recent trend among scholars of American foreign policy of the1920s of emphasizing 
economic motives.  Close examination of the 1921-1924 period of instability reveals that 
economic explanations alone are insufficient to explain the nature of German-American 
relations.   
 Focusing on the political dimension, this study analyzes the nascent German-American 
relationship, from both the American and German perspectives, in the relatively neglected 
yet vitally important years of instability, seeking to do more than fill the gap between studies 
of German-American relations in the Versailles era and studies of the post-1924 era of 
stabilization.  Consideration of the 1921-1924 period provides the opportunity to examine 
basic motivations and determinants of German and American policy toward each other, as 
well as the effects of these relationships and policies during their critical early stages on other 
European nations.  Also, because these core policies would carry over into later years, the 
insights gained facilitate the evaluation of hypotheses about motivations when the 
relationship had developed more fully. 
 Interaction between the desperate German need for both reconstruction at home and 
support for its revisionist foreign policy and American domestic constraints on its foreign 
policy, resulting from American rejection of the Versailles treaty and a desire to avoid 
foreign entanglements, is the central theme of this study.  For both Germany and America, 
policy was often driven by expediency, resulting in a series of political intersections and 
divergences that account for the pattern of urgent diplomatic activity erupting from periods 
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of relative diplomatic inactivity.  Examination of this ebb and flow, based on the 
expediencies of those years, allows for the analysis of underlying motivations.  
 This dissertation postulates that Germany’s relationship with the United States was the 
fundamental element that shaped German foreign policy in the early Weimar period.  From 
the armistice of November 1918 to the 1924 settlement of the reparation crisis, Germany 
continually looked to the United States for help in revising the political and economic 
consequences of its defeat. This view of America became the idée fixe of German diplomacy 
as it sought a revision of the Versailles framework and was originally fostered by Woodrow 
Wilson’s pre-Versailles rhetoric. Despite German resentment that America had not produced 
a more lenient peace treaty, Germany continued to see America as the answer to its 
problems, a view reinforced both by the American rejection of the Versailles treaty and the 
election of Warren G. Harding, which offered hope for new American policies.  This study 
will trace this dynamic throughout the slow re-establishment of full relations, a period during 
which German optimism about America rose with American initiatives, only to be replaced 
by frustration at times when America demonstrated little inclination to become involved with 
international affairs on Germany’s behalf.    
 This study will pay particular attention to constraints on American interaction with 
Germany imposed by domestic political considerations resulting from America’s residual 
feelings about Germany following the war and from the political consequences of the failure 
of the Republican Senate to ratify the Versailles treaty.  The reaction of Wilson, a Democrat, 
to the treaty’s defeat was to personally block any attempt to establish official relations with 
Germany, which allowed a condition of the state of war to continue; albeit the United States 
did have a mission in Berlin, relations were minimal and mostly confined to private 
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initiatives.  Harding’s election in November 1920 led to an increase of expectations in 
Germany for what relations with America might hold, but in America Wilson’s lack of action 
left the new Republican administration with pressing problems regarding the establishment 
of peaceful relations with Germany. These included ending of the state of war by concluding 
a separate formal peace treaty, establishing a means for the settlement of American war 
claims against Germany and regulating trade through a commercial treaty. 
 The American diplomatic response to Germany and the crisis in Europe was determined 
by very definite domestic political constraints. The fight over the Versailles treaty divided 
angry Democrats and Republicans into isolationist and administration wings which hindered 
the formulation and conduction of Harding’s new Republican administration.  In particular, 
the Senate fight over the Versailles treaty redefined the American political landscape and 
especially affected the freedom of action for U.S. foreign policy.  Having lost both the fight 
for the treaty and the election, the Democratic Party refused to hand the new Republican 
administration any foreign policy victory, but especially in Germany and Europe. Although 
the new Harding administration was dominated by internationalists, it had to contend with 
very real isolationist opposition in Congress; having defeated the wartime president and his 
peace plans, the postwar Congress was particularly activist and assertive of its prerogatives.  
This work will demonstrate that the need to conform foreign policy and diplomatic action to 
congressional constraints and demands, a crucial determinant in the formulation and 
operation of American foreign policy toward Germany and Europe during this period, would 
continue through all the bilateral negotiations, from the Berlin peace treaty (1921) and the 
Mixed-Claims Agreement (1922) to the commercial treaty (1923), and also limit how 
America could engage problems of Europe as a whole.  No domestic consensus existed in the 
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United States, nor was there a cooperative body of elites that demonstrated a single-minded 
policy towards Europe and Germany, economic or otherwise. Political determinants, rather 
than expansionist economic aspirations of American liberal capitalism, provided the basis for 
U.S. diplomacy during this period.  
 For Germany, cooperation with the United States was essential for both economic and 
political reasons.  Germany needed American capital for economic stabilization and 
reconstruction, but economic reconstruction through economic involvement with America 
was also a political goal.  Relations with America were seen as the prime vehicle for 
achieving revisionist aims against the Versailles settlement.  Unlike in the United States, 
there was broad consensus among elites, parties and interests groups on this point; indeed, it 
was one of the very few points of agreement among the factions in the early Weimar 
Republic.  Germany, however, was unable to pursue consistent long-term goals: conflict over 
domestic distribution of war costs, unwillingness to come to grips with inflation, and refusal 
to accept the verdict of Versailles necessitated a focus on short-term policy goals.  American-
German relations during the 1921-1925 period are best understood in this context.  
 This engagement of American with German would develop within the growing European 
crisis that began after the Versailles settlement.  The cost of the war made Britain and France 
look to Germany’s required reparations to rebuild their societies and help finance the war 
debts that the United States had refused to cancel.  For France, which had not only failed to 
obtain a security guarantee from the United States and Britain following American rejection 
of the Versailles treaty but also feared that it would be left alone to face the potential threat of 
the emergence of a strong Germany, reparations represented both an economic and a security 
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issue.  The London Ultimatum, with its threat of sanctions against Germany if it failed to pay 
reparations, greeted the new Harding administration as it took office.   
 While the Harding administration believed (as the Coolidge administration would also) 
that European stabilization and peaceful reconstruction would significantly serve American 
interests and that the reconstruction of Germany was essential for European recovery, there 
was not a consensus in the United States that Europe was of such vital importance to 
America that it should intervene.  Even with the attainment of a peace treaty, a mixed-claims 
agreement for the settlement of American claims against Germany and a commercial treaty, 
the United States could not fully engage Germany without resolution of the complex and 
interrelated questions of German reparations, Allied war debts, French security demands and 
German efforts for a revision of the Versailles settlement.  These issues dominated the 
American-European diplomatic agenda during the turbulent years of the early 1920s, 
climaxing in 1923 with the occupation of the Ruhr—a situation that required bilateral 
American-German engagement and multilateral negotiations as well wherein America and 
Germany had to come to terms with the concerns of Britain and France. This study will 
explore how the German-American relationship affected the policies of other nations and 
how both the United States and Germany used Britain to leverage their diplomatic objectives. 
 The interaction among these effects demonstrates the importance of the German-
American relationship in the European crisis.  How America responded to Germany would 
affect Britain and France, as German hopes for American assistance affected its responses to 
Britain and France, whose relations with each other in turn grew more tense with British 
disapproval of France’s actions in the Ruhr.  These consequences all arose from Germany’s 
position as the “problem of Europe.”  
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 It would not be until France’s hold on the Ruhr threatened the unity of the German nation 
that American opinion about U.S. intervention became favorable and, together with 
international recognition that the United States was essential to the solution of the European 
crisis, provided a diplomatic opening for American intervention.  At the same time, Germany 
showed that it was willing to make the tough but necessary economic reforms required for 
the Coolidge administration to believe that intervention would serve American interests. (In 
addition, if America failed to intervene and the European crisis became more chaotic, the 
Republican Coolidge administration would face the 1924 election with the Democrats eager 
to blame it for the situation.)  Therefore, the United States joined Britain in pressuring France 
into accepting an experts committee, dominated by an American, Charles E. Dawes. Between 
his insistence and the necessity for an American loan to make the plan work, the United 
States was able to obtain consensus on a plan that satisfied its own view of how the Ruhr 
occupation should be resolved: the Dawes Plan would stabilize Germany’s monetary system 
on terms favorable to the United States’ economic interest in Europe, at the expense of 
British interests, provide Germany with a modified reparations-payment structure, and 
sufficiently satisfy France’s interests to gain French acceptance.  
 At the London Conference, the United States and Britain, together with their bankers, 
forced France to withdraw its economic presence from the Ruhr and to evacuate its troops 
one year later. France was also forced to accept a protocol that reduced the likelihood of 
future sanctions against Germany, whereas German diplomacy successfully avoided making 
economic and commercial concessions in exchange for the French evacuation. Consequently, 
France became unable to strictly enforce the Versailles treaty by means of sanctions; it was 
the beginning of the end of French predominance in Europe.  For Germany, the conference 
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marked the beginning of a return to Great Power status and set the stage for its economic 
engagement with America in the second half of the decade. 
 Most centrally, this dissertation is constructed around the question of how, given so many 
domestic and international constraints, misperceptions and mistrust, Germany and the United 
States managed to eventually engage one another and revise the international European 
system.  Although the answer is a complicated story involving many steps and missteps, its 
crucial element remains the evolution of the German-American relationship.  It was not until 
America engaged Germany—diplomatically, economically, and politically--that the post-
World War I crises in Europe could be resolved.  Because Germany was and remains central 
to the European system, German-American relations were and even now are still the key 
factor in American relations with Europe as a whole. Therefore, examination of the nature 
and development of the German-American relationship, and in particular the rebuilding of 
that relationship, is important. 
 This study is largely based on State and private papers found in archives both in the 
United States and Germany.  The broad outline of the United States diplomacy has been 
discerned through examination of State Department files regarding Germany and Europe 
held by the National Archives within Record Group 59.  Likewise in Germany, the 
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes holds the German files regarding relations with 
the United States.  The files of Abteilung III (the Foreign Office section covering America 
and Britain), the files of the Reichsminister, and the Washington Embassy files, which 
contain the major diplomatic correspondence dealing with political relations with the U.S., 
served as the essential sources for this work.  
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 Much relevant material has been published in document collections, either in the State 
Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States or in the Auswärtige Amt’s Akten zur 
deutschen auswärtigen Politik,1918-1925 (Serie A).  As these collections are readily 
available to the researcher, published documents are cited whenever possible, most notably 
the German cabinet minutes and papers. 
 As this study emphasizes the important roles played by individuals in the political 
relations among Germany, America and Europe, perusal of the private papers of the leading 
actors has been particularly rewarding.  The papers of Alanson B. Houghton and Otto 
Wiedfeldt, the two ambassadors who played a decisive role in re-establishing the German-
American relationship, are an especially valuable resource.  Because both ambassadors were 
businessmen, with strong political influence but nonetheless outsiders to the diplomatic 
service, their papers are privately held by the archives of their firms: Houghton’s at the 
archives of Corning Inc. in Corning, New York, and Wiedfeldt’s by the Historisches Archiv 
der Fried. Krupp GmbH Essen.  The loss of some of Wiedfeldt’s papers during World War 
II,  particularly those of the period just as he was being tapped for the Washington post, 
required much investigation in the papers of Wiedfeldt’s associates to reconstruct his 
correspondence. 
 The papers of other key participants proved indispensable in constructing a more detailed 
picture of events and motivations than diplomatic files alone could provide, although, for the 
years before the reestablishment of relations, very little material exists.  The papers of the 
head of the American mission to Berlin, and later Chargé, Ellis Loring Dresel, located at 
Harvard’s Houghton Library, are a valuable exception; these were heavily consulted for the 
period through the Treaty of Berlin to the exchange of ambassadors. In the United States the 
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papers of Charles Evan Hughes, Herbert Hoover and Henry P. Fletcher were consulted.  Of 
most use, and vital to an understanding of the attitudes and motivations of the State 
Department, are the papers of William R. Castle, located in the Herbert Hoover Presidential 
Library.  These papers, particularly Castle’s correspondence with the Berlin Embassy, 
provided a wealth of material and Castle himself can always be depended upon to provide a 
striking quotation.   
 In Germany, the Auswärtige Amt holds the working papers of the Foreign Ministers and 
top officials who were prominent in formulating political policy toward the United States.  
These include the working papers of Carl von Schubert, Ago von Maltzan and Edgar Haniel 
Haimhausen.  The recent splitting of the German Bundesarchiv between Koblenz and Berlin 
left Koblenz with the major portion of the Nachlässe [private papers].  Many collections 
were consulted, particularly in regard to reconstructing Wiedfeldt’s correspondence, but of 
particular value to this study were the papers of Walther Rathenau, Joseph Wirth, Wilhelm 
Solf and Moritz Bonn.  These private papers, which greatly enhance the main diplomatic files 
in the National Archives and Politischen Archivs des Auswärtigen Amts, led to a fuller view 
of and deeper insight into the motivations and actions of those determining and implementing 
the foreign relations of Germany and the United States.  
 
Prologue   
 Important to this study is an understanding of how the effect of the Treaty of Versailles, 
and its rejection by the United States Senate, set the political context for the postwar 
engagement of America with Germany and the accompanying limitations on American-
German interactions.  At the Paris Peace Conference, President Woodrow Wilson faced a 
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major dilemma regarding Germany’s future role in Europe and the nature of its relations with 
the United States.  Some of the goals of the conference were contradictory: to enhance 
French security, rehabilitate a reformed Germany into the new liberal economic order 
envisioned by Wilson, and promote American economic interests in Europe while limiting 
America's strategic commitments there.  However, granting Germany a liberal, lenient peace 
increased the danger of the resurgent country again becoming a threat to Europe.  Such a 
peace would have been unacceptable, not only to France but also to important elements of 
American opinion which recognized that a liberal peace would require the U.S. to increase its 
commitment to Europe, because if Germany again became a military threat the United States 
would have to protect Europe. Wilson, who was personally skeptical about Germany's 
commitment to liberal democracy, was willing to compromise although the United States 
was not prepared to accept that level of responsibility. 
 The economic clauses of the Treaty of Versailles blatantly contradicted the "Open Door" 
trade principles advocated by the United States, but their economic discrimination against 
Germany was time-limited. Germany emerged from the Versailles Conference an undivided 
nation that, after a probationary period, could be reintegrated into the world economy, 
thereby retaining its potential to become a major economic power--a possibility that also 
gave Germany potential military strength.  Consequently, French hopes to create, at a 
minimum, a lasting economic balance of power between France and Germany were 
frustrated.  Germany’s reparations obligation remained the primary long-term check on its 
ability to achieve economic dominance in Europe; however, at the same time, many thought 
that German reparations could be a major impediment to the reconstruction of Europe. 
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 American policy at Versailles regarding reparations reflected the contradictions inherent 
in America's ambivalence toward making any postwar commitment to Europe. Wilson's 
economic advisors argued for a fixed reparations settlement, calculated on Germany's 
capacity to pay within thirty years, reasoning that a fixed and limited sum would allow 
Germany to reestablish its credit and issue bonds.  Mobilization of the German debt would in 
turn help the Allies reestablish their credit and fund their war debt to America (approximately 
$10 billion). Wilson's advisors believed that too great a reparation burden would cripple the 
German economy and frustrate mobilization of the German debt.  Even so, Wilson was 
forced to accept the Allied plan for a reparation commission to determine Germany's 
reparation requirements. 
 Wilson's concessions to the Allies reflected the necessity to accommodate their political 
needs. His ability to negotiate with them was also hampered by the United States Treasury's 
refusal of the Allies' suggestion that the use of German reparations bonds should be allowed 
to satisfy inter-Allied debts.  Such linkage would have not only entailed a high credit risk, it 
also would have signaled acceptance of the idea that the American and European economies 
were interdependent, not to mention acceptance of certain responsibilities toward Europe the 
United States would be expected to bear as a result. In 1919, this idea was unacceptable to 
both the American public and Congress.16   
 Wilson's advisors entertained some hopes that an American presence on the Reparation 
Commission would eventually result in a reparation program based on Germany's capacity to 
pay.  The difficulty of achieving this goal became apparent in June 1919 when the Allies 
rejected Wilson's proposal to limit Germany's reparations to a fixed, interest-free amount, 
                                                 
 16 Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919, 
pp. 364-65, 373. 
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and the United States rejected a British plan for the reestablishment of international credit 
that would have allowed German reparation bonds to be used for payment of war debts.  The 
United States would not accept an international clearing procedure for war debts as long as 
the reparation terms, which America considered excessive, remained in the treaty. For their 
part, the Allies refused to change those terms unless the United States agreed to actively 
participate in restoring credit in the world economy. This conflict over the relationship 
between war debts and reparations would dominate the international agenda in the early 
1920s and remain a significant issue throughout the decade.17
  The domestic political constraints which limited Wilson's ability to foster German 
recovery were also evident in his failed attempt to persuade Britain and France to relinquish a 
portion of the German merchant fleet.  Lloyd George, the British prime minister, was willing 
to release some of the German ships allotted to Britain if the United States would release 
some of the German ships it had confiscated.  Such an action, however, was politically 
impossible for Wilson in the face of Congressional opposition.  The problem of confiscated 
German property would complicate American-German relations until the Mixed Claims 
Agreement of 1922 and indeed well beyond that.18  
 In the United States, the contradictory elements of the Treaty of Versailles exposed 
Wilson to attacks from multiple directions.  Progressives denounced the treaty as vindictive 
and a betrayal of the Fourteen Points.  Moderate Republicans agreed with Wilson that the 
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United States should take the lead in promoting disarmament and an Open Door trade policy, 
but they would only endorse the League of Nations without enforcement powers.  Wilson's 
refusal to compromise with Republican senators who would only accept the treaty with 
reservations led to its defeat in the Senate. Congress’ fight over the ratification of the Treaty 
of Versailles and establishment of the League of Nations would have political ramifications 
for how American foreign policy was conducted during the 1921-1924 period. 
 The conflict began in February 1919, when Wilson first presented the Covenant of the 
League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference, and would continue for a little more than a 
full year.  Drawing immediate Republican opposition was Article X of the covenant, which 
guaranteed the political independence and territorial integrity of league members against 
external aggression and required league members to take action against violators, even to the 
extent of using military force.  Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts led the immediate 
attack of Senate Republicans against both the league and Article X; his colleagues were 
already furious that Wilson had not included any prominent Republicans in the peace 
conference delegation.19  
 But Wilson and his followers, seeking a strong League of Nations with the power to 
punish aggressors through collective security, were opposed by a formidable ideological 
spectrum.  At one end were senators who favored the idea of the United States joining a 
community of nations to promote and preserve peace and at the other were isolationists who 
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totally opposed ratification of the treaty when presented in final form--the so-called 
“Irreconcilables” led by Republicans William Borah of Idaho and Hiram Johnson of 
California.  The isolationists appealed to a long-standing policy of avoiding any foreign 
entanglements and any international arrangement that might encroach the sovereignty of the 
United States.  Included in this group were many progressives who denounced the treaty as 
vindictive and a betrayal of Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which promised a liberal peace, and 
who favored disarmament and the formation of a world court for settling disputes.  Some of 
these progressives hoped to gain political advantage by courting votes (of liberals 
disillusioned by the treaty and ethnic groups, such as the anti-British Irish and German-
Americans who felt the treaty was too harsh on Germany). 
 In the wide middle were moderate Republican senators, joined by a few Democrats who 
were more or less willing to accept the treaty with reservations. The most important of these, 
requiring congressional approval, was acceptance of the American obligation to action under 
Article X. Opinions varied on other aspects of the treaty; some felt it lenient in its treatment 
of Germany but were willing to accept its terms.  Among the Republicans, some moderates 
agreed with Wilson that the United States should take the lead in promoting disarmament and 
an Open Door trade policy, but they would only endorse the League of Nations with 
reservations.  Wilson, however, stubbornly refused to accept any limitation on the treaty, and 
in March 1920, Lodge failed to gain the Senate’s consent for a treaty with reservations: the 
treaty was returned to the President without ratification.20   
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 The prolonged, bitter fight over the treaty exacerbated tensions between Congress, 
particularly the Senate, and the executive branch. Congress acted to reassert its powers and to 
gain a greater voice in foreign policy through criticism of executive policy, obstructions of 
initiatives, and limiting amendments and reservations in the area of treaty making. 
Partisanship and ill-will increased too, as did the importance of individual personalities.  In 
this atmosphere, both the executive and legislative branch feared any initiative that could 
result in another such divisive conflict.21  
 Because of these dynamics little was accomplished in the last months of the Wilson 
administration, which had been effectively destroyed by the treaty fight. The United States' 
international economic program depended upon the development and implementation of 
coherent policies toward German reparations, Allied war debts, private loans to Europe, and 
exchange controls, but these matters affected domestic issues such as inflationary concerns, 
levels of taxation, balancing of the budget, reduction of the national debt, and tariff policy.  
The fight over ratification made American relations with Europe and Germany a matter of 
intense and often bitter partisan political debates; relations with Germany were largely put on 
hold during the treaty fight and the presidential campaign of 1920.  Although defeat of the 
treaty had wiped the slate clean for the Republican Party, when the Harding administration 
took office in early 1921 and the reparations bill was presented to German representatives in 
London, the political atmosphere created by the treaty fight would severely complicate 
American efforts to help with reconstruction of Germany and Europe.    
 Immediately after the collapse of Germany in November 1918, forward-thinking 
Germans saw relations with the United States as the key to the new republic’s future.  They 
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understood that the role of the United States, with its financial and productive might, had 
decided the outcome of the war and now only the United States would be able to rebuild 
Germany and Europe.  How best to achieve this engagement would be a central question for 
successive German governments and foreign ministers.  Wilhelm Solf, the last Foreign 
Minister of Imperial Germany, had directed that German foreign policy should focus on 
fostering relations with the United States; his successor, Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-
Rantzau, also attempted to carry this idea forward into the Versailles conference.  Germany 
would place its hope on Wilson and the United States.22
 From the German perspective, the Treaty of Versailles represented a failure of its 
diplomacy at Paris.  Germany had offered what it considered concessions on economic 
issues, which by their very nature could never be final, in the hope of limiting the loss of 
territory and thereby preserving as much economic potential as possible.  It had mistakenly 
believed that by becoming a democracy and adopting Wilson's liberal program it could 
achieve a lenient peace based on Wilson's Fourteen Points, interpreted in a manner 
maximally advantageous to Germany.23   When this strategy failed, many Germans 
condemned Wilson for deceiving and betraying Germany.  This reaction to the treaty dealt a 
blow to Germany’s liberal elements from which they never recovered.  Nevertheless, many 
in Germany continued to believe that close relations with the United States represented the 
only way to improve the German economic and political position and that a mutual interest in 
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trade provided the basis for that cooperation. Indeed, this became the idée fixe of German 
foreign policy of the early Weimar Republic.   
 The German representatives at Paris were unprepared for the terms of Versailles treaty, 
the German people even less so.  Wartime censorship within Germany and the national 
fixation on Wilson’s political rhetoric had created a “dreamland” of public opinion, which 
transformed into deep resentment over the shock of the Versailles treaty and not only 
established revisionism as the guiding principle of Weimar Germany’s foreign policy but 
also precluded an objective view of the actual treaty terms.  
 The Versailles treaty returned Alsace-Lorraine to France, but against French desires the 
Rhineland was not separated from Germany.  In a compromise the treaty allowed for an 
Allied occupation of the German Rhineland, with a staged withdrawal over fifteen years to 
provide France time to recover from the impact of the war.  The treaty also required 
Germany to provide Britain, and especially France, with commercial concessions for a five- 
year period.  In the East, it recreated the nation of Poland from former Russian and German 
territories, in doing so separating German East Prussia from the rest of Germany by a Polish 
corridor that gave Poland access the to Baltic and the port city of Danzig, which was severed 
from Germany and made a free city.  (In 1921 Germany was able to negotiate provisions for 
plebiscites in ethnically and nationally disputed areas, such as Upper Silesia.) 
 Although Germany had lost its colonies, the Treaty of Versailles preserved it as a viable 
nation, the second most populous in Europe with a dominant position in Central Europe.  The 
treaty also provided for German reparations payments to the Allies, the total sum of which 
was to be fixed later by the Allies and included the so-called “War Guilt” clause (Article 
231), which pinned moral responsibility for the war on Germany and its allies.  This clause 
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was designed on American initiative, to justify reparations but also limit them so that the 
total cost of the war would not be imposed on Germany.  The treaty also provided for a 
security guarantee to France, by the United States and Britain, which would ultimately 
depend on American ratification.  At Wilson’s insistence, the treaty contained a provision for 
a league of nations as well, intended to be a formal vehicle for collective security and conflict 
resolution.24
 Despite the hopes of many in the German foreign office and the various governments of 
the new German republic, relations with the United States would be based on pragmatic 
considerations and not on shared political, cultural, and social values.  The nationalistic 
reaction to the treaty resulted in a discrediting of Western political and social values which 
would damage German understanding of American politics and thereby impair German 
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diplomacy as well.25   German behavior would in turn strengthen American stereotypes about 
German stubbornness and self-serving advocacy, reinforcing the idea that agreements 
between the United States and Germany had to be virtually dictated to Germany. 
  At the same time, American disinclination to assist Germany on anything other than 
American terms would limit the help Germany could receive from America as the crisis over 
reparations moved steadily toward a French occupation of the Ruhr.  With the stalemate of 
the French-German conflict over the Ruhr, the United States withdrew to let Europe have, in 
the words of Secretary of State Hughes, its “bit of chaos.”26  Although German diplomatic 
reactions to the Ruhr occupation were directed toward achieving American mediation on its 
behalf, German diplomatic missteps resulted in confirming Hughes’s decision to remain 
aloof.  American economic and commercial interests in Germany did provide a mutuality of 
interests, but there were significant limits to that mutuality.  As Germany took action to 
improve its credibility with the United States, the German domestic situation was rapidly 
reaching the point of collapse.  The efforts of Gustav Stresemann to adjust German policy to 
the wishes and needs of the United States, while holding Germany together to prevent total 
collapse, created the opportunity for the United States to decisively engage both Germany 
and Europe. 
 The resultant Dawes Plan and its implementation by the London Conference in 1924 
brought the United States back into a leading role in European affairs, on its own terms, 
                                                 
 25 Peter Krüger, "German Disappointment and Anti-Western Resentment," in Hans-
Jürgen Schröder, ed., Confrontation and Cooperation: Germany and the United States in the 
Era of World War I, 1900-1924, pp. 323-34. 
 26 Hughes’s famous remark can be found in Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a 
Conversation with the British Ambassador (Geddes), 23 Feb1923, Papers Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States 1923, II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1938), p. 56 (hererafter cited as FRUS). 
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provided the Republican administration with a foreign policy success in Europe which had 
eluded them since 1921, and formed the basis for a viable Republican foreign policy 
alternative to Wilson’s more direct engagement with Europe.  For Germany, the successful 
engagement with America represented a victory for its foreign policy that it also had 
struggled for since 1921.  After American intervention, a decisive step toward the revision of 
the Versailles treaty system, Germany once again felt itself an equal partner in international 
affairs, although it remained very clearly the junior partner in the German-American 
relationship.  Despite the false starts and bungling, the emphasis placed on the United States 
by German foreign policy would bear fruit.  After 1924, the goals of German revisionism 
with regard to the Versailles system would be underwritten by the financial and moral 
authority of the United States.    
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 Chapter I 
The Separate Peace: 
The Making of the Treaty of Berlin 
 
    In contrast to the Treaty of Versailles, the 1921 Treaty of Berlin that ended the state of 
war between the United States and Germany has by and large been treated as a footnote in 
the diplomatic history of the era.  When discussed from the perspective of American history, 
it has been generally characterized as a treaty in which the United States "assumed all the 
rights of the Treaty of Versailles and none of its obligations" or as some variant of "the best 
that could be done under the circumstance."1   From the perspective of German history, it has 
been termed the "first significant success of German foreign policy."  It has also been seen as 
the beginning of a "special relationship" and reflection of "a mutuality of interests" between 
Germany and the United States.2   Those who have given significant attention to the treaty 
                                                          
 1 Hans W. Gatzke, Germany and the United States: A "Special Relationship?" 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 89; Sally Marks and Denis Dulude, 
"German-American Relations, 1918-1921,"Mid-America: An Historical Review” 53 
(October 1971), pp. 211-226; Kurt Wimer and Sally Wimer, "The Harding Administration, 
the League of Nations, and the Separate Peace Treaty," The Review of Politics, 24 (January 
1967), pp. 13-24. 
 2 Lloyd E. Ambrosius, "The United States and the Weimar Republic, 1918-1923: From 
the Armistice to the Ruhr Occupation" ( Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1967), pp. 395-96; 
Werner Link,  "Die Beziehungen zwischen der Weimar Republic and der USA," in Die 
Weimarer Republik,   ed. Michael Stürmer (Königsstein/Ts.: Verlagsgruppe Athenäum, 
Hain, Scriptor, Hanstein, 1980), pp. 62-92; Manfred Jonas, "Mutualism in the Relations  
between the United States and the early Weimar Republic," in Germany and America: Essays 
on Problems of International Relations and Immigration, ed. Hans L. Trefousse (New York: 
have predominately focused on the Congressional political battles that accompanied its 
ratification and have often neglected the German perspective.  
 Such brief characterizations often fail to appreciate the context of the interactions 
between Germany and the United States.  The Treaty of Berlin illustrates the foreign policy 
agendas that were evolving in the Weimar Republic and the changing directions in the 
United States.  The meeting ground was the economic expectations of the two nations.  But 
the political agendas were very divergent.  Germany sought to escape from the confines of 
Versailles, while the United States wished to minimize political issues and looked forward to 
an era of economic diplomacy that would foster American economic expansion and 
European stability.  The negotiations regarding the treaty would reflect the clash between 
these agendas.   It is in the broad context of these issues, implicitly revolving around the 
reparations problem, that the Treaty of Berlin can best be understood.   
 
The Harding Administration and the Problem of Peace with Germany 
 When President Warren G. Harding took office on 4 March 1921, more than two years 
after the Armistice of 1918, the United States was still technically at war with Germany.  In 
March 1920, the Republican controlled Senate had defeated Woodrow Wilson's final effort to 
obtain ratification of the Treaty.  Wilson, in turn, had vetoed a Republican effort in May 
1920 to end the state of war through a congressional resolution.3  In January 1921, Wilson 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Brooklyn College Press, 1980), pp. 41-53. 
 3 House Joint Resolution 327, Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 2nd sess., House 
Document 799. 
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also rejected German offers of a separate treaty following a declared peace.4  During the 
campaign President-Elect Warren Harding had been non-committal regarding peace plans.  
But having been strongly supported by the more internationalist wing of the Republican 
party in the fight for the nomination, Harding was not opposed to the ratification of the 
Versailles treaty with reservations and American entrance into the League of Nations, if such 
a solution were politically possible.    
 Harding's Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, a prominent member of the business 
oriented internationalist wing of the Republican Party, favored ratification of the Treaty of 
Versailles and an American entrance into the League of Nations.  Hughes, however, believed 
that the League should be separated from the treaty and transformed into an international 
forum for the promotion of peace and prosperity rather than an organization charged with the 
enforcement of the Versailles system.5  In February and March 1921, Hughes sounded out 
the French regarding these ideas but was firmly rebuffed.6  Hughes was left with the problem 
                                                          
 4 The Commissioner at Berlin (Dresel) to Secretary of State (Colby), 15 Jan 1921, and 
Colby to Dresel, Washington, 16 Feb 1921, Department of State: Political Relations between 
Germany and the United States, Record Group 59, #711.62199/-, National Archives, 
Microcopy #335 (hereafter cited as Dept. of State, RG 59), Roll 1. 
 5 Beerits Memorandum, "The Separate Peace with Germany, the League of Nations, and 
the Permanent Court of International Justice," in Charles Evans Hughes Papers, box 172, 
folder 25, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division (hereafter cited as Beerits 
Memorandum).  Henry Beerits was hired by Hughes in 1933 to arrange his papers and write 
a series of essays on his life and career; the Beerits memoranda were written between 1933 
and 1934. See Peter H. Buckingham, International Normalcy: The Open Door Peace with the 
Former Central Powers, 1921-29 (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1983), p. 13, n. 1. 
 6  Hughes met first with the French ambassador in February while still secretary-
designate.  In late March, French Premier Aristide Briand, concerned that the new 
administration would ignore French security and sign a separate peace treaty, dispatched 
René Viviani to urge the new Republican administration to seek ratification of the Versailles 
treaty.  Viviani told Hughes that France was "extremely apprehensive" about the possibility 
of a separate peace.  Such a peace would make it "extremely difficult" for the Allies to exact 
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of bridging the gap between the internationalist Republicans and the Irreconciables, those 
Republicans who were irreconcilably opposed to both the treaty and the League, as well as 
fending off partisan attacks from Democrats.  
  Following Harding's inauguration, the battle between Republican internationalists and 
Irreconcilables for Harding's support intensified.  On 2 April, Senator Philander Knox, who 
objected to Wilsonian idealism and favored traditional military alliances as the foundation of 
national security, informed Harding that he intended to renew the effort to make peace with 
the Central Powers through a resolution similar to the one that Wilson had vetoed in 1920.7  
A few days later a delegation of Irreconcilables who were concerned over Hughes's 
intentions bluntly informed Harding that if Hughes attempted to introduce ratification of the 
Treaty they would block Harding's legislative domestic program.  Harding, who did not have 
a strong commitment either to the Versailles treaty or the League, capitulated to the political 
realities.  Hughes wanted to salvage as much as possible of the Versailles Treaty but had 
little room to maneuver.  Both Harding and Hughes realized that it was imperative to avoid a 
replay of Wilson's disastrous battle with the Senate.8     
                                                                                                                                                                                    
German compliance with Versailles, and Viviani predicted "disastrous consequences."  
France, however, would have no problem if the United States sought an exemption from the 
general international peace guarantee responsibilities provided by Article X of the Covenant 
before joining the League. Hughes replied that the problem lay in “the difficulties which had 
been created as a consequence of making the League of Nations an instrument for the 
enforcement of the Treaty and of the difficulties which would confront the United States in 
entering it.” On that matter Viviani could not compromise.  Beerit's   emorandum, "The 
League of Nation and the World Court," box 172, folder 24, Hughes Papers; Department of 
State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1921, I (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1936), pp. 964-67 (hereafter cited as FRUS). 
 7 New York Times, 3 Apr 1921, p. 2. 
 8 Beerits Memorandum, "The Separate Peace with Germany," Hughes Papers, 16; Merlo 
J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1951), vol. 2, p. 432. 
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 On 12 April Harding informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he 
unequivocally opposed American participation in the League of Nations and that he 
supported Congressional passage of a declaratory resolution establishing a state of peace.  He 
also suggested that the United States should then safeguard its rights by accepting the 
existing Versailles Treaty with explicit reservations and modifications.9   The following day 
Knox introduced Senate Joint Resolution 16 repealing the declarations of war against the 
Central Powers and calling for the retention of all seized enemy alien properties until war 
claims against Germany by American nationals were settled.  The Knox resolution also 
provided that the United States, although it had not ratified the Treaty of Versailles, "reserves 
all the rights, powers, claims, privileges, indemnities, reparations, or advantages to which it 
and its nationals have become entitled . . . "both under the Armistice agreement and the 
Treaty.”1  0   The resolution thus claimed for the United States all of the advantages of victors 
while explicitly avoiding the associated responsibilities. Republicans, having rejected the 
Versailles treaty over strong Democratic protests, considered it a political necessity to claim 
for the United States every right that the Versailles treaty provided.  The Republican priority 
was to negotiate a treaty as quickly as possible and move on to the domestic political 
agenda.11     
                                                          
 9 New York Times, 13 Apr 1921, p. 1. 
 10 U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, Senate Joint Resolution 16, 67th Cong., 
1st sess., pp. 188-89. 
 11 Henry Cabot Lodge, the Republican Majority Leader in the Senate, wrote Ellis Dresel, 
the American Commissioner in Germany in reference to American claims under the 
Versailles treaty: " As a matter of fact, we have hardly an interest in the treaty of any kind 
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  The Senate passed Knox's resolution, and a similar resolution was introduced in the 
House by Stephen G. Porter, the Republican Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs.12   Wilsonian Democrats immediately served notice that any peace treaty would 
continue to be a matter of domestic partisan politics.  Charging that a repeal of the 
declaration of war could be interpreted as a disavowal of the war effort, Democrats forced 
Porter to change the language of the resolution to a simple declaration that war between the 
United States and both Germany and Austria-Hungary was over.13   But before this dispute 
over wording could be resolved, events in Europe intervened.  Following the March 1921 
London Conference on reparations which precipitated a European crisis, Germany had asked 
the United States to mediate a solution to the reparations problem.  Harding, at Hughes's 
request, asked Porter in early May to delay action on the resolution.14   Hughes wanted to 
send the message both to Germany and to the Allies that the separate peace proposal did not 
indicate that the United States was shifting away from Britain and France and towards 
Germany. 
 
German Expectations 
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 12 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Report 2, 67th Cong., 
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 13 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Report 2, 67th Cong., 
1st sess., pt. 2, pp.1-5; Congressional Record, 67th Congress., 1st sess., p. 865; 
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 To understand the context in which the Treaty of Berlin would be negotiated, it is 
necessary to review German reaction to the election of Harding and Germany's anticipation 
of normalized relations.  Germany had noted the election of Harding with keen interest and 
anticipation.  On November 6, American specialists in the German foreign ministry 
[Auswärtige Amt] immediately and correctly predicted that Harding would be caught 
between the Internationalists and Irreconcilables. The United States would then either accept 
a revised Versailles Treaty or negotiate a separate peace.  Germany hoped for, and somewhat 
expected, the latter.15  There was also a general expectation in both Germany and the United 
States that the pro-business Harding administration would pursue policies more favorable to 
Germany than had its predecessor.  Indeed, rumors that the United States might return 
German property that had been sequestered during the war drove the value of the mark on the 
New York exchange upward from eighty-eight to sixty-three marks to the dollar between 
November 12 and 18.16   
 By December 1920, Germany was already looking forward to the possibilities of a 
separate peace. The German Foreign Ministry believed that Germany's economic importance 
to the United States, then in a post-war depression, would provide Germany with negotiating 
strength. They expected that support from American business interests would allow Germany 
to negotiate on an equal basis a commercial treaty which would be free from the restrictions 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
83; Buckingham, International Normalcy, p. 19. 
 15 Aufzeichnung des Generalkonsuls Grunow, Berlin, 6 Nov 1920, Nr. 35, Akten zur 
deutschen auswärtigen Politik, 1918-1945, Serie A: 1918-1925 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1986), Band IV, pp. 64-67 (hereafter cited as ADAP). 
 16 Feldman, The Great Disorder: Politics, Economic, and Society in the German Inflation, 
1914-1924, p. 257. 
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of Versailles.  Beyond serving as a precedent for future negotiations, this would also provide 
Germany with access to American raw materials and investment funds, allowing Germany to 
achieve the economic growth that Germany believed the Versailles Treaty sought to 
restrict.17  
 Germany's primary goals for a treaty with the United States were defined as the 
establishment of full diplomatic relations, the return of German property seized during the 
war, and the renewal of commercial relations on a reciprocal basis.  Germany also hoped for 
American assistance in halting its inflation and expected the United States to make 
indemnification for claims arising out of the post war occupation.18   Germany's most 
immediate priority was the release of at least part of the German property that had been 
sequestered upon the United States entry into the war and held in the Alien Property Fund.  
Released assets could be used to obtain credits for the export of American foodstuffs to 
Germany, thus relieving pressure on the mark.19
                                                          
 17 Aufzeichnung des Wirklichen Legationsrat Bücher, Bemerkungen zur Frage eines 
amerikanischen Rohstoffkredits für Deutschland, 18 Dec 1920, Nr. 88, ADAP IV, pp. 167-
70.  German expectations were also buoyed the December visit to Berlin of Senator Joseph 
McCormick of Illinois. McCormick, owner of the Chicago Tribune, also had large financial 
interests in newspapers in Ohio, Harding's home state.  Max Warburg appears to have set up 
meetings between McCormick and leading Germans.  McCormick, who had two confidential 
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Castle, 29 Dec 1920, box 68, Dresel Papers).  For German Foreign Office interest in 
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Vereinigten Staaten, 24 Jan 1921, Nr. 143, ADAP IV, pp. 295-98. 
 19 A prominent German-Jewish banker, Paul v. Schwabach was sent to the United States 
with the hope of forming a corporation to take over part of the Alien Property Custodian for 
the purpose of furnishing credits.  Schwabach, a consultant to Germany's Foreign Exchange 
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 German Foreign Minister Walter Simons recommended that Germany wait for the new 
Harding administration to take the initiative, believing that Germany's bargaining position 
would be even better if the United States initiated the negotiations.20   Simons, however, saw 
no harm in informal lobbying.  In January 1921, he told the American Commissioner in 
Berlin, Ellis Loring Dresel, that a separate declaration of peace would be "greeted with joy 
by the German people," American efforts to ratify the Versailles Treaty with reservations, 
however, would be met by Germany with "endless discussion."  As an added incentive, 
Simons reminded Dresel that although the Versailles treaty gave reparations claims a first 
mortgage on all state property in Germany, because the United States had few reparation 
claims to make, ratification of Versailles would impede other claims the United States did 
have against Germany.  Finally, Simons's warned Dresel was that while the German people 
might forgive Wilson's abandonment of the Fourteen Points at Versailles, an American 
ratification of the Versailles Treaty after its devastating effects upon Germany had been 
evident for two years would be unforgivable by the German people.21   Dresel clearly 
recognized Germany's underlying agenda.  He wrote Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the 
Republican Senate Majority Leader, "The farther they can get away from the peace of 
Versailles in negotiating with us, the less difficulty they believe they will meet in eventually 
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 20 Aufzeichnung des Reichsminister des Auswärtigen Simons, Berlin, 20 Dec 1920, Nr. 
84, ADAP IV, p. 174. 
 21 The Commissioner at Berlin (Dresel) to the Acting Secretary of State (Colby), 15 Jan 
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obtaining a modifications of the peace."22
 Simons, misreading the political situation in the United States, was premature in his 
lobbying efforts. Harding would not take office until March 1921 and in the last months of 
Wilson's administration neither Wilson nor his Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby had any 
interest in furthering German efforts to make a separate peace with an incoming Republican 
administration.  When German officials leaked the conversations to the press, Secretary of 
State Bainbridge Colby, angrily ordered Dresel to halt any discussions on the matter.23   An 
embittered Wilson, over the objections of the State Department, also ordered the removal of 
the American representatives on the Council of Ambassadors and the Reparation 
Commission, in order, as William Castle, Chief of the West European Division in the State 
Department wrote Dresel "to make things for the Republicans just as difficult as he jolly well 
can."24  
 It was assumed in Germany that the in-coming Harding administration would move 
quickly to end the state of war and reestablish diplomatic relations on a basis other then 
Versailles.    Noting the importance of relations with the United States, Simons called for the 
immediate collection of material regarding Germany’s economic situation.  The material 
would form a guideline regarding future German economic and political policy toward the 
U.S. to be used by diplomats and consular official soon to be sent to the United States.  
                                                          
 22 Dresel to Lodge, 14 January 1921, box 263, Dresel Papers. 
 23 Colby chastised Dresel that he had no business discussing delicate matters that might 
be misconstrued by the Allies as "allowing ourselves to become an entering wedge between 
them and Germany."  Colby to Dresel, Washington, 16 Feb 1921; Dresel to Colby, 19 Feb 
1921, FRUS 1921 II, pp. 2-3. 
 24 The planned withdrawal from the Reparations Commission was still held secret in 
January 1921.  Castle to Dresel, 17 Jan 1921, box 68, Dresel Papers. 
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Expecting quick movement of the questions of peace negotiations, the release of German 
property, and a new commercial treaty, Simons wanted the material ready before Harding 
took office.25
 
The London Ultimatum and German Hopes for U.S. Intervention 
 Germany's misguided hopes for a rapid American involvement significantly influenced 
its strategy regarding reparations. Confronted with French proposals for a provisional 
solution under which Germany would accept five years of substantial annuities that would be 
satisfied in part through payments in kind, Germany, unaware of Wilson's plans, adopted a 
policy of stalling until, as Foreign Minister Walter Simons informed the cabinet, "its 
impossibility could become obvious during the negotiations and the Americans can come to 
help us in the meantime."26
 Germany was not alone in hoping for greater American involvement in the economic 
reconstruction of Europe.  The United States had emerged from the war as the primary 
creditor nation, and both Britain and France believed that any long term solution inevitably 
must involve the United States.  Both nations were under pressure from the United States to 
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which had the support of the British Ambassador, Lord D'Abernon.  Simons also argued that 
by appearing to engage in negotiations Germany could prevent a Poincaré government from 
coming into power in France.  Kabinettssitzung, 15 Jan 1921, Nr. 156, Das Kabinett 
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establish debt refunding schedules before the moratorium on Allied war debt interest 
payments ended in October 1922. Both nations hoped that the new administration might 
inaugurate a reconstruction program that would alleviate the problem of reparations and war-
debts.27   In Germany, Walter Rathenau, at that time an advisor to the government on 
reparations matters, flatly stated that "the task of reparations cannot be discharged without 
American involvement."28   Rathenau insisted that Germany required American loans or, 
even more preferable, a solution involving German assumption of Allied war debts since 
they carried lower interest rates. 29  
 Confident that Germany could bring the new Harding administration into reparation 
negotiations, Simons confidentially told Dresel just prior to the London Conference of March 
1921 that he intended to submit an unacceptable proposal for reparations in the hope that 
after its rejection Lloyd George would support the German recommendation that the question 
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Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 251. 
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of reparations be referred to a committee of experts.30  Simons's gamble failed when Lloyd 
George joined France and Belgium in rejecting the German offer and presenting Germany 
with an ultimatum demanding some immediate payments and German acceptance of the total 
indemnity that would be set by the Reparations Commission.  To insure the immediate 
payments, the towns of Düsseldorf, Duisburg, and Ruhrort, the principal ports of the Rhine, 
were occupied on 8 March and plans were made for the establishment of a custom frontier 
along the Rhine.31    
 These actions immediately involved the United States.  The success of a customs regime 
in the Rhineland depended upon American consent since American occupation troops 
controlled the important bridgehead across the Rhine from Coblenz.  Hughes, who believed 
that Germany had both a moral and legal obligation to pay reparations, readily approved the 
application of sanctions but insisted that the Allies bear the total responsibility for enforcing 
them.  This passive stance lowered the likelihood of any incident that might provoke 
Congress into the total withdrawal of American forces.  It also allowed the Allies to 
accomplish their aims without the United States appearing to side with the Allies against 
Germany.32  
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 The reparations crisis forced Germany to turn to the United States for help despite its 
intentions to let the United States make the first major diplomatic move in German-American 
relations.  On 21 March 1921, Simons, in the hope that the United States might be persuaded 
to mediate the conflict, gave Dresel a carefully worded note stating that Germany intended to 
pay reparations to the best of its ability.  Although urged by Castle and other advisors to 
reject the implied request for mediation immediately, Hughes reserved judgment and simply 
sent a reply making it clear that the United States, like the Allies, held Germany morally 
responsible for reparations.33   Castle whose advice reflected the growing irritation at 
Germany within the State Department, privately wrote Dresel that Germany had to be 
disabused of its belief "that this country would in the end, for trade reasons take its side on 
reparations as against England and France."  Castle also informed Dresel that sympathy for 
Germany had evaporated over the previous year partly through "the shameless propaganda 
campaigns" of German-American activists, partly through Simons's "thoroughly stupid 
proposal" at the March London Conference, and partly through reports of American 
businessmen of a "tremendous economic revival" in Germany.  Castle's exasperated 
conclusion was that "the Germans are more expert in misunderstanding the psychology of 
other people than anybody in the world."34
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 The April Initiative 
 Simons, now depressed and desperate, insisted on making a confidential but formal 
request for America to serve as an umpire and to fix the sum for German reparations, despite 
Dresel's strong discouragement of such a request.35  This initiative had been prompted by the 
advice of a small group of German-American businessmen.36  It was a naive and 
misconceived plea for America intervention that reflected not only desperation but also a 
deeply held German conviction that trade with Germany was essential to the United States, a 
belief that was reinforced by a continuous parade through Germany of American 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
was convinced that the proposed sums were well beyond Germany's ability to pay and that 
France was exaggerating the German economic recovery.  Dresel saw Germany's first 
proposals at London as an "amazing blunder" and another example of Germany making 
things worse for itself.  His greatest fear was a French military occupation of the Ruhr, which 
he felt might collapse Germany into anarchy. Dresel's sympathies lay with the left-center in 
German politics; he feared that the burden of reparations would ultimately fall not on the 
wealthy but rather on the ordinary German worker and bourgeoisie, whom he considered the 
ultimate support for German democracy.  Castle, although worried about French designs on 
the Ruhr and Communist activity in Germany, considered Dresel's views so out of touch with 
opinion in Washington, which was less certain about Germany's inability to pay, that he 
suggested that should Dresel ever be appointed ambassador he should spend a few months in 
the United States to get a better sense of American opinion.  Dresel to Castle 
correspondence, November 1920 - May 1921, see especially Castle to Dresel, 9 May 1921, 
box 68, Dresel Papers. 
 
 35 Dresel to Hughes, 20 Apr 1921, FRUS 1921 II, pp. 41-42; Aufzeichnung des 
Reichminister des Auswärtigen Simons, Berlin, 20 Apr 1921, Nr. 250, ADAP IV, p. 512; 
Draft of Appeal, Apr 1921, R28189k, Büro Reichminister (hereafter Büro RM) Reparation, 
Bd. 1, D736085, Politisches Archiv Auswärtiges Amt (hereafter PA-AA). 
 36 The initiative stemmed from German-American businessmen hoping to obtain 
American credits for Germany that could support large cotton orders. They were informed by 
Hugo Stinnes and other major industrialists that reparations would preclude such credits.  In 
an effort to remove the impediment of the reparations issue from their commercial schemes, 
they convinced Simons to attempt his initiative.  The source of the initiative was known to 
Allied diplomats and served further to discredit German diplomacy. Dresel to Lodge, 7 May 
1921, box 263, Dresel Papers. 
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businessmen and speculators looking for opportunities in Germany's inflationary economy 
and by German confidence that German-American propagandists in the United States were 
swaying American opinion in Germany's favor.  It also was a reflection of the inadequate 
expertise that existed at the German Foreign Ministry which had been undergoing major 
reorganization since 1919 and did not have strong leadership.  Germany mistakenly believed 
that the United States followed the German pattern of close consultation between 
government and business. The Foreign Office also had little familiarity with who the 
influential voices in American business and politics actually were.37   
 Hughes believed that the United States had a vital interest in a reparation settlement and 
wanted the crisis resolved.  It significantly complicated his immediate problem of obtaining a 
peace treaty from the Senate.  It also hampered European recovery and his plans to foster free 
trade by extending the “open door” in to Europe.  Castle and other State Department advisors 
counseled Hughes to refuse the German request for mediation and argued that the best 
vehicle for American participation would be resumption of involvement in the Reparation 
Commission which had been ended by Wilson.38  Harding had given Hughes wide latitude 
within the administration to develop foreign policy, but Hughes's freedom of action was 
limited by the Senate.39  The role of umpire would have been unacceptable to both the Allies 
                                                          
 37 For a discussion of the German Foreign Service see Peter Krüger, "Struktur, 
Organisation und Wirkungsmöglickkeiten der leitenden Beamten des auswärtigen Dienstes, 
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 38 Memorandum, Castle to Hughes, Washington, 25 March 1921, Dept. of State, RG 59, 
462.00 R29/565, cited in Buckingham, International Normalcy, p. 109. 
 39 Beerits Memorandum, "The Separate Peace with Germany," Charles Evans Hughes 
Papers, p. 14. 
 47 
and the United States Senate, and Hughes could not resume formal American participation in 
the Reparations Commission since American involvement was anathema to the 
Irreconcilables in the Senate.40  His immediate situation was further complicated when 
Germany published its reparation proposals.41  Hughes could, however, engage in 
confidential informal mediation, and he was willing to explore that option. 
 Hughes informed Simons confidentially that the administration "would be willing with 
the concurrence of the Allies to participate in the negotiations if Germany seeks to resume 
them on a sound basis."42   Wary of being maneuvered into appearing to favor one side or the 
other in the reparations dispute, Hughes cautiously attempted to see if such informal 
mediation was possible.  On 25 April Hughes informally presented new German proposals to 
the British and French Ambassadors, reiterating American support for the principle that 
Germany should be made to pay for its aggression.  At the same time Hughes pointed out 
that the world economy needed German productive power and that what Germany could pay 
was a matter for experts to decide.43   The Allies informed Hughes that the German proposals 
were entirely unsatisfactory and could not be accepted as a basis for further negotiation.44   
                                                          
 40 Senators William Borah and Hiram Johnson were obsessed with avoiding American 
involvement with the Reparation Commission. They were convinced that participation would 
lead to political entanglement with Europe and serve as a "backdoor" entry into the League 
of Nations. Robert J. Maddox, William Borah and American Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1969), p. 121. 
 41 Castle to Dresel, 9 May 1921, box 68, Dresel Papers. 
 42 Hughes to Dresel, Washington, 21 Apr 1921 - 6 p.m., FRUS 1921 II, p. 45.    
 43 Memorandum by the Undersecretary of State (Fletcher) of a Conversation between the 
Secretary of State and the British and French Ambassadors (Geddes, Jusserand), 25 Apr 
1921, FRUS 1921 II, pp. 48-50. 
 44 Memorandum by the Secretary of State of Conversations with the British and Belgian 
Ambassadors and the Counselor of the French Embassy, 28 Apr 1921, FRUS 1921 II, p. 52-
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Unwilling to exert pressure on the Allies, Hughes notified Simons of the bad news and 
suggested that the German government should make a better offer directly to the Allies.45
 A perturbed Simons replied that this appeared to make an end of all intervention by the 
United States and indicated that America had placed itself "definitely on the Allies' side."  
The German initiative had ended in failure.46  Simons's idea of placing the fate of Germany 
in the hands of an American President only a relatively short time after what Germany 
considered a betrayal by Wilson reflected Germany's conviction that German and American 
interests were inevitably linked.  It was an especially risky political gamble since Simons had 
consulted neither the parties nor the Reichstag.  Given the political realities that existed in 
Britain, France and the United States, Simons’s move was well characterized by Dresel as 
"ludicrous in the extreme if the seriousness of the situation had not also made it pathetic."47   
A few days later the Reparation Commission fixed the German indemnity at 132 billion gold 
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 45 Hughes's timing of the response to Germany is illustrative of the caution he took to 
maintain a stance of American impartiality in the reparations dispute. The British 
Ambassador requested that Hughes delay informing Germany that mediation would not be 
possible until the ambassador received further instruction from the Supreme Council, then 
meeting in London.  Knowing that an ultimatum would be sent to Germany and concerned 
that it might be "fantastic" in its terms, Hughes feared that if the American response to 
Germany took place after the ultimatum, the United States might be forced to take a position 
that could appear as approval or disapproval of the ultimatum's terms.  When no response 
from London arrived by the evening of 2 May, Hughes suspected that the Allies as well as 
Germany were attempting to maneuver the United States into supporting their position.  
Hughes immediately cabled the American response to Germany just ahead of the 
announcement of the ultimatum. Castle to Dresel, 9 May 1921, box 68, Dresel Papers. 
 46 Hughes to Dresel, Washington, 2 May 1921; Dresel to Hughes, Berlin, 3 May 1921, 
FRUS 1921 II, pp. 54-55. 
 47 Dresel to Lodge, 7 May 1921, box 263, Dresel Papers. Simon saw U.S. intervention as 
Germany’s last hope.  With the failure of the April initiative, Simon thought that his 
effectiveness as foreign minister was at an end and wished to resign. Simon to Bergmann, 27 
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marks, and on 5 May the Allies declared Germany in default and threatened occupation of 
the Ruhr in one week.  The Fehrenbach government capitulated to the Allies' demands and 
resigned.48      
 Germany's April initiative revealed many of the basic parameters of the German-
American relationship that would structure the peace treaty negotiations and later relations.  
Hughes believed that as the world's largest economic power, the United States had a vital 
interest in a general European recovery; that the reconstruction of Germany, while an 
important element in that recovery, was only one element; and that Germany, because of its 
overarching problem of reparations, needed the United States more than the United States 
needed Germany.  While Hughes personally believed that the Allies' reparation demands 
were excessive, he was unwilling to pressure the Allies to reduce them because doing so 
would risk raising the question of reducing Allied war debts as well.   The German 
misreading of American political realities resulted in bringing America closer to the Allies 
and increasing Hughes’s sensitivity to Allied concerns regarding a separate peace.  The best 
Hughes could do was obtain Harding's permission to resume formal American participation 
on the Supreme Council and send unofficial observers to the politically sensitive Reparations 
Commission.49  
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 48 Resolution of the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers, 5 May 1921, FRUS 1921 II, 
pp. 56-57.  The failure of the April initiative ended all chances for the survival of the 
Fehrenbach government, which had already been abandoned by the German People Party 
even prior to the London ultimatum.  Trachtenberg, Reparations in World Politics, p. 213. 
 49 Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence: A Study in 
American Diplomacy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966), pp. 144-45; Buckingham, 
International Normalcy, p. 111. 
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Domestic Developments in the U.S. and Germany 
 The reparations crisis of March and Germany’s April initiative, in which it had attempted 
to draw in the United States, had immediate and dramatic effects on the politics of the Knox-
Porter peace resolution.  To the Republican Irreconcilables, Harding's approval of Hughes's 
actions during the crisis indicated that the President was deserting his former Senate 
colleagues. Lodge had to forestall open rebellion among Senate Republicans.5  0   After 
Germany's acceptance of the London ultimatum, Porter quickly pushed his resolution 
through the House.  Lodge was then able to force acceptance of the House version in the 
Senate, and on 2 July 1921, President Harding, pausing between two rounds of golf in 
Raritan, New Jersey, signed the resolution ending the state of war with Germany.5   1  Senators 
Borah and Johnson, however, remained determined to block any treaty with Germany that 
involved the United States in Europe.  The German April initiative thus served to limit 
Hughes's flexibility in negotiating a treaty with Germany even further. 
  Congress' unilateral declaration of peace presented Hughes with an acute dilemma.  The 
Congressional declaration alone did not guarantee American rights. Such rights had to be 
confirmed by a formal German acceptance in a treaty.  Hughes, therefore, had to negotiate a 
treaty acceptable to Germany, the administration, and the Senate. At the same time any 
                                                          
 50 The Irreconcilables' anger intensified when Harding indicated a preference for Porter's 
resolution declaring an end to the state of war.  Harding's decision was seen in political terms 
as a further movement away from the isolationist conception of the Senate Irreconcilables 
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complications with the Allies had to be avoided, since the postwar European system was 
based on the Versailles treaty.  Hughes tried to use the complexity of the task as justification 
to resubmit the Treaty of Versailles, with reservations and without the League.  His plan was 
blocked by the Irreconcilables, who had long suspected such intentions, and regular 
Republicans who saw little political gain in passing Wilson's treaty.  Hughes' solution was to 
create a new treaty by grafting the parts of the Versailles treaty which specified American 
rights and privileges onto the Knox-Porter Resolution. It was as much of the Versailles treaty 
as Hughes believed he could get through the Senate.52
 The American domestic political situation demanded a rapid conclusion of negotiations 
with Germany and the signing of a treaty.  The first step was to inquire informally whether 
Germany intended to raise questions regarding the Knox-Porter Resolution's claim to all the 
rights and privileges accorded the United States under the Armistice and Versailles treaty.  
Hughes was especially concerned with three specific rights: He wanted an American voice in 
the disposition of German colonies; he wanted to make certain that reimbursement for costs 
of the American Army of Occupation would be a first lien on German property; and he 
wanted the opportunity to utilize the Versailles system of tribunals for the settlement of 
American war claims against Germany. Hughes made it clear that the American government 
would not agree to any treaty that did not retain those rights. "Have it clearly understood," he 
instructed, "that resumption of diplomatic relations which is in the discretion of President 
and further steps with regard to relations between the United States and Germany, will 
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largely depend on the attitude of German government in this matter."53  
  In Germany, a new minority Weimar Coalition cabinet led by Dr. Josef Wirth, which had 
taken office on 10 May 1921, accepted responsibility for fulfilling the conditions of the 
London Ultimatum.  The new government's publicly avowed policy was one of fostering 
economic recovery through cooperation with the Allies.  Its "fulfillment" reparation policy 
was based on appearing to cooperate while demonstrating that economic conditions 
demanded that reparations be reduced.   Dresel expected that the United States would hold a 
strong hand in negotiations with Germany.  Germany wanted a separate peace “as part of its 
constant policy to get herself loose from all Versailles obligations without absolutely 
repudiating the Treaty,” and Dresel believed that the German policy would collapse if the 
United States withheld a separate peace.54  Hughes's proposal offered Germany its separate 
peace, including the tantalizing possibility that "further steps" might also include American 
involvement in the reparation question, but the price was that American terms had to be 
quickly accepted.  
 Germany wanted the rapid reestablishment of commercial relations with the United 
States.55   It was believed that once American and business interests were involved with 
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Washington, 5 July1921, Dept. of State, RG 59, 711.62119/9a, Microcopy #355, Roll 1. 
 54 Dresel to John Foster Dulles, 30 Apr 1921, Dresel Papers. Dresel expected that 
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 55 In anticipation of a treaty, the new German Foreign Minister, Friedrich Rosen, 
informed Dresel on 6 July that Germany intended to send a commission to America as soon 
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relations between the two countries. Recognizing the Allies' sensitivity to German-American 
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Germany, they would serve as an invaluable lobby for American intervention in the 
reparation question on Germany's behalf. Germany also looked to the United States as the 
primary source of investments, loans, and foreign exchange both for reparation payments and 
for stabilization of the German economy.56  
The Negotiations 
 Negotiations for a separate treaty between the United States and Germany began on 7 
July 1921.  Dresel presented Hughes's proposal to the German Foreign Minister Friedrich 
Rosen, whose only initial responses were to inquire whether commercial matters would be 
taken up in the proposed protocol and to promise Dresel an early response to the "rights and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Hughes, Berlin, 6 Jul 1921, Dept. of State, RG 59, #711.62119/9, Microcopy #355, Roll 1).  
The State Department brief on Rosen noted that he was objectionable to France because of 
his involvement in the Morocco crisis of 1905, but that he offered the advantage of being a 
professional diplomat in contrast to the political background of the two prior foreign 
ministers. See "Who's Who - Dr. Friedrich Rosen- Service Report," Dept. of State, RG 59, 
#711.62119/-, Microcopy #355, Roll 1. 
 
 56 Germany's need for American dollars was especially pressing since the London 
ultimatum's requirement that the first billion gold-mark payment be made by 31 August 1921 
had ended almost a year of relative stabilization of the mark and had driven the value of the 
German mark down from 62.30 to the dollar at the end of May 1921 to 76.76 in July. The 
relative stabilization of the German economy that Germany enjoyed during 1920 and the first 
half of 1921 was based on large flows of foreign speculative capital, much of it American.  It 
was estimated that in October 1920 as much as $130 million in German industrial securities 
and municipal loans had been sold on the American market.  In addition the holding of 
millions of marks by American exporters who hoped for appreciation had the effect of 
providing Germany with a massive interest-free loan.  Germany's great fear was that 
speculation in favor of the mark would stop, with a resulting monetary and economic 
collapse.  A closer relationship with the United States offered the possibility of averting this 
danger by converting short-term speculations into long-term American investments and 
loans.   During the early summer of 1921 Germany also had the immediate concern of 
obtaining foreign exchange following the commencement of reparation payments.  These 
payments had diminished the Reichsbank's foreign exchange, leaving it in no position to 
intervene on behalf of the mark. Feldman, The Great Disorder, pp. 256, 346. 
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privileges question."57   From the American perspective, Hughes's proposal was straight-
forward and in Germany's own interest. When Rosen kept Dresel waiting until 13 July for an 
answer, Dresel, irritated by the delay and suspecting that Germany would ask for 
concessions,  complained that German mentality did not have the sense "to meet us more 
than half way. . . it is no time for quibbling."58  
 Rosen, who had to defend German acceptance before the cabinet, had specific concerns 
that from the German perspective were far from quibbles. In regard to the issue of 
sequestered German property, Germany wanted the language of the Knox-Porter Resolution 
to take precedence over the Versailles treaty provisions regarding seized German property.  
The Knox-Porter resolution implied the return of this property after Germany satisfied 
American claims and granted most-favored-nation privileges to the United States, whereas 
the Versailles treaty provision would only return property after Germany fulfilled all 
reparations requirements.  Second, Germany wanted reciprocity in regard to rights and 
privileges so that it might reserve any rights and privileges provided by the Versailles treaty 
that were of benefit to Germany.59   
 While the proposed protocol fell far short of fulfilling Germany's expectations and hopes, 
Wirth and Rosen strongly advocated its acceptance. Rosen, looking forward to diplomatic 
relations as well as a commercial and friendship treaty, argued to the German cabinet that the 
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treaty offered tangible benefits despite its limitations. Additionally, if acceptable to the other 
Great Powers, he hoped for a possible American entry into the commissions established by 
Versailles, including the all-important Reparations Commission.  Last, Rosen told the cabinet 
that he viewed the American proposal as only a preliminary protocol that would serve as the 
basis for further negotiation. The Auswärtige Amt hoped to talk the United States into a 
reduction of its claims against the German government by asking it to limit the rights 
assigned to the United States by virtue of the Versailles treaty.60   
 Hughes's proposed protocol did, however, pose some political risks for the Wirth 
government, a minority government under heavy criticism both for its program of raising 
taxes and for the situation in Upper Silesia.61  Opponents of the government's policy of 
fulfillment complained that concessions to France were only resulting in renewed demands. 
The London Ultimatum had been perceived in Germany as another Diktat and had rekindled 
German anger over the Versailles treaty.  The Wirth government desperately wanted to avoid 
any appearance that a treaty with the United States would be yet another Diktat and not a 
bilaterally negotiated agreement. 
 By 22 July the Wirth government was ready to declare that it did not have the intention 
"to bring into question the rights, interests, and advantages which the American government 
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wishes to claim by the treaty of Versailles in connection with the Congressional 
resolution."6  2   Germany, however, had no clear understanding of American intentions in 
regard to the rights claimed, and wanted assurances that German rights under the Versailles 
treaty would be respected by the United States.63   Rosen also wanted some concessions that 
could help shore up the Wirth government politically before Germany gave its final 
acceptance.  He noted the Harding administration had an interest in the continued existence 
of the Wirth government, but that it could fall without some success to show for his policies, 
at least in the matter of the “American question.”   Germany wanted a declaration from the 
Harding administration of its intention to release German property held by the Alien Property 
Custodian.  In addition Rosen wanted some movement on the question of a commercial 
treaty and some assurance that the German government would not be confronted with an 
unalterable document.64    
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 The question of how to deal with German property seized in the United States under the 
requirements of both the Versailles treaty and the Knox-Porter Resolution raised complex 
policy and legal issues.  The Treaty of Versailles deprived Germany of the right to reimburse 
German nationals for property claimed by the Allies without specific approval by the Allies, 
since such compensation would reduce German ability to pay reparations. While the Knox-
Porter Resolution provided for the release of property after war claims had been paid, it was 
in one respect more restrictive than the Versailles treaty as it also required Germany to 
provide the United States certain commercial rights before the property could be released. (In 
addition, the Wilson administration had sold off some of the sequestered property for 
artificially low prices, an abuse halted by Hughes.) If the United States released the German 
assets, these problems would be solved for Germany:  German nationals would regain their 
property, any United States war claims against Germany government would be in 
competition with reparations demands, and German property would no longer be held 
hostage in any commercial-relations negotiations.  Furthermore, after seized German 
companies in the United States were returned to German ownership, they could serve as a 
source of foreign exchange and provide a base for the expansion of German-American 
commercial relations, an important element in Wirth's "fulfillment" policy.  The release of 
German property in the United States would also serve as a counterexample to Versailles and 
represent a political victory for the Wirth government.65   But Hughes, facing his own 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
pp. 182-83. 
 65 St. John Serret, Unofficial American Delegation - Reparation Commission, Paris to 
Van Merle-Smith, Assistant Secretary of State, Paris, 7 Jan 1921, Dept. of State, RG 59, 
711.62119/1, Microcopy #355, Roll 1; Solicitor's Memorandum, Section V of the Peace 
Resolution, Washington, 15 Jul 1921, Dept. of State, RG 59, 711.62119/-, Microcopy #355, 
Roll 1. 
 58 
domestic problems, was in no position to provide Germany with a reward for its acceptance 
of his terms.  Germany was told on 25 July that "Congress alone has the power to deal with 
that matter."66
 Rosen temporarily dropped the question of sequestered German property and turned his 
attention to opening up any formal treaty for negotiation.  Rosen noted that the proposed 
protocol included some provisions of the Versailles treaty while excluding others, but that 
the Versailles treaty contained a series of important provisions that were intimately and 
inseparably connected with other provisions.  He was particularly concerned about the 
linkage between the reparations clauses and the evacuation of the Rhineland. This point went 
to the question as to whether the United States would later be able to resist German or 
domestic pressure for an early evacuation of American forces from the Rhineland on the 
grounds that Germany had not fulfilled the reparation requirements.  Rosen's proposed 
solution was to include in the treaty protocol "specific enumeration of the rights, privileges, 
and advantages claimed by the United States together with their conditions or limitations 
claimed by Germany."67   The broader significance of this issue was that restrictive language 
could serve as a counter-example to French claims that the Versailles treaty gave the Allies 
the right to remain in the Rhineland until each and every provision had been satisfied.  
  Dresel was willing to provide only a memorandum of understanding stating that if the 
United States claimed a right under the Versailles treaty that also provided Germany a right, 
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the United States would recognize "such condition or limitation."68   Hughes had no intention 
of allowing any protocol specifically spelling out American rights and limitations. Correctly 
viewing the German effort as an attempt "to insert a commentary upon the Treaty of 
Versailles into the proposed treaty,"  he was determined to minimize the extent to which a 
separate peace could be seen as a criticism of the Versailles treaty or as creating a gap 
between the United States and its Allies.69  Washington had an additional reason to avoid the 
issue of German rights: Hughes's proposed treaty was an imperfect solution and the State 
Department did not want Germany raising awkward and potentially politically embarrassing 
questions regarding conflicts between the proposed treaty and the Treaty of Versailles.70  
 The State Department took the position that the question of German rights was simply a 
"sentimental demand" and that Germany should simply sign the short treaty and trust that the 
United States "is going to treat them perfectly fairly."  From Hughes's perspective, all that 
was needed was an agreement granting the rights specified in the Congressional peace 
resolution and a series of cross references to the treaty clauses that contained American 
privileges.  The problem of linked provisions could be solved by adopting the German 
suggestion that each provision be construed in light of its context, an idea to which Hughes 
had no objection. In order to maintain the pressure on Germany for rapid agreement, Hughes 
instructed Dresel that Germany be told that discussions related to the resumption of 
diplomatic and commercial relations could proceed only after the new treaty came into 
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force.71  Hughes quickly forwarded the draft to Dresel along with authorization to negotiate 
on behalf of the United States.72  The designation of Dresel as the negotiator, rather than 
sending a high-level delegation, reflected Washington's decision to keep any negotiation 
regarding the new treaty to a minimum. Dresel's task was to get the Germans to sign it 
quickly. 
 The draft treaty appended three articles to the Knox-Porter Resolution. Article I provided 
for German acceptance of the rights specified by that resolution.  Article II stated "That the 
rights and advantages stipulated in that [Versailles] treaty for the benefit of the United States, 
which is intended that the United States shall have and enjoy embrace those defined in 
Section I, of Part IV, and Parts V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIV, and XV."  These rights 
included special trade and transportation rights, reparations, and army occupation-cost 
reimbursements, as well as the right to take part in the disposition of German colonies.   
 Article II of the draft treaty also specifically excluded the United States from any 
responsibilities arising from those parts of the Versailles treaty relating to the League of 
Nations (Part 1), the boundaries of Germany (Part II), the political clauses for Europe (Part 
III), all provisions relating to German rights and interests outside Germany with the 
exception of those sections relating to German colonies (Part IV) and Labor provisions (Part 
XIII). The United States reserved the right to participate in the Reparation Commission and 
any other commissions established by the treaty, but only by its own discretion.  Finally, 
Article II also stipulated that all time limits specified by the Versailles treaty would begin, by 
                                                          
 71 Castle to Dresel, 2 Aug  1921, box 68, Dresel Papers; Hughes to Dresel, Washington, 
28 Jul 1921,  FRUS 1921 II, pp. 10-11. 
 72 "Draft of Treaty with Germany," Dept. of State, RG 59, 711.62199/22A, Microcopy 
#355, Roll 1. 
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decision of the United States, from the date of the German-American treaty. Article III 
provided that the exchanges of ratification would take place in Berlin.73  
 When the draft treaty was presented on 1 August 1921, Rosen immediately complained 
that its omission of provisions securing German rights and "peremptory language" would 
anger the public and endanger the government.  Rosen's fears had little credibility with 
Dresel, who recognized that the "burning questions" in German politics were the issues of 
Upper Silesia and tax reform. American politics defined the framework for negotiations, and 
Dresel was being prodded by Washington to move negotiations as rapidly as possible since 
the State Department was being criticized for inaction and the Senate was getting restless.  
Germany would have to be satisfied with Hughes's assurances that German rights would be 
respected and that any problems could be worked out after the treaty was signed.74  
 Both the draft treaty and Dresel's insistence on rapid German acceptance raised serious 
concerns in the German foreign ministry, which had no reliable information regarding 
American intentions.  German consent to the treaty could be seen as a renewed sanctioning 
of the demands of Versailles and making a later revision of those demands impossible.  It 
also opened the possibility of an expansion of demands to include payment for American 
military pensions.  This viewpoint was challenged by Friedrich Gaus, the legal advisor to the 
                                                          
 73  Ibid.
 74 Dresel believed that the Wirth government would survive any crisis regarding Upper 
Silesia since it had the support of the “inarticulate masses.”  He was less sure that it would 
survive the scheduled Reichstag debate over tax reform in the autumn.  Dresel to Lodge, 26 
Jul 1921 and Dresel to Castle, 26 Jul 1921, box 63; Castle to Dresel, 2 Aug 1921, box 68, 
Dresel Papers; Dresel to Hughes, Berlin, 6 Aug 1921, Continuation of Memorandum  of 
Interviews with Chancellor Wirth and Dr. Rosen on Subject of Peace Negotiations, Notes of 
1 August, Dept. of State, RG 59, 71162119/60, Microcopy #355, Roll 1 (hereafter cited as 
Dresel Memorandum Notes, Part 2); Dresel to Hughes, Berlin, 1 Aug 1921, FRUS 1921 II, p. 
12.  
 62 
German foreign ministry, who argued against the idea that this treaty was worse than 
Versailles.  He cogently noted that the Armistice agreement alone committed Germany to 
far-reaching compensation to America.  Accepting Gaus's argument, the ministry assumed 
that the negotiations were not about American interest in the general Versailles settlement; 
they were about the United States' particular claims against Germany.  The German 
negotiating strategy would be aimed at limiting those claims.75   When Rosen presented the 
draft treaty to the cabinet on 5 August, other concerns were raised to be addressed with 
Dresel.  Wirth asked only if the treaty would indeed lead to diplomatic relations with 
America, as that was of an “importance not to be underestimated,” Rosen replied that it 
would.76
 On 6 August, Rosen presented five specific points of concern.  First, he wanted language 
in the treaty recognizing German rights. Second, at the request of the German Social 
Democrats, he asked that the United States' accept Part XIII of the Versailles treaty, which 
related to the International Labour Organization.  Third, with respect to German property, 
Rosen wanted the Knox-Porter Resolution to take precedence over the Versailles treaty.  His 
fourth request was for the inclusion of a statement that negotiations would later be initiated 
on points not covered and that diplomatic and consular relations would be resumed as soon 
                                                          
 75  Elisabeth Glaser-Schmidt, "Von Versailles nach Berlin," p. 328. 
 76  Ministerratssitzung vom 5 Aug 1921, Nr. 64, Die Kabinette Wirth I, pp. 190-93; 
Undatierte Aufzeichnung des Geheimen Legationstrats von Schubert, Kabinettssitzung vom 
5 Aug 1921, Nr. 98, ADAP V, pp. 201-3.  Frustration with the unclarity and tone of the draft 
treaty can be seen in this meeting by Rathenau’s comments regarding Dresel.  Rathenau 
confesses a great mistrust of Dresel, whom Rathenau described as simply “a postbox” in 
negotiations with the U.S.  He wished that German diplomats could be sent directly to 
Hughes in Washington to conclude the treaty and perhaps find the opportunity to open 
discussion on the whole Treaty of Versailles.  
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as the treaty was ratified.  The fifth point related to the possible delay by two additional years 
of those parts of the treaty that had fixed time periods. Germany was specifically concerned 
that the United States might be able to claim a longer occupation of the Rhineland than the 
other Allies. Dresel strongly discouraged any negotiation on points two, three and four, but 
agreed to raise the first and fifth points.77   
 Hughes was willing to make symbolic concessions to satisfy German amour propre, but 
refusing any substantive concessions.  Hughes was willing to add to Article I the provision 
that the United States, in exercising its rights under the Versailles treaty, "will do so in a 
manner consistent with the rights accorded to Germany under such provisions."  Hughes was 
also willing to provide a collateral formal declaration that the United States would not claim 
the right to occupy the Rhineland for two extra years.  Since Hughes was struggling to 
maintain some American presence in the Rhineland against a Congressional push for the total 
and immediate withdrawal of American troops, a concession not to maintain American 
troops in the Rhineland two years after the theoretical withdrawal of British and French 
troops was easily made.  Hughes, however, would neither reconsider the substantive question 
of German property nor give up the leverage of withholding negotiations regarding 
diplomatic and consular relations until after the treaty was ratified.78
 
                                                          
 77 Dresel Memorandum Notes, Part 2, Dept. of State, RG 59, 711/62119/60, Microcopy 
#355, Roll 1; Dresel to Hughes, Berlin, 6 Aug 1921, 6 p.m. and 7 p.m., FRUS 1921 II, pp. 
12-14. For a German view of the negotiations and Rosen’s 5 points, see Amerikanisches 
Angebot eines Friedensvertrag, Undatierte Aufzeichung ohne Unterschrift (11 Aug 1921), 
Nr. 104, ADAP V, pp. 210-24. 
 78 Hughes to Dresel, Washington, 8 Aug 1921, FRUS 1921 II, pp. 14-15. 
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Acceptance of the Treaty  
 The Wirth cabinet was reluctant to make any decision regarding the proposed treaty until 
the imminent determination by the Allied Supreme Council on the fate of Upper Silesia was 
announced.  An adverse decision was likely to precipitate a political crisis and the Wirth 
cabinet would have to weigh the domestic political advantages and disadvantages of signing 
the treaty.79   Rosen used the delay to press for a concession on Germany's primary concern, 
the issue of the German property held in the United States.  Accepting the reality that the 
State Department could not override Congress, Rosen now asked that President Harding 
make an explicit recommendation for the return of the sequestered property, a concession 
which would assure acceptance of the treaty.80  Dresel, while warning Rosen that he had no 
direct knowledge, indicated his belief that the Alien Property Fund question would be taken 
up by Congress after peace was made but that the President was unlikely to provide any 
assurances in advance.81    
                                                          
 79 Dresel to Castle, 8 Aug 1921, box 68, Dresel Papers. 
 80 Rosen maintained that such an announcement would not only have an extraordinarily 
beneficial effect on German opinion, which had been bitterly disappointed by what was seen 
as Wilson's abandonment of the Fourteen Points, but would also "obviate any further 
question of form or substance in regard to the proposed treaty and would make ratification a 
matter of course," a point he reiterated after receiving Hughes' response to the five points.  
Dresel to Hughes, Berlin, 15 Aug 1921, Continuation of Memorandum of Interviews with 
Chancellor Wirth and Dr. Rosen on Subject of Peace Negotiations, Notes of 9 Aug, Dept. of 
State, RG 59, 71162119/58, Microcopy #355, Roll 1 (hereafter cited as Dresel Memorandum 
Notes, Part 3). 
 81 Rosen had little comment regarding the response to points two, four, and five, but 
wanted to know if the word "embrace" in Article II Section I of the proposed treaty fully 
indicated that general rights under the Versailles treaty claimed under Knox-Porter 
Resolution were limited by the specific rights claimed in Article II and suggested "are" as a 
preferable phraseology.  Dresel Memorandum Notes, note of 10 Aug 1921, Dept. of State, 
RG 59, 711.62119/58, Microcopy #355, Roll 1;  Dresel to Hughes, Berlin, 10 Aug 1921, 
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 In Washington, the political pressure for a rapid conclusion of negotiations intensified as 
Senate Democrats opened an attack on Republican peacemaking efforts. Denouncing  
Majority Leader Lodge as a hypocrite, they pointed out that Lodge had attacked Wilson in 
1919 for not providing information to the Senate regarding progress of the Paris Peace 
Conference, but was now allowing a Republican administration to follow a similar policy of 
secrecy.82  Hughes was ready to make minor concessions in language to speed German 
acceptance but was unable to offer any concession on the Alien Property Fund question, 
since to interfere with Congressional prerogatives when already under attack in Congress 
would have been political folly. What Hughes wanted was a rapid conclusion of the 
negotiations, on American terms.83
 In the German cabinet, opposition to the treaty was led by Walter Rathenau, the Minister 
of Reconstruction, who bore the primary responsibility for the government's policy of 
fulfillment. Both that policy and Rathenau himself were under heavy and constant attack 
from the Nationalists. While Rathenau looked to the United States for the eventual solution 
to Germany’s problems, there was little in the proposed treaty that promised immediate 
political help.  Echoing the earlier concerns of the Foreign Ministry, Rathenau claimed that 
rather than limiting the rights granted under the hated Versailles Diktat, the draft treaty 
appeared to extend those rights and represented "complete surrender to America" that was 
"worse than Versailles" since it provided no specificity.  He maintained that Dresel's 
negotiating stance was "a bluff" and that Germany should not accept the terms. Believing in 
                                                          
 82 New York Times, 11 Aug 1921, p. 1. 
 83 Hughes instructed Dresel to allow Germany to have the "consistent with Germany's 
rights" phraseology included in the text.  If necessary, Germany could even have "are" 
instead of "embrace." Hughes to Dresel, 11 Aug 1921, FRUS 1921 II, p. 16. 
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the importance of German markets to America, then suffering from severe economic 
depression, and encouraged by visiting pro-German Americans, Rathenau expressed 
confidence that resistance would not cause difficulties, and that the United States would 
continue to negotiate.84  
 Matters came to a head on the evening of 12 August, when news reached Germany that 
despite the German victory in the Upper Silesia plebiscite, the Allied Supreme Council had 
decided to refer the Upper Silesia issue to the League of Nations.  When Rosen informed 
Dresel of considerable opposition to the treaty in the cabinet and general concern about 
attacks from the Nationalists, Dresel became alarmed that the adverse decision on Upper 
Silesia could shift opinion in the cabinet against the treaty or, even more likely, lead to 
procrastination out of political timidity.85   Dresel immediately began to apply pressure on 
                                                          
 84 Notes of Chefbesprechung of 12 Aug 1921, Nr. 66, Die Kabinette Wirth I, pp. 195-
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Piotr S. Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies, 1919-1925 (Minneapolis: University of 
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the German government.  His first step was to keep the primary advocates of the treaty, 
Wirth and Rosen, from weakening their support.  He warned them that the consequences of 
rejecting the treaty would be "disastrous."  America would respond with "indignation" and 
Germany would be charged with "trying to evade her obligations."  He reminded them that 
American financial and diplomatic support was essential if Germany hoped to achieve 
reparation reduction and reconstruction, cautioning that he did "not see how relations could 
be taken up for a long time" unless the treaty was signed.86     
 Having reassured himself of Wirth's and Rosen's support, Dresel next confronted 
Rathenau, who had been the primary source of opposition to the treaty in the cabinet.  
Rathenau retreated under Dresel's threats of an American withdrawal.  With the mark falling 
at a rate of ten percent per month, Germany's pressing need for dollars was greater than 
America's need for German markets. Rathenau claimed that his position had been 
misunderstood and offered to support the treaty in exchange for written assurances that 
America would not only establish diplomatic relations as soon as it was ratified but also 
grant opportunities for discussion regarding the proper construction of the parts of the 
Versailles treaty accepted by America.  Dresel provided Rathenau with an informal letter of 
understanding on both points.  The next day, President Friedrich Ebert assured Dresel that 
there was every prospect for an agreement.87
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Minnesota Press, 1962), pp. 225-37; and F. Gregory Campbell, "The Struggle for Upper 
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 86 Dresel Memorandum Notes, Part 3, note of 12 and 13 Aug 1921, Dept. of State, RG59, 
711/62119/58, Microcopy #355, Roll 1. 
 87 Dresel Memorandum Notes, notes of  12, 13, 14, 15 Aug 1921, Dept. of State, RG 59, 
711.62119/58. The only accounts of the meeting between Rathenau and Dresel appear to be 
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 Germany made one last try on the issue of the Alien Property Fund.  Rosen informed 
Dresel that Germany would sign the treaty if it could obtain language that would limit the 
effect of the Knox-Porter Resolution to the specified rights retained under the Versailles 
treaty.  In addition, Rosen wanted written assurances that the promised later negotiations 
would include reciprocal economic relations.88   Rosen's efforts merely succeeded in 
irritating Hughes, who recognized that the only practical and significant consequence of 
Rosen's proposed limitation would be to override the Alien-Property provisions of the Knox-
Porter Resolution.  Knowing he could not alter language related to that resolution without 
jeopardizing Senate passage, Hughes nonetheless pointedly reminded the German 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
down" Rathenau since Rathenau had been continually opposed to the treaty from the start.  
Dresel recounts that, acting on his belief that "sometimes it is of use in dealing with the 
German mentality to blow up occasionally," he took Rathenau to task for his questioning of 
the "straightforwardness of the American government" (Dresel to Castle, 23 August 1921, 
Dresel Papers).  The image portrayed by Dresel of a blustering German who would back 
down when faced with a straightforward American was typical of the conceptions held about 
Germans by American officials, even those who, like Dresel, had a generally sympathetic 
view of Germany's problems. Disdain for the German mentality and diplomacy was widely 
held in official Washington circles. Lodge felt that "the trouble with the Germans is that they 
seem to be stupid as well as not fair and open in their dealings" (Lodge to Dresel, 8 Aug 
1921, Dresel Papers). 
 For his part, Rathenau also had disdain for Dresel and his methods, which Rathenau felt 
were far from straightforward.  There was a great deal of frustration on the part of the 
German cabinet and with Rathenau in particular over how the treaty was being negotiated.  
Rathenau saw Dresel as simply a “postbox” to Washington without the authority to negotiate 
on the issues Germay wished to address.  Despite Dresel’s threats and informal assurances, 
Rathenau remained skeptical of the treaty.  As Minister of Reconstruction, Rathenau had a 
strong interest in keeping the pressure on Wirth and Rosen to obtain as much as possible 
from the United States. See Ministerratssitzung, 5 Aug 1921, Nr. 64, Die Kabinette Wirth I, 
pp. 190-93; Aufzeichnung von Schubert, Kabinettessitzung, 5 Aug 1921, Nr. 98, ADAP V, 
pp. 201-3. 
 88 Dresel to Hughes, Berlin, 22 Aug 1921, Continuation of Memorandum  of Interviews 
with Chancellor Wirth and Dr. Rosen on Subject of Peace Negotiations, notes of 14, 15, 19 
Aug, Dept. of State, RG 59, 71162119/67, Microcopy #355, Roll 1 (hereafter cited as Dresel 
Memorandum Notes, Part 4); Dresel to Hughes, Berlin, 19 Aug 1921, FRUS 1921 II, pp. 17-
18; Kabinettssitzing von 20 Aug 1921, Nr. 71 Die Kabinette Wirth I, pp. 207-8. 
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government German property could be held by the United States under the reparation 
provisions of the Versailles treaty.  All he could offer was the promise that if Germany 
accepted the new treaty, the United States would not claim any rights beyond those given by 
the Versailles treaty and that the alien-property question would be dealt with "upon the most 
fair and righteous basis."  Hughes was also willing to state that the United States looked 
forward to negotiations regarding the fostering of commercial relations, but instructed Dresel 
to warn Germany again that any controversy resulting from German insistence on limiting 
the Knox-Porter Resolution "would be a serious obstacle to the resumption of diplomatic and 
economic relations."89
 Hughes's assurances reached Germany two days after the Wirth cabinet had already 
decided in principle to accept the treaty.  Still, Rathenau had objections and recommended 
ratification only if further clarity could be obtained regarding interpretation.  Despite 
Dresel’s informal letter of assurance, Rathenau, continually suspicious, told the cabinet that 
it would be extremely desirable to obtain further assurance that the United States would not 
use the treaty to raise the German reparation bill above that set by the London Conference 
and saddle Germany with American occupation costs of $235 million.  Wirth and Rosen both 
felt it unwise to raise further objections at this late date and argued for immediate acceptance.   
In the last analysis Rathenau, as the minister responsible for reparation policy, could not 
afford a break with the United States.  In addition, Wirth had been able to achieve the 
support of the major German political parties.  Even the Nationalists were not expected to 
offer serious opposition and the general consensus of German political leadership was that 
                                                          
 89 Hughes to Dresel, Washington, 20 Aug 1921, FRUS 1921 II, pp. 19-20; Memorandum 
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there was no practical alternative for Germany.  The cabinet agreed to leave the final 
negotiations to Wirth and Rosen and accept whatever concessions Hughes might see fit to 
make.90
 On 25 August, the treaty was signed in Berlin without any ceremony, a deliberate 
contrast to Versailles.  On 30 September it was ratified by the Reichstag with an 
overwhelming majority, the only significant opposition coming from the Communists.91
 
Reactions and Ratification 
 Few in Germany were very enthusiastic about the Berlin treaty.  Germany had failed to 
achieve either the release of sequestered German property or a commercial treaty.  All that 
had been obtained were American promises of eventual action on these issues and the 
promises made by the executive branch would have to be fulfilled by Congress, where their 
fate and timing were uncertain.  Germany had hoped that America's desire for trade with 
Germany would provide significant leverage for Germany in the negotiations and that 
successful treaty negotiations would politically strengthen the weak Wirth government.92   
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 92 Otto Wiedfeldt, director of Krupp and soon to be German ambassador to Washington, 
was particularly dissatisfied with the Berlin treaty and argued against signing it.  Despite the 
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But instead, the nature of the Berlin treaty and its negotiations were governed and defined by 
American domestic politics. There was very little public interest in the treaty, which was 
taken as "a matter of course" by the general public.  Its immediate political importance was 
overshadowed by the assassination on 26 August 1921 of Matthias Erzberger, the former 
Minister of Finance and a signer of the Versailles treaty, and the resulting political crisis.93   
 In official Washington, the Berlin treaty was considered a great success.  Hughes's 
personal judgment was that "It was as well as we could have done, for we secured every right 
and privilege that we wanted, and assumed no obligation that we did not want."94   The treaty 
also accomplished its domestic political purpose. Within the State Department, Hughes' 
strategy was deemed "a clever move" since it would be "almost impossible" for the Senate to 
refuse to ratify it and its success would have the effect of uniting the Republican factions.9  5   
Hughes, who was concerned that an unfavorable Allied reaction to the Berlin treaty might 
have an adverse effect on American public opinion, cabled the Allies reassuring them that it 
did not "place the United States in a position superior to that of the Allied Powers."  The 
treaty was, Hughes explained, as close to Versailles as he could get.  Hughes requested that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
cheerful face the Foreign Office attempted to put on the treaty, Wiedfeldt pointed out that 
concessions won from the Americans were minuscule.  Especially objectionable was the 
inclusion of so-called “War Guilt” sections of the Versailles treaty, although the Foreign 
Office claimed that no declaration of guilt was explicitly recognized in the treaty.  In regards 
to the return of German property and commercial policy, Wiedfeldt saw the treaty as 
delivering Germany completely into the hands of the Americans.  Wiedfeldt to Simson, 25 
and 30 Aug 1921; Simson to Haniel, no date, PA-AA, Handakten Simson 62, R25987: 
K584973. 
 93 Dresel to Castle, 6 Sep 1921, box 68, Dresel Papers. For Erzberger, see Klaus Epstein, 
Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1959). 
 94 Beerits Memorandum, "The Separate Peace with Germany," p. 24. 
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the Allies refrain from criticism and that "an approval be expressed as soon as possible" to 
create a favorable influence "while public opinion is being formed."96   The Allies 
cooperated with informal expressions of general approval, as a step taken towards a final 
restoration of normal conditions.97   
 Hughes had an easier time with the Allies than he would have with the United States 
Senate, to whom Harding submitted the treaty on 21 September 1921.  Senator Borah, 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, feared that Hughes would pressure 
Harding to utilize American rights under the treaty and to appoint representatives to the 
various commissions established by the Versailles treaty, most particularly the Reparations 
Commission.  Borah was convinced that such action would inevitably entangle America in 
European politics.98   He succeeded in attaching a reservation to the treaty stipulating that the 
United States could not take part in any commission or body connected with the Versailles 
treaty without congressional approval. In addition, if approval were to be given, all 
representatives would have to be confirmed by the Senate. 
 This was almost identical to the reservation Lodge had appended to the Versailles treaty.  
By giving Congress powers usually associated with the executive branch, the Irreconcilable 
Republicans hoped to keep the administration from involvement in European affairs.  Lodge 
was able to hold off committee action demanding the end of American participation in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 95 Castle to Dresel, 30 Aug 1921, box 68, Dresel Papers. 
 96 Hughes to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Harvey), Washington, 26 Aug 1921, 
FRUS 1921 II, pp. 24-25. 
 97 The Ambassador in France (Herrick) to Hughes, Paris, 6 Sep 1921; Hughes to Herrick, 
Washington, 7 Sep 1921, FRUS 1921 II, p. 26. 
 98  New York Times, 21 Sep 1921, p. 3. 
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occupation only with the assurance that Harding would begin the withdrawal of all 15,000 
American troops as soon as the treaty was ratified.  Out of more parochial interests, the 
committee also added a reservation designed to make certain that American citizens could 
press claims against the former Central Powers.99    
 Once out of committee, the treaty met opposition from Democrats organized by 
Woodrow Wilson, acting behind the scenes, and three Republican Irreconcilables led by 
Borah.  The opposition emphasized that the Berlin treaty gave the United States the rights of 
the Treaty of Versailles without any of the obligations and responsibilities those rights 
morally implied.  The Wilsonians sought the assumption of the responsibilities, whereas the 
isolationists feared that acceptance of the rights would invariably enmesh the United States 
in Europe.  But final passage was never in doubt since Lodge had commitments of support to 
break any attempted filibuster from a sufficient number of Democrats who had concluded 
that there was no practical alternative.  On 18 October 1921 the Senate voted to ratify the 
separate peace with Germany.10   0  The treaty was ratified by President Harding on 21 
October and by President Ebert on 2 November.  Ratifications were exchanged at Berlin on 
11 November 1921, the third anniversary of the 1918 Armistice.101
 The Wirth government's claim that the Berlin treaty was bilaterally negotiated, not a 
Diktat, was true more in form than in substance.  The politics of the Senate had left Hughes 
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no alternative but to insist that if Germany wanted relations with America, it would be 
strictly on American terms.  But from the German perspective the greatest importance of the 
Treaty of Berlin was simply that it was not the Treaty of Versailles.  While Article 231 of the 
Treaty of Versailles, the so-called war guilt clause, was implicitly included in the Berlin 
treaty among the retained rights, there was no explicit mention of German guilt or 
responsibility in the treaty itself.102   It was form and not substance that determined German 
perception.  
 The Treaty of Berlin established that bilateral relations between the United States and 
Germany would take place outside the context of the Versailles system.  Germany valued the 
treaty for what it was believed it would make possible over time.  But while the Berlin treaty 
was built around the hope of a "mutuality of interests," it was a limited mutuality based on 
American needs and expediency.  The United States, particularly American elites, did not 
have the cultural and affective affinity with Germany that they had with Britain and France.  
American negative preconceptions regarding Germany had been reinforced during the 
negotiations and American negotiating tactics had heightened German mistrust of American 
policy toward Germany.  The treaty had only defined the framework for policy and not the 
policy itself. In regard to the open bilateral issues of American war claims and commercial 
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closely defined and German rights acknowledged.  That the Berlin treaty was based on the 
Treaty of Versailles and did not address the issue of sequestered German property was 
explained by the constraints of the Knox-Porter Resolution and the all-important need to 
restore relations with the U.S. as quickly as possible.  Rosen was at pains to point out that the 
inclusion of Article 231 in no way implied German recognition of war guilt and was without 
legal significance to the U.S.  Undated, PA-AA, Buro Reichsminister, Vereinigte Staaten von 
Nordamerika, Bd.1, R28487: 200 (D618524).  Rosen, in his later memoirs, considered the 
inclusion of Article 231 as one of the major deficiencies in the treaty. Friedrich Rosen, Aus 
einem diplomatischen Wanderleben (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1959), p. 385. 
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relations, Germany could only hope that the direction and logic of American policy would 
result in actions favorable to Germany.    
 In signing a separate treaty, the United States, out of the Senate's desire to avoid 
involvement in the politics of Europe, had taken a step backward from the Versailles system.  
In so doing it laid the groundwork for the partial revision of the Versailles system that would 
come in 1924.  But the same political dynamics in the United States that Germany celebrated 
when they led to a rejection of Versailles and the signing of a separate peace were also the 
dynamics that resulted in the end of formal American participation in the Reparation 
Commission.  The full benefits of American economic participation in Germany could only 
take place after some resolution of the reparations problem; it would be that issue that would 
dominate American-German relations in the ensuing years.  
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 Chapter II 
From Berlin to Genoa: 
September 1921 - April 1922 
 
 
America Turns Away 
 By solving its immediate problem of concluding a peace treaty with Germany, the Treaty 
of Berlin ended America’s bitter domestic struggle over the Versailles treaty.  However, 
there remained much partisan ill-will and highly charged divisions over how America should 
conduct foreign policy.  Although the Berlin treaty established a framework for relations 
between the United States and Germany, it did not define an American policy toward 
Germany nor immediately stimulate closer relations.  This was a great disappointment for the 
German government, as the terms of the Berlin treaty were accepted precisely because the 
Germans were anxious to begin close relations and American intervention on Germany’s 
behalf. 
 The overriding issues in international politics of European reconstruction were the 
questions of inter-Allied war debts and reparations.  German policy toward the United States 
was determined by the vicissitudes of those linked questions and Germany's efforts to escape 
the constraints of Versailles while also avoiding the domestic reforms its inflationary 
economy demanded.  The Harding administration, however, faced the complex task of 
finding ways to constructively engage these issues without compromising domestic priorities 
 
or making political commitments unacceptable to the American public. The United States 
looked forward to the recovery of Germany, but only in the context of a general European 
reconstruction in which America considered Germany the key element. 
 Rather than being grounded in an overarching mutualism, the system in which American-
German relations would develop contained self-contradictory elements such as both nation's 
policies about reparations, war debts and reconstruction1.  The initial uncertainty of 
American policy toward Germany immediately after the Treaty of Berlin, demonstrated by 
subsequent aloofness, forced Germany to seek other means of achieving its goals.  
Nevertheless, by the late spring of 1922 Germany would find itself crucially dependent on an 
America that had become both the center of gravity in international politics and committed to 
a peaceful revision of the Versailles system. 
 The United States had emerged from war the major international creditor; the $10 billion 
it had borrowed domestically and lent to the Allies constituted two-fifths of the federal 
government’s $25.3 billion total gross domestic debt.  Nevertheless, American policy makers 
at the Treasury and at the State Department in both the Wilson and Harding administrations 
recognized that it was in the United States's ultimate interest to reduce or even cancel Allied 
war debts.  This position was supported by a significant segment of the business, banking 
and agricultural communities whose sensitivities to the interdependence of European and 
American prosperity had been heightened by the economic downturn of 1920-21.  Many 
business and financial interests argued that trade with a stable and reconstructed Europe 
would more than compensate for any reduction in debt payments.  Others, however, were 
                                                          
 1 Manfred Jonas defines American-German relations during this period as “a mutuality of 
interests.” Manfred Jonas, The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History (Ithaca 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 161-75. 
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concerned that the American taxpayer would have to make up any reduction in the debt at a 
time when business taxes were historically high.  Nor were many business leaders eager to 
see British industry and commerce gain at the expense of the United States.2  But overriding 
all such policy considerations was the political reality that neither public opinion nor 
Congress were not yet ready to accept any significant reduction.3
 The Harding administration’s belief that the recovery of Germany was the key to 
European reconstruction, along with the desire to respond to the needs of business, led it to 
                                                          
 2 For a sampling of American opinion on this issue see Melvyn Leffler, "The Origins of 
Republican War Debt Policy, 1921-1923: A Case Study in the Applicability of the Open 
Door Interpretation," Journal of American History 59 (December 1972), pp. 585- 601, esp. 
595.  Leffler questions the applicability of the Open Door, originally outlined in William A. 
Williams's The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, to Republican war-debt policy. Williams’s 
thesis is that United States diplomacy has been primarily driven by the American 
establishment's need to find external markets to resolve the chronic domestic problems of 
overproduction and unemployment created by the American capitalistic system, but Leffler 
argues that while the search for markets was an important consideration of American debt 
policy, other considerations--electoral, fiscal, bureaucratic, and strategic--were the major 
factors determining war-debt policy in 1921 and 1922.  This focus on the political 
complexity of American debt policy can also be found in Steven Schuker's "American Policy 
Towards Debts and Reconstruction at Genoa, 1922," pp. 95-122.  This discussion of 
American war debt and reparation policy, which focuses on a period when debt policy was 
primarily controlled by Congress, follows the line of analysis suggested by Leffler and 
Schuker. 
 3 In 1917 the Treasury had solved the problem of financing the war through a 
nationalistic appeal to the American public, for whom the war-debts question was a highly 
emotional issue.  Millions of Americans bought their first security of any type by purchasing 
Liberty Bonds through local saving banks or wage check-off plans in a patriotic effort to 
whip Kaiser Bill.  Although proud and self-congratulatory regarding the American war 
effort, Americans were dissatisfied with the postwar settlement and disappointed with both 
their former allies and enemies.  Not only could cancellation of war debts be seen as asking 
the public to pay a second time through higher taxes, it ran the risk of being perceived on an 
emotional level as somehow invalidating America's patriotic war efforts for the benefit of 
squabbling Europeans. See David M. Kennedy, "American Political Culture in a Time of 
Crisis: Mobilization in World War I," Confrontation and Cooperation: Germany and the 
United States in the Era of World War 1, 1900-1924, ed. Hans-Jürgen Schröder (Providence: 
Berg, 1993), pp. 213-27.   
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indirectly link the war debt issue to the question of German reparations. In June 1921, while 
preparing for negotiations with Britain regarding that nation's debt, the administration tested 
congressional flexibility on war-debt repayment by requesting authorization for the Treasury 
to extend the term of payment on Britain’s principal and interest as well as authorization to 
accept domestic obligations of Allied debtors or German reparation bonds in exchange for 
French and British obligations. The bill encountered immediate opposition in Congress, 
where it was denounced as a scheme to make the American people pay $10 billion of the 
German reparation bill.4   Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon received rough handling 
in committee hearings, especially after he was forced to acknowledge that the British had 
twice solicited total war-debt cancellation.  His vague and often contradictory testimony 
reflected the political concerns and general ambivalence surrounding the issue of war debts.5    
 In October 1921, only days after congressional ratification of the Treaty of Berlin, the 
administration had to accept a House Ways and Means Committee bill that placed authority 
for war-debt policy in the hands of a five-member commission.  Well aware of schemes 
involving the Allies, Germans, and even some American officials to resolve the reparation 
crisis by assigning German reparation payments to the United States in lieu of Allied debt 
payments, Congress barred the commission from accepting the bonds of any foreign 
government in lieu of another.  Because the House of Representatives would not tolerate 
exchanging valuable French and British obligations for German bonds which were 
                                                          
 4 Congressional Record, 24 June 1921, pp. 3015, 3021-28. 
 5 Refunding of Obligations of Foreign Governments, Hearings before the Committee of 
Finance, United States Senate, 67th Congress, 1st sess., on S 2135, pp. 49-53. For public 
commentary see "What about that $10,000,000,000?," Literary Digest 70 (13 August 1921), 
pp. 11-22; "Our Moral Obligation to Our Europe Debtors," Literary Digest 74 (19 Aug 
1922), pp. 13-15. See also Leffler, "Origins of Republican Debt Policy," pp. 585-601. 
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considered to be practically worthless, Mellon's only success there was that the bill granted 
the commission latitude to alter rates of interest and dates of maturity.6  While Treasury 
officials privately questioned how America could "collect $500,000,000 of interest in from 
Europe in its present condition," they publicly adhered to the official line for fear of 
provoking Congress into further restrictions.  Treasury strategists were left with the hope that 
the commission might be able to provide political cover for Mellon if deferral someday 
became a political or economic necessity.7  
 As the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles had left the United States without a clear 
conception of its relationship to Europe, congressional restraints reinforced the Harding 
administration’s disinclination to engage Europe politically.  Unable to acknowledge the 
perceived link between war debts and reparations or the connection between the American 
rejection of the Versailles treaty and French military spending, the administration focused on 
the issue of disarmament as a partial solution to Europe's economic problems.  The 
Washington Naval Conference became the Harding administration’s first major venture into 
international diplomacy.8   Preparation for the conference increasingly absorbed the energies 
                                                          
 6 Refunding Foreign Obligations, Report by Mr. Fordney, from the Committee on Ways 
and Means, to Accompany H.R. 8762, 67th Congress, 1st sess., House of Representatives, 
Report No. 421, 20 Oct 1921.  See also Schuker, "American Policy Towards Debts and 
Reconstruction at Genoa, 1922" and Leffler, "The Origins of Republican War Debt Policy, 
1921-1923." 
 7 Elliot Wadsworth (Assistant Secretary of the Treasury) to Dresel, 15 Aug and 29 Oct 
1921, box 421, Dresel Papers. 
 8 These points have been made by Carole Fink, who noted the quality of expediency in 
American policy that resulted from the retreat from Versailles in The Genoa Conference: 
European Diplomacy, 1921-1922 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1984), pp. 24-6. Sally Marks makes the additional point that the Senate's rejection of the 
Versailles treaty was reinforced by the Treaty of Berlin in “German-American Relations 
1918-1921," p. 226. 
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of the State Department during the late summer and autumn of 1921.9  Meanwhile, the lack 
of a fully formulated policy toward Europe greatly affected relations with Germany.  
Contrary to American promises for both the early resumption of full diplomatic relations and 
negotiations for a commercial treaty, the level of diplomatic activity between America and 
Germany markedly diminished rather than increased in the months following the August 
1921 signing of the Treaty of Berlin. 
 The administration, which had yet to develop its overall trade policy, was not anxious to 
begin commercial negotiations with Germany.  The State Department also intended to hold 
trade talks hostage to German acceptance of American plans for a still-undefined joint claims 
board for the settlement of war claims.  In addition, the State Department opposed any 
release of sequestered German property without assurances that American claims would be 
settled--a strategy it termed "Machiavellian," but Washington was convinced that it was the 
only way the claims would be paid.  Dresel was instructed not to indicate any American 
interest in opening up trade negotiations, and relations with Germany were placed on the 
back burner.10  
 Washington's indifference to German concerns and sensitivities regarding bilateral 
relations manifested in a number of ways. The State Department had neglected to keep 
Dresel informed about the progress of Senate ratification of the Berlin treaty, leaving him 
embarrassed by his inability to respond to German inquires, and also insisted on approving 
German diplomatic personnel, including diplomatic secretaries, and vetoed appointments 
                                                          
 9 Castle to Dresel, 2 Aug and 19 Oct 1921, box 68, Dresel Papers. 
 10 Castle believed that a bill releasing German property could pass Congress, but that 
such a move would be "idiotic." Castle to Dresel, 16 Feb 1922, box 68, Dresel  Papers. 
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approved by Dresel.  The latter practices infuriated not only the German foreign ministry but 
also Dresel, who noted that "it is quite impossible to make a pretense of friendly relations, 
and at the same time treat the German diplomatists as pariahs."11   Dresel was further 
embarrassed when the State Department failed to respond to the choice of Dr. Karl Lang as 
temporary chargé in Washington, which forced him to leave for the United States with 
alternate plans to take the post as consul in New York if rejected by Washington.12  
 The American diplomatic presence in Berlin was further diminished after the 
administration decided in mid-November not to name Dresel ambassador but to make a 
political appointment instead.  The eventual choice, New York Congressman Alanson B. 
Houghton, would not arrive in Berlin until April 192213; in the interim, key embassy staff 
were reassigned and not replaced, leaving an overworked and demoralized Dresel unable 
even to keep up with the mission’s routine chores.14
 The failure of America to actively engage Germany was disappointing to the Germans; 
consequently, German hopes rapidly diminished for both financial support and increased 
trade with the United States in the immediate future.  Major American bankers made it 
known that they had little interest in handling any long-term German reparation loan that 
might be floated in America without evidence that Germany was willing to control its 
inflation.  German-Americans who had held marks out of sympathy with Germany began 
                                                          
 11 Dresel to Castle, 29 Nov 1921, box 68, Dresel Papers. 
 12 Ibid., 13 Dec 1921. 
 14 Dresel, who was already in poor health and found what he considered the "lack of 
idealism" in the Harding administration to be "shocking," became increasingly pessimistic 
and depressed during the winter and spring of 1921-22. Dresel to Castle, 26 Sept and 18 Nov 
1922, box 68, Dresel Papers. 
 83 
disposing of their holdings as the mark fell from 69 to the dollar in June to 105 in September 
1921; some argued that the decision on Upper Silesia proved that any help given to Germany 
would only end up in the pockets of France.  Horror stories of America threatened by a flood 
of cheap German goods began to circulate; however, American fears of German exports had 
little basis because, in reality, price instability and delays resulting from the high cost of raw 
material imports into Germany as the mark fell angered American importers and significantly 
impeded German exports to America.  
 Although Germany's overall negative balance of trade substantially worsened during 
1921, many business leaders in America nevertheless believed that Germany was 
deliberately inflating its currency, a belief which intensified the general distrust of Germany. 
Businessmen who were convinced that reparations, and not government action, was driving 
the inflation were equally reluctant to become involved due to their conviction that loans and 
investments would have to await a revision of reparations.15   
 In the late summer 1921, the deteriorating situation raised concerns in the State 
Department that German inflation might spiral out of control, but the department had little 
interest in becoming directly involved in the question of reparations, having  reached a 
consensus that the London Schedule was beyond Germany's capacity to pay, that the 
indemnity should be based on Germany's capacity to pay, and that these matters should be 
determined by financial experts not politicians.16  But American efforts to implement these 
                                                          
 15 Feldman, The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics, and Society in the German 
Inflation, 1914-1924, pp. 398-99; Bergmann, The History of Reparations, pp. 104-5. 
 16 William R. Castle, memorandum, 2 Sept 1921, Record Group 59, General Records of 
the Department of State, 1910-29 (hereafter cited as USDS), 462.00R29/932, United States 
National Archives, Washington D.C.   
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goals were restricted to the attempts of its unofficial delegates to the Reparation 
Commission, Roland Boyden and James A. Logan, to persuade the commission to adopt a 
capacity-to-pay formula. 
 When Boyden and Logan suggested in September 1921 that the United States undertake 
an initiative to place the issue of reparations on a "more business and conciliatory basis," the 
State Department refused permission.17 Convinced that Germany would not be able to make 
reparation payments after spring 1922, Logan then suggested that the United States accept 
the relatively secure B bonds as war-debt payments and to enhance American influence on 
any European economic settlement. But the State Department, better attuned to the political 
realities in Congress, demurred,1  8   nor was it willing to increase the pressure on France at a 
time when it hoped for French cooperation on the issue of disarmament;  instead, it warned 
Logan to mute his outspoken opinion that reparations must be reduced.19  America's policy 
about reparations continued to be one of watching and waiting for the Europeans to accept 
what some chose to call Germany's “capacity to pay” as the basis of a reparation settlement. 
 But while America was willing to wait, the Wirth government could not: its most 
pressing problem in late 1921 was the need to obtain a moratorium for the reparation 
payments due in January and February 1922.  Efforts to utilize German industry's credit 
                                                          
 17 James A. Logan to Under Secretary Henry P. Fletcher, 29 Aug and 2 Sept 1921; 
Assistant Secretary Fred Dearing minutes, 24 Sept 1921, 462.00R29/1026 and 1043, USDS. 
 18 Logan to Fletcher, 9 Sept 1921, 462.090R29/ 1043, USDS; Fletcher to Logan reporting 
Assistant Treasury Secretary Wadsworth's response, 21 Sept 1921, 462.090R29/1046, USDS;  
Dresel to Castle, 6 Sept 1921, box 68, Dresel Papers. 
 19 Fletcher to Logan, 22 Oct 1921, Leland Harrison Papers, box 7, Library of Congress, 
cited in Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and 
French Security, 1919-1933, p. 71. 
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abroad to procure $1.5 billion in gold marks foundered on industrial insistence on a program 
of governmental financial austerity and privatization of German railroads, along with the 
dismissal of thousands of excess workers, in response to which the Socialist trade unions 
demanded a wealth tax on real assets from industry and the rich.  Wirth, unwilling to force a 
domestic political crisis over these issues, concluded that a moratorium was the only 
practical solution.20  
 The German political situation further weakened American confidence in the Wirth 
government's ability to accomplish financial reforms and stabilization in the face of 
widespread tax avoidance and speculation.  Boyden saw Wirth as a weak leader, lacking in 
both firmness and frankness and unable to stand up to either his cabinet or the German 
industrialists.  Even the more sympathetic Dresel despaired at the "impotence" of the Wirth 
government, the "preposterous conditions" of the industrialists and the "equally unworkable 
program" of the Socialists.21   Germany's worsening inflation and governmental weakness 
reinforced American tendencies to view Germany not as a nation with mutual interests but 
rather a nation whose situation had to be changed if American goals for Europe were to be 
achieved. 
                                                          
 20 This battle over finances ended hopes of drawing the German People Party (DVP) into 
the government coalition.  On 2 October the German Democratic Party (DDP) took 
advantage of the League of Nations decision about the partition of Upper Silesia to withdraw 
from the government, forcing Wirth to form a new minority government based on a Center-
Social Democratic coalition on 26 October. Rathenau, a member of the DDP, withdrew from 
his official position but remained a government advisor (Besprechung mit Vertretern der 
Regierungsparteien, 11 Nov 1921, Nr. 138, Kabinette Wirth I, 385).  For discussion of the 
battle over financial reforms see Kabinette Wirth I, xxxvi-xxxviii, and Feldman, The  Great 
Disorder, pp. 350-84. 
 21 Boyden to Hughes, 22 Nov 1921, 462.00R29/1285, USDS; Dresel to Castle, 18 Nov 
1921, box 68, Dresel Papers. 
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 Mutual misunderstanding between the United States and Germany was also hampered by 
differing views regarding the causes of the German inflation. Germany's reluctance to take 
strong action to curtail its printing presses reflected not only political concerns, but also the 
degree to which "balance of payment" theory dominated the economic thinking of the 
majority of German economists and political leaders about inflation. This theory held that a 
negative balance of payments led to an outflow of paper money and a rise in the price of 
foreign exchange.  In contradistinction to monetary theory, which emphasized the quantity of 
money in circulation, balance of payment theory postulated that inflation and the increase in 
the quantity of money were consequences of the exchange depreciation, not its cause.  
German theorists argued that since Germany had inelastic demands for food and raw 
materials, restricting the currency supply and balancing the budget would not halt the basic 
demand for imports and end inflation.  Rathenau, a strong proponent of balance of payment 
theory, denounced quantity of money theory as "an alien way of looking at things."22 
Although the German belief in the balance of payment theory of inflation was independent of 
the issue of reparations, it offered a powerful argument against the practicality of large 
payments. Self-righteous German insistence on treating balance of payment as an article of 
faith, however, undermined mutual understanding between Germany and both Britain and the 
United States, nations where the quantity of money theory held greater sway.23
                                                          
 22 Walter Rathenau, Gesammelte Reden (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1924), p. 380. 
 23 For British views see D'Abernon's memoranda "The Supposed Effect of Reparations on 
Trade and Exchange," 24 Dec 1921 Documents on British Foreign Policy, first series XVI, 
pp. 855-7 (hereafter cited as DBFP); and "Memorandum respecting German Financial 
Position," 15 Nov 1921, DBFP XVI, pp. 808-9. See also Trachtenberg, Reparation in World 
Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacy, 1916-1923, pp. 226-27. For the current 
debate on the relationship between reparations and the German inflation by modern scholars, 
see Trachtenberg, Reparation In World Politics, and Feldman, The Great Disorder.  Both 
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 The ideas of Moritz Bonn, the leading proponent of balance of payment theory, had a 
major influence on the Wirth administration's viewpoint toward the United States in autumn 
1921.  Bonn recognized that Germany's economic problems included not only reparations but 
also the growing debt from numerous short-term private loans being made to Germany by 
American bankers.  While such loans had kept the German economy afloat, Bonn realized 
these obligations would have to be consolidated into long-term foreign bonds at lower 
interest rates, because the German economy would not be able to afford the interest on those 
loans plus reparation payments.24
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Trachtenberg and Feldman highlight the inability of the weak Wirth government to 
implement fiscal reforms and monetary restraints.  Trachtenberg uses modern monetarist 
(quantity of money) theory to demonstrate the fallacies of German balance of payments 
arguments and justify French demands for external controls on the German economy (pp. 
220-3; 337-42).  Feldman, while acknowledging the contribution of monetarist theory, 
believes that contributions of Keynesian analysis with its emphasis on questions of demand, 
employment and consumption "has nevertheless been greater" and that the German inflation 
is best understood from that perspective (p. 9). In assessing the new historiography that 
followed the opening of the French archives in the 1970s and emphasized French sensibility, 
British duplicity and German bad faith, Feldman warns, "It would unfortunate, however, if 
the welcome discoveries concerning the complexities of French reparation policy were to 
create the illusion that the German story was a simple tale of treaty evasion and bad faith"(p. 
309) and notes that "while the chief sources of the German inflation were endogenous, the 
catalyst of inflationary development between the spring of 1921 and the summer of 1922 was 
reparations" (p. 418).  Feldman makes the additional point that some balance of payment 
theorists, such as Moritz Bonn, believed that Germany had an obligation to pay reparations 
(p. 402). 
 24 See also Moritz Bonn, So Macht Man Geschichte (München: Paul List Verlag, 1953), 
p. 252 and pp. 257-67. Bonn's program for German reconstruction was to obtain a $1.5 
billion loan from London and use it to make some immediate payments to France; he argued 
that by 1923-1924 Germany would be able to get its domestic finances in order and meet the 
interest payments on that loan.  With the mark strengthened and confidence in Germany 
improved, Bonn believed that Germany would then be able to obtain major long-term 
American financing to consolidate its debts. Feldman, The Great Disorder, pp. 400-1; 
“Reparationsfrage und internationale Anleihe,” Essen, 27 May 1922, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, 
Nachlass M.J. Bonn, N1082, 4c. 
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Germany Turns to Britain  
 With major American banks uninterested in long-term reparation loans and American 
diplomatic interest in Germany at a low ebb, Germany's political and economic leadership 
increasingly placed their hopes in Britain to keep France in check, serve as a source for 
loans, and lead the United States into taking greater responsibility for Germany. They noted 
with satisfaction the weakening of the American economic position in Europe during 1921, 
as American trade with Europe dramatically fell and the pound rose against the dollar, 
hoping that Britain, with its greater interest in integrating Germany into the world economy, 
would take financial leadership and get America to join in a program of major loans to 
Germany.25  Firmly believing that American involvement was essential to Germany's 
problems of reparation and inflation, Rathenau told the DDP convention in November that 
Germany had to recognize that America for the time being would not accept any greater 
responsibility for the reconstruction of Europe and Germany.26  Germany, however, could 
not wait for America to become involved.  In April 1921, Germany had sought to be rescued 
from the impending London ultimatum by the United States; in November 1921, it turned to 
Britain and Lloyd George to be rescued from the payments imposed by that ultimatum. 
 The German attempt to involve London coincided with a change in British policy.  Lloyd 
George had already come to the conclusion that, because the London payment schedule was 
impossible, Germany required a moratorium.  He also was convinced that Britain should take 
the lead in finding an alternative solution to the reconstruction of Europe.  When first 
                                                          
 25 Ibid., 401-2. 
 26 Speech at the DDP convention in November 1921, Walter Rathenau, Gesammelte 
Reden, p.  355. 
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Rathenau and then Hugo Stinnes, the leading German industrialist, met with Lloyd George in 
London in late November and early December, each proposed an elaborate scheme involving 
expanded German exports to Russia, the profits from which would serve as reparation 
payments to Britain.27
 Lloyd George expanded the German ideas into a plan to settle the questions of 
reparations, inter-Allied debts, and Russian reconstruction through an overarching program 
for European reconstruction led by Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, telling 
Rathenau that he wanted to see a cancellation of all debts with the exception of Germany's 
responsibility for the devastated areas of France and Belgium.  Both men agreed that the 
United States was the key to any solution but Rathenau, whose primary goal was obtaining a 
moratorium and keeping the French out of the Ruhr, was under the impression that French 
resistance to Washington's disarmament program was isolating France and that Lloyd George 
would be able to involve the United States in his scheme.  Once that occurred, Rathenau 
noted, "America and England can enforce everything."  With little prospect of immediate 
help from the United States, Rathenau was quite willing to follow Lloyd George's lead.28  
                                                          
 27 For a discussion of the Stinnes and Rathenau visits to London, see Feldman, The Great 
Disorder, pp. 380-2. Rathenau's scheme was modeled on the Wiesbaden Agreement Germany 
had signed with France in October, which would have allowed Germany to meet a significant 
share of its reparations payments to France through payments in German-produced goods. 
The agreement was more of an experiment in trying to decrease tensions with France than a 
practical or rational economic arrangement, but it raised suspicions in London about Franco-
German cooperation.  Since payments in kind would not have been useful to Britain, the 
Russian scheme was proposed as an alternative.  For the Wiesbaden Agreement see 
Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics, pp. 216-18, and Feldman, The Great Disorder, 
pp. 356-57. 
 28 In the belief that American gold had to be sacrificed to save Germany and Europe, 
Rathenau drew an analogy between the United States and Fafner, the gold-hoarding giant in 
Wagner’s opera Das Rheingold. Rathenau's misreading of American policy and intentions 
reflected the lack of German representation in Washington that could supply reliable 
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  Lloyd George first attempted to get French cooperation. He met on 8 December with 
Louis Loucheur, the French Minister of Liberated Regions and Premier Aristide Briand's 
close associate, offering to cancel French debts to Britain and German reparations to the 
same degree that the United States would cancel British debts, but also warning Loucheur 
that Germany must have a moratorium and that any French occupation of the Ruhr would 
rupture Anglo-French cooperation.  Rathenau, Lloyd George and Loucheur worked out a 
plan centered on inducing the United States to convene an economic conference whose 
ultimate purpose would be the cancellation or reduction of debts.29
 When Briand accepted Lloyd George's invitation to a conference on reparations in 
London, a delighted Rathenau told the German cabinet that it was the beginning of a 
"revision of Versailles";  Germany officially requested a payment moratorium on 14 
December 1921.3  0   Rathenau was further encouraged by Britain’s refusal of Germany's 
request, as expected, for a loan of 500 million gold marks, which not only saved the Wirth 
government from having to make the fiscal reforms any such loan would have required, but 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
intelligence. Obtaining his ideas about French isolation from a meeting on 1 December with 
General Allen and George Harvey, the American ambassador to Britain, Rathenau had 
misread the extent of American annoyance with France. Another example of Rathenau's 
ignorance of American politics was his suggestion to Lloyd George that it might be helpful 
for him to visit the United States to explain the European perspective; the more astute Lloyd 
George was forced to explain that any such visit would interpreted simply as an attempt to 
get Britain's debt remitted. Walter Rathenau, Walter Rathenau:  Industrialist, Banker, 
Intellectual and Politician, Notes and Diaries 1907-1922 , entries of 1 and 2 Dec 1921, pp. 
275-81.  
 29  Walter Rathenau: Notes and Diaries, entry of 9 Dec 1921, 282-83; "Conversation in 
London between British and French Ministers," 19-22 Dec 1921, DBFP XV, pp.760-65. 
 30 Chefbesprechung, 12 and 13 Dec 1921, Nr. 166 and 167, Die Kabinette Wirth I, p.  
463.  
 91 
also included language at the behest of Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, 
in consultation with Rathenau, stating that Germany's reparations requirements precluded 
any long or short-term loans from Britain.3  1   Norman had provided Germany with strong 
justification not just for a moratorium, but also for a revision of the London Schedule; for 
Wirth and Rathenau it was a confirmation of their Erfüllungspolitik.   
 Rathenau's policy was, as always, critically dependent on United States involvement.  
When informed of Rathenau's initial plan for Germany to play the role of middleman with 
Russia, Hughes was inclined to go along "provided the middlemen play fair," but Secretary 
of Commerce Herbert Hoover, who was strongly and outspokenly opposed to any 
arrangement in which other nations would dispense American capital and goods, saw the 
plan as undermining the basic principles behind the United States' policy of non-recognition 
of Russia.32   
 American opposition to any linkage between Allied war debts and German reparation 
payments also remained adamant.3  3 Congressional opposition to debt cancellation stiffened 
in reaction to French recalcitrance about naval disarmament at the Washington Conference in 
December.  Democrats, quick to seize on the issue, demanded that the full interest on the 
debt be used for popular programs such as tax relief, credits for farmers, bonuses for soldiers, 
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and unemployment compensation.  The administration also had to cope with restive 
Republican majorities as well as an overall congressional mood that favored taking back 
powers lost under Wilson’s wartime leadership. 
 Also in December, the Senate Finance Committee revised the war debt legislation to 
require Senate confirmation of appointees to the Debt Commission established by the House 
and to stipulate that any new funding agreements should neither exceed a period of twenty-
five years nor carry an interest rate of less than five percent. Vigorous lobbying by the 
Treasury in January managed to get the final minimum interest rate reduced to 4.25 percent, 
but these congressional actions precluded any American participation in Europe's 
reconstruction in the immediate future from involving cancellation of Allied debts.34
  In December, encouraged in part by his conversations with the British regarding the 
possibility of American involvement, Loucheur made a clumsy appeal for the United States 
to call for an economic conference as a follow-up to the Washington Naval Conference. 
Hoover, who had gotten wind of Loucheur's and Lloyd George's plan, which included Britain 
offering the elimination of pensions from the German reparation bill and France reducing its 
claims by half before pressuring Washington for the elimination of all war debts, warned 
Harding that such proposals would create an "impossible situation" for the administration.  
The president agreed and on 16 December the United States punctured the trial balloon and 
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officially declined to call a conference.35    
 Washington's decision had the major impact on the London Conference (19 - 22 
December) of collapsing Lloyd George's grand scheme to link reparations and Allied war 
debts. He believed that it was politically impossible for Britain, which was struggling to 
maintain its financial leadership against an American challenge, to cancel its war debts 
without reciprocal American action.  Convinced by Rathenau that Germany could not fulfill 
the London Schedule, Lloyd George felt compelled to drive Briand hard, insisting that 
France agree to both a moratorium on German reparation payments and the convocation of a 
conference for the opening up of Russia.  Briand made no specific concessions, but by 
reminding him that the Allies could drive Germany into an alliance with Russia that would 
threaten the status quo, Lloyd George maneuvered Briand into agreeing to a Supreme 
Council meeting on Germany and Russia.36  
 The London Conference ended with all major decisions being postponed until the Allies 
met in Cannes in January. Even though Rathenau himself questioned Germany's ability to 
raise sufficient capital to participate in the planned international consortium, Germany was 
optimistic about its turn toward Britain.37   Wirth told Lord D'Abernon, Britain's influential 
ambassador to Germany, that Lloyd George's plans for European reconstruction had assured 
Britain of Germany's friendship for years to come.  D'Abernon in turn reported to London 
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that Germany's policy of following Britain, which had suffered a temporary eclipse, "is now 
again dominant and probably stronger than before."38  But Germany's strategy was 
dependent upon Britain's ability to hold France in check and to lead America into 
involvement with European reconstruction, two possibilities that remained very open.  
 At the Cannes Conference (6 - 12 January 1922), the Supreme Council accepted Lloyd 
George's proposals for the reestablishment of economic and eventually political relations 
with Russia, and an invitation went out to the nations of Europe and the United States for a 
world conference in Genoa.39   However, it was easier to conceptualize such a gathering on a 
grand scale than to settle the problem of German reparations.  While Germany adopted a 
strategy of pleading bankruptcy, offering minimal payments and resisting any imposition of 
Allied controls over Germany's fiscal and monetary affairs, Lloyd George continued to press 
Briand for concessions the premier could not give and survive politically.40   
 On 12 January the Briand government fell and Raymond Poincaré assumed the 
premiership.4    1 Yet despite this change in French leadership, Germany won a temporary 
victory at Cannes, receiving a partial moratorium without the imposition of Allied controls 
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over its monetary and fiscal affairs.  At Lloyd George's urging, the Allies accepted German 
promises for reform instead of controls42; in addition, Germany could expect to play a major 
role at Genoa and in the planned reconstruction of Russia.  
 The Cannes settlement was a major step in the revision of the London Schedule, enabling  
Rathenau and Wirth to triumphantly inform the Reichstag Foreign Affairs committee on 
January 19 that, despite Briand’s replacement, "we will not sink back into the complete 
darkness of the year 1921 in the year 1922.”43   Rathenau's reward was his appointment as 
Germany's Foreign Minister.  But Poincaré could be expected to hold a harder line toward 
Germany and would prove more difficult for Britain to check without a reduction in war 
debts.  By trying to exploit inter-Allied politics to achieve reduced reparations and a 
moratorium on payments without painful but necessary domestic reforms, Wirth and 
Rathenau had tied the fate of Germany to American policy about Allied war debts.  Carl 
Bergmann later noted," We had entered the blind trail of the moratorium; it was soon to 
terminate in a jungle."44
 U.S. Declines Invitation to Genoa Conference 
 The State Department followed negotiations in London and Cannes with both interest and 
skepticism.45   While Washington considered the London reparation schedule to be 
unworkable, it also believed that Germany could and should pay reparations.  Castle’s 
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opposition to any moratorium allowing Germany to avoid cash payments and escape with 
only requirements for payments in German goods had been strengthened by a meeting with 
German banker and reparations expert Carl Bergmann in which Bergmann, a proponent of 
fulfillment, told Castle that if Germany could raise a modest loan to stabilize the mark, it 
would not require a moratorium and could pay an annual indemnity of 2.5 billion gold marks. 
 Bergmann's stance was in direct opposition to that of Rathenau and Wirth.  But if 
German reparation diplomacy was characterized by its disorganization, American diplomacy 
was characterized by its passivity. The State Department, reluctant to take a firm position on 
the question of reparations, instructed Boyden simply to insist on payment of the 
accumulated costs incurred by the United States Army occupation forces, a matter of great 
interest to Congress.46   Following the Cannes conference, the State Department turned down 
a French invitation for American participation in the Reparation Commission subcommittee 
appointed to consider fluctuations of the German exchange.  With characteristic caution, 
Hughes decided that he was "not ready to take up the reparations question," nor did he relish 
the possible consequences of asking the Senate to approve such an appointment.47  
 The British and French invitation to the Genoa Conference for the reconstruction of 
Europe could not be dismissed so easily. Secretary of Commerce Hoover, the primary 
recipient of complaints about the adverse impact of the European situation upon American 
business, sent Harding a memorandum on 4 January outlining his plan for European 
stabilization, the key to which was ending the economic conflict between France and 
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Germany.  His plan was based on a severe reduction in armaments, a five-year partial 
reparation moratorium, a foreign loan raised by Germany for reconstruction of the devastated 
areas of Belgium and France, a reduction in the military forces occupying the Rhineland, a 
reorganization of Germany's finances, and a return of European currencies to the gold 
standard.  In return America could offer a five-year moratorium on interest payments on 
debts to America to all European countries, with the exception of Britain, which Hoover 
believed could well afford to pay.  America's reward, beyond that accruing from international 
peace and harmony, would be the improvement of America's trade and competitive position 
in Europe.48   However, Hoover also let it be known that European stabilization, while 
serving American interests, was not essential.  America, Hoover maintained, could 
"reestablish its material prosperity and comfort without European trade."49
 Hoover's plan reflected the general American disillusionment with Europe. France's 
posture at the Washington Naval Conference had aggravated American tendencies to view 
France as an impediment to disarmament whose military spending also contributed to the 
economic problems of Europe. Irritation at France, however, did not translate into a pro-
German attitude.  Hoover believed that Germany had profited from its inflation, avoided 
efficient taxation, doled out subsidies, and taken advantage of unsophisticated foreign 
holders of marks. He expected Germany to end subsidies, increase taxation, balance its 
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budget, and stabilize the mark by its own means without resorting to foreign loans.50  
 Hoover, like most American leaders, viewed Germany within the context of Europe but, 
unlike many others, his dislike of Germany was no greater than his dislike of France or 
Britain. Therefore his condemnation of Germany was no harsher than his attitude toward the 
other European states, although State Department officials suspected that the Commerce 
Department harbored pro-German sentiments and were suspicious that Jews in leading 
positions there were too close to the German-Jewish banking community in the United 
States.51  But even more important than personal prejudices was the general resentment of 
Commerce Department interference in prerogatives of the State Department and the 
Treasury, rivalries that impeded policy initiatives and reinforced the passive American 
posture toward Europe.52   
 Although Hoover's plan was politically unrealistic, his focus on the reduction of 
European armaments resonated with Harding's conviction about world affairs. On 6 January 
Harding told the New York Times that although the Europeans were responsible for solving 
their own problems and that Allied debts to the United States could not be discussed, the 
United States might consider involvement if Europe was prepared to reduce its land 
armaments.53   Harding's comments opened a public debate. Public opinion predominately 
opposed participation. The conference was seen as a scheme to get the United States to 
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cancel the debts and underwrite German reparations.  State Department officials in 
Washington and abroad opposed participation as well.  Castle pointed out that the British and 
French positions after Cannes were so far apart, little of use could be accomplished. Richard 
W. Childs, ambassador to Italy, warned that America had little to gain since it held "all the 
chips" while the Europeans would be holding "all the cards."5  4   Public opposition to 
American attendance tapped into the same sentiments and interests that made cancellation of 
war debts such and emotional issue.  In addition, anti-French attitudes stemming from 
perceptions of France as militaristic together with anti-German sentiments based on 
suspicions of a German Drang nach Osten reinforced a general disinclination to become 
involved with European affairs.55  
 Hoover concluded by late January that the conference’s nature would be political, not 
economic, and urged that the United States not attend, instead suggesting a six-month 
postponement during which he hoped France would become more realistic about the amount 
of reparations it could collect and America might become more flexible about war debts.56 
Secretary Hughes, with characteristic caution, adopted a wait-and-see approach. It was not 
until 8 March that he formally refused to participate believing that the conference would be 
of "a political character" and had excluded from consideration the "chief causes of economic 
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disturbances."57  
 Hughes's timing may have been influenced by his anticipation of the political firestorm 
that in fact did follow the 11 March ratification of the Allied decision in Cannes to exclude 
American occupation costs from the apportionment of German reparation payments.  Hughes 
complained in an off-the-record press conference that "it was ridiculous to suppose that we 
should bear our share of the expenses of occupation and then be told to whistle for our 
money." As expected, Congress erupted in outrage and threatened to cut off funding for all 
American troops in Europe.58
 
The Search for an Ambassador to Washington 
 The American decision not to participate doomed Germany's hopes for a solution at 
Genoa.  On 7 March, Rathenau made a last-minute impassioned plea for the United States to 
save Germany by recognizing the link between international indebtedness and international 
recovery and attending Genoa, pointing out that only the United States could facilitate 
Germany raising a loan large enough to satisfy its creditors.59   The timing of Rathenau's 
speech was reflective of the poor intelligence Germany had regarding American intentions; 
without capable, high-level representation in Washington, he was dependent on Britain for 
information. But Britain, wanting to hold Germany in line, had waited until 2 March before 
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notifying Germany that America was very unlikely to attend Genoa.6   0
 Lloyd George's failure to deliver America to the conference increased German concerns 
about Britain’s ability to hold France in check.  For his part, Poincaré had little incentive to 
attend a conference that did not promise elimination of French debts but rather threatened 
revision of both the London reparations schedule and the enforcement of Versailles. Under 
the terms of the provisional moratorium established at Cannes, Germany had to produce 31 
million gold marks every ten days. If Genoa was indefinitely postponed or if reparations 
were excluded from discussion, both Rathenau's policy and the mark faced collapse.  
 German fears were confirmed at the Boulogne meeting on 27 February when, to ensure 
French participation at Genoa, Lloyd George was forced to agree to Poincaré's demands that 
there would be no discussion at Genoa of either reparations or the other provisions of the 
Versailles treaty.60  At Paris in early March, Lloyd George was also forced to accept French 
demands for the primacy of the Reparation Commission over the Supreme Council in setting 
reparation terms, a move which significantly reduced his political influence. In addition, 
Lloyd George acceded to French demands for specific methods to establish control over 
Germany's chaotic finances.  From the German perspective, Boulonge was a reversal of the 
gains of Cannes.  Germany had overestimated its freedom of action, and without American 
involvement, Lloyd George would not support German interests at the expense of coming to 
terms with France.61   
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 Thus, Germany was again faced with the urgency of stimulating American involvement.  
On 1 March when Otto Wiedfeldt, director of Krupp and expert financial consultant to the 
German government, met informally with Lloyd George in London for a frank discussion of 
the outlook for the Genoa Conference and the reparations question, Lloyd George admitted 
that he had no definite program for Genoa and warned that “England cannot help you alone” 
and “You must get other people to assist us in the task.”  These remarks were meant as clear 
references to the United States.  Following a critique of the present German diplomats, Lloyd 
George added that he would be very interested to see who would be sent to America.  Soon 
afterward, Ambassador D’Abernon discussed this meeting with Rathenau and reported 
Rathenau’s view: “In his judgment, nothing remains but America.  If he could only get a 
good German Ambassador at Washington he might be able to bring them in to help Europe. 
‘It would be worth a great sacrifice to do this.’”6   2
  Rathenau stepped up the difficult search for an appropriate ambassador to Washington 
that he had been overseeing since taking over as foreign minister in January. Since the 
election of Harding and subsequent German hopes for a quick re-establishment of relations, 
Berlin had been wrestling with the dilemma of whom to send.  It was not an easy question: 
the United States made clear that it wanted no former representative of the Old Regime.  
Debates took place throughout 1921 over what sort of person would best represent German 
interests.  Rosen strongly favored sending a leading German intellectual such as Lujo 
Brentano or the theologian Adolf von Harneck.  Germany’s deepening financial crisis and 
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American preferences eventually resolved the uncertainty in favor of a leading financial 
figure, but who would want the job?  Due to the sinking mark, only a millionaire could afford 
to take up the position and Germany’s leading businessmen were occupied with their more 
profitable interests at home.  Wilhelm Cuno, General Director of the Hamburg-Amerika-
Linie, repeatedly refused, as did the General Director of the Norddeutschen Lloyd, Philipp 
Heineken.  Finance Minister Andreas Hermes did not want the job; the Center Party 
preferred he stay in the cabinet.  Wilhelm Solf, the former Foreign Minister and German 
Ambassador to Japan since 1920, was the preferred candidate of the Foreign Office but was 
passed over after much debate, due to concerns over American reaction to Solf’s Imperial 
background and his connections to Japan.63
 By late February, Otto Wiedfeldt had emerged as the best candidate. Wiedfeldt was a 
leading German economic expert, with wide experience in national and international 
financial and social matters.  Before the war he had made a study of the transportation 
situation in the Far East and America for the Reich Railroad Authority, and as chairman of 
the Krupp directors he had orchestrated the firm’s postwar reorganization. Both the 
Kaiserreich and the new Republic were highly corporatist and relied heavily on technical 
experts from industry, a capacity in which Wiedfeldt served often during the negotiations 
with the Ukraine in 1918 and as a leader of technical delegations both for Paris Peace 
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Conference and the Spa Conference 
 He had always refused the cabinet positions offered to him by Wirth, however.  
Politically close to the liberal wing of the Peoples Party, Wiedfeldt both considered Wirth 
too socialistic and distrusted the fulfillment policy.  But because of his business background, 
familiarity with Germany’s financial difficulties, and official expert status, Rathenau and 
especially President Ebert were keen to persuade Wiedfeldt to accept the Washington post.  
They were also attracted to Wiedfeldt’s similarities with his eventual American counterpart 
in Berlin, Alanson B. Houghton, who came from the business world rather than the foreign 
service and had strong independent political ties.  For both the United States and Germany, 
these were traits that fit the peculiarly financial requirements of rebuilding relations between 
the two nations.64   
 Wiedfeldt agreed to accept the Washington position but only with permission from a 
reluctant Gustav Krupp von Bolen, who was hesitant to lose his most valuable employee. 
President Ebert and the Foreign Office therefore applied direct pressure to Krupp for 
Wiedfeldt’s release to accept the urgent Washington position so vital to Germany’s financial 
situation.  Ebert made clear his opinion that nothing was more important for the German 
economy than to stimulate American engagement with Europe, calling on Krupp to release 
Wiedfeldt in the interest of German economic life.65   Still Krupp remained obstinate, loath 
to lose Wiedfeldt at a time the firm most needed his talents, until Wiedfeldt himself came up 
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with the idea of taking the Washington position as a special mission of limited duration—as 
a Sonderbotschafter [a special ambassador].   Negotiations over Wiedfeldt’s 
appointment continued well into March, including an effort by Hugo Stinnes, Germany’s 
greatest industrialist, to sway his colleague’s intransigence.  By mid-March, Krupp had 
relented enough to permit a “special mission” of short duration in Washington but wished to 
retain Wiedfeldt through the summer so that he could go to Genoa, arguing that Genoa must 
play out before anything else could happen regarding the United States. 
 Rathenau, who by late March realized the prospects for any real achievements at Genoa 
were dim, was strongly apposed to any delay, especially since the new U.S. Ambassador, 
Alanson B. Houghton, would soon be in Berlin and the U.S. was asking for a German 
ambassador in Washington as soon as possible. Because relations with the United States 
were now the first priority, Carl von Schubert, director of the American section of the 
Foreign Office (Abteilung III), complained to Rathenau that Krupp just wouldn’t understand 
how vital America now was for Germany and Europe and the absolute necessity of having a 
reliable German expert in Washington to explain the German situation and counter French 
influence. Despite the continued reluctance of his employer, Otto Wiedfeldt was named 
German Ambassador to the United States on 22 March 1922.  German hopes were now once 
again squarely pinned to help from the United States.66    
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 The Failure of the Genoa Conference  
 Britain's financial ability to help Germany in the Reparation Commission had also been 
severely curtailed by America's refusal to attend the Genoa Conference, its request for 
payment of American occupation costs, and its request to London to negotiate a debt-funding 
arrangement.  On 22 March, the Reparation Commission granted Germany a provisional 
short-term moratorium but imposed rigorous conditions, including a tax increase of 60 
billion marks, a reduction in German expenses, the establishment of an independent 
Reichsbank, and a committee of guarantee in Berlin.  The commission also imposed a 31 
May deadline for acceptance, or reparations terms would revert to the schedule of the 
London Ultimatum and Germany would be in default.67   The demands produced a crisis in 
the Wirth government. With its policy of fulfillment now in danger of being totally 
discredited, Ebert, Wirth and Rathenau gambled that the Reparation Committee would take 
no action on the eve of the Genoa Conference and refused the demands for new taxes and 
controls.6    8 The decision received strong backing in the Reichstag, reinforcing the feeling 
that Germany's financial state had reached an intolerable situation and that Germany required 
new tactics. Well aware that the mark had declined to 346 to the dollar, the Cabinet feared 
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that essential food and raw- material imports would make reparation payments impossible.69
 It is this context that best explains the German decision during the Genoa Conference to 
sign the Treaty of Rapallo with Russia, a risky gamble that a special relationship with Russia 
could provide leverage against other European nations and thereby improve Germany’s 
international position.  From the time he took office, Wirth had hoped to widen German 
options and escape a Versailles-based, Allied-dominated European system by improving 
relations with the United States and Russia; signing a trade agreement with Russia in May 
1921 and accepting the Treaty of Berlin in August had left him little to show for his efforts.  
After the Reparation Commission’s demands of 24 March further proved that Germany had 
failed to loosen the restraints of Versailles, Rapallo was an attempt to breathe life into 
Wirth's policy and, national independence and freedom of action.70
 With the support of Wirth, who was attracted to the possibilities for more freedom of 
movement in the East, Ago von Maltzan, the influential head of the Eastern department of 
the German Foreign Ministry, skillfully took advantage of German fears that Britain and 
France would conclude a separate agreement with Russia at Germany's expense to maneuver 
an ambivalent Rathenau into signing the treaty. The Rapallo Treaty provided for the 
establishment of diplomatic relations, mutual repudiation of claims for war costs and 
damages, Russian renunciation of any claims under the treaty of Versailles, and a waiver of 
German claims for the nationalization of German property in Russia, thereby shattering 
                                                          
 69 Chefbesprechung, 4 Apr 1922, Nr. 240, Kabinette Wirth II, pp. 670-74. 
 70 This view of Rapallo follows the analysis of Peter Krüger. See Peter Krüger, Die 
Aussenpolitik der Republik von Weimar (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 
1989), pp. 147-50; and "The Rapallo Treaty and German Foreign Policy," in Genoa, Rapallo, 
and European Reconstruction in 1922, ed. Carole Fink, Axel Frohn, and Jürgen Heideking, 
pp. 49-64. 
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unified Western non-recognition of the Communist regime and insistence on compensation 
for nationalized property. 
 Rapallo was also a reversal of the German policy of close cooperation with Britain and a 
refusal to concentrate German efforts on whatever solutions for European construction might 
be accomplished by Lloyd George.  As its critics in Germany noted, the treaty did nothing to 
solve Germany's 31 May deadline and reflected the lack of clear priorities and purpose in 
German foreign policy created by the apparent bankruptcy of Germany's fulfillment policy.  
This desperate, uncertain, conflicted quality would characterize Germany's relationship with 
the United States when Germany would once again turn to the United States for salvation in 
mid-1922.71  
 The United States viewed the lack of any substantive progress at Genoa with smug 
satisfaction.  The American observer at the conference, Ambassador to Italy Richard W. 
Child, who had initially advised that the United States should withhold its involvement until 
Europe turned away from "imperialistic intrigue and purely political programs" and sought 
"liberal economic cooperation," considered the conference " a great confusion.”7    2 Logan 
termed the conference a "cess-pool of political intrigues."73   The United States was not 
especially concerned about Rapallo.  To Castle it was just "another case of German 
                                                          
 71 For a discussion of Rapallo in the larger context of the Genoa Conference see Fink, 
The Genoa Conference; for a detailed analysis of the specific events that led to the signing of 
the Russo-German pact, see Krüger, "The Rapallo Treaty and German Foreign Policy," 
Genoa, Rapallo, European Reconstruction in 1922, pp. 49-64. 
 72 Child to State, 16 March and 29 Apr 1922, USDS 550.E1/108 and 550.E1/226. 
 73 Logan to State, 28 Apr 1922, USDS 550.E1/293. 
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psychology" that confirmed Washington's dislike and mistrust of Rathenau.74   But while the 
Rapallo pact cast a pall over the Genoa Conference, it was not the cause of its failure. The 
Genoa Conference reflected Lloyd George's political agenda, not the agenda of the United 
States. All agreed that German reparations and Allied war debts were the pivotal issues in the 
reconstruction of Europe, but neither could be solved without the United States, which had 
little interest in placing its political and financial interests under the tutelage of Lloyd George 
and Britain.75  
 Ironically, the American decision not to attend the Genoa Conference, together with 
Congressional restrictions on reduction of war debts, did increase America’s interest in 
resolving the question of German reparations.  The United States sought the economic 
revival of Germany as an essential element in the larger question of the reconstruction of 
Europe and increasingly viewed the battle over reparations as the heart of the European 
crisis.  By spring 1922, strong consensus had developed that the London reparation payment 
schedule was impossible for Germany to meet and that the cycle of French demands 
worsening the situation in Germany, followed by German refusals heightening French 
demands, had to be resolved through a "businessmen's solution" based on a determination by 
non-political experts of Germany's capacity to pay.  This approach offered multiple 
                                                          
 74 Castle to Alanson Houghton, U.S. ambassador to Germany, 22 Apr 1922, Houghton 
Papers.  Castle, who had a dislike of "reds" and carefully monitored communist activity in 
Germany, wrote Houghton that he did not trust Rathenau, considered him sympathetic to 
communism, and worried that Rathenau would lead "the forces of destruction if a terrible 
economic crisis hit Germany."  Castle to Houghton, 11 May 1922, Houghton Papers.  Logan 
considered Rathenau "a man with exaggerated ego and exalted conceit."  Logan to State, 28 
Apr 1922, 550.E1/293, USDS. 
 75 This point is also made by Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik in 
Deutschland, 1921-1932, p. 122. 
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advantages: it avoided political entanglements that would be unacceptable to Congress and 
the American public and it was grounded in a belief that a recovered Germany could pay 
reasonable reparations to France, which in turn could begin to pay its war debt to America. 
 In mid-March 1922, rumors of plans to shame the United States into canceling Allied war 
debts by having the Reparations Commission offer to reduce German reparations by 100 
percent, if the United States would agree to such a plan, gave the Harding administration 
additional incentive to move the issue of German capacity out of the Reparations 
Commission and into an experts committee.76  Keeping the issue of Allied War debts off the 
table both avoided a fight with Congress and held the issue in reserve as possible leverage for 
later British and French concessions about trade and disarmament. 
 By the logic of American policy, the first step was to maneuver France into accepting a 
reduction in German payments that would pave the way for American loans to stabilize 
Germany, but the State Department doubted that the 24 March demands of the Reparation 
Commission would accomplish anything useful.  Dresel warned that the demands had led to 
a fall in the exchange rate of the mark and that Germany faced a "real catastrophe" if this 
continued.  Myron T. Herrick, the American ambassador to France, advised Hughes that a 
reform of German finances was essential for reparation payments, "but there is no way of 
permanently reforming German finances or obtaining maximum possible indemnity which 
does not begin by reducing the total to a figure within German capacity."  American official 
opinion was now supporting those Germans who insisted that reform and stabilization could 
                                                          
 76 The plan was suggested by British Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Robert Horne, 
discussed at the Paris meeting of the Allied Ministers in March and then leaked to the press.  
Harvey to Hughes, 13 and 21 Mar 1922, 462.00R29/1543 and 1552, USDS; Herrick to 
Hughes, 21 Mar 1922, 462.00R29/1554, USDS; Boyden to Hughes, 21 Mar 1922, 
462.00R29/1601, USDS. 
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not occur unless the total bill for reparations was reduced.77   
  The opportunity for American intervention in the reparation crisis arrived on 4 April, 
when the Reparation Commission decided to appoint a special loan committee, including 
international bankers, to evaluate Germany's qualifications for an international loan. France 
and Belgium had agreed to this plan, both because they urgently needed reparations and 
because of a general concern that Germany was approaching collapse.78   But the French 
position had hardened after the Rapallo Pact. It was not until mid-May that Germany reached 
an agreement with the Reparation Commission in which Germany promised to balance its 
budget and accept the supervision demanded by the commission, with the understanding that 
supervision would not affect the sovereignty of the German government. In return, the 
commission would grant approval for an international loan.  The agreement was contingent 
upon Germany receiving a loan, but without American involvement it was unlikely that any 
loan could floated.79
                                                          
 77 Dresel to Hughes, 23 Mar 1922, USDS 462.00R29.1564; Herrick to Hughes, 24 Mar 
1921, USDS 462.00R29.1565. 
 78 The idea of an international loan for Germany was initially proposed at the March 
conference of Allied finance ministers in Paris by Sir Robert Horne, whose plan called for a 
loan of 4 billion gold marks guaranteed by German customs receipts which would provide 
four reparations annuities of 720 million gold marks and 500 million gold marks for 
stabilization of the mark.  Chefbesprechung, 1 Apr 1922, Nr. 237 and Kabinettssitzung, 6 
Apr 1922, Nr. 243, Kabinette Wirth II, pp. 659-62; Bergmann, The History of Reparations, 
124-6; David Felix, Walther Rathenau and the Weimar Republic (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1971), p. 149;  Feldman, The Great Disorder, pp. 433-44. 
 79 The agreement was the result of an independent initiative by Andreas Hermes, the 
German finance minister, who had met in Paris with British, Belgian and French 
representatives during the course of the Genoa Conference. Because France refused any 
discussion of Germany's total liabilities, the plan negotiated by Sir John Bradbury, the British 
representative on the Reparation Commission plan, proposed the interim solution of a partial 
moratorium for 1922 while compelling Germany to get its fiscal house in order.  Hermes 
accepted the plan, which required Germany to reform its finances before stabilization, a 
 112 
  
The Loan Committee  
 The Loan Committee provided Hughes with a mechanism for United States involvement 
in the reparations question by which the issue of Allied war debts could be avoided.  The 
State Department readily approved the loan committee scheme on 8 April, but rejected 
Boyden's suggestion of New York Federal Reserve Bank President Benjamin Strong as the 
American representative because of his connection with a semi-official government agency.  
Hughes instructed Boyden to suggest J.P. Morgan, the influential New York banker, but 
cautioned Boyden to "safeguard against any possible allegation that his name had been 
proposed by you." The administration wanted to be certain that Morgan could insist on a 
reduction of German reparation payments and at the same time claim he had no authorization 
to discuss any reduction in Allied war debt.80     
 While unwilling to become officially involved, Harding publicly announced that the 
administration supported the bankers committee as a vehicle to European reconstruction and 
American economic expansion.81   His message was reinforced by Hoover, who told the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
reversal of the German "balance of payment" approach to inflation; Wirth was furious and 
the German Cabinet split over the issue for five days.  Rathenau initially opposed acceptance, 
but then changed his mind and finally convinced Wirth that there was no alternative to 
acceptance.  For Cabinet meetings and documents see Kabinette Wirth II, pp. 728-88, 791-
822, 828-36, 839-41. See also Feldman, The Great Disorder, pp. 438-40, and Felix, Walther 
Rathenau and the Weimar Republic, pp. 153-54. 
 
 80 Hughes to Boyden, 8 Apr 1922, 462.00R29/1608, USDS. See also John M. Carroll, 
"The Paris Bankers' Conference of 1922 and America's Design for a Peaceful Europe" 
International Review of History and Political Science, 10 (August 1973), pp. 39-47.  Carroll 
follows the Open Door interpretation of American policy regarding Allied war debts, arguing 
that Washington sought to use those debts as leverage to further American commercial 
interests but makes no mention of the domestic political pressures constraining Hughes. 
 81 New York Times, 6 May 1922. 
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United States Chamber of Commerce on 16 May that European reconstruction required a 
reduction in armaments, a balancing of budgets, and a responsible schedule for the payment 
of reparations.  Hoover also pointed out that America was unlikely to give government loans 
to Europe, and that the Allies and Germany needed to demonstrate their commitment to 
peace and economic stability if they wanted private loans.82   The message was clear: If 
Europe would follow America's agenda, the dollars necessary for reconstruction would be 
made available.83
 Although France officially insisted that the Loan Committee could not modify either the 
Treaty of Versailles or the 1921 London Schedule, the Reparation Commission's Loan 
Committee expected that the international bankers would insist upon modification of the 
reparations schedule, thus sparing the commission responsibility for the decision.  Morgan's 
task was to convince the French that Germany's total reparation bill had to be scaled down if 
Germany was to receive a loan.  Logan quipped, "The fellow who lends the money is the 
fellow who makes the conditions and sets the rules, this fellow is not the politician but is the 
banker."84   But Logan's quip to the contrary, it was not Morgan who was setting the rules in 
May 1922, it was the Harding administration, which had defined the basic parameters of the 
loan.  As noted by Logan, if Morgan attempted to ignore those parameters, any attempt to 
                                                          
 82 New York Times, 17 May 1922. 
 83 Hoover was so adamant on the scaling down of reparations that he told Hughes that 
unless the State Department instructed Morgan to insist upon the reduction, he would 
publicly declare that any German loan not accompanied by a reduction in reparations was 
worthless. Hughes demurred, since he was already aware of Morgan's belief that a reduction 
was essential for any loan.  Memorandum by Christian A. Herter, 22 Apr 1922, Hoover 
Papers, cited in Buckingham,  International Normalcy, p. 119. 
 84 Logan to Fletcher, 18 May 1922, box 8, Henry Fletcher Papers, quoted in Carrol, "The 
Paris Bankers' Conference of 1922," p. 45. 
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link the reduction of Germany's reparations with the inter-Allied debt would result in the 
United States government withholding its "favorable consideration," essential for marketing 
the loan in the United States.85
 Poincaré, however, was not prepared to accept American rules.  In the latter half of April, 
the United States had begun pressuring France and Britain to prepare to begin repaying the 
war debt.86   Morgan reported that it would be possible to float a loan of $1.25 billion 
secured by German customs receipts and railroads. Germany would also have to reform its 
finances.)  But when Morgan refused to discuss any reduction in French debt to the United 
States and indicated that much of any loan would have to go for German food and raw 
material imports, thus limiting the amount available reparations, Poincaré's attitude 
hardened.87
 Expecting that the bankers would recommend a dramatic reduction in the 132 billion gold 
mark reparation bill, Poincaré told the French senate that the Loan Committee should not 
have the power to make recommendations about German reparations as long as American 
bankers had no mandate from their government to consider the question of inter-Allied debts.  
                                                          
 85 Logan to Assistant Secretary of State Leland Harrison, 2 June 1922, 462.00R29/1773, 
USDS. On 3 March 1922 the State Department, in an effort to control foreign loans by 
United States banks, had issued a public policy statement establishing procedures by which 
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While the administration had no legal power to enforce its decision, banks were dependent 
on the government's aid in cases of default. Press release issued by the Department of State, 3 
Mar 1922, FRUS I, pp. 557-58; see also Leffler, The Elusive Quest, pp. 58-64, and Carl P. 
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 86 Wadsworth to the Secretary of State, 18 Apr 1922, FRUS 1922 I, p. 397; Poincaré to 
the Secretary of State, 19 Jul 1922, FRUS 1922 I, pp. 404-5. 
 87  Fletcher to State, 6 June 1922, 462.00R29/1779, USDS;  Carrol, "The Paris Banker's 
Conference of 1922 and America's Design for a Peaceful Europe," pp. 39-47;  Link, Die 
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Accordingly, on 7 June the French representative to the Loan Committee cast a lone 
dissenting vote to defeat the resolution authorizing the Loan Committee to deal with all 
matters affecting German eligibility for an international loan.88   Having misjudged French 
resistance to American inflexibility regarding war debts, America’s premature efforts to 
force a settlement on France ended in failure. 
 The report of the Loan Committee was designed to be and was recognized as a severe 
reprimand to France.  In it, the bankers concluded that Germany could not receive an 
international loan while the reparation bill established by the London Ultimatum remained 
unchanged.  They did not consider Germany qualified for either a provisional loan large 
enough to cover its needs for five or six years or even for a small loan in the range of 1.5 
billion gold marks, which would cover reparations payments for one year.  The committee 
concluded that France's position made any further efforts pointless; however, the problem of 
inter-Allied debts and American policy did not escape notice.  In its final report, the 
committee insisted that prerequisites for any future loan must include, in addition to the 
removal of uncertainty about Germany's reparation obligations and stabilization of 
Germany's finances, a settlement of inter-Allied debts.89  
 The American assessment was that, despite the failure to reach agreement on a loan, the 
conference of bankers was "of great benefit to the general situation" and a vindication of 
                                                          
 88 For the French reaction see Kent, The Spoils of War, pp. 182-83; and Trachtenberg, 
Reparation in World Politics, pp. 247-49. 
 89"Report of the Banker's Committee to the Reparations Commission on the Question of a 
German Loan, 10 June 1922," London Times, 12 June 1922.  For the deliberations of the 
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American policy.  Logan reported to Washington: "Their findings constitute an expression of 
the world's financial opinion that the figure of the present indemnity so far exceeds German 
capacity as to be fantastic and that the maintenance of this figure can only lead to German 
bankruptcy.  The world opinion will undoubtedly follow the majority view of the 
Commission, backed by the Bankers, on this subject and this must have its ultimate effect on 
French Government opinion."90   Germany, like Logan, viewed the committee report as a 
great victory in the battle for world opinion.  Rathenau termed it "the greatest progress which 
the government's policy has enjoyed since the London Ultimatum."91   
 Rathenau's delight stemmed from the report’s conclusions that reparations had to be 
transformed from intergovernmental debts, enforceable by sanctions and force, to a 
commercial debt dependent upon traditional mechanisms of credit, which included the 
capacity to pay.  America and Germany had a mutual interest in such a transformation, which 
both saw as essential to the reintegration of Germany into the world economy.  But this 
mutuality had its limits.  While America sought a peaceful revision of the Versailles system, 
it expected Germany to pay reparations significantly higher than German ambitions.  In 
addition, while Germany wanted American political support for reduction in reparations, it 
was ambivalent at best about the prospect of being rescued by American loans, particularly 
interim and partial loans that would not cover the full costs of reparations but would still 
impose fiscal and monetary restraints and require mortgages of German assets.92
 Stabilization of the mark and fiscal discipline entailed social and economic consequences 
                                                          
 90 Logan to Harrison, 9 June 1922, 462.00R29/1790, USDS. 
 91 Kabinettssitzung, 13 June 1922, Nr. 291, Kabinette Wirth II, p. 867. 
 92 Ibid., pp. 862-67. 
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that the weak Wirth government was reluctant to face. Advocates of a loan were caught in a 
circular dilemma:  Germany insisted it could not stabilize without a loan, but it could not get 
a loan unless it was willing to reform its finances and stabilize its currency.  In addition, 
right-wing opponents of the Wirth government, which was far from confident about the 
success of its fulfillment policy, increasingly voiced criticisms.  The Wirth government was 
now dependent on the United States in two crucial respects. First, the United States had to be 
both willing and able to pressure a progressively more militant France into reducing 
Germany's reparation burden and not invading the Ruhr. Second, because Germany was 
willing to make only limited domestic reforms, American investors had to have enough 
confidence in Germany to provide sufficient investment and trade to keep the mark and the 
German economy from collapsing.  But the first reward of the "victory" of the bankers report 
was the fall of the mark, on 8 June, from 278 to the dollar to 313 on June 13. Hyperinflation, 
looming on the horizon, would further complicate Germany’s foreign relations.93   
 During the spring and summer of 1922 the United States developed its policy toward 
Germany and European reconstruction. American policy options, like German ones, were 
limited by domestic political considerations. Germany was important to the United States but 
not so important that the United States would risk direct political involvement.  By June 1922 
American policy had taken shape.  In seeking a European reconstruction based on a peaceful 
and limited revision of Versailles, America would continue to rely on "unofficial" economic 
diplomacy while waiting for the "ultimate" effect on French policy.  The bankers report 
contained all the elements that would reappear in the Dawes plan of 1924.  But initiative had 
                                                          
 93 For a discussion of beginning of Germany's slide into hyperinflation, see Feldman, The 
Great Disorder, pp. 447-52.  
 118 
passed to France in the early summer of 1922, and the German-American endeavor to reduce 
German reparation payments would be based on waiting France out. By overestimating its 
freedom of action and by refusing to undertake domestic reforms without a reduction in 
reparations, Germany had made itself dependent upon the United States, whose policy was 
still characterized by detachment.  Bilateral relations between the two nations, that began to 
grow with the exchange of ambassadors in the spring of 1922, would evolve in that context. 
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 Chapter III 
“Fairest and Most Righteous Treatment”: 
German-American Relations and the Origins of the 1922 Mixed Claims Agreement 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 After each of the two world wars, and again after the end of the Cold War, the United 
States has been forced to establish a new basis for its relationship with Europe and Germany.  
The United States engagement with Germany and Europe in the years immediately following 
World War II has been studied extensively, as scholars have long recognized the importance 
of the early years of the Weimar Republic to the rise of Hitler and widely debated the 
triangular interaction between Germany, France and Great Britain.  However, only minimal 
attention has been paid to post-World War I German-American relations prior to U.S. 
involvement in the Dawes Plan of 1924, which ended the French and Belgian occupation of 
the Ruhr and temporarily resolved the German reparations question. 
 The paucity of studies on German-American relations from 1918 to 1923 reflects the 
inherent problems of considering both nations’ multifaceted domestic issues that, together 
with complex international issues, impacted and defined the relationship.  Yet the nascent 
relationship between Germany and the United States was arguably the most crucial 
relationship in the international system of the early 1920s.  Germany represented the greatest 
challenge to the international system while the United States, which had emerged from the 
First World War as the world’s dominant economic power, represented the logical solution to 
the problems of European security and reconstruction.  It is this context that gives the United 
States-German Mixed Claims Agreement of 1922, which established a vehicle for the 
settlement of American war claims against Germany, its particular importance. 
 The agreement, an important step toward defining the German-American relationship in 
the 1920s, created the necessary political space in both the domestic and international arenas 
for a more active American role in reparation diplomacy and its later participation in the 
Dawes plan.  A close examination of the relationship between American domestic political 
issues and the implementation of foreign policy, as evidenced in the Mixed Claims 
Agreement, allows evaluation and critique of theoretical paradigms about the origins of 
American foreign policy during the 1920s.  From the perspective of Germany, the agreement 
demonstrates the importance it placed on its relations with the United States in its efforts to 
escape the restrictions of the Versailles treaty.   
 The issue of American war claims against Germany, symbolized in American minds by 
the sinking of the passenger liner Lusitania in 1915, engendered fierce political passions in 
the United States.1  After Congress refused to ratify the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, the 1921 
Treaty of Berlin, which reestablished official relations between the United States and 
Germany, claimed all rights and privileges against Germany granted under the Versailles 
treaty but refused to accept the corresponding responsibilities.  Section 5 of the Treaty of 
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relations, see Reinhard R. Doerries, Imperial Challenge: Ambassador Count Bernstorff and 
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 121 
Berlin provided that confiscated German property would be retained by the United States 
against all war claims dating from 31 July, 1914, thereby including shipping loss claims 
predating America’s entry into the war.  These pre-war claims not only made up the largest 
component of all claims but also engendered the greatest American political passions.  Their 
inclusion was a political necessity for Congressional ratification of the Treaty.  The Treaty of 
Berlin thus allowed for the possibility of extensive American claims against Germany.2 
 Germany had misread American policy and had hoped that an American desire to counter 
the domestic post-war recession through increased American exports to Germany would 
provide the Germany a strong hand in negotiating a separate peace.  Secretary of State 
Charles Evens Hughes, however, was concerned over the acrimonious political atmosphere 
in the U.S. Senate after the fight over the Versailles Treaty and insisted that Germany accept 
the Treaty of Berlin without modification. The German government, led by Chancellor Josef 
Wirth, had unsuccessfully attempted to limit American war claims in the Treaty of Versailles 
so that claims predating America's entrance into the war could be avoided.  Germany had 
also failed to secure the return of German assets seized during the war and held as security 
for American war claims, which it had hoped to use as a source of foreign exchange and a 
base for the expansion of German-American commercial relations, an important element of 
Wirth's “fulfillment” policy regarding reparation demands.3   
                                                          
 2 Department of State, Treaty Between the United States and Germany: Restoring 
Friendly Relations, Treaty Series No. 658 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1922). 
 3 The minority Weimar Coalition cabinet led by Dr. Josef Wirth took office on 10 May 
1921 and had accepted responsibility for fulfilling the conditions of the London Ultimatum 
on reparations imposed by Britain, France and Belgium.  The Wirth government's publicly 
avowed policy was one of fostering economic recovery through cooperation with the Allies.  
Its "fulfillment" reparation policy was based on appearing to cooperate while demonstrating 
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 All that Germany achieved were assurances that the United States, unlike its allies, would 
not press claims under the reparation clauses of Article 244 of the Versailles treaty and a 
promise that Germany would "be dealt with on the fairest and most righteous basis."4   
Germany, desperate for American aid in its growing conflict with the Allies over reparations, 
accepted the ambiguous terms of the separate peace agreement.  It did so both out of German 
enthusiasm for anything that was not Versailles and the hope that the settlement would lead 
quickly to a helpful and favorable resumption of full diplomatic and commercial relations 
with the United States.  However, having resolved the immediate political need for a peace 
treaty with Germany, the Harding administration was content to wait with cool detachment 
while it debated its policy about the reconstruction of Germany and Europe.  
 By 1922, the question of how the cost of the war was to be apportioned had reached a 
crisis stage.  The Allies owed the United States billions in war debts and were demanding 
billions in reparations from a German government whose financial capacity to pay was 
doubted and which had little political will to make the necessary sacrifices.  While the United 
States officially denied any links between the question of the Allied war debts and question 
of German reparations, there was an organic linkage that both Britain and France attempted 
to exploit.5
                                                                                                                                                                                    
that economic conditions demanded that reparations be reduced. 
 4 Secretary of State Hughes authorized Ellis Loring Dresel, American Commissioner in 
Berlin, to offer these assurances.  Hughes to Dresel, Washington, 20 Aug 1921, Papers 
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1936), vol. 2, pp. 19-20 (hereafter cited as FRUS). 
 5 France and especially Britain responded to American calls for a reduction in reparation 
demands from Germany by noting that U.S. reduction or even cancellation of Allied war 
debts would go a long way toward reducing their claims against Germany. See Stephen A. 
Schuker, "American Policy Toward Debts and Reconstruction at Genoa, 1922," pp. 95-122. 
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 Because political opinion within the United States was divided over the question of 
reducing the Allied war debt as a means of solving the reparation crisis and facilitating the 
economic recovery of Europe, the Harding administration and Secretary of State Hughes 
adopted a policy of seeking a "business-like" solution based on German capacity to pay.  
This formulation finessed the hot political question of reducing Allied war debts in exchange 
for reduced Allied demands for German reparations. 
 Interpretation of American policy regarding war debt reduction has been a subject of 
lively debate between historians sharing William Appleman Williams’s emphasis on a rigid 
economic determinism in U.S. foreign policy6 and those such as Melvyn P. Leffler, who 
emphasize the multiplicity of political and economic factors that led to policy formation.7  
Recently, scholars such as Michael Hogan, who identify the development of corporatism as 
the primary influence in American domestic and foreign policy, have seized upon the phase 
"business-like" as evidence of the beginning of the strengthening of government-business 
collaboration.8  However, even though extensive American claims against Germany would 
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impact what Germany could pay in reparations and the question of American war claims 
against Germany was a major roadblock to the settlement of the war debts/reparation issue, 
American scholars of this period have in general paid only slight attention to American war 
claims and the Mixed Claims Agreement. 
 Two reasons can be suggested for this relative neglect.  First, a useful analysis requires a 
combined American-German perspective since the question assumed a much greater 
importance in Germany than in the United States.  Second, only scant documentation exists 
in official government archives about the formation of policy toward war claims; Hughes's 
later account of the negotiation of the agreement simply repeats the official representations 
he originally made for domestic political purposes.9
 That scholars writing from the German perspective have given slightly more attention to 
the Mixed Claims Agreement is to be expected, given the large role the United States played 
in German diplomatic and economic aspirations of the time.  But even among these scholars, 
there is no general consensus regarding the Mixed Claims Agreement and its meaning for 
German-American relations.  Views on the Mixed Claims Agreement depend on how one 
understands the negotiations leading up to the agreement and the extent to which the 
agreement served the perceived goals of both Germany and the United States. 
 For example, Russell Van Wyk sees confusion and incoherence in the negotiations which 
naturally led to disappointment on both sides and the eventual failure of the Mixed Claims 
Commission that resulted from the agreement.10  Alternatively, Elisabeth Glaser-Schmidt 
                                                          
 9 See Beerits memorandum, "The Separate Peace with Germany, the League of Nations 
and the Permanent Court of International Justice," in Charles Evans Hughes Papers, box 172, 
folder 25, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division. 
 10 Russel D. Van Wyk, German-American Relations in the Aftermath of the Great War: 
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views the negotiations as evidence of a continuing, deliberate American policy to incorporate 
Germany into a liberal trading system, and the signing of the agreement as the launching of a 
new period of normalization for German-American relations.11  These studies, however, fail 
to evaluate the Mixed Claims Agreement in light of the international deadlock over 
reparations and war debts, a conundrum that constrained the foreign policy options of both 
Germany and the United States (monies paid to the United States for war claims would 
reduce what Germany could afford to pay the Allies in reparations).  It is only in this context 
that the coherence of policy and the limitations of the Mixed Claims Agreement can be 
understood. 
 
The Exchange of Ambassadors 
 The German government, desperate for American aid to contain Germany's rapidly 
expanding economic crisis, hoped that closer relations with the United States, especially via 
a commercial treaty, would help crack some of the economic restrictions placed on Germany 
by the Versailles treaty.  By spring 1922, Germany found itself crucially dependent on an 
America that had become the center of gravity in international politics.  Secretary of State 
Hughes made it clear that no commercial treaty would be considered until a provision for the 
settlement of American claims against Germany had been reached.12   The Germans, with 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Diplomacy, Law, and the Mixed Claims Commission, 1922-1939 (Ph.D. diss., University of 
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 11 Elizabeth Glaser-Schmidt, "Von Versailles nach Berlin. Überlegungen zur 
Neugestaltung der deutsch-americanischen Beziehungen in der Ära Harding," and "German 
and American Concepts to restore a Liberal World Trading System after World War I.” 
 12 Castle to Dresel, 16 Feb 1922, box 68, Dresel papers; Dresel to Sec. of State, 22 Feb. 
1922; Sec. of State to Dresel, 15 Apr 1922; Houghton to Sec. of State, 5 May 1922, FRUS, 
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almost no diplomatic leverage, had to wait for the State Department to establish its policy 
toward Germany and offer its proposals in regard to confiscated German property and the 
settlement of war claims.  Examination of the formulation of policy in Washington is 
therefore not only the key to understanding the origins of the Mixed Claims Agreement, it 
also provides crucial insight into the more general questions of who set policy and how 
policymakers balanced domestic and foreign policy concerns.  
 The ratification of the Treaty of Berlin, in November 1921, reestablished official 
diplomatic ties between the United States and Germany.  However, the appointment and 
exchange of ambassadors, the next step in normalizing relations, did not occur until spring 
1922.  In early 1922 the United States, still in the process of establishing policy about 
Germany and Europe, was in no hurry to have a heightened presence in Germany. Anxious to 
gain the good will and cooperation of the United States and unwilling to appear as pressing 
Washington on the issue, the Wirth government waited for Washington to make the initial 
move.    
 In February 1922, President Harding appointed Alanson B. Houghton, whose political 
and business background eminently qualified him, as the first U.S. postwar ambassador to 
Germany.  Houghton personified the business-oriented Republican policy toward Europe.13   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1922, II,  pp. 240-43;  For German confusion on this issue, see Haniel to Rathenau, Berlin, 
19 Apr 1922, Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, 1918-1945, Bd. VI, Serie A: 1918-
1925 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), pp. 140-42.  
 13 Houghton had supported the nomination of Frank O. Lowden, the governor of Illinois, 
as the Republican presidential candidate. Harding's appointment of him as ambassador to 
Germany was an effort to heal party wounds but he also had a genuine regard for Houghton's 
abilities and qualifications.  Houghton had been a loyal Republican who was, at the time of 
his appointment, serving as congressman from New York's 37th District.  This gave 
Houghton an understanding of the political realities of the administration's interactions with 
Congress over foreign policy.  As president of Corning Glass Works, a family concern, 
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Although William Castle, chief of the West European Division, and other State Department 
officials had hoped that Ellis Loring Dresel, the American commissioner in Berlin, would be 
appointed ambassador, the State Department was resigned to a political appointment.  
Houghton did, however, meet with State Department approval, even if he was not their man.  
Castle considered Houghton perhaps too sympathetic to Germany, but at least "sane" on the 
subject of reparations.  Castle commented to Dresel that "if we had to have a political 
appointee, Houghton is the best" and noted that perhaps Houghton's businessman's viewpoint 
would not be bad.14   
 In Germany, the search for an ambassador was more difficult.  The United States refused 
to accept any diplomat who had previously served in the United States under the Kaiserreich.  
The State Department also had asked the Germany not to send a "big name," but rather 
someone who understood and appreciated economic questions.  More important, due to the 
exchange rate, only a millionaire could afford to accept the post and few were willing to do 
so.  In March 1922, Otto Wiedfeldt, director of Krupp, accepted the government's pleas to 
take the position. Walther Rathenau, the German foreign minister, considered Wiedfeldt 
especially suitable because of his connections to leading German industrialists and financial 
circles.  The choice demonstrated the premium placed by the Wirth government on fostering 
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commercial relations and on courting the United States for help with Germany's financial 
situation.15   
 With the arrival of Houghton, Germany looked forward to bilateral relations with the 
United States.  Germany's goal was a commercial treaty that would enhance economic ties 
with the United States and help break the economic restrictions imposed by the Treaty of 
Versailles.  But before Hughes would even consider a commercial treaty, he wanted a 
German agreement on the settlement of American war claims against Germany. His first task 
would be to obtain an agreement, based on terms set by the United States.  
 
The Problem of the American War Claims   
 When the Harding administration took office it faced a confusing situation regarding the 
satisfaction of American claims against Germany.  A significant amount of American claims 
against Germany stemmed from losses, primarily shipping losses, that had occurred prior to 
the entry of the United States into the war and therefore were not covered by the Versailles 
Treaty.  Claims relating to the rights of neutrals during time of belligerency traditionally had 
been governed by precedents arising out of international law and many of the claims of 
United States citizens against Germany arose from incidents which might not be considered 
violations of international law.  When Senator Philander Knox, in 1920, proposed 
terminating the state of belligerency by simply repealing President Wilson's declaration of 
war, he had added a proviso giving the United States the right to retain German property 
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until Germany satisfactorily settled all United States claims.  Germany's defeat had not 
softened the memory of the sinking of the Lusitania which continued to excite American 
passions.  Wilson's veto of that measure, however, left the legal justification for American 
pre-war claims in legal limbo.  
 The Wilson administration had not been overly concerned with the legal technicalities of 
American claims and sequestered German property, as during the war other belligerent 
nations had also ignored the traditional prohibitions of international law against seizure and 
sequestration of private property.  Following their example, Wilson sequestered German 
property in the United States when America entered the war in 1917 and by 1918 had begun 
to sell off German assets to satisfy claims, a practice reflecting his nationalism as well as his 
personal lack of interest in economic affairs.16  
 The disarray that characterized the final year of the Wilson administration, together with 
the unresolved questions of legal status, gave entrepreneurs ample opportunity to loot the 
Alien Property Custodian Fund and seek settlements furthering individual financial and 
political gains.  The sale of German assets, particularly patent rights, for artificially low 
prices created a small scandal.17   Law firms seeking large fees advertised their political 
connections to German owners of confiscated assets.  Francis P. Garvin, the Alien Property 
Custodian, proposed to German shipping companies that America would return German 
                                                          
 16 See Elisabeth Glaser-Schmidt, "Von Versailles nach Berlin. Überlegungen zur 
Neugestaltung der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen in der Ära Harding," p. 320; James 
A. Gathings, International Law and American Treatment of Alien Enemy Property  
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 17 Dulles to Dresel, 9 March 1921, Dresel Papers. 
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property if German companies dropped complaints against the United States and the Alien 
Property Custodian.18  
 The Harding Administration inherited both the problems of the Alien Property Custodian 
Fund and the legal questions associated with American claims against Germany.  Hughes' 
first step was to stop the abusive practice of selling German assets at below market prices.  
Hughes, a patrician attorney with progressive beliefs, had little tolerance for these corrupt 
practices.  He also disliked the idea of using the confiscated property of private German 
nationals to pay claims, but in April 1921, there appeared to be little alternative to that 
policy.  Legal advisors in the State Department noted:  
 It seems extremely unfortunate that no such provision was made and that pre-war 
claims must be settled, so far as the treaty is concerned, out of the proceeds of 
property which for centuries has been regarded as inviolable.19
 
Congress was similarly guided by these considerations in July 1921 when it passed the 
Knox-Porter Resolution ending the state of war against the Central Powers.  Section 5 of the 
resolution expressly addressed the holding of German property until suitable provisions had 
been made "for the satisfaction of all claims against the German Government" by American 
nationals "who have suffered through the acts of the Imperial German Government or its 
agents since July, 31, 1914, loss, damage, or injury to their persons or property."20   
 
 
                                                          
 18 For these and other schemes involving the sequestered property, see Van Wyk, 
"German-American Relations," pp. 35-39. 
 19 Nielsen to Hughes, 16 Apr 1921, RG 59, 711.62119/116, USDS. 
 20 Congressional Record, (SJ Res. 16), 67th Cong., 1st sess., p. 3299. 
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The Mixed Claims Proposal 
 During negotiations over the Treaty of Berlin, Germany had been well aware that Section 
5 of the Knox-Porter Resolution could become the basis for extensive American claims 
against Germany.  They had tried without success to have American claims limited by the 
Treaty of Versailles as a means of avoiding claims originating before America's entrance into 
the war.  But these efforts were met only with assurances that the United States would not 
press claims under the Versailles treaty’s reparation clauses of Article 244 and that Germany 
would "be dealt with on the fairest and most righteous basis."  But even with this 
understanding, the language of Section 5 still afforded United States nationals the 
opportunity to file a vast array of claims against Germany.  
 When Hughes turned his attention to the issue in February 1922, he had little trouble with 
the idea that validating claims from 31 July 1914 was a marked departure from prior 
international law.  Section 5 of the Knox-Porter Resolution made Germany responsible for 
prewar damages, whether or not those acts constituted a violation of international law as it 
applied to the rights of neutrals.  Not only had Germany signed the Treaty of Berlin, thereby 
accepting such claims, any actions casting doubt on the legitimacy of claims against 
Germany for the sinking of the Lusitania or other shipping losses would have been politically 
untenable.  What did trouble Hughes was the confiscation of private property belonging to 
German nationals, which violated the norms of both international and American law and set a 
potentially dangerous precedent for the possible confiscation of American property in some 
future war or military action. 
 In a draft proposal for the settlement of claims against Germany, the first assumption of 
Hughes's legal advisors was that "provision should speedily be made for the return of this 
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property subject to proper provision being made for the protection of American claims 
against Germany and German nationals" (emphasis in original).  The second assumption, 
however, was that "no undertaking or guarantee of the German government would be 
sufficient in view of its precarious financial condition and that the reparation claims of the 
Allies have a prior lien."  The only secure source of funds in 1922 was the Alien Property 
Custodian Fund.  In the legal department's opinion, the preservation of the benefits of the 
provisions of Versailles "fortunately" allowed the retention of German nationals' private 
property to secure or provide for claims.  Hughes could assert that the United States was 
acting entirely within the context of law.21     
 The February 1922 draft proposal conceptualized four classes of claims.  The largest 
category, claims of American nationals against the German government concerning the 
conduct of the war, included American ships sunk by German submarines.  For the second 
category, insurance claims arising from insurance payments for losses incurred and the 
expense of excessive war premiums, the solicitor's office recommended that no provision be 
made since insurance companies had been compensated for their losses through increased 
premiums and ship owners had received insurance payments.  Also, the cost of increased 
insurance payments had already been shifted to consumers, whose reimbursement was 
deemed impractical.22   
 The solicitor's office expected that claims in the third category, for the return of real 
                                                          
 21 "Suggestions for Dealing with the Private Property of German Nationals Now in the 
Hands of the Alien Property Custodian," 14 Feb 1922, unsigned draft, copy in the Houghton 
Papers, Corning NY.  This draft proposal appears to have been given to Houghton before his 
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 22 Ibid. Insurance claims constituted approximately 40 percent of all pending cases in 
1922. Van Wyk, "German-American Relations," p. 99, n. 52. 
 133 
property (factories, warehouses, goods, and securities) seized by the German government 
during the war, would largely take care of themselves as Germany had already restored these 
things to their American owners.  Outstanding claims would be for the use of these properties 
during the war and claims for properties that Germany had converted into cash.23   
 The fourth and final category of claims was payment of private debts, owed by German 
nationals to American nationals, which had been interrupted by the war, including bank 
accounts and commercial debt.  The solicitor's office wished for these claims to be paid at the 
mark’s exchange rate in March 1917, one month prior to America's entrance in to the war, 
and wanted to apply this principle to the property debt category as well  (the mark had 
declined as the possibility increased that the United States would enter the war).  In addition, 
the office viewed the efforts of German nationals to discharge their debts in depreciated 
marks as an "injustice" against which American nationals should be protected "just as the 
Allied governments have protected their nationals against a similar injustice."  The State 
Department was probably well aware that Congress would not tolerate American nationals 
being treated less favorably than Allied nationals. This category of claims, however, 
represented a departure from international law as it attempted to hold the German 
government responsible for the debts of its private citizens.24    
 By February 1922, $270,000,000 in damage claims had been filed with the State 
Department, an amount estimated by the solicitor’s office to greatly exceed what would 
actually be paid, especially if insurance claims were excluded. The State Department fully 
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Hands of the Alien Property Custodian," 14 Feb 1922, unsigned draft, copy in the Houghton 
Papers. 
 24 Ibid.
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expected that the $400,000,000 German assets held in the Alien Custodian Fund would more 
than cover claims and that as soon as the full amount of legitimate claims could be 
ascertained, the balance could be returned to Germany.  The draft proposal suggested that 
German small holdings of under $2000 should be paid immediately and in full.  Owners of 
larger holdings would then be returned some percentage of their assets.25  
 The original proposal envisioned a German bureau operating in the United States with 
the authority to approve claims and, if necessary, litigate disputes before a tribunal consisting 
of one American, one German, and one neutral; an American bureau would present claims to 
the German bureau and assist in their adjustment.  The State Department expected that the 
vast majority of claims would be settled without litigation, but the February proposal 
recommended an all-American tribunal for those that were disputed, arguing that American 
claimants might hesitate to submit their claims to a mixed tribunal and would prefer to 
litigate in American courts.  The proposal noted, "It is perhaps necessary that American 
claimants should know of their right to assert their claims in American courts," but expressed 
the hope that claimants would be attracted to "the more speedy relief" of an "all-American 
tribunal."26  
 Above all, Hughes's legal advisors and the State Department wanted to keep claims cases 
out of American courts, presumably because of the greater influence the State Department 
would have on a tribunal system.  Unlike the court system, wherein the executive branch had 
only limited influence, the administration would be able to appoint members of the tribunal, 
better assuring not only its integrity but also greater sensitivity to Hughes’s diplomatic 
                                                          
 25 Ibid.
 26 Ibid.
 135 
agenda.  Hughes had to satisfy Congressional political imperatives while preventing 
American claims against Germany from spiraling out of control.  Large American claims 
against Germany would be in competition with British and French claims for reparations; the 
United States could not simultaneously raise questions as to Germany's capacity to pay 
reparations, demand payment of Allied war debts, and seek massive claims against Germany. 
 The State Department's desire to disallow insurance claims reflected concern about 
opening up the claims process to indirect or consequential injuries rather than limiting claims 
to proximate causes.  At the same time, Hughes had to contend with the language of Section 
5 that made Germany liable for damages caused "directly or indirectly" to American 
nationals.  If allowed under the language of Knox-Porter, consequential claims could include 
categories such as lost profits, possibly totaling several hundred million dollars in claims.  
This would create a diplomatic nightmare for Hughes, who was struggling to keep pressure 
on Britain and France for a reduction in German reparations annuities while maintaining the 
official separation of inter-Allied debt from German reparations.  The draft proposal thus 
reflected a compromise among Hughes' sensitivity to the political demands of Congress, his 
personal preferences for the rules of international law and his recognition of the diplomatic 
realities of reparation politics in 1922.27   
 The final mixed-claim proposal that emerged in June 1922 was very close to the February 
draft proposal.  In formulating plans for a claims commission, Hughes limited his 
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consultations to the legal staff of the State Department.   Castle and other West European 
advisors were consulted only minimally.28   The only significant change was the substitution 
of a mixed American-German claims commission in place of the original plan for an all-
American one.  A commission composed entirely of Americans would have had several 
advantages, including easier Congressional acceptance and avoiding insistence that cases be 
tried in American courts. Additionally, because American nationals’ claims against Germany 
was a popular subject of Congressional rhetoric, an all-American tribunal would have 
assured Congress that Germany would not be able to evade claims.  The initial proposal, 
however, violated international legal precedent and differed significantly from the tribunal 
mechanisms established by the Treaty of Versailles.  Germany would also very likely have 
raised significant objections.  Following consultations with Houghton, Hughes settled on a 
plan which amounted to an elaborate charade.  The United States would propose a mixed 
tribunal and then ask Germany to request the appointment of an American to serve as an 
umpire for disputed cases.29  
 The German foreign office raised the question of a mixed claims commission in February 
in connection with its desire to establish commercial relations.  While it expressed its 
resentment that commercial negotiations were being held hostage to the claims question, it 
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also expressed its willingness to establish a mixed claims commission.  Germany, however, 
wanted the commission not only to determine the amounts to be paid, but in addition to 
decide on the justification of the demands, determine the categories of indemnities and 
clarify questions of finances.  Germany also wanted a specific waiver from the United States 
of American rights to reparations under the Treaty of Versailles.30  
 Written at a time when Germany still held high hopes for its relationship with Britain and 
Lloyd George, the German note was a challenge to the American position that Germany was 
responsible for damages incurred during the period of American neutrality.  Since American 
claims were secured by the Alien Property Custodian Fund, the German note represented 
little more than an expression of irritation with the United States and the unrealistic hope that 
those claims based on German action before the United States entered the war could be 
excluded.  
 Hughes waited until Houghton was on his way to Germany in April before answering the 
German note, pointing out that while the commission would consider questions of facts, the 
rules of liability were determined by the Treaties of Versailles and Berlin.  He also indicated 
that claims would be limited to the three categories detailed in the February proposal.3   1  
Germany would not be subject to open-ended reparation claims.  Negotiations would center 
around the question of the composition of the mixed claim commission and on what 
categories of claims Germany could exclude.  
 Immediately upon his arrival in Germany on 18 April, Houghton sounded Wiedfeldt out 
on the idea of Germany asking for an American umpire.  In that conversation and in 
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subsequent meetings with German officials that an American umpire would help gain 
Congressional support for a mixed commission.  In response to German suggestions that the 
mixed claim commission could be started immediately, leaving the issue of an umpire to be 
settled later, Houghton indicated that it would be best to resolve the matter before Congress 
dictated an even less desirable solution.32  
 German officials were ambivalent about the proposal.  The idea of a mixed commission 
was tremendously appealing.  It would set a precedent for German equality in international 
relations and signify a break with international commissions on which Germany had no 
representatives but which handed down "Diktats."  Although concerned about the possibility 
that an American umpire would always rule against Germany, senior German officials tended 
to believe that the United States would treat Germany fairly and that Germany might even 
fare better with an American umpire than with a neutral.  The plan also offered the 
possibility of the release of some assets from the Alien Property Fund.  Houghton also misled 
the Germans into believing that decisions of the commission would have to be confirmed by 
the Reichstag.  What bothered German officials was the possibility that the German public 
would view an American umpire as a violation of equal bilateral German-American relations.  
Despite this, Germany was prepared to accept the idea rather than face Congressional action.  
The Auswärtige Amt's strategy was to hold out as long as possible for a mixed commission 
without an umpire and hope that the United States might drop its demand for an American 
umpire.  At the same time, Germany would see what concessions it might extract, including 
American action on the revival of the prewar bilateral treaties between the United States and 
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Germany on such matters as consular relations, patents, copyrights and naturalization 
conventions.33  
 By early June, German hopes for a reparation settlement were riding on a committee of 
international bankers, led by J.P. Morgan Jr., who were investigating the possibility of a loan 
to Germany.  Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau, was inclined to be as cooperative on the 
war claims issues as German political conditions allowed.  Rathenau accepted an American 
umpire but hedged on the powers of the umpire out of persistent concerns about German 
public opinion.  Privately, however, Rathenau told Houghton that he would "swallow it 
whole."34  
 This bid for closer relations with America, with the hope for American support in the 
growing reparations crisis if the claims issue could be settled quickly, represented the last 
gasp of Chancellor Wirth's and Rathenau's fulfillment policy.  Large government 
expenditures had maintained the social order within Germany, which had been shaken by the 
war and the traumatic birth of the republic, but by June 1922, Germany had begun its 
collapse into “hyperinflation” threatening the existence of the middle class.   The Wirth 
government’s fulfillment policy had brought to a boil the issue of which segment of society 
would be forced to bear the burden of the domestic costs of reparations.  This was a lethal 
issue in Germany which tested the new democratic state.  Walther Rathenau's assassination 
on 24 June 1922 resulted largely from his role in the government’s fulfillment policy.  
Chancellor Wirth and other members of the cabinet also faced the real threat of 
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assassination.35   
 The murder of Rathenau and the spurt of inflation that followed it significantly changed 
the atmosphere of negotiations.  Houghton chided Castle for State Department delays in 
drafting the final treaty.  "If the Department had acted promptly," Houghton noted, "the 
treaty would have been signed and put into effect long before Rathenau's death."  Houghton 
was convinced that the late foreign minister "meant to play the game very much as I wanted 
it."36   Houghton also believed that Rathenau had been more concerned with the German-
American relationship than about the details of the treaty.  But after his death, "[t]he four or 
five Under Secretaries who run the Foreign Office just now cannot get that point of view."37
 Despite American assurances of good will, Germany had reason to question exactly how 
the United States would interpret the broad reach of the language contained in Section 5 of 
the Knox-Porter resolution.  Germany wanted several points changed or clarified.  The first 
of the Auswärtige Amt's concerns was that, contrary to Houghton's earlier mistaken 
assurance that decisions of the Commission would have to be approved by the Reichstag and 
the United States Congress, the draft treaty specified that decisions would be binding on both 
governments. Germany wanted all decisions to be subject to ratification by the Reichstag.  
Such a provision would provide a check on rulings by an American umpire.  Secondly, 
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Germany wanted removed from the jurisdiction of the Commission the question of debts 
owed to American citizens by German nationals.  The Auswärtige Amt argued that the 
Commission should only deal with claims against the German government and not private 
individuals.  The inclusion of claims against German nationals technically violated German 
constitutional law.  In addition, the treaty made the German government responsible for the 
payment of such claims.  In July 1922, the Wirth government was under attack for the failure 
of its policy of fulfillment.  It was concerned that it would be attacked for agreeing to treat 
private debts in a manner which was not provided for either in the Treaty of Berlin or the 
Treaty of Versailles.  In an effort to limit the number of claims it would have to pay, 
Germany wanted to exclude all claims not presented to the Commission within two months 
of its first meeting.  Germany's primary concern, however, was to secure a side letter 
specifying that the United States did not intend to raise claims relating to military pensions or 
family allowances.  The Auswärtige Amt also sought the insertion of phraseology that could 
be interpreted as limiting American claims to those originating after America's entrance into 
the war.  Finally, Germany, desperately short of foreign exchange, was anxious to discover if 
there was any possibility of assets from the Alien Property Custodian Fund being released. 38  
 Although very willing to provide Germany with a side letter stating that the United States 
did not intend to press claims for pensions, Hughes was worried about a bill, introduced by 
Senate Democratic Minority Leader Oscar Underwood, that proposed to treat American 
claims against Germany as a purely domestic matter and establish an exclusively American 
                                                          
 38 Houghton to Sec. of State, 2 and 7 August 1922, FRUS 1922 II, pp. 256-57, 259.  
Wiedfeldt was active in following up reports of State Department plans to release trust 
accounts of under $10,000 and was lobbying for the interest-bearing securities held in the 
Custodian Fund to be paid to the German owners.  Castle to Houghton, 8 Jul 1922, Houghton 
Papers. 
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commission that would use the Custodian Fund to pay American claims.  Additionally, 
Underwood's bill sought to include military pensions and family allowances under American 
claims.  Such claims would have vastly exceeded the assets of the Custodian Fund.  Coming 
at a time when Germany had just requested a two-year moratorium on reparation payments, 
such Congressional action would have been a diplomatic bombshell.  It would have placed 
the United States in direct competition with Britain and France for German reparations when 
the United States was already insisting on Allied payment of war debts and promoting the 
idea that German reparations be based on Germany's capacity to pay.39   
 The financial impracticability of attempting to charge American military pension costs to 
Germany most likely would have enabled the Harding Administration to stop such 
legislation.  However, Congressional insistence upon an all-American claims commission 
and confiscation of the Custodian Fund to pay benefits represented a serious threat to 
Hughes' plans.  The original proposal had envisioned an all-American commission.  
Germany's demands for a moratorium strengthened the belief that the Fund's assets 
represented the only likely vehicle for payment of American claims.  Hughes viewed the 
outright confiscation of private property as going against the tenets of international law, "at 
variance with the principles and practice generally observed by nations in their relations with 
each other."40   Hughes, who looked forward to a reconstruction of Europe based on the 
principles of liberal capitalism, had little interest in setting precedents for overt government 
                                                          
 39 The Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Knute Nelson) to the Sec. of State, 
21 Jul 1922; Sec. of State to the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Nelson), 29 
Jul 1922, FRUS 1922 II, pp. 251-53; Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2nd. sess., pp. 
10443-49. 
 40 Sec. of State to Nelson, 29 July 1922, FRUS, 1922, II, pp. 252-54. 
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confiscation of the private property of foreign nationals, a precedent that could some day 
rebound against the interests of United States property owners in foreign lands.  Nor was 
there any particular advantage for the United States to do so.  Hughes knew that Germany 
would accept an American umpire and that the United States lost nothing by waiting to see if 
an alternative to the Custodian Fund could be arranged.  
 Hughes now turned to Senator William E. Borah for assistance.  Borah was the best 
situated to lead any potential revolt against the administration and his support would cut 
short any Congressional attempt to block the administration's policy.  Borah, who believed 
that German recovery was necessary for European reconstruction and that the Allies had 
been too hard on Germany, accepted Hughes's constitutional argument that the 
administration had the authority to set up the Mixed Claim Commission through executive 
agreement.4   1 Although Borah's support assured Hughes that the Administration's position 
ultimately would prevail in Congress, Hughes wanted rapid German acceptance to forestall 
Democrats from using the issue for political advantage in Congress.  Hughes used the threat 
of the Underwood bill to pressure Germany into quickly accepting American terms for the 
Mixed Claims Commission.  As a sweetener, Hughes was willing to accept a time limit for 
the filing of claims, although he extended the German request for a two month time limit to 
six months.  But Hughes was not prepared to yield on the question of pre-war claims or 
claims against German nationals. 42   
                                                          
 41 Castle to Houghton, 4 Aug 1922, Houghton Papers; Hughes, "The Separate Peace," 
Hughes Papers; Robert J. Maddox, Borah and American Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1969), pp. 123-24. 
 42 Castle to Houghton, 4 August 1922, Houghton Papers; Sec. of State to Houghton, 29 
July and 5 Aug 1922, FRUS 192, II, pp. 255-58. 
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 German Acceptance 
 The Wirth cabinet decided on 15 July to accept the principle of an American umpire.  
Although Germany's experience with neutral referees in tribunals established under the 
Treaty of Versailles had not been good, the cabinet felt that Germany was likely to do no 
worse with an American umpire, especially if a member of the United States Supreme Court 
was chosen for the position.  Furthermore, cooperation on this point would gain American 
good will.43   The Auswärtige Amt and State Secretary Edgar Carl Haneil von Haimhausen 
remained strongly opposed to accepting the agreement.44   In addition, the Ministers of 
Justice and Interior, Eugen Schiffer and Georg Gradnauer, opposed the provision regarding 
claims against German nationals.  Nonetheless, Wirth overrode the opposition and accepted 
the Mixed Claims Commission on 29 July.45     
 The German-American claims agreement was signed on 10 August, and Wirth asked the 
United States to name the umpire.  Hughes arranged for the immediate announcement that 
Supreme Court Associate Justice William R. Day would serve as umpire.  President Harding 
asked Hughes that in making the announcement, Hughes "emphasize the request to us to 
name [the] umpire."  "It is so unusual," Harding noted, that its significance is worth bringing 
well to the fore."  The Agreement provided the administration with the political ammunition 
to defeat Underwood's bill.  It also allowed Hughes to celebrate the Agreement as an 
                                                          
 43 Cabinet meeting of 15 Jul 1922, Kabinette Wirth II, p. 953. 
 44 Glaser-Schmidt, “Von Versailles nach Berlin,” p. 337. 
 45 Houghton to Hughes, 2 and 7 August 1922, FRUS 1922 II, pp. 256-57, 259-60; 
Agreement Between the United States of the America and Germany, signed at Berlin, 10 
August 1922, FRUS 1922 II, pp. 262-64. 
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administration success while campaigning for Lodge in October 1922.46   
 Both the Alien Property Custodian Fund and the Mixed Claims Agreement quickly 
became enmeshed in reparation politics. The Allies immediately saw the Custodian Fund as a 
source from which the United States could obtain its costs for the American occupation 
forces.  The dispute over the United States' entitlement to reparation annuities for the 
payment of claims against Germany would continue through the London Conference of 
1924, which established the Dawes Plan for the payment of German reparations, and into 
early 1925 when it was finally agreed that the United States would reduce the annual 
installment for its occupation costs in exchange for the allocation of two percent of the 
German reparation payments to American claims.47
 In 1923 the United States Congress passed the Winslow Act, allowing accounts of 
$10,000 and less held in the Custodian Fund to be returned to their owners.  The act was in 
large measure a humanitarian gesture designed to help holders of small trusts during the 
ravages of the German hyperinflation of 1923.  It would be another five years before the bulk 
                                                          
 46 Hughes to Harding, and Harding to Hughes, 10 August 1922, FRUS, 1922, II, pp. 262-
66; Hughes speech at a mass meeting, Symphony Hall, Boston MA, 30 Oct. 1922, box 189, 
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of Alien Property Custodian Fund was released to its owners.48
  
Conclusion 
   The history of the negotiation of the Mixed Claim Commission provides little support 
either for the argument that domestic economic issues drove American foreign policy in the 
early 1920s or for the thesis that foreign policy resulted from a collaboration between 
business interests and government.  The United States was divided over the crucial issue of 
whether it should reduce Allied war debts to foster a European recovery that could stimulate 
American exports.  While Hughes was forced to take parochial congressional pressures into 
account, the Mixed Claims Agreement is primarily an example of diplomacy directed from 
the top and closely held because of lack of consensus. 
 Secretary of State Hughes balanced the domestic political and partisan concerns of 
Congress with the practical concerns of the problem of inter-allied debts and the stabilization 
of Germany in the interest of European reconstruction.   Hughes satisfied American public 
opinion with the staged German proposal for an American umpire, smoothing the 
agreement's way through Congress, and in doing so undercut the Democrats’ ability to use 
the war claims issue in the 1922 elections.  The establishment of the Mixed Claims 
Commission kept the claims issue out of American courts, where the amount of allowable 
claims and sums awarded against Germany could spiral out of control, confounding the 
administrations diplomacy with both Germany and the Entente.    Hughes therefore 
successfully prevented the question of American claims against Germany from opening up 
                                                          
 48 Manfred Jones, The United States and Germany, A Diplomatic History (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1984), p. 167; Van Wyk, “German-American Relations in the Aftermath of 
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larger question of the linkage between the war debts the Allies owed to the United States and 
the Allies reparation demands against Germany.  Hughes was now free to continue to take 
the position that the two issues were unrelated and that what was needed was a "business-
like" solution that would settle the reparation demands on the basis of Germany's capacity to 
pay.  It was a position that the United States would continue to hold throughout 1922 as the 
reparation crisis deepened and throughout the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr.  It would become 
the basis of the Dawes plan. 
 Germany was forced to accept an agreement whose terms were dictated by American 
priorities.  Hughes threatened the stick of the Underwood bill and held out the carrot of a 
commercial treaty.  In addition Germany was desperate for the support of American financial 
interests in its struggle with France over reparations.  From the German perspective, the 
agreement did have the advantage of being a settlement with a major power that had been 
negotiated outside the framework of the Versailles treaty.  Most importantly, in accepting the 
agreement Germany settled the last outstanding issue with the United States clearing the way 
for Germany to seek aid of the world's strongest economic power in its struggle to escape 
from its reparation burden and the confines of the Versailles treaty.  When the Wirth 
government fell in September 1922, the new German government, with the blessings of 
Ambassador Houghton, would be led Wilhelm Cuno, the President of the Hamburg-
American shipping line, who was chosen in large measure because of his American 
connections and whose explicit mandate was to seek a "business-like" solution to the 
reparation crisis.   Germany's eventual reward for its relationship with the United States 
would be the American led Dawes plan which temporarily resolved the reparation issue, 
ended the threat of any further French militarily action against Germany to enforce 
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reparations, and marked the beginning of Germany's escape from the Versailles settlement. 
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Chapter IV 
War Debts and Reparations: The Limits of Economic Diplomacy 
June 1922 – January 1923 
 
 
The Question of German Reform and the Moratorium 
 Secretary of State Hughes's attempt to avoid direct U.S. involvement in the reparations 
crisis and utilize the Reparations Commission as a vehicle to achieve a “businessman's 
solution” had unintended, pernicious effects of reinforcing Germany’s  belief  that American 
involvement would lead to a reduction in the reparation bill and that eventual American loans 
would ease Germany's path to stabilization.  Poincaré's rejection of the loan commission's 
June 1922 proposals had allowed Germany to immediately enjoy the dubious benefits of 
avoiding the reforms any loan would have imposed and thus the hard choices involved in 
stabilization.  Reichsbank President Rudolf von Havenstein saw no need to commit 
Reichsbank gold to support the mark, and in July the Wirth cabinet was content to pass tax 
legislation that the government knew in advance would not cover the cost of reparation 
payments.1  
 The after-dinner conversation that took place at the American Embassy on 23 June 1922 
(the eve of Rathenau's murder) between Rathenau, Stinnes, Houghton and Logan, is 
revealing of how German leaders thought about their economic problems.  Rathenau and 
                                                          
 1Cabinet meeting, 9 May 1922,  Kabinette Wirth II, p. 766.  For the effects of inflation 
and tax evasion on the yield of the July 1922 forced loan-tax program, see Kent, The Spoils 
of War, table 7, p. 196. For Havenstein's reluctance to commit German gold, see Feldman, 
The Great Disorder, p. 444.  
Stinnes, defended Germany's postwar inflationary policy to Houghton and Logan. Both 
argued that inflation had been a political necessity in the immediate post-war period to 
maintain employment at a level sufficient to contain the revolutionary impulse.  In addition, 
both saw the need to bring inflation under control by ending governmental subsidies and 
economic controls, and by increasing worker productivity, agreeing that worker productivity 
could be increased without the spur of higher unemployment.  However, the two leaders felt 
that increased productivity would support only modest reparation payments.  Rathenau 
believed that Germany would be able to afford fifty billion gold marks in reparation 
payments, but only eventually.  Despite their dreams of a better future, both men were 
convinced that Germany could no longer afford the partial payments it was making under the 
moratorium. Logan was skeptical about Rathenau's catalog of complaints regarding 
Germany's condition but agreed that Germany required a moratorium.2  
 In reflecting on that long conversation, Houghton recognized the link between Rathenau's 
reparation policy and domestic German politics. He correctly recognized Rathenau’s waiting 
game of doing what he could to hold Germany together and making "such a show of 
fulfillment" as he was able until France's need for money forced that nation to accept a 
solution based on loans to Germany.  Houghton further noted that a loan would depend not 
only on a final reduced settlement of the reparation bill, but on "absolute freedom for 
Germany from further interference from France."  Germany would seek to get as large a cash 
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payment for France as could be raised and settle the rest later, according to a formula based 
on Germany's ability to pay.  If Rathenau's policy was successful, Houghton reasoned, it 
would both bridge the gap between the fulfillment policy and the policy of non-fulfillment 
advocated by Ruhr industrialists and bring the German People Party into the government, 
which in turn would stabilize Germany's domestic politics.  This solution to the reparation 
conundrum would be compatible with American policy, and with Houghton who personally 
favored a shift to the right in German politics. In Houghton Germany had an American 
ambassador whose thinking was quite compatible with the primary thrust of German policy.3  
 German optimism was based on the expectation that the United States would be able to 
convince France to accept American ideas about reparations and that in the interim, Boyden 
and Logan would bring American influence to bear on the Reparation Commission in favor 
of Germany.  On 12 July Germany submitted its request for a two-and-a-half year 
moratorium on cash payments to the Reparation Commission.  If accepted, cash payments 
under the reduced schedule established in March would stop and no more cash payments 
would be made until 1925.  Germany was therefore asking for a two-year suspension of the 
London Ultimatum schedule, which was to be resumed at the end of 1922.   
 While a strong argument can be made that Germany required a moratorium in cash 
payments for the remainder of 1922, its request for extension of two years was an assault on 
the London schedule that, if granted, would allow Germany to wait until 1925 for French 
financial weakness to force France to accept a program similar to the one that had been 
                                                          
 3 Houghton favored a harder policy towards labor than either Stinnes or Rathenau, 
believing that low productivity was a major difficulty and that workers needed the threats of 
unemployment and hunger to accept higher productivity.  Diary entries of 24 Jun 1922, 
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outlined by the Loan Commission in June (an international loan requiring a significant 
reduction in Germany's total reparation).  The extension would also remove the possible 
threat of France using 85 billion gold marks of un-issued C Bonds, set up by the London 
Schedule, as leverage in later negotiations with Germany over further revisions in the 
Versailles settlement.  With his policy of fulfillment vindicated and his government 
strengthened, Wirth could then use the two extra years to develop a program of stabilization 
through international loans.4  
 The realities of the weakness of Germany's position and the United States' limited 
willingness and ability to check France became evident as soon as Germany made its request 
for an extension of the moratorium.  The Reparation Commission did not believe the German 
arguments that reparations had been the chief cause of the mark's recent collapse, insisted 
that Germany undertake domestic reforms to curtail inflation and make its scheduled July 
payment.  Boyden was reduced to arguing that reparations were at least aggravating inflation 
and Germany needed a suspension of the July payment if only for its "psychological effect."5    
Hughes, however, warned Boyden and Logan to only observe and not "take any position that 
involves the United States in these discussions" or express opinions on these subjects.6  
                                                          
 4 The mark had fallen from 331 to the dollar on the eve of Rathenau's murder to 670 on 
July 3; Wirth's tax program, passed in July, had been based on a range of 250 to 300.  
Germany also faced a poor harvest in 1922.  In addition, Germany was beginning to 
experience a domestic flight from the mark and was also losing the competitive advantage of 
the weak mark as other nations adjusted and were able to undersell Germany or offer quicker 
and more reliable service.  In his review of the domestic problems faced by Wirth in July 
1922, Feldman concludes that while Germany's policy was problematic, ". . .  this is not to 
argue that the policy was not justified under the circumstances." Feldman, The Great 
Disorder, p. 454;  see also pp. 600-2. 
 5 Boyden to Sec. of State, 15 Jul 1922, 462.00R29/1852, USDS. 
 6 Sec. of State to Logan, 20 Jul 1922, 462.00R29/1852 USDS. 
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 Hughes's curtailment of the activities of Boyden and Logan was in response to changes in 
the positions of both Britain and France.  Loan Committee's June report and Germany's July 
request had infuriated Poincaré.  By mid-July, he began thinking about obtaining "productive 
pledges," the seizure of German assets as a means of producing some reparation payments.  
Poincaré was now willing to consider breaking with the Allies and even acting independently 
of Reparation Commission if necessary. His first step, however, was to pressure Belgium to 
oppose the moratorium.7
 Belgium, whose primary policy was to avoid having to choose between France and 
Britain, turned to the United States for help in finding a compromise solution. Although 
willing to support a moratorium, Belgium would not take the lead.  Seeking to sound out 
American attitudes, Belgium informed Henry P. Fletcher, the United States ambassador to 
Belgium and former Under Secretary of State, that Lloyd George was planning to propose 
reducing Britain's reparation demands, thereby giving France the opportunity to do likewise 
and thus create pressure for an American reduction of war debts.8    
 Belgium's warning was confirmed on 19 July when Poincaré notified Hughes of the 
"absolute impossibility" for France to begin payments on its debt to the United States, 
cautioning that if a reduction of the German debt to France were to be imposed, the 
settlement of France's debt to America "would involve France's ruin."9   Poincaré's note was 
primarily an effort to avoid having to break with the Allies and follow an independent policy.  
                                                          
 7  For the shift in Poincaré policy see Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics, pp.  
249-52. 
 8 Fletcher to Sec. of State, 6 Jun 1922 and 12 Jul 1922, 462.00R29/1779 and /1850, 
USDS. 
 9 Poincaré to Hughes, 19 Jul 1922, 462.00R29/1894, USDS. 
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If France could obtain a reduction in its debts to Britain and the United States, it could then 
afford to relax some of its demands on Germany.  By refusing a moratorium for Germany, 
France hoped to force a meeting where the issues of reparations, inter-Allied debts and loans 
would be considered by governments rather than financial experts.  This strategy would 
become the central thrust of French policy throughout 1922.10  
 Poincaré's policy threatened to place the United States in the middle of the reparation 
crisis and to reopen questions about war debts that had been decided when the United States 
had refused to attend the Genoa conference, but its immediate effect was to limit the support 
the United States would provide Germany.  While Hughes "was anxious to have a German 
collapse avoided," he could not place himself in a situation wherein the United States was 
requesting that the German debt be reduced while at the same time demanding France and 
Britain pay their debts to the United States.  Hughes was also sensitive to the fact that Logan 
and Boyden were unofficial observers, not official representatives. Any open efforts on their 
part to help Germany would be vulnerable to French criticism; Hughes therefore cautioned 
them not to take "any position that might involve the United States in these discussions."11     
 Within Germany, policy was increasingly driven by a sense of desperation and worry 
over the scheduled London Conference of 7 - 14 August, during which the Allies were to 
consider Germany’s moratorium request as well as future policy about Germany's 
obligations.  Warned by Carl Bergmann (chief advisor and negotiator to the German 
Government for reparations) that France would take "independent action" if the majority of 
                                                          
 10 Poincaré explicitly outlined this policy in a message to President Millerand on 13 
August 1922, Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics, pp. 258-59. 
 11 Sec. of State to Logan, 20 Jul 1922, 462.00R29/1852, USDS. 
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the Reparation Commission granted the moratorium over French objections, and cautioned 
against "false hopes" that Britain could or would protect Germany from Poincaré, the Wirth 
government began a desperate search for assistance.12  Wirth sent impassioned pleas to the 
pope and to Lloyd George, but his main effort was directed at the United States, which was 
now becoming more cautious. Wirth informed Houghton that if the Allies did not lift the 
reparation burden the German economy would collapse and asked him to inform Hughes 
"that if the administration has any desire or intention to help Germany at this juncture the 
help must be rendered now otherwise it will come too late."13
 After 15 months in office pursuing its policy of fulfillment, the Wirth government found 
itself in the same humiliating position that its predecessor had been in April 1921.  With the 
exchange value of the mark at 670 to the dollar, only one-tenth of what it had been in May 
1921, Germany’s task of changing both its own attitude and economy enough to actually 
make the economy function properly and fulfill reparation requirements had become even 
more difficult.14     
 The continuing downward slide of the mark raised suspicions that Germany was 
deliberately destroying its currency as a means of avoiding reparations; Poincaré viewed the 
situation as a German swindle and was far from alone in that belief.  American attitudes 
varied.  In general, those most involved in German affairs were sympathetic to the German 
position.  Ambassador Houghton, a businessman appointed from outside the ranks of the 
State Department, was even more sympathetic than Dresel had been.  Both Logan and 
                                                          
 12 Bergmann to Wirth, 29 Jul 1922, Kabinette Wirth II, pp. 974-80. 
 13 Houghton to Sec. of State, 26 Jul and 31 Jul 1922, USDS 462/00R29/1872, 1880. 
 14 Feldman, The Great Disorder, p. 505. 
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Boyden believed that Allied reparation policy was driving inflation and destroying any 
chances of Germany obtaining the loans that they believed would be necessary to make 
reparation payments.15
 The perception among Washington officials, who had a broader perspective on European 
affairs, was quite different.  Economic analysts in the State Department, believing that 
Germany had deliberately inflated its currency as an obstacle to cash payments, drew the 
obvious comparison between Germany, which had placed itself in a situation where it could 
not raise $12 million monthly, and France which had raised large sums for reconstruction.16   
But because Germany had the closest contact with American officials based in Germany and 
Europe, it is very likely that Germany either did not fully appreciate that Washington might 
be less sympathetic or, if it did understand the difference, chose to ignore it. 
 
The Balfour Note 
 The validity of Bergmann's caution regarding British assistance became apparent with 
Britain's issuance on 1 August of the Balfour note, a specific attack on U.S. war-debt policy, 
which declared that Britain was prepared to give up reparations claims as well as claims 
against the Allies to the extent that the United States would cancel British debts.  If the 
United States insisted on Britain repaying its debt, Britain was now stating its intention to 
collect an amount from its debtors, notably France, Italy and Germany, equal to what it owed 
the United States.  Blame for what might next occur in Europe could then be placed on the 
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United States.17    
 The note had three immediate consequences.  First, it infuriated France because it 
upstaged the French plan for a parallel reduction in German reparations and Allied debts.  If 
Allied war debts were not reduced, France faced the prospect of having to pay the Allies in 
full while being asked to reduce German reparations.1  8   Second, it impeded Britain's ability 
to help Germany with France; because Britain had offered cancellation of debts owed to it 
only to the extent that America would cancel British debts, the more German reparations to 
Britain were reduced, the more France would have to pay.  The note therefore limited the 
extent to which Britain could ask for concessions for Germany.  Lloyd George, although well 
aware of the likely French reaction, had come to believe that France would only moderate its 
policies after experiencing the consequences of attempting to take independent action against 
Germany;  Britain could then use any resultant European chaos to its own advantage in 
discussions on war-debt payments with the United States.19
 Last, the Balfour note created an uproar in the United States, where it was readily 
identified as moral blackmail. Congress strongly opposed the scheme's overall debt 
reduction, as did the overwhelming preponderance of newspaper editorial opinion.20  The 
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most prominent supporters of war-debt cancellation were members of New York 
international banking community, led by J. P. Morgan, who openly called for the 
cancellation of debts, which he considered an impediment to international trade and 
prosperity.21  Interest groups such as agricultural groups and import-export concerns also 
lobbied for a program of overall debt reduction, but because economic conditions in non-
agricultural sectors began to improve in the second half of 1922, the administration was not 
under great pressure to respond to them.  For the Harding administration, the public and 
congressional reaction reinforced political lessons learned in its 1921 confrontation with 
Congress over the issue; reduction of war debts would be considered a political impossibility 
until after the November elections.22  
 The Balfour note cut short the French attempt to reach a reparation settlement involving 
cancellation of inter-Allied debts.  Louis Dubois, the French president of the Reparation 
Commission, informed Logan that France, now extremely concerned about its finances, was 
willing to fix all treaty charges against Germany, including reparations at 48 billion gold 
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argument that a strict Open Door interpretation of America's war-debt policy in the 1921-
1922 period is too narrow a reading of a policy that also contained other economic, strategic, 
and political factors. Leffler, "Origins of Republican War Debt Policy." 
 159 
marks, if Britain relinquished its reparations claims and both the United States and Britain 
canceled French debts. Washington found the proposal "interesting" but did not see what 
could be done, "particularly in view of the recent action of the British in dispatching the 
Balfour Note."23  
 After the London Conference of 7 - 14 August ended with no decision regarding a 
moratorium, Poincaré turned to his alternative plan of demanding extensive production 
pledges in exchange for the German moratorium.  Lloyd George was willing to let Poincaré 
take independent action in the hope that consequent French financial problems would result 
in the fall of the Poincaré government, but would not risk making a unilateral concession to 
France with only a hope of U.S. reciprocal action in favor of Britain.  In addition, Lloyd 
George had an intense personal dislike of Poincaré and opposed giving a French government 
led by Poincaré extensive rights in Germany.  The most he would tolerate was supervision of 
mines and forests if Germany defaulted on deliveries of coal and timber.  The Reparation 
Commission would only take title to those properties if Germany could not make up the 
default.24   After the conference it was evident that the policies being pursued by Lloyd 
George, Poincaré and Wirth, considered together, along with the absence of large-scale 
                                                          
 23 Logan to Sec. of State, 5 Aug 1922 and Young to Harrison, 9 Aug 1922, 
462.00R29/1895, USDS. 
 24 The French proposals called for the restoration of custom boundaries between the 
occupied and unoccupied areas, the surrender of Prussian state forests and mines in the 
Rhineland and the Ruhr to the Allies, the surrender of 60% of the shares of the chemical 
industries on the left bank of the Rhine, the confiscation of tax receipts in the occupied areas 
if reparation payments were delayed, and increased control of German exports. Foreign 
Office, Great Britain, Minutes of the London Conference on Reparations, August 1922, Cmd. 
2258 (London, 1924).  For a strong critique of Lloyd George's policy see Sally Marks, 
"Reparations in 1922" in Genoa, Rapallo, and European Reconstruction, ed. Fink, Frohn and 
Heideking. 
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financial intervention by America, were setting the stage for a disaster in Europe.  
  Despite the hopes of the Europeans, the Harding administration had no intention of 
asking Congress in an election year to reduce or cancel the war debts.  Meanwhile, Hughes 
cautiously waited in Washington until after the conference to respond to Poincaré's note on 
France's debt to America.  His reply hinted that the administration was prepared to help with 
the question of the French debt, eventually, but that Washington first wanted a "reasonable 
and practical solution" to the debt problem "consistent with the economic recuperation of 
Europe."25   Faced with British and French proposals for war debt relief, Hughes needed a 
plan that could implement a businesslike solution of the reparation problem; otherwise the 
United States would be accused of doing nothing except letting the Europeans stew in their 
own juices. 
 
Plan for a International Commission and a Capacity-to-Pay Solution 
 Hughes now concluded that the idea of reducing reparation and war debts in a single 
operation was politically impossible and began to consider a proposal, originally suggested 
by Boyden, calling for an international commission of private financial experts appointed by 
their respective governments to determine Germany's capacity to pay.  But before Hughes 
would go to Congress and ask for debt reduction, France would have to accept the reduction 
of reparations.  "To start with war debt reduction," Hughes argued, "is to begin at the wrong 
end."26   Although decisions of the proposed commission would not be binding, Hughes 
                                                          
 25 The Secretary of State to the French President of the Council and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (Poincaré), 23 Aug 1922, FRUS 1 1922, pp. 412-13. 
 26 Sec. of State to Richard W. Child, United States Ambassador to Italy, 18 Oct 1922, 
462.00R296/1, USDS. 
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believed that world opinion and American influence would force French and German 
acceptance. He knew that Germany’s chances of evading equitable reparations payments 
would decrease, since through the proposed sale of bonds it would become the debtor of all 
nations.  Hughes told Castle that if France did not accept then it could "go to hell" and if 
Germany did not accept it could "go bust for all the world cares."27    
 Hughes's tentative plan for a panel of experts, while moving the United States closer to 
official involvement since the experts would be appointed by governments, had the 
advantage of allowing the United States to select financial experts who, unlike Morgan, did 
not have the proclivity of linking reparations to war debts.  American financiers could utilize 
American financial strength to achieve a resolution based on Germany's capacity to pay 
without compromising the issue of war debts or directly involving the government in 
Europe's political affairs.  Accordingly, after August Hughes would repetitively reply to 
requests for war debt remission with a legalistic litany: "Congress has not given the 
administration the power to reduce war debts," "Germany cannot pay one mark more or less 
because of what France may owe," and "Germany must pay up to her capacity but France can 
not collect what Germany is unable to pay."  He would maintain these positions throughout 
1922 and 1923; they would become the basis of the Dawes Plan that resolved the reparation 
crisis in 1924. 
 Hughes's economic diplomacy, which sought to frame reparations as a financial issue 
based on Germany’s ability to pay, ignored the reality that reparations were more than just a 
financial issue for France, which had little confidence that any commission of financial 
                                                          
 27 Memorandum by William R. Castle of conversation with Hughes, 1 Aug 1922, copy in 
Castle to Houghton, 4 Aug 1922, Houghton Papers. 
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experts would recognize its security needs. With no Anglo-American security guarantee, 
reparations were the means of establishing French economic predominance over Germany or, 
at a minimum, assuring German cooperation with France in the reconstruction of Europe.  In 
addition, French debt reduction approved by some future Congress was uncertain, as were 
disarmament concessions or trade-policy changes the United States might require in 
exchange for debt reduction.  France needed access to American financial markets and 
wanted American moral support against Germany, but it could not afford to place itself in a 
position of strategic and economic inferiority to a recovered Germany.  For these reasons, 
France wanted a political solution to the problem of war debts and reparations.  French 
financial weakness would be essential to its agreement to Hughes’s plan, and French pressure 
on Germany would be essential in gaining American acceptance of its views.  
 Starting in August, tension over the European situation increased within the State 
Department.  Castle admitted to Houghton that “from this distance the situation in general 
looks pretty desperately bad” and “at the present time I find it hard to see a light.”  Hughes, 
Castle noted, “is very restless under our enforced inactivity.”28 This struggle would continue 
throughout the remainder of 1922.  Although both the United States and Germany intended 
to wait until France agreed to a "capacity to pay" settlement, their assessment of what 
Germany’s capacity to pay differed.  That difference was not a major issue in 1922, however; 
the crucial difference was that United States could afford to wait patiently for the eventual 
success of its policy while Germany, facing growing inflation and the increasing impatience 
of France, could not. The unanswered question was what Germany could or would do to 
stabilize its economy and thereby aid the United States in convincing France that Germany 
                                                          
 28 Castle to Houghton, 4 Aug 1922, file 51, Castle Papers. 
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would pay reparations to the full extent of its capacity.  
 
German Rejection of External Controls 
 In Germany, political and economic attitudes toward both inflation and reparations made 
any solution difficult.  The German conviction that reparations were fueling inflation added 
to political resentments about the Versailles treaty that were already strong.  With the Left 
and Right divided over the means by which stabilization should be accomplished, reparations 
gave both sides a common enemy.  As inflation continued, more Germans lost faith in their 
currency and a flight from the mark began.  When Germany failed to implement exchange 
controls on its own, the Reparations Commission insisted on their establishment as a 
condition of consideration of a moratorium. 
 Imposing controls from the outside had serious consequences. The Reparation 
Commission was unanimous in its belief that a foreign loan to Germany was essential if 
France and Belgium were to receive any substantial sums of money.  But as Logan noted, the 
need for external controls made any loan more difficult. Even if the financiers were willing 
to accept that a reduced final settlement of Germany’s reparation bill would have to wait, the 
decision to impose external supervision of German exchange control would only “shake the 
confidence “of potential lenders.  "It might be difficult,” Logan quipped, "to get a lender to 
advance money if he were told that it was necessary to keep three or four policeman with the 
borrower so as to prevent his running away."29  
 The hardening French policy deepened the atmosphere of crisis in Germany.  Houghton 
advised Washington that the collapse of the mark, which had fallen by late August to 1300 
                                                          
 29 Logan to Harrison, 26 Jul 1922, 462.00R29/1906, USDS. 
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marks to the dollar, a loss of almost half its value in a month, was primarily due to the 
changed reparation policy and that "specific threats of the French government have created a 
psychological, economic and financial vicious circle."  Hoping to prod Washington into a 
more active policy, Houghton specifically noted that German cotton and copper imports from 
America had dramatically declined and asked that his report be forwarded to Hoover at the 
Commerce Department.30  Even Lloyd George's compromise for the supervision of German 
mines and forests was too much for the Wirth government.  Wirth insisted that acceptance of 
Allied supervision of properties that belonged to the individual states and not the federal 
government would bring his government into further conflict with Bavaria, which was 
already fighting with the national government over what it defined as its constitutional 
sovereign rights.31
 While Germany would cite constitutional reasons for its inability to accept supervision, 
                                                          
 30 Houghton to Sec. of State, tel., 26 Aug 1922, 462.00R29/1950, USDS.  Houghton's 
analysis of the effect of international events on inflation is supported by Feldman, who notes 
that while the reparation payments themselves exerted a strong influence on the value of the 
mark in the latter half of 1921, they became of secondary significance in 1922 when political 
events had a much greater influence in the collapse of the mark. Feldman, The Great 
Disorder, pp. 505-6, esp. Table 19, which provides a correlation between the dollar exchange 
rate of the mark and political news in 1922.  Feldman uses the rational expectation model of 
inflation (people respond to what they anticipate will be the consequence of fiscal news) to 
explain the impact of reparations on inflation at a time when Germany was not paying cash 
reparations.  Feldman's discussion is in part an answer to Marks, who strongly questioned 
how it could be said that reparations were causing inflation at a time when Germany was not 
paying reparations.  This point, however, does not bear on Marks's central argument, which 
is that Germany had neither the "desire or the will to act" on its problems in 1922.  Marks, 
"Reparations in 1922." 
 31 Chefbesprechung, 25 Aug 1922,  Kabinette Wirth II, p. 1053. For Wirth's conflict with 
Bavaria see  Kabinette Wirth II, pp. 981-87, 991-1010, 1016-19, 1021-37. Wirth was willing 
to offer 50 million gold marks in foreign securities as a guarantee, but France, determined to 
keep the pressure on Germany, refused the offer. The Acting Secretary of State to the 
Secretary of State, 28 Aug 1922, FRUS 1922 II, pp. 160-62. 
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Wirth had other reasons for opposing the proposal, including his lack of confidence that his 
progressively weakening government could implement a stabilization plan in the face of the 
country’s economic and social conflicts.  He was willing to take on Bavaria to obtain a 
moratorium, but not for one that would last only until the end of 1922.  In a similar vein, 
State Secretary of the Foreign Office Ernst von Simson acknowledged to Houghton that if 
the Germans agreed to give up their mines and forests, within a few months nothing would 
remain to obtain the further moratorium that would almost certainly be required.32   
Houghton, cautioning that France with its military strength could now disregard Britain, 
reminded Wirth that there was only one angle from which France could be attacked and that 
was the "financial angle."33   Despite the growing inflation, Wirth was willing to gamble: 
Germany refused to accept the conditions for the moratorium, hoping that French financial 
weakness would force France to accept a reduced reparations bill if Germany could hold out 
long enough.34  
 Germany's refusal to accept the proposal not only risked a declaration of default and an 
occupation of part of the Ruhr as a sanction, it meant that Britain could no longer be 
depended upon to restrain France.  Bradbury informed Bergmann that Lloyd George was in a 
tight spot and would not mind seeing France serve as the scapegoat for his policy, warning 
that "England would not prevent French stupidities."3   5  This change in British policy 
                                                          
 32 Houghton Diary, entry of 24 Aug 1922; The Acting Sec. of State to the Sec. of State, 
28 Aug 1922, FRUS 1922 II, pp. 160-62. 
 33 Houghton Diary, entry of 24 Aug 1922. 
 34 Chefbesprechung, 25 Aug 1922,  Kabinette Wirth II, p. 1053. 
 35 Kabinettssitzung, 23 Aug 1922, Kabinette Wirth II, p. 1043;  Houghton to Acting Sec. 
of State (Phillips), tel., FRUS 1922 II, pp. 162-63. 
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increased German reliance upon the United States; however, Germany could not afford to 
make a public appeal to the United States to accept the linkage between war debts and 
reparations when the reverberations of the Balfour note had not yet died down. The 
inevitable American refusal would simply leave Germany isolated and more vulnerable to 
France.  For its part, the United States did not want Britain to be able to use a French-
German crisis as a vehicle for pressuring the United States into reducing war debts.  In 
addition, the Harding administration was vulnerable to charges that its failure to ratify the 
Versailles treaty had resulted in chaos in Europe.  For Germany, the game continued to be 
one of hoping that American support in some form would enable it to outlast Poincaré 
financially.  
 
Restraints on U.S. Intervention 
 As the crisis intensified, President Harding's immediate concern was the presence of 
1,000 American troops in the Rhineland.  If France were to make a move towards the Ruhr, 
Harding wanted those troops immediately removed to avoid any entanglement.36 
Unfortunately, Washington did not have good intelligence about the extent of French 
                                                          
 36 Throughout 1922 Harding had vacillated between withdrawing the troops to avoid any 
entanglements and leaving them in place both as symbol or America's acceptance of a moral 
obligation and so their withdrawal would not be seen as a gesture relating to any European 
crisis.  For France, the presence of American troops was a symbol of American support for 
the occupation of the Rhineland.  For Germany, the American presence served as a moral 
check on France. Houghton to Sec. of State, 10 Jan 1923, FRUS 1923 II, p. 48.  Harding's 
political instinct was to have the troops quietly withdrawn during a period of non-crisis.  
Harding to Fletcher, 24 Aug 1922, Henry P. Fletcher Papers, Library of Congress; Harding to 
Phillips, 31 Aug 1922, 462.00R29/2020, USDS.  In Harding's view, any moral support the 
troops provided Germany was not worth the domestic political costs that entanglements 
would produce. Harding's attitude was also very dependent on which way changing political 
winds were blowing in Congress.  See Nelson, Victors Divided, pp. 234-235. 
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intentions.  The United States ambassador in London, George Harvey, warned that despite 
the French concessions at the London Conference, Britain believed that the French demands 
cloaked ulterior political motives regarding the Rhineland.  It is likely that Britain 
emphasized this aspect of French policy to Harvey in a deliberate effort to heighten 
Washington's anxieties and thus influence American war debt policy.37  
 French interest in an active Rhineland policy did increase in the summer of 1922.  
General Allen, the commander of American troops in the Rhineland and the unofficial 
American representative on the Rhineland High Commission, reported that French activity in 
the Rhineland led him to seriously question whether France was simply interested in a 
financial settlement, a view shared by Houghton.  Allen warned that if the French were to get 
control of the Ruhr coal, “[they will] exercise an excessive influence on Europe."  Britain 
had also passed on to Allen its warning regarding French intentions.38   The American 
Embassy in Paris, however, emphasized the economic issue and advised Hughes that France 
was following a policy of taking a firm stand before other Allies did away with the 
reparations entirely.  According to embassy analysts, France had simply concluded that 
"moral suasion of Germany was useless" and that forceful measures were necessary to "make 
the Germans desire to pay".39   While continuing to keep a watchful eye on events, Phillips 
notified Harding that the State Department did not believe "the moment has arrived when we 
can say definitely that France has embarked on a policy of independent aggression in the 
                                                          
 37 Harvey to Sec of State, 14 Aug 1922, 462.00R29/ 1917. 
 38 Allen (private report) to "Billy" Phillips, 22 Aug 1922, copy in Houghton Papers; 
Allen, Henry T., Mein Rheinland Tagebuch (Berlin: Verlag Reimar Hobbing, 1923), pp. 269-
70. Houghton to Sec. of State, 170, 25 Aug 1922, 462.00R29/1949, USDS. 
 39 Whitehouse (Paris) to Sec. of State, 24 Aug.1922, 462.00R29/1945, USDS. 
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Ruhr."40    
 Germany immediately tried to see what support it could get from the United States.  
When Wiedfeldt sounded out Castle, he was told that although Houghton and Hughes were 
in favor of some American intervention, American public opinion was against action in 
Europe.  Castle informed Wiedfeldt of Hughes's idea for an expert commission, but 
acknowledged that neither France nor Britain had any interest in Hughes's proposal and that 
Castle’s efforts  had to have Hughes make a public statement had been unsuccessful.  Castle, 
who saw no solution to the problem, predicted that public opinion in America would 
eventually change, but that the change would come too late for Europe.41  
 Despite Castle’s pessimism, Germany, having learned from its experience with its April 
1921 initiative to avoid direct governmental pleas, forwarded a note to Washington from 
German labor federations maintaining that Germany had done "all in its power politically to 
fulfill its obligations" and now had "the absolute need of immediate help from outside."4  2   
                                                          
 40 Phillips to President, 25 Aug 1922, 462.00R29/1978a, USDS.  American confusion 
over French intentions is understandable; even with access to French archival materials, the 
question of whether France saw its Rhineland policy as an end or only as a tactic in its 
pursuit of reparations has continued to be hotly debated among modern scholars. 
Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics, pp. 259-74. For a critique of the thesis favoring 
French moderation, see Jon Jacobson, "Strategies of French Foreign Policy after World War 
I," Journal of Modern History 55 (March 1983), pp. 78-95. 
 41 In response to Wiedfeldt's plea that action by Hughes could save Europe and 
accomplish what Wilson had failed to do, Castle simply noted that Wilson was an idealist, 
but Hughes was a realist who must respect public opinion.  Notes of a conversation between 
Wiedfeldt and Castle, 25 Aug 1922, "Politische Beziehungen, U.S.A zu Deutschland vom 
1922 bis 1922,"  Archives of the German Embassy, T290, Microfilm roll 2, National 
Archives, Washington DC; Aufzeichnung, 25 Aug 1922, Botschaft Washington, Po2a (959), 
PA-AA. 
 42 The German Chargé (von Thermann) to Acting Sec. of State (Phillips), 26 Aug 1922, 
FRUS II, p. 160. 
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President Harding's response was that America "would be glad to be helpful in a consistent 
and practical way," but "unless further advised, I do not understand what course we might 
helpfully pursue."43   Hughes, who did not feel that America could make "any helpful 
suggestion while the subject is a question for the Reparation Commission," was committed to 
his idea of an expert commission and did not want the idea compromised by allowing the 
United States to be dragged into political bargaining in the Reparation Commission. 
 Uncertain of French intentions, Hughes was willing to wait on events. Hughes also 
realized that if the French were "fully determined to act at once," no suggestion the United 
States might make would affect their decision.44    By late August the United States had 
determined that if the French were resolved to take independent action in the Ruhr, there was 
nothing the United States' could or would do to stop them and that America's response would 
be restricted to the immediate withdrawal of American troops.  It was this policy that the 
United States would follow in January 1923.  
 
The Belgian Compromise 
 Germany correctly recognized that American help would be limited and did not "really 
seriously" expect United States intervention in the Reparation Commission. At best they 
hoped for an indirect expression of approval of Germany through Logan. Yet, as Houghton 
                                                          
 43 With Hughes at sea on a visit to Brazil, Acting Secretary of State Phillips worked 
directly with Harding, who followed the crisis closely. Harding to Undersecretary of State 
(Phillips), 26 Aug 1922, roll 186, frame 1673, Harding Papers, quoted in Kenneth Paul 
Jones, "Alanson B. Houghton and the Ruhr Crisis: The Diplomacy of Power and Morality," 
U.S. Diplomats in Europe, 1919-1941, ed. Kenneth Paul Jones, reprint edition (Santa Barbara 
and Oxford: ABC-Clio, 1983), p. 28. 
 44 Sec. of State to Acting Sec. of State (Phillips), 30 Aug 1922, FRUS 1922 II, p. 163. 
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noted, Germany also clung "to the hope that the United States will make its influence felt in 
some way in their behalf."45
 The crisis in the Reparation Commission was temporarily resolved by Logan. Acting on 
his own initiative, he found a way to bypass the question of the moratorium with the aid of 
Bradbury and the cooperation of Belgian representatives on the Reparation Commission who 
desperately wanted to avoid having to cast the deciding vote between Britain and France.4  6
German cash payments for the remainder of 1922 were scheduled to go to Belgium; although 
the Belgians could not simply relinquish their claim, Logan obtained Belgian consent to 
accept 200 million gold marks in the form of German treasury bills guaranteed by an 
equivalent amount of Reichsbank gold deposited in a neutral country.  Logan and Bradbury 
then stage-managed a vote on the moratorium which allowed the Belgians to cast the 
decisive vote against a moratorium. In a second vote, the Belgians switched sides and joined 
Britain and Italy in voting against declaring Germany in default.  But Germany was asked to 
submit proposals for financial reform, including proposals for how it would eventually pay 
                                                          
 45 Houghton to Acting Sec. of State (Phillips), 30 Aug 1922, FRUS 1922 II, pp. 162-63. 
 46 Belgium was inclined to cooperate with Germany in defusing a crisis that threatened to 
catch them between Britain and France, but faced domestic pressures to move closer to 
France.  At London, Belgium had proposed a new conference after the American elections in 
November to discuss inter-Allied indebtedness, reductions in German reparations and an 
international loan to Germany.  Lloyd George had accepted the idea, provided Germany 
received a moratorium in the interim, a demand Poincaré had refused. On 16 August the 
Belgian foreign minister, Henri Jaspar, informed Fletcher that Poincaré had intimated that the 
United States would approve vigorous and direct action by France against Germany.  Jaspar, 
who wanted to avoid being forced to follow France in the Ruhr, asked for the United States 
to strongly express its disapproval of any move into the Ruhr. Fletcher replied that it would 
be difficult for the United States to take any action that would seem like an intrusion into 
European affairs irrespective of the political situation.  Belgium was therefore willing to 
cooperate with Logan in finding a solution.  Fletcher to Sec. of State, 16 and 17 Aug 1922, 
462.00R29/1923 and /1926, USDS. 
 171 
its reparation debts.47
 The actions of Logan and Bradbury were partly revolt against the policies of their 
respective governments (Hughes's policy of avoiding American initiatives in the Reparation 
Commission and Britain's policy of allowing France to take independent action).  Members 
of the Reparation Commission, with the exception of the French, had long personally 
concluded that Germany was incapable of meeting its immediate reparations payments; 
Logan outspokenly so.  Bradbury, firmly convinced that if the present reparation policy 
continued it would lead to "a complete collapse of the mark" by the end of the year and to the 
complete collapse of the franc a year later, was prepared to use the commission's judicial 
capacity without regard to his governments political instructions and, if necessary, go to the 
press.48  
 Phillips notified Harding, who had been ready to withdraw the troops "on a moment's 
notice" that the crisis had passed and asked that no withdrawal take place since such action 
could be construed as American disapproval of the commission’s action.49 Despite his efforts 
to keep his involvement quiet, Logan was forced to respond to charges of "American 
arbitration" in press accounts instigated by the British in response to unfavorable publicity 
about the arrangement. But he simply stressed his limited, unofficial role as an observer.50  
  The German response to Logan's compromise further demonstrated the Wirth 
government's inability to resolve its own internal conflicts, thereby complicating American 
                                                          
 47 Logan to Sec. of State, 29 and 30 Aug 1922, 462.00R29/1958 and /1961, USDS. 
 48 Logan to Sec. of State, 29 Aug. 1922, 462.00R29/1958, USDS. 
 49 Phillips to President, 1 Sept 1922,  462.00R29/2020, USDS. 
 50 Logan to Sec. of State, 2 Sept 1922, 462.00R29/1971, USDS. 
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and British efforts to assist Germany.  Rudolf von Havenstein, the director of the 
Reichsbank, balked at the idea of using Reichsbank gold to guarantee Belgian reparation 
payments, insisting that the gold was indispensable for a future stabilization of the mark and 
arguing that Germany had to decide whether the time had come to close down its policy of 
fulfillment. Havenstein also suggested that Germany use the autonomy of the Reichsbank as 
an excuse to reject the proposal.5  1 His earlier suggestion of using the 80 million gold marks 
worth of gold, set aside for food imports by the Wirth government, had been rejected by the 
cabinet.52
 Wirth was willing to support Havenstein on the issue of keeping Germany's gold but 
would not abandon his policy of fulfillment.  Turning again to America for help, Wirth asked 
Houghton to assist in getting Belgium to extend the time that they would hold the German 
bills from six to eighteen months, so that the Reichsbank could provide guarantees without 
drawing on gold reserves.  With Houghton's assistance, an arrangement was made for the 
guarantee to be provided by the Bank of England, which held 50 million gold marks of the 
Reichsbank's gold.53
 Poincaré, although angered, accepted the Reparation Commission's decision. As 
American representatives in Paris had correctly judged, he was not yet ready to take 
independent action, although he did begin to try to get Belgium in line with French policy.  
                                                          
 51 Kabinettssitzung, 30 Aug.1922,  Kabinette Wirth II, pp. 1069-71, 1071-76. 
 52 Kabinettssitzung, 23 Aug 1922, Ibid. , pp. 1042-43. For a detailed discussion of the 
internal German battles regarding the use of the Reichsbank gold, see Feldman, The Great 
Disorder, pp. 457-59. 
 53Diary, entries of 5 and 9 Sept Houghton , 1922, Houghton Papers;  Meetings of 4 and 8 
Sept. 1922, Kabinette Wirth, II,  pp.1081-82, 1098-1101. 
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Poincaré wanted Belgian cooperation both in the Reparation Commission and in pressuring 
the United States to reopen the question of war debts.  He wanted Belgium to call for an 
international conference on war debts and reparations, to be held in Brussels after the 
American elections in November.  Belgium confidentially informed Fletcher of the plan, 
after which Logan warned Washington that sentiment for such a plan was growing in the 
Reparation Commission and that the United States could expect both another crisis and an 
European attack on the American position on war debts following the November elections.54 
Although aware of he worsening situation in Germany and the increasing desperation of 
France, Hughes had little interest in reversing America's decision, made at the Genoa 
conference, against attending international economic conferences that would link war debts 
and reparations.  Instead, he strengthened his commitment to his idea of an expert 
commission but also, out of caution and uncertainty about what the post-election mood of 
Congress would be, kept his options open. 
 
Lack of German Proposals and the Failure of Fulfillment 
 America's ability to assist Germany was hampered by German reluctance to submit the 
proposals for stabilization and reparation payments demanded by the Reparation 
Commission.55  In an early-September meeting, Castle informed Wiedfeldt that in addition to 
Hughes's plan for an expert commission, it was also possible that American public opinion 
might be changing, which might give the administration more flexibility about war debts 
after the election, but also reminded him that the administration needed German proposals.  
                                                          
 54 Fletcher to Sec. of State, 25 and 26 Sept 1922, 462.00R29/2037 and /2082, USDS. 
 55Thurmann to A.A., 5 Sept 1922, Botschaft Washinton, Po2a (959), PA-AA. 
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An embarrassed Wiedfeldt had little to offer, He complained to the Foreign Ministry that the 
German note pleading for help could be compared to "the SOS signal of a sinking ship, 
which must leave the ways and means of rescue to the savior."  Wiedfeldt had, on his own, 
asked for some public statement from the administration in support of Germany and for 
Logan and Boyden to become more active in the Reparation Commission.  But without 
instructions he could not go further, other than to point out that the complex 
counterproposals he had received in response to the intricacies of the compromise with 
Belgium "were beyond the capacity or interest" of senior State Department officials and were 
no substitute for a comprehensive German plan for German and European reconstruction. 
 Wiedfeldt had concluded from his conversations with Castle that Germany's best chance 
lay with supporting Castle and Hughes, since Hoover was insisting that America would not 
become involved in the question of reparations until Germany stabilized its currency, 
balanced its budget and restored its balance of trade.  He emphasized that although Germany 
could not expect results from the United States until after the elections, it must have specific 
proposals if anything were to be accomplished.  Wiedfeldt's note illustrates the problems 
caused by the strong tendencies of German foreign policy to procrastinate first and later to 
seek hasty, improvised solutions based on temporary compromises.56  
 While Wiedfeldt could only complain about Germany's lack of proposals, he did what he 
could to improve Germany’s image in American opinion, particularly in Washington and the 
                                                          
 56 Wiedfeldt to Auswärtige Amt, 5 Sept 1922 and Tel. Nr. 200, 6 Sept 1922; letter to Leg. 
Roediger in London, 23 Sept 1922, unsigned but presumably written by or on the instructions 
of Wiedfeldt, Archives of the German Embassy. It is very likely that, because the State 
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major trade centers such as New York, areas of influential opinion which he believed were 
more sympathetic to Germany than the rest of the United States.  Recognizing that the United 
States saw Germany as central to the reconstruction of Europe, Wiedfeldt maintained that the 
way to overcome Hoover's statement that Germany represented only five percent of 
American trade was to continually stress that Germany was the key to Europe.  Wiedfeldt 
also astutely recognized that the American people, while proud of their role in winning the 
war, did not care about the Versailles treaty.  Germany had to take advantage of the 
American propensity to favor the underdog; therefore, its propaganda line should emphasize 
"the dire conditions in the new, democratic, disarmed Germany which is harassed by the 
Versailles treaty but trying to live up to its obligations."  If Germany could win American 
public opinion, then the United States could move. Germany should propose practical 
programs "rather than just complain."57  
 Germany's inability to provide specific proposals reflected the collapse of Wirth's policy 
of fulfillment in the face of growing inflation.  Its policy was becoming one of haggling over 
the details of temporary expedients.  While a general consensus existed that fulfillment was 
impossible and stabilization had to be confronted, there was no agreement on the 
preconditions for stabilization or how it should take place.  Going on the offensive for both 
domestic and foreign opinion, Wirth announced a new policy formula to the international 
press in Berlin of “first bread then reparations,” which struck at the heart of the chancellor’s 
own fulfillment policy.58   Wirth and some business leaders, including Wilhelm Cuno, who 
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would replace Wirth as chancellor in November, strongly insisted that an external solution 
requiring outside help was essential, arguing that German policy must continue to be directed 
toward a reduction of reparations and a foreign loan.  For Wirth, an external solution was a 
political necessity; his fragile minority government was already too weak to undertake the 
necessary deflationary measures without the legitimization of a reduction in reparations or a 
foreign loan.  
 Businessmen such as Cuno saw a foreign loan in terms of international economic 
reconstruction based on cooperation among the world's businessmen, a positive alliance 
which would in and of itself lead to a reduction in reparations.  The drawback of an 
externally imposed option, the realized, would be German foreign policy development based 
on passively waiting for foreign help and desperately attempting to fend off British and 
American attempts to attach preconditions of domestic stabilization, especially international 
controls on the economy, to reparation reduction.  This assessment, shared by the Wirth 
government, was the most basic impetus for its preoccupation with the Reparation 
Commission and attempt to achieve an 18-month moratorium. 
 Others favoring German control of its own domestic stabilization comprised a 
heterogeneous group ranging from liberal members of the DDP to Hugo Stinnes, whose 
grandiose scheme envisioned a major restructuring of the German economy.  Many were 
convinced that because the nation’s economy was collapsing and a domestic stabilization 
would enhance possibilities for an eventual loan and forestall external economic controls, 
Germany could wait no longer.59
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 The Wirth government would not respond to Wiedfeldt’s requests for proposals to give 
Castle in September 1922  because, caught up in its debate over stabilization, it had no plan  
to offer other than continued pleading for international understanding of Germany's 
condition. Under pressure, Wirth activated his emergency powers to impose exchange 
controls to dampen speculation. It was more of a gesture to demonstrate that Germany had 
not surrendered to total passivity than an effective program.  The crucial decision, to begin 
the stabilization of the currency by issuing gold-denominated Treasury bills, was 
postponed.6    0 Without a solution to Germany’s domestic problems, the Wirth government 
could not develop a coherent foreign policy, and events began to overtake Wirth's last efforts 
to hold to his policy of fulfillment. On 17 October, Lloyd George fell and was replaced with 
Bonar Law, who was widely expected to be more accommodating to French interests. The 
Wirth’s government’s policy of fulfillment was increasingly seen as irrelevant to any 
solution to Germany’s problems.  
 
Stinnes - Lubersac Initiative 
 Hugo Stinnes was eager to step into the policy vacuum.  With President Ebert's support, 
Stinnes bombarded foreign leaders with suggested plans for Germany's stabilization and the 
reconstruction of Europe.  Behind the scenes he was engaged with Baron de Lubersac, the 
leading representative of the French coal industry, in a scheme to privatize Germany's "in 
kind" reparation payments and used this contact to pass his ideas on to Poincaré.  Stinnes 
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 178 
also used Houghton, to bypass the Foreign Ministry and confidentially inform Wiedfeldt of 
his proposals.  Wirth was never kept fully informed; as Stinnes told Houghton, "he did not 
trust the Chancellor's discretion."61
 Stinnes' program called for the Allies to abandon all sanctions, evacuate the Rhineland 
and grant Germany most-favored nation status.  In exchange the German people would agree 
through a plebiscite to work overtime for as many years as necessary to achieve a favorable 
balance of trade and cover the cost of a gold loan that would provide for French and Belgian 
reconstruction as well as stabilization.  Germany would balance its budgets, abandon 
controls, and reduce publicly funded employment; social and labor policy would be 
structured to favor production.  Finally, Germany would join the other Allies in approaching 
the United States for a program of general debt cancellation.62  
 The plan was politically unrealistic but its emphasis on increasing German productivity 
appealed to Houghton, who viewed decreased German industrial productivity as a major 
cause of German difficulty. Houghton believed a new coalition government must be formed 
that included the German People Party (DVP). He  reasoned that if that party’s membership, 
which included major German industrialists, entered a government committed to a reparation 
settlement, skepticism about Germany's willingness to accept and fulfill a reasonable 
reparation settlement would end.  Houghton also knew that such a government would have a 
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better chance of forcing reforms on Germany's economy.  Houghton actively encouraged a 
German move to the political right.63    
 Hughes, however, was not interested in the Stinnes vision of a reconstructed Germany. 
When Wiedfeldt presented some of the ideas in an interview with Hughes, the Secretary of 
State told him "it was idle to begin with political questions" and stressed that what was 
needed was "taking the first practical step" in settling the problem of reparations, which to 
Hughes meant a solution based "on a sound economic basis."  Hughes informed Wiedfeldt 
that the State Department was continuing to work on finding a way for an impartial expert to 
examine the problem.64   
 
“Capacity to Pay” and War Debts 
 By mid-October the question of Germany was becoming a struggle between France and 
the United States over the issue of war debts. Bonar Law had adopted a somewhat passive 
policy and Germany was in the midst of its internal debate over economic reform.  Poincaré 
had been pressing Britain since August for a conference at Brussels to consider war debts 
and reparations. Bonar Law had delayed in hopes of a softened American position on war 
debts, which had hardened following the Balfour note.  Britain did not want to be the only 
creditor at the table, but, under pressure from Poincaré and needing French cooperation in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 63 Houghton to Sec. of State, 15 and 23 Sept 1922, 462.00R29/2023 and 2031, USDS. 
 64 Memorandum by the Sec. of State of an Interview  with the German Ambassador, 9 
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Asia Minor, Bonar Law agreed to a preliminary conference in London in December.65
 The combination of German passivity, a new British government, and Poincaré's policy 
of seeking productive pledges, increased the pressure on the United States to relax its war 
debt policy.  On 14 October Boyden sent an urgent plea warning that the German situation 
was approaching "complete demoralization" and unless something was done immediately 
there was "no possibility of saving Germany."  Boyden cautioned that "if the United States 
does nothing France will not make sufficient concessions to meet [the] situation." Boyden 
reported that the French political situation was preventing Poincaré from changing his policy 
without the political cover of a U.S. intervention, which would allow France to accept a 
"capacity to pay" approach to Germany.  Boyden advised Hughes that, even with pledges of 
"definite security and stringent financial controls," French concessions were "barely 
possible," but added that he still believed there was a "great probability" of France accepting 
the capacity-to-pay principle if it could be applied to inter-Allied debt as well. 
 In the Reparations Commission, Bradbury, who was becoming more independent-
minded, developed a plan that would give Germany an opportunity to stabilize its economy 
through a two-year moratorium. The 1921 London Schedule of Reparations would be 
retained until the planned Brussels conference, at which the Allies were meant to consider 
both reparations and war debts.  In an effort to pressure both the Allies and the United States, 
Bradbury released the plan to the press.66   In response to French pressure, Belgium was also 
trying to find a way to include the United States in the proposed Brussels conference.  Jaspar 
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offered to exclude any agenda item America might find objectionable. An extension of the 
“capacity to pay” would actually allow discussion of the capacity-to-pay principle to segue 
into a discussion of the cancellation of war debts.  But even if war-debt relief was overtly 
excluded, Belgium wanted an American presence at Brussels because major American 
participation would be crucial for Europeans to agree on an international loan to Germany as 
a solution to the reparation problem.  In one way or another, Europe saw American dollars as 
the answer to the reparations issue.67    
 The Harding administration, in addition to international pressure, was also under 
domestic pressure from agricultural and banking interests to settle the war debt issue.  At the 
American Bankers Association convention in October 1922, Thomas Lamont, Morgan's 
partner, termed the inter-Allied debt problem a more important issue than reparations and 
called for American concessions, statements echoed by Reginald McKenna, former 
Chancellor of the Exchequer in Britain.68   Mindful of the impending election and the need to 
take some public stand, Harding authorized Hoover to give a speech on 16 October flatly 
rejecting war debt cancellation.  But Hoover refused, declaring that to do so "would 
undermine the fabric of international good faith."69   As Harding could not now reverse 
himself before the November elections, Hughes was also locked into a policy of opposing 
cancellation of war debts, writing to Child, " Any suggestion looking to discussion of debts 
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would create violent opposition here . . ."70
 The fact that any debt reduction or exchange of Allied debt for German debt would be 
accomplished in the glare of an international crisis rather than through quiet negotiations was 
highly problematic for Harding in October 1922.  There were issues of context as well: the 
administration wanted to deal with Britain in terms of American-British relations, not a 
German crisis.  And, as Hughes explained to Child, the administration was also concerned 
that an economic conference about reparations and war debts would give the Europeans an 
excuse to raise politically taboo subjects such as tariffs and ship subsidies.71  
 
Committee of Experts  
 Harding's decision against modifying war debts left Hughes solely dependent on his plan 
for a committee of experts to determine Germany's capacity to pay.  Although Hughes argued 
that there was "no prospect for agreement unless Governments can arrange to interpose 
between themselves and their public the findings of an impartial committee," he could not 
make either a public statement or even a confidential formal diplomatic proposal to France 
about his plan.  While recognizing that there was "no prospect" of Poincaré yielding to a 
public demand by the United States in the face of French public opinion, Hughes also did not 
want to give Poincaré a formal diplomatic proposal that Poincaré could use to insist on a 
corresponding reduction of France debts to the United States.  Hughes stressed to Child, "It is 
important that the United States should not make a proposal on this matter while refusing to 
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discuss French debts."72
 Hughes also notified Herrick and Boyden that although the United States could not make 
a formal statement regarding an experts committee, it was committed to that approach. He 
expressed little confidence that the Reparation Committee’s arguments could settle anything 
and emphasized "the futility of sending notes or issuing statements that will encourage retorts 
and attempts to start useless discussions," particularly discussions about linking reparations 
and war debts at the proposed Brussels conference.73    
 At the same time Hughes, not indifferent to the problems of Germany, knew that the 
"uncertainty" regarding reparations promoted "economic disorganization in Germany where 
the situation is becoming extremely critical" and negatively affected American interests.  
Hughes also recognized that the administration at some point might have to reduce France’s 
debt, but he wanted its "present undefined reparation asset reduced to a certainty" before 
negotiating debt reductions with the French.  Because the United States would have to know 
what Germany would be paying France before reducing France’s debts, Hughes maintained 
that "to begin with the debt question is to start at the wrong end."74   Telling Houghton that 
"the key to this situation is held by France," Hughes was now ready to see if Poincaré could 
be talked into not only accepting a committee of businessmen as a means of settling the 
reparation crisis, but making the proposal himself.75   
 Despite the antagonism that had developed between Poincaré and Morgan after the Loan 
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Committee report in June and Morgan's public support of cancellation of war debts, Hughes 
turned to the banker for help in convincing Poincaré to accept the plan for an experts 
committee.76  Morgan's efforts, however, would be reluctant at best.  Still bitter over his 
experience on the bankers committee in June, he had come to the conclusion that reparations 
were a political issue.  He told his associate Thomas Lamont that if the politicians wanted a 
committee of experts, they would have to give that committee complete freedom to arrive at 
their conclusions.  Anything less "would be worse than useless."77
 In Paris, Herrick informed Poincaré that the American decision against linking war debts 
with reparations was final and also, hinting that some reduction in French debts might be 
possible in the future, tried unsuccessfully to convince the French premier to accept the idea 
of an experts commission.  Knowing full well that any such commission would reduce 
French claims against Germany with no guarantees that French debts to the United States 
would be reduced, Poincaré insisted that governments, not economic experts, should control 
the reparations issue.  Poincaré still hoped to lure the United States into the proposed 
Brussels conference, where reparations and war debts would be linked.  After two frustrating 
interviews, Herrick concluded that Poincaré had such an anti-German prejudice as to 
"destroy sound judgment" but that financial weakness would eventually force France to 
yield.78
 Poincaré next sent Jusserand to inquire about American participation in the proposed 
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Brussels conference.  Hughes demurred by noting that plans for the conference were still 
tentative.  The next day Jusserand and the British, Italian and Belgian ambassadors, in a 
long-awaited response to the United States' March 1922 request for arrangements to 
subsidize America's forces in the Rhineland, reminded Hughes of America’s interest in 
German reparations.  Jusserand additionally pointed out that because of the moratorium 
Germany had been making payments only in kind, suggesting that perhaps "in some manner" 
a similar in-kind arrangement could be made with United States.79  
     By the beginning of November, not only had Germany still not replied to the Reparation 
Commission's demand for specific proposals, the question of what Germany was willing to 
pay also remained unanswered.  In presenting the American case to France, Hughes and 
Herrick had argued that, since no one was suggesting relieving Germany of any payments 
that it could reasonably make, war debts bore no relationship to reparations.  However, what 
Germany could pay largely depended on what sacrifices Germany was willing to make in 
order to pay.  German proposals to the Reparation Commission would be taken as an 
indication of that willingness; France would be acutely sensitive to such matters.  Boyden 
cautioned Hughes that unless Germany made meaningful reparation proposals, the American 
denial of any link between reparations and war debts would be in "serious danger" in the 
Reparation Commission.80    
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 Hughes's initiative reinforced German passivity. When Wiedfeldt questioned Hughes as 
to the status of the expert committee plan, he was told that while the United States was doing 
its best, Hughes feared that there was only "slight hope of success."  Nevertheless, Hughes 
warned Germany to do and say nothing regarding the initiative.  Any German involvement 
would make it even more difficult to convince Poincaré to accept the plan.81   Unable to do 
much else, Wiedfeldt busied himself meeting with nervous New York bankers cautiously 
urging them not to shorten German credit at this crucial juncture.82   While it would have 
been impolitic for Germany to propose any new initiative in the face of Hughes's caution to 
wait on events, that restraint did not apply to Houghton who was more than willing to plead 
Germany's case.  
 Houghton’s consistent argument that French security concerns were intermingled with 
reparation demands was reinforced by talks with Stinnes, who told Houghton that he 
believed Poincaré would accept the capacity to pay formula if it was accompanied by a 
security arrangement endorsed by the United States.8  3   Since any involvement by the United 
States in security guarantees was politically impossible, Houghton came up with another 
arrangement linked with debt cancellation.  In an impassioned plea to Hughes, he proposed a 
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fifty-year renunciation of war by Germany, France, Britain and Italy.  Their constitutions 
would be modified to require a plebiscite before any nation could go to war, and all would 
agree to a disarmament program.  In exchange, America would cancel the war debts.  
 Houghton argued that America would only be able to collect a fraction of the debt, that 
the American people would respond positively to such a plan, and that the alternative was 
that the "Bolshevik tide" already "beating against the barriers of European civilization" 
would "sweep relentlessly to the Atlantic."  Urging the administration to bypass Congress 
and take the case directly to the American people, Houghton asked for permission to float a 
trial balloon by raising the idea personally and unofficially in a Thanksgiving Day speech.  
His plan, although impractical, offered a cordon santaire against Bolshevism, the economic 
recovery of Europe, and world peace in a single package.84  
 Castle, in Germany at the time and deeply concerned by the conditions he found, 
endorsed Houghton's idea for less idealistic reasons. He believed the plan could have 
political appeal in America.  Noting the propensity of the American public to respond to 
moral issues, Castle observed that action by the administration would keep the Democrats 
from gaining "tremendous initial advantage" by sponsoring the issue.  He further argued that 
a speech by Houghton could begin the education of the American public, which would in 
turn ease the administration's path with Congress.  In addition, Castle was interested the 
possibility of an economic conference in Washington, an idea that offered the advantage of 
turning the tables on the Europeans by having Washington set the agenda.85  
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 Hughes also faced domestic pressure from agricultural interest groups, increasingly 
supported by Senator Borah, who were asking for an economic conference.8  6   However, 
while maintaining that reparations had to be settled outside the political arena, Hughes was 
extremely sensitive to American domestic political concerns.  The Republican Party had 
suffered major losses in the November 1922 elections but still had control of both houses of 
Congress.  The administration, still in the early stages of developing its Open Door trade 
policy, did not want to clash with a new Congress over the political and economic issues that 
any conference on the reconstruction of Europe would inevitably include.  After consulting 
with Harding, Hughes informed Houghton that he was to limit his remarks to American 
interests in promoting disarmament and that any remission of war debts was "unlikely in the 
near future."87   America would continue to restrict its efforts to attempts at persuading 
France to agree to the capacity-to-pay formula, but Harding's decision meant that there would 
be no common ground for Franco-American negotiations.  
 
Experts Meeting on Currency Reform and the German Proposal  
 While Germany waited to see the results of the American initiative, in early November it 
set up its own informal experts committee by convening a meeting of international economic 
experts in Berlin, which Wirth hoped would support his position that Germany required both 
a reduced reparations bill and an international loan.8   8  Left to follow their theoretical 
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inclinations, the economists produced two reports, neither of which satisfied Wirth.  The 
majority, including Keynes and American economist Jeremiah Jenks, held that permanent 
stabilization was impossible because of both Germany's financial policy and the 
requirements of the Treaty of Versailles.  However, the majority report also stated that 
Germany, with its large gold reserve, could undertake a temporary stabilization without 
external help, and called for a two-year moratorium on reparations as well as a concentrated 
German effort to balance the budget. The minority report, written by the Dutch banker 
Vissering and Dubois, the French representative on the Reparations Commission, was even 
more unsatisfactory to Wirth; it called for an external loan but made no mention of reducing 
reparations.89  
    The reports arrived when Wirth was attempting to follow Houghton's advice to move the 
government to the right and create a Great Coalition including both the DVP and SPD, in 
hopes that SPD cooperation would allow Germany to cut its budget and increase labor 
productivity.90   Wirth had used the experts committee as an excuse to deflect both the 
Socialists' demands for rapid stabilization at the expense of the industrialists and the 
Reparation Committee's request for concrete German proposals.91  But  after the experts 
committee released its reports in early November, Wirth was finally forced to submit a 
proposal.  Combining features of both reports, he attempted to design a program that would 
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both placate the Reparation Commission and form the basis for a Great Coalition 
government. Reluctantly accepting the principle that temporary stabilization was possible 
without a final reparation settlement, Wirth proposed a moratorium of three years, although 
deliveries in kind would continue, and a stabilization of the mark through an international 
loan of five hundred million gold marks that Wirth was now willing to have guaranteed by 
Reichsbank gold.  This loan would become the primary obligation of the Reich.  He also 
promised that Germany would balance its budget and increase productivity.  In addition, 
Wirth proposed to raise an internal gold loan, half of which would be used to pay off the 
international loan and the other half to pay reparations.  However, he also included a request 
for the Reparation Commission to encourage a permanent solution by expediting a definite 
determination of the German debt and calling for a conference of international financiers to 
arrange the necessary loans that would place the entire debt on a commercial basis.  This 
request was made to gain the support of industrialists such as Stinnes, who wanted Germany 
to be given a final reparation amount at a time of economic disarray, in order to keep the 
figure as low as possible.92
 Wirth's proposal, an advance over his policy of fulfillment, was nevertheless a rejection 
of France's demand for productive guarantees and a gamble that, having taken Hughes’s 
suggestion of a committee of experts to devise a plan, he could gain American support and 
British willingness to accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.  Wirth also hoped that 
Britain and United States together could restrain France, as they had during the crisis in 
August.  The British foreign office, however, saw the plan as "vague schemes for the 
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stabilization of the mark" that gave "no guarantee of the eventual payment of reparations."9  3   
Even Houghton saw the request for a final determination as an attempt by the industrialists 
"to use the present critical situation in Germany to hold down the reparations to the lowest 
possible amount."94   In response to Wirth’s proposal, the Reparation Commission simply 
took no action.   
 
The Fall of the Wirth Government 
 The reparation proposal was the final act of Wirth's government.  On 14 November the 
SPD, which had reunited with the left wing Independent Socialists in September 1922, 
refused to join any Great Coalition that contained the DVP.95   With his policy of fulfillment 
in ruins and worn out by his efforts, Wirth resigned. His decision to ask for an external loan 
had been dictated by domestic political considerations.  Germany required outside help to 
achieve stabilization because by November 1922, divisions between the Socialists, who 
wanted an internal stabilization at the expense of the industrialists, and the Right, which 
wanted stabilization at the expense of the workers through an austerity program, had become 
too deep to be overcome.  Consequently, the general unwillingness to accept the need to pay 
reparations was reinforced.  The domestic price of Wirth's policy of fulfillment had been a 
failure to confront inflation; the stresses of that inflation had exacerbated the divisions within 
German society and consequently weakened its government.  In part unable and in part 
unwilling to muster its own internal resources, Germany had made itself an object for other 
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states’ decisions. Germany was united only in its opposition to the payment of reparations.96  
 Wilhelm Cuno, who had been serving as president of the Hamburg-Amerika shipping 
line, formed the new government.  The bourgeois parties, unable to agree on a candidate 
from within their political ranks, had settled on Cuno as compromise candidate who would 
be able to create a new coalition government under the guise of a government of experts.  
Well-known as an “America expert,” Cuno was familiar and well liked in U.S. business and 
government circles.  He had become a personal friend of Houghton, and this relationship 
together with his business contacts in the United States were important reasons for his 
selection.97   Cuno was also known as a strong advocate of the businessman solution to 
reparations.  Party leaders unrealistically hoped that this approach and his American 
relationships would facilitate American and British aid in obtaining a final settlement of the 
reparation problems.98     
                                                          
 96 Boyden commented to Houghton, ". . . any weakness which one detected in the 
German government was, in large measure, due to the same causes which produced the 
financial difficulties with which the Commission was struggling, namely: that conditions had 
never been such that the German people that the German people could unite on a definite 
policy of fulfillment with a strong government to carry it out."   Boyden to Houghton, 14 
Nov. 1922, Correspondence between Roland W. Boyden and Houghton, Houghton Papers. 
 97Wiedfeldt reports that Hughes was pleased with the appointment of Cuno, who he had 
met and of whom he had a good impression.  Wiedfeldt to A.A., 28 Nov 1922, Botschaft 
Washington, Po2a (960), PA-AA. 
 98 Cuno's major success had been an agreement he had signed with the American Ship 
and Commerce Company that facilitated the German line's re-entry into international 
shipping activities and provided close personal contact with Averell Harriman, the American 
line's owner.  He had been asked but declined to become the first American ambassador, and 
in September 1922 he had been asked by Wirth to become foreign minister. Wirth believed 
that Cuno's contacts with American and British businessmen could strengthen Germany's 
position in negotiations.  Lord D' Abernon, the British ambassador to London [??], described 
Cuno as "rather pro-English and still more pro-American.”  Viscount D'Abernon, An 
Ambassador of Peace, 3 vols. (London 1929-30) vol 2, p. 132; Hermann J. Rupieper, The 
Cuno Government and Reparations, 1922-1923, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), pp. 
 193 
 Before Cuno accepted the chancellorship, which he did in hopes that America's economic 
and financial power could still influence the final reparations settlement, he discussed the 
situation with Houghton with whom he had a personal relationship.  According to Houghton, 
Cuno believed it was possible to handle reparations as "a business question."  Houghton did 
nothing to disabuse him of that idea, cautioning his friend only to insist on a free hand in 
forming his cabinet.99     
 Dresel, ever suspicious of the German industrialists, had placed his faith in the workers 
of Germany, whom he believed would make the necessary sacrifices and rally to support the 
government in times of crisis. The SPD’s withdrawal from the government proved him 
wrong.  Houghton, on the other hand, believed that Germany needed a government ready to 
listen to businessmen if the twin problems of inflation and reparations were to be solved.  He 
found what he wanted in the Cuno government, viewing it as representing the largest and 
most important banking and industrial elements in Germany and also as committed to 
obtaining a reparation settlement.  Houghton noted, "His government has no other reason for 
existing."10   0  However, the Cuno government’s true level of commitment remained to be 
seen.  
 Almost immediately after Cuno took office, the small hope that Morgan might persuade 
Poincaré to accept Hughes' solution came to an end.  Before he would even meet with the 
French leader, Morgan demanded that Poincaré accept the plan proposed by the Loan 
Committee in June as well as a prolonged moratorium on reparation payments.  Poincaré 
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rejected the demands and refused to see Morgan.  Castle complained that Morgan failed to 
understand the political pressures on Poincaré and had set conditions in advance rather than 
trying to get French concessions in the context of the findings of experts.101  
 While Morgan’s diplomatic skills might have been wanting, the substance of American 
diplomacy had placed Poincaré in an impossible political position.  America was insisting on 
payment of the French debt while demanding that France reduce German reparations and 
accept a moratorium.  Boyden, pointing out that Poincaré had staked his political career on 
an aggressive policy, advised Hughes that if he wanted results he would have to "make some 
public utterance" to rally moderate opinion in France and stiffen the resistance of the other 
Allies to a French policy which Boyden saw leading to disaster. 
 Hughes, however, argued that an appeal over the head of Poincaré would only make 
matters worse and concluded, with Herrick, that any further efforts on America's part before 
the proposed Brussels conference would only be interpreted as coercion.102   A public 
statement by Hughes would have given Poincaré an opportunity to respond by publicly 
calling for the United States to join the Allies at Brussels in a discussion of all international 
debts.  But Hughes had to rely on Bonar Law to keep Poincaré in check, as Germany was 
relying on the United States.  Poincaré still hoped to find a settlement at London, but on 27 
November the French cabinet began making contingency plans for the occupation of the 
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Ruhr.103  
 
Cuno’s Attempts at Settlement 
 Cuno's, program was one of continuity rather than change. He endorsed Wirth's 
stabilization program and request for a moratorium.  His publicly announced foreign-policy 
program called for the return of German sovereignty, equal rights in the world market, and a 
revision of the London Schedule of reparation payments.  It was a German wish list upon 
which all parties could agree, but it did little to resolve Germany’s immediate difficulties. 
Meanwhile in the Reparation Commission, faced with Poincaré's refusal to allow an 
international loan without productive pledges, the British agreed not to press for 
consideration of German stabilization plan in exchange for French agreement not to press for 
a declaration of default on German coal and timber deliveries.  The issue of any moratorium 
was now to be settled at a December meeting between the Bonar Law, Poincaré, Belgian 
premier George Theunis, and Benito Mussolini, who had taken over the Italian government 
and supported the French position.  
   The failure of the Morgan mission led Cuno to try to use the Stinnes-de Lubersac 
relationship to contact Paris informally and open negotiations through and with Ruhr 
industry.  In part, his initiative emerged from a strain of German policy in which a settlement 
with France based on a common interest in industrial developments was thought possible.  
Some German industrialists believed that France, in need of money and industrially 
dependent on German coal, could be forced into cooperation.  Their argument was that if 
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France wanted reparations from Germany, then France would have to allow Germany to 
become a strong, economically integrated nation. 
 In exchange for their support on reparations, these leaders envisioned Germany obtaining 
reduced reparations, most-favored-nation treatment for Germany, and liberation of the 
Rhineland and Saar from occupation and sanctions.  Their argument was that if France 
wanted reparations from Germany, then France would have to allow Germany to became a 
strong integrated nation.  In late 1922, however, Cuno's initiative was merely an act of hope 
rather than an attempt to negotiate from German strength.  In any case, Poincaré had little 
interest in any negotiations with Germany until he could determine what might be achieved 
at London.104  
 Cuno's next move was to turn to the Reparation Commission for help in developing a 
plan that could be presented at London.  But with Poincaré insisting on productive pledges, 
the Reparation Commission was pessimistic about what could be accomplished.  Logan and 
Boyden advised against submitting any plan, since they were certain that any plan submitted 
by Germany would be rejected by Poincaré.  The American position remained that Hughes's 
capacity-to-pay approach was the only solution.  Bradbury, however, recommended that 
Germany provide some plan that Bonar Law could use as a basis for negotiation. Unable to 
wait for Hughes, Cuno prepared his proposal, which placed stabilization in the foreground.105  
Unlike Wirth, Cuno was now willing for Germany to attempt stabilization out of its own 
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resources and to accept a provisional arrangement without a final settlement; reparations 
would be paid predominantly from a foreign loan yet to be raised.  In exchange, Germany 
would ask for a minimum two-year moratorium.  The plan, however, allocated very little 
immediate cash to France and industry had declined to guarantee the loan since the plan did 
not include a final settlement.  Taken as a whole, it asked the Allies to fund German 
reparation payments, because Germany was bankrupt, and to grant Germany a moratorium so 
it could raise money at home for stabilization.106
 At the London meeting, the question of inter-Allied debt dominated the proceedings.  
Britain’s desire to attend a conference at Brussels at which it would be the only creditor was 
no greater than U.S. desire had been to attend the Genoa conference.  Poincaré, still hoping 
for a conference on inter-Allied debts and reparations, was willing to reduce Germany's 
theoretical burden only by transferring to Britain an amount in C Bonds equivalent to 
France's indebtedness to Britain.  Bonar Law, who wanted to use German and French debts 
to Britain as leverage in debt negotiations with the United States, was willing to retreat only 
slightly from the Balfour note position, although Britain was willing to accept the risk of 
paying somewhat more to the United States than it received from France and Germany.  
Neither Britain nor France considered the German offer satisfactory, but while Bonar Law 
adopted the attitude that the Allies should take what they could get from Germany, Poincaré 
demanded the occupation of portions of the Ruhr.  With neither eager for an open break, 
Poincaré and Law agreed to meet in Paris in early January. 
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Towards the Ruhr Occupation  
 By mid-December, Hughes was aware that an occupation of the Ruhr was likely, having 
been warned by Herrick that although Poincaré was reluctant to go into the Ruhr, France 
would do so if an agreement could not be reached with Britain.107  Within days after the 
conference Hughes met separately with Wiedfeldt and Jusserand.   Wiedfeldt told Hughes 
that Germany was convinced of France’s determination to occupy the Ruhr, expressing the 
fatalistic attitude of many Germans that the seizure of the Ruhr was France's "last card"  and 
saying the Germans almost hoped that France "would take the Ruhr and they would have this 
over."  But Wiedfeldt also predicted that any profit France would gain from Ruhr coal would 
be eaten up by the administrative costs of an occupation and warned Hughes that French 
intentions were not to get reparations costs, but "to dominate German industry and prostrate 
Germany."108  
 Hughes's meeting with Jusserand was also based on the assumption of a French 
occupation of the Ruhr.  He made some effort to convince Jusserand to accept a settlement 
based on expert advice about Germany's capacity to pay, but his primary concern was the 
extent of French intentions.  Hughes, thinking that a French policy of seizing productive 
pledges would be unwise and unlikely to be effective, warned Jusserand that the United 
States assumed France "did not contemplate a policy which would dismember Germany and 
lay her prostrate";  such a policy "would defeat an economic revival" and affect American 
interests.  He also told Jusserand that French occupation ran the risk of creating a situation 
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that "would seem to make war at some time inevitable."109  
 In response to these concerns, Poincaré sent assurances through Jusserand that France did 
not contemplate any "diminution" or "annexation" of German territory, however, Jusserand 
could not explain exactly what measures were contemplated to enforce guarantees, nor was 
he certain about the possible use of military force.  Hughes replied by warning that an 
occupation to enforce guarantees "might not be easily given up."  Despite these misgivings, 
Hughes would later be able to claim that he had obtained French assurances that its demands 
on Germany were limited and did not include diminution of German territory, and would rely 
on these assurances in the formulation of American policy.110    
 Having met with the French and the Germans, Hughes was ready to meet with Sir 
Auckland Geddes, the British ambassador.  Geddes told Hughes that, in Bonar Law's exact 
words, Britain saw "no chance of agreement" with France while Poincaré held office and that 
although Bonar Law was almost certain France would send forces into the Ruhr, he could not 
predict either the extent of those forces or the eventual measures France would adopt.  
Geddes, who wanted to know what Hughes was prepared to do, asked the United States send 
an American representative to the scheduled Allied meeting in Paris. 
 Hughes begged off, citing rumors that France objected to an American presence.  Nor 
would Hughes commit to making a public statement expressing his opposition to French 
occupation of the Ruhr.  Hughes told Geddes that he doubted very much whether “any 
suggestion the American government could make at this time would bring about any 
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change…" Hughes emphasized that the United States was not going to enter into any 
discussion of war debts.11  1   Angry that Bonar Law would have to face Poincaré without the 
possibility of a remission of French war debts owed to America, Geddes notified London that 
Hughes and Harding "are frightened of their own political shadows and are terrified by the 
new radical senators who whether they are [R]epublicans or [D]emocrats are more strongly 
isolationist than the men they replaced."112  
 After the failure of the London meeting, Cuno made a three-pronged effort to ward off 
French action.  He first tried to schedule meetings with France, only to again be rebuffed by 
Poincaré, who was not interested in negotiations with German industrialists.113   Houghton 
had also attempted to facilitate German-French cooperation, by using Boyden and Herrick to 
pass on to Seydoux his assessment that Germany was now ready to enter into serious 
negotiations.114   Cuno’s second effort was to begin work on yet another reparation plan that 
could be presented to the Allies.  And finally, with Houghton's encouragement, Cuno sought 
to involve the United States both politically and financially in efforts to resolve the 
reparation crisis. 
 Almost certainly with Houghton's prompting, Cuno tried to address French security 
concerns and gain American support by demonstrations of Germany’s commitment to 
European cooperation.  Cuno offered on an unconditional basis to sign a thirty-year non-
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aggression with Britain, France, Germany and Italy; each power would then promise the 
United States not to go to war without putting the matter to a popular vote.  The United 
States, in some undefined manner, was to serve as "trustee" for this arrangement.  However, 
when queried by Hughes as the extent of the peace proposal, Wiedfeldt acknowledged that 
the pact would not refer to a war with a non-participatory power.  Cuno's proposal would 
ultimately serve as the basis of the Locarno Pact of 1925, but in 1922 Germany was no more 
willing than it would be in the Locarno pact to forswear war with Poland.115   
 France was interested in the proposal only to the extent that the United States was 
prepared to guarantee the pact. When Hughes explained that the United State would not be 
bound to any action but would simply "be entitled to complain" if Germany broke "such a 
solemn agreement," Jusserand replied that France did not trust German promises.  Despite 
Hughes's request that France reconsider, Poincaré rejected the approach as well.  In 1925, 
France would have to accept the end of the Allied occupation of the Cologne zone in 
exchange for the Locarno Pact (which did have stronger guarantees than Cuno's proposal), 
but in December 1922, France was in a stronger position.  Before Poincaré made peace, he 
wanted to be paid.116   
 Pursuant to Cuno’s effort to produce a new reparation plan and involve the U.S., 
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Wiedfeldt traveled to New York on 16 December to meet with J.P Morgan.   Hughes gladly 
arranged the meeting, despite his previous disagreements with Morgan, knowing that 
Morgan’s support would eventually be needed for a European settlement.  Wiedfeldt hoped 
Morgan might be willing to offer his opinion on the amount Germany might offer in a new 
settlement proposal and also discuss the possibility of an American loan to finance it.  
Hughes was doubtful that Morgan would be willing to offer any firm opinions after his 
experience the previous summer with reparation politics, and perhaps because of this, he 
approved the meeting. 
 As predicted, Morgan gave Wiedfeldt no positive answers, citing that the questions were 
basically political rather then financial, but he did express interest in seeing the reparations 
issue settled and willingness to participate in an international loan as soon as the reparations 
sum was definitively set.  The setting of the sum, in Morgan’s view, was firmly in the hands 
of the politicians.  Only after the political questions had been settled could the financiers 
discuss the question of a loan.  Wiedfeldt warned that Germany was on the verge of collapse 
and that the situation could not wait until France decided on a more reasonable course.  
While Morgan agreed that the mark could not be stabilized until the reparations question was 
settled, he was, in Wiedfeldt’s view, remarkably unconcerned over the effect a French move 
into the Ruhr might have on Germany.  Morgan was sure that even if the French were to 
move into the Ruhr, they would quickly be forced out by world opinion.  When Wiedfeldt 
protested that Germany would starve, Morgan replied, “such things do not happen in the 20th 
century.”117
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  A report prepared by Castle upon his return from Germany offers revealing insight into 
how official Washington circles viewed Germany in December 1922.  Castle noted that 
economic conditions were horrid and that the population had little hope, adding that labor did 
not want reparations paid on the backs of working people and that among the moderate 
parties there was no will at all to undertake reparations since "payment in full is obviously 
impossible."  Castle realized that these dynamics undermined the original notion that the 
payment must be made, concluding that "[t]he Allies, therefore, have to deal with a nation 
which plans to pay just as little as possible, a nation which might have buckled down to the 
task had the reparation figures been furnished promptly and the sum had been reasonable." 
Castle's assessment, while expressing the prevailing American belief that the European 
politicians had simply made a mess of the reparations issue, offered very little in the way of 
solutions.  He believed that Germany had to stabilize before reparations could be paid but 
that stabilization was "naturally impossible" without a moratorium, which France was 
refusing to provide, and he knew quite well that the option of linking war-debt relief to some 
type of peace arrangement had already been rejected by Hughes.  Castle wondered if the 
United States might find some way to guarantee French security. But any meaningful 
security arrangement was precisely what the United States had rejected when it chose the 
Treaty of Berlin over the Treaty of Versailles.118  
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 By late December, when it had become obvious that France was very likely to enter the 
Ruhr, Hughes was prepared to see a limited French presence if it would secure Poincaré's 
productive guarantees.  On the other hand, if Wiedfeldt proved correct and Poincaré would 
gain little net profit for his efforts in the Ruhr, then Hughes could wait until the Poincaré 
government fell and a more moderate French government accepted his plan.  However, 
Hughes was under pressure from Germany and Britain as well as members of his own 
diplomatic corps to make some effort to facilitate a settlement. 
 What finally forced Hughes’s hand, however, was domestic political pressure.  Senator 
Borah, urged by agricultural groups to help increase exports and personally quite opposed to 
French intervention in the Ruhr, had introduced a Senate resolution calling for an 
international conference on trade, war debts, reparations and disarmament.  His primary 
motivation for the resolution, however, was political.  Borah was seeking to rally reform 
Republican senators under his leadership.  Challenged by Borah and faced with an almost 
inevitable French occupation in the Ruhr, the Harding administration was finally forced to 
respond.119  
 The administration needed to inoculate itself against charges of American inaction by 
domestic and foreign critics.  Hughes’s famous New Haven speech to the American 
Historical Association, delivered on 29 December, is best understood in this context.  In that 
speech Hughes at last publicly revealed his proposal for an international committee of 
financial experts to determine Germany's capacity to pay, defining the crux of Europe's 
problems as the settlement of reparations and arguing that although France deserved 
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reparations, Germany could not be prostrated since European prosperity depended on 
German recovery.  Hughes then exempted the United States from any blame in creating the 
problem, pointing out that the United States did not ask for general reparations but only for 
its occupation costs but did not mention American war claims. 
 Hughes further noted that American troops were in the Rhineland at the Europeans’ 
request and that "[o]thers have been paid and we have not been paid."  He maintained that 
the United States was not responsible for a solution.  The United States could not act as an 
arbiter unless invited, he stated, nor should it seek "such a burden of responsibility" that 
would draw "to ourselves all the ill feeling which would result from disappointed hopes and 
a settlement which was viewed as forced upon nations by this country which is at the same 
time is demanding the payment of its debts."  Hughes insisted that the European themselves 
must find a solution: "The key of the settlement is in their hands not ours." 
 Turning to the issue of American war-debts policy, Hughes reminded his audience that 
France's capacity to pay the United States could not be determined until how much France 
would receive from Germany had been settled and noted, in an effort to disarm domestic 
critics, added both that the Harding administration was following the same policy as the 
Wilson administration and that it was Congress which had removed the administration’s 
flexibility on the issue.  In response to Borah, Hughes dismissed the idea of any general 
economic conference issue since a "political" conference could not be expected to achieve 
results and argued that his proposal for a commission of finance experts was the only 
practical one.  Such a commission would be "friendly" and "not be bound by special 
obligations" and "distinguished Americans" would be willing to serve.120   
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 Hughes's speech did not influence French intentions, nor was that Hughes’s primary 
purpose.  But, in addition to mounting a political defense of the administration, it signaled 
the American public that France would occupy the Ruhr and outlined future American 
policy.  If the reparations problem was not of American making and only the European could 
solve it, then America would simply have to wait until the Europeans, particularly the 
French, were ready for a settlement.  The speech also paved the way for the administration to 
demand more flexibility from Congress about war debts.  Hughes was now prepared to ride 
out any storm of domestic criticism and wait on events.   
 Thus, in the last days of December, Cuno could no longer count on either Hughes or 
Bonar Law to restrain France.  The only remaining question was whether Germany could 
come up with a serious reparation proposal that might tempt Poincaré into negotiations.  
Cuno was forced to turn to the bankers and industrialists for help, but the impending crisis 
did little to alter the industrialists’ differences of opinion, which were based on self-interest 
and varying interpretations of political necessity.  The proposal that emerged was a hurried 
attempt to satisfy different interest groups, particularly the Ruhr industrialists.  Its final offer 
avoided fixing the German debt but did call for a massive international loan of 20 billion 
gold marks, evacuation of the right-bank towns occupied in 1921, and an early evacuation of 
the Rhineland.  As an impetus for the economic integration of Germany, free from Allied 
interference, it was more a statement of attitude than a serious proposal.  Few believed that 
any German offer would be considered by the Allies, who were meeting at Paris in an 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in New Haven, enclosed in Sec of State to Herrick, 29 Dec. 1922, FRUS, 1922, II, pp. 199-
203. 
 207 
attempt to resolve the impending crisis.121     
  The German proposal was never presented at Paris.  Bergmann considered it "insolence" 
and Castle called it "the kind of thing that the French will seize upon as proof that Germany 
is trying to get out in the easiest possible way."122   But ultimately its absence made no 
difference.  Hoping to obtain significant future reparations, Bonar Law presented his own 
plan that offered Germany a four-year moratorium, reduced the real value of the total debt to 
37 billion gold marks, and required unanimous Allied agreement to impose sanctions instead 
of Poincaré’s desires, which were a high reparation bill and French control of German assets 
that would produce immediate payments. The Paris meeting quickly degenerated into a fight 
over the allocation of inter-Allied debts and reparations.  France rejected Bonar Law's plan 
and forced a declaration of default with the support of Belgian and Italian Reparations 
Committee members.  On 11 January Belgian and French troops entered the Ruhr, Germany 
implemented a policy of passive resistance, and the test of strength between Germany and 
France began.123  
 
Conclusion 
 The United States recognized that a resolution of the question of German reparations was 
essential to the reconstruction of Europe.  However, American policy about reparations 
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contained self-contradictory elements.  The United States wanted a settlement that would 
reduce German reparations sufficiently to allow Germany to stabilize its economy.  
Republican policy makers hoped that a peaceful, prosperous Germany would provide both 
security for France and a market for American goods and investments.  At the same time, the 
United States believed that Germany had a moral responsibility to pay reparations and sought 
a level of payment large enough to allow France to meet its debt payments to the United 
States and to place some limits on Germany's economic and military potential. 
 Policy makers seized upon the idea of Germany's "capacity to pay," as determined by 
experts, as a stratagem that could meet the United States' diverse goals.  This allowed the 
United States to pursue a settlement without official involvement, circumvent linkage 
between war debts and reparations, and avoid debate over political and strategic 
considerations.  It also deferred the contentious questions of exactly what sum Germany 
could pay and what means could induce or force Germany to pay.  Policy debate centered 
primarily on how vigorously and publicly the United States should pressure France to accept 
this solution and whether war-debt reduction should be used as an inducement.  
   The administration's first attempt to implement its solution, through J.P. Morgan and the 
Loan Committee in June 1922, failed when Poincaré refused to accept the committee's 
findings that the London Schedule of Reparations would have to be reduced and that a 
moratorium on Germany payments would have to precede a stabilization loan to Germany. 
 However, France would not accept a reduction in reparations when it was being asked to 
pay its war debts and the uproar following the Balfour note in August 1922 severely limited 
American flexibility on war debts.  Despite demands by international bankers and 
agricultural interests to stimulate international trade by a reduction of Allied war debts, 
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prevailing American domestic opinion remained opposed to sacrificing the nation’s financial 
interests for the benefit of international trade.  Domestic economic priorities rather than 
desire for expansion of exports drove American policy. The Harding administration was not 
willing to pay the domestic political costs necessary to accommodate Poincaré's demand for 
linkage between war debts and reparations.  After August, Hughes became committed to a 
solution based on Germany's capacity to pay, determined by an expert committee without 
reference to Allied war debts.  Convinced that France's financial position would eventually 
force it to accept American terms, Hughes was willing first to accept and then to wait out the 
French occupation of the Ruhr.  
 Germany's foreign policy in1922 centered on its conflict with France over reparations.  It 
was a struggle over both national capabilities and relations of power.  The highly technical 
questions of whether or not capital transfers of the magnitude demanded by the London 
Schedule were beyond Germany's capacity to pay, and what effect those transfers would 
have upon the international economic system of the 1920s, may remain unanswerable even 
with modern economic analysis. Reparations was a political question whose feasibility could 
only have been established empirically and politically through the efforts of Weimar policy. 
Feasibility was therefore more a function of the national will than national resources.  
  In part, the lack of German political will about reparations reflected Germany's 
unwillingness to accept its defeat and the verdict of Versailles.  But even if Germany's 
economic ability to pay reparations is theoretically assumed, its political capacity to pay was 
not simply limited by German strategic ambitions.  Facing very difficult domestic and 
political dilemmas arising from the internal distribution of the war’s costs, German parties of 
the left refused to accept an austerity program and the representatives of heavy industry 
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refused to support either a coherent or reasonable reparations offer or a stabilization program 
adverse to their interests.  Stabilization and reparations policy was subordinated to the need 
to maintain social peace and revive industrial production. 
 The Wirth government sought to buy time for a gradual stabilization which would be 
socially, economically and politically tolerable to the German people and that would allow 
Germany to enter a reconstituted world economic order with reduced reparations and a 
currency stabilized at an advantageously low level.  Its policy of fulfillment was a gamble 
which accepted the risk of domestic political conflict and economic instability in order to 
prove that reparations were unfeasible.  By August 1922 it had clearly failed as 
hyperinflation took hold, but the growing domestic and foreign crisis only paralyzed the 
Wirth government, which clung to its unsuccessful policies.  The subsequent Cuno 
government, heavily influenced by industrial interests, also refused to accept the economic 
consequences of a gradual revision of Versailles and, with a sense of confronting the 
inevitable, was willing to accept a showdown with France.    
 The policies of both the United States and Britain contributed to Germany's lack of 
political will to pay reparations.  Although the two nations’ perspectives differed on how 
European reconstruction and debt settlement should be achieved, both viewed the London 
Schedule as an impediment to European reconstruction.  To pay reparations, Germany would 
have had to establish a deflationary fiscal policy, generating budget surpluses, and accept a 
decline in national income reducing the import of foreign goods and creating an export 
surplus.  Such an economy would have served the perceived interests of neither the United 
States nor Britain. 
 The view that the London Schedule was both impractical and an impediment to a 
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European recovery was also shared by British and American international bankers, who by 
late 1921 had became the arbiters of Germany's capacity to pay.  The Bank of England's 
refusal to lend money for reparations in November 1921 and the report of J.P. Morgan’s 
Loan Committee in June 1922 strongly critiqued what the bankers considered excessive 
demands made upon Germany, thereby strengthening Wirth and Rathenau's hopes for the 
ultimate success of their fulfillment policy and serving as a disincentive for stabilization.  In 
the Reparation Commission, unofficial American representatives worked to protect Germany 
from demands they considered beyond Germany's means; their success in preventing a 
declaration of default in August 1922 allowed Germany to postpone reform.  Hughes's 
subsequent efforts to convince Poincaré to accept an experts committee could only have 
reinforced Germany's belief that France would eventually be forced to give way.  
 At the same time, American war-debt policy hindered any reparation settlement.  The 
establishment of the World War Foreign Debt Commission in February 1922 increased 
French resistance to Morgan's Loan Committee in June.  Poincaré would not accept a 
reduction of German reparations while France was being pressured to pay its war debts.  
Lloyd George's Balfour note and the United States’ subsequent refusal to link war debts and 
reparation reduction induced France to consider an occupation of the Ruhr as a means of 
forcing Germany to pay reparations. 
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 Chapter V 
 
Passive Neutrality: 
The Ruhr Crisis and the American Response  
January - August 1923 
 
 
The Occupation of the Ruhr and American Troop withdrawal from Koblenz 
 On 11 January 1923 three columns of French and Belgian infantry, supported by cavalry 
and heavy weapons, swept into the Ruhr, ostensibly to provide security for the 72 French, 
Belgian and Italian engineers of the Mission interalliée de contrôle des usines et des mines 
(MICUM) sent in to extract reparations directly from Germany’s industrial heartland.1   The 
                                                          
 1 France moved into the Ruhr with two infantry divisions and a reinforced cavalry 
division numbering well over 20,000 men.  Belgium provided two infantry battalions, three 
batteries and a cavalry regiment.  By 16 January, there were 47,000 French and Belgium 
troops in the Ruhr, the British noting that 176 trainloads of French troops passed through the 
British occupation zone in the first week.  Italy provided token participation by contributing 
two engineers to the MICUM mission.  The Americans were shocked by the extent of French 
military action. Warren Robbins in Berlin wrote to Castle “What really does annoy me about 
this whole fiasco is that the French still have the gall to say that they have sent engineers to 
inspect the working of the mines and the necessary troops for their safeguard,” estimating 
that by late January France had 65,000 troops in the Rhineland and the Ruhr.  Robbins to 
Castle, 30 Jan 1923, file 51, Castle Papers.  For troops strengths see Stanislas Jeannesson, 
“Pourquoi la France a-t-Elle Occupé la Ruhr,” Vingtieme Siecle 51 (1996), p. 56;  Conan 
Fischer, The Ruhr Crisis: 1923-1924 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 41-42; 
Ludwig Zimmermann, Frankreichs Ruhrpolitik (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1971), pp. 92, 
96; James E. Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland, 1918-1929, facsimile edition 
(London, Imperial War Museum, 1987), p. 249. 
 occupation was both the result of the total failure of the diplomacy of 1922 and a return to 
the sanctions of 1921, applied unilaterally by France with Belgian cooperation, but on a far 
larger scale. 
 The government of each major power was required to alter its international policies in 
light of the crisis.  Seeking to avoid blame for the collapse of diplomacy, all were under 
pressure to respond to their respective domestic pressures and public opinion.  Secretary of 
State Hughes immediately disengaged the United States as much as possible to avoid any 
entanglement in the conflict.  In conformity with a Senate resolution that had already been 
passed in anticipation of the French-Belgian action, on 6 January, American troops in the 
Koblenz occupation zone were withdrawn to preclude any incidents with French troops 
moving through it.  As William R. Castle noted, the troops had been a restraining force, but 
"now the French are beyond restraint."2   Washington deliberately did not provide an official 
explanation for the withdrawal, so officially France and Germany could both interpret the 
action in support of their policies.   
 Although Hughes’s New Haven speech of 29 December, calling for a committee of 
experts to take up the issue of reparations, had come far too late to prevent the occupation of 
the Ruhr, it did reinforce Germany’s belief that American intervention was all that could 
break the deadlock with France and supply the impetus for revision of the reparations 
schedule.  With what he thought was the moral and financial authority of the United States 
behind the call for an international conference, Cuno felt he could afford to take a moral 
stand against Poincaré.  On 10 January Cuno personally told Houghton that Germany would 
not make any formal public appeal for support from the United States or any other county, 
                                                          
 2 Castle to Houghton, 12 Jan 1923, Houghton Papers. 
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 dramatically declaring his intention to “let history take its course.” 
 Germany did, however, intend to protest the invasion as a violation of the international 
law and the Treaty of Versailles, which it paradoxically reviled as a “Diktat” and which the 
United States never ratified.3  The German government also announced that during the 
duration of the Ruhr occupation, Germany would not, because it could not, make reparation 
deliveries or even discuss them.4   Nonetheless, Cuno was anxious that the United States 
retain its troops in the Rhineland, believing that their presence would make the treatment of 
Germans less severe and possibly avert more serious trouble, a belief supported by 
Houghton.5  However, when the withdrawal of American troops was announced, Rosenberg 
and Cuno made the best of the situation, interpreting the move as a response to the French 
and declaring that “the withdrawal of American troops from Koblenz can only be seen as 
nothing else but a protest action.”6
 In an effort to block France, Germany immediately asked Britain to move troops down 
from Cologne into the Koblenz zone.  Needing to maintain the appearance of neutrality 
because its occupation of the Rhineland’s Cologne zone placed it in the center of any 
                                                          
 3 Houghton to Secretary of State, 10 Jan 1923, FRUS 1923 II, p. 48; Erklärung des 
Reichskanzlers Dr. Cuno vor americanischen Pressevertretern, 8 Jan 1923, Ursachen und 
Folgen bd. V, Nr. 995, pp. 12-13. 
 4 Statement for the Press Handed by the German Ambassador (Wiedfeldt) to the Under 
Secretary of State (Phillips), 11 Jan 1923, FRUS 1923 II, p. 50-51. 
 5  Houghton to Secretary of State, 10 Jan 1923, FRUS 1923 II, p. 48; Castle to Houghton, 
12 Jan 1923, file 51, Castle Papers. 
 6 Besprechung mit den Ministerpräsidenten der Länder, 12 Jan 1923; Besprechung mit 
Vertretern der Gewerkschaften, 23 Jan 1923, Das Kabinett Cuno, ed. Karl-Heinz Harbeck 
(Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1968), pp. 143, 186. 
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 German-French conflicts, Britain understandably declined the invitation.7    
 Poincaré, recognizing the importance of international opinion, awkwardly attempted to 
mitigate the view that the French incursion was meant as a dismissive rebuff to Hughes’s call 
for a committee of experts that the American withdrawal of troops was then meant to protest.  
On the eve of the occupation Poincaré had categorically denied, in public, that he had 
received any version of the New Haven proposal prior to Hughes’s actual speech.  “This is, 
of course a straight lie,” according to Castle.8   Furious, on 5 January Hughes informed the 
French Ambassador, Jules Jusserand, that he would not tolerate being “put in a position 
before the American people of contenting himself with making a speech at New Haven and 
supposing that this was a way to address the French Government. He had previously taken 
this matter up directly with the French Ambassador and if publicly questioned , he would 
make this clear.”9   
 The extent of the French military move into the Ruhr had caught the United States by 
surprise, although some sanctions in regard to the Ruhr were expected. Hughes opposed the 
military occupation, fearing it would do far more harm than good. He especially was opposed 
to any thought of French annexation of German territory “creating another Alsace-Lorraine.”  
                                                          
 7 Curzon to D’Abernon, 15 Jan 1923, DBFP 21, no. 30, pp. 35-36; David G. Williamson, 
The British in Germany, 1918-1930: The Reluctant Occupiers, (New York: Berg, 1991), pp. 
221-22; Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland, pp. 247-48.  
 8 Castle Diary, entry of 9 Jan 1923, vol. 4, Houghton Library, Harvard University. 
 9 Memorandum by Secretary of State of a Conversation with the French Ambassador 
(Jusserand), 5 Jan 1923, FRUS 1923 II, p. 46. For Hughes notification to the French see 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the French Ambassador 
(Jusserand), 7 Nov 1922 and 21 Dec 1922, FRUS 1922 II, pp. 178-79, 195-96; Phillips to 
Herrick, 29 Dec 1922, FRUS 1922 II, pp. 199-202; Hughes to Herrick, 6 Jan 1923, FRUS 
1922 II, p. 203. 
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 Since late December 1922, Jusserand had repeatedly met Hughes’s queries about Poincaré’s 
intentions with assurances that “nothing was contemplated except to take certain guarantees.”  
When he asked directly if France intended military occupation of the Ruhr, Jusserand 
thought not.10   On 8 January, three days before French troops moved in, Hughes had again 
quizzed Jusserand, who “intimated that all the plans would be made for the occupation of the 
Ruhr in order to impress Germany and in the hope that some better offer would be made by 
Germany.”1   1
 The French military occupation of the Ruhr so soon after Hughes had issued his New 
Haven proposal and the French attempt to keep him in the dark as to their intentions 
embarrassed and angered Hughes.  Writing to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, Hughes admitted that “of course there were rumors and many 
entertained views as to what France would do.  But France herself did not disclose her plans 
until her final demand on Germany immediately before the entry of her troops into the 
Ruhr.”12   To British Ambassador Sir Auckland Geddes, Hughes clearly stated that “the 
French had deliberately misled him” about the Ruhr.13
 Hughes had also warned Jusserand on 8 January that the United States would 
immediately withdraw its troops if the French occupied the Ruhr, to which Jusserand 
responded by requesting that the United States take no immediate action for fear that it 
would give the “wrong impression abroad.”  Obviously France was more than willing to take 
                                                          
 10 Memorandum of Interview with the French Ambassador, 26 Dec 1922, Hughes Papers. 
 11 Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the French Ambassador 
(Jusserand), 8 Jan 1923, FRUS 1923 II, p. 47. 
 12 Hughes to Lodge, 1 Feb 1923, reel 28, cont. 41, Hughes papers. 
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 over the American position in Koblenz, albeit the loss of visible American support in the 
Rhine was a blow.14   Poincaré’s public denial that he had been warned by the United States 
of American intentions, made immediately after the announcement of American troop 
withdrawal, added insult to injury.  Castle wrote Houghton that Poincaré’s statement were 
attempts to reduce the “odium” surrounding the French action.15
 In fact, America’s troop withdrawal was widely recognized as a sharp rebuke of France, 
particularly after Boyden condemned the French action in the Reparation Commission and 
General Allen, commander of American forces in the Rhineland, protested the withdrawal 
and called for the reopening of negotiations.1  6   Hughes, however, did what he could to 
perpetuate the appearance of strict American neutrality.  After French complaints, he firmly 
instructed General Allen to refrain from comments and restrict his activities withdrawing the 
troops. He also curtailed the activities of Boyden and Logan within the Reparation 
Commission.17
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 13 Quoted in DBFP XXI, no. 89, fn. 1, p. 94. 
 14 Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the French Ambassador 
(Jusserand), 8 Jan 1923, FRUS 1923 II, p. 47. 
 15 Castle to Houghton, 12 Jan 1923, file 51, Castle Papers.  Hughes had discussed the 
issue of a committee of experts in meetings with Jusserand on 7 November and 21 
December.  On 5 January Hughes had confronted Jusserand on the matter of Poincaré denial, 
noting that regardless of form, “the French Government certainly had the suggestion before 
it” and asking the ambassador to confirm this with Paris.  Memorandum by the Secretary of 
State of a Conversation with the French Ambassador (Jusserand), 7 Nov 1922 and 21 Dec 
1922, FRUS 1922 II, pp. 178-79, 195-96; Memorandum by Secretary of State of a 
Conversation with the French Ambassador (Jusserand), 5 Jan 1923, FRUS 1923 II, p. 46; see 
also Rupieper, Cuno Government, p. 92. 
 16 New York Times, 27 Jan 1923, p. 3; Allen to Sec. of State, 13 Jan 1923, FRUS 1923 
II, p. 51. 
 17 Sec. of State to Allen, 15 Jan 1923, FRUS 1923 II, p. 53;  Herrick to Allen, 16 Jan, 
1923, copy in Houghton Papers; Boyden's letters to his mother, A.L. Boyden, 26 Jan and 4 
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German Reaction to the Occupation 
  Despite a reparations policy that was clearly provoking confrontation with France, 
Germany had done little in actual preparation for French intrusion into the Ruhr.  Cuno 
continued to hope that some last-minute arrangement could be made; it was not until 9 
January that his cabinet began to outline plans for passive resistance designed to foil 
economic exploitation of the region.  The first step, taken in conjunction with Ruhr 
industrialists, was to remove the expertise and organization needed to run much of the 
region’s industry by evacuating coal-syndicate headquarters from Essen to Hamburg.18  In 
protest, Germany stopped all reparations deliveries of coal to France and Belgium and ceased 
cooperation with the Military Control Commission still conducting inspections within 
Germany.19  Not wishing to provoke the French into further action, there was a degree of 
moderation in the planning for passive resistance.  The cabinet, for example, decided against 
calling a railroad strike as it would place an undue burden upon the population and would 
likely serve as a pretext for a French seizure of the railways.   
 The German government had planned to recall its ambassadors to France and Belgium in 
the event of an occupation, and did so although the embassies remained open and diplomatic 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Apr 1923, Boyden Papers, cited in Buckingham, International Normalcy, p. 127. 
 18 Ministerrat beim Reichspräsidenten, 9 Jan 1923,  Das Kabinett Cuno, Nr.37, pp122-
129; Protokoll über eine Versammlung der Mitglieder des Rheinisch-Westfälischen Kohlen-
Synikats, 9 Jan 1923, Ursachen und Folgen, Bd. V, Nr. 996, pp. 13-15; Conan Fischer, The 
Ruhr Crisis, 1923-1924 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 34-35. 
 19 Coal deliveries did continue to Italy, as Germany hoped for Mussolini’s intervention.  
See von Rosenberg to Embassy in Rome, 7 Feb 1923, ADAP, Bd. VII, p.166; Besprechung 
mit den Ministerpräsidenten der Länder, 12 Jan 1923, Das Kabinett Cuno, Nr. 43, p. 143. 
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 relations continued under Chargés d’Affaires Leopold von Hoesch in Paris and Conrad 
Roediger in Brussels.20  Noting during the planning stage that evacuation of the Ruhr could 
only be accomplished by negotiations between governments, von Rosenberg regretted that 
German “national resistance can only be expressed in a modest form.”21   With little 
preparation the government declared passive resistance in the occupied territories of the 
Rhine and the Ruhr.  The mechanisms of passive resistance were slow and difficult to 
organize.  The key element necessary for effective passive resistance was providing the 
financial support to the Ruhr, especially subsidies for industry and the payment of 
unemployment insurance.  This quickly led to dangerous deficits and eventually to the 
collapse of the policy of passive resistance.22
 From the German perspective, the conflict was tantamount to war: a Ruhrkrieg, 
subjectively understood as a fight for the very existence of the unified German Reich of 
1871.  Militarily, of course, Germany could do nothing, but the if the government was to 
survive and national unity to be preserved, Cuno felt that a strong show of resistance to the 
German people, especially in the occupied areas, was essential.23   Much of the government’s 
response would necessarily rely on moral protest.  President Ebert declared on 14 January, 
                                                          
 20 Besprechung im Reichsverkehrsministerium, 10 Jan 1923, Das Kabinett Cuno, Nr. 38, 
p. 130; Ministerrat beim Reichspräsidenten, 9 Jan 1923,  Das Kabinett Cuno, Nr.37, pp. 122-
23; Frederick L. Schuman, War and Diplomacy in the French Republic (New York: 
Whittlesey House, 1931), pp. 289-90. 
 21 Ministerrat beim Reichspräsidenten, 9 Jan 1923, Das Kabinett Cuno, Nr. 37, p. 124. 
 22 Rupieper, The Cuno Government, pp. 103-5. 
 23 In the Reichstag, Cuno admitted that there was “little, bitterly little” that could be done 
outwardly to resist but declared: “What we can and must do to resist inwardly is more: will 
and resolution!” Aus der Rede des Reichskanzlers Dr. Cuno, 13 Jan 1923, Ursachen und 
Folgen, Bd. V, Nr. 1000, p. 29. 
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 the first Sunday after the beginning of the occupation, a national day of mourning.  The 
government also imposed social controls such as increased regulation of alcohol, luxury 
goods, black markets and frivolous amusements.  To demonstrate solidarity with the 
occupied region, the nation was to adopt a fittingly solemn attitude.24   As in 1914, the 
government exhorted all parties and classes to cooperate in supporting a policy of passive 
resistance.2     5
    While Germany would meet the French/Belgian incursion with a demonstration of 
national unity and moral resistance, governmental appeals to national feeling and a few 
administrative steps could not change the fact that Germany was financially and materially 
unable to support passive resistance for long.  It needed outside assistance, if not direct 
diplomatic intervention then at least foreign credits and coal deliveries to supplant the loss of 
the Ruhr mines.  Credit, secured by Reichsbank gold, was obtained from the Bank of 
England, Swiss banks and the Dutch.  Coal was delivered by Britain, which was pleased to 
ease the plight of its own coal yards, and was also provided by Poland and Czechoslovakia in 
                                                          
 24  Ministerrat beim Reichspräsidenten, 9 Jan 1923,  Das Kabinett Cuno, Nr. 37, p. 128; 
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 progressively larger quantities, a situation particularly galling to the French.26  
 The Cuno government knew that Germany could not maintain passive resistance for long, 
given its financial strains. Nonetheless, it hoped to hold out long enough to thwart France’s 
attempt to make the occupation pay, in the meantime working to exploit perceived Allied 
disagreements by pressing both for internationalization of the conflict and reduction of the 
German reparations debt as per the New Haven proposal.  The courting of American 
intervention and the elicitation of positive U.S. reactions were therefore central to Germany’s 
strategy for successful resistance; these would remain the primary thrust of German policy 
until economic collapse rendered passive resistance infeasible.  
  Germany’s immediate diplomatic tactic in response to the Ruhr occupation was to seek 
direct American intervention based on Hughes’s New Haven proposal for a committee of 
experts, albeit no formal public appeal was made.  The idée fixe of German policy, “only 
America can help,”27 was to remain the cornerstone of German diplomatic objectives 
throughout the crisis; only the tactics for achieving U.S. involvement, either direct or 
indirect, would change.  In the early months of the crisis, the Cuno government had great 
faith that they might achieve direct involvement, based on the warmer relations with the 
United States that had begun when Cuno replaced Wirth as chancellor. 
 Passive resistance was based on the premise of outside intervention, yet the policy itself 
proved to be an impediment to intervention.  Cuno stated that he was eager for American 
mediation but also insisted that French evacuation from the Ruhr was a precondition for 
                                                          
 26 Rupieper, The Cuno Government, pp.109, 113-14. 
 27 Cuno to Wiedfeldt 5 Jan 1923, ADAP Bd. VII, pp. 14-15. 
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 negotiations.2  8   France, in turn, repeatedly opposed any American initiatives on the grounds 
that they could encourage German resistance.29   Neither French nor German policy allowed 
space for realistic diplomatic intervention by the United States or Britain.  
 On 7 January, facing the impending French move into Ruhr, Cuno made a desperate 
informal appeal to Hughes in which he stated that “only America can help” and asked 
Hughes to immediately call for an international conference.30   Following his meeting with 
Hughes, Wiedfeldt’s assessment was that the United States did have the ability to put 
financial pressure on France but that American public opinion and policy splits in the cabinet 
favored passivity.  Knowing that Hughes’s expert committee was the only proposal on the 
table, he concluded that “I think we must do every thing to push for this American plan.”3   1
 On 20 January, Wiedfeldt again met with Hughes and informed him that sentiment in 
Germany was such that any government yielding to French demands would be “blown 
away.”  Counting on a favorable attitude toward the Cuno government, he added that the 
                                                          
 28 Houghton to Hughes, 29 Jan 1923, Houghton Papers. 
 29 Logan to Hughes, 19 Jan and 9, 16, 23 Feb 1923, Fletcher Papers, box 10. 
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 chancellor needed some success in foreign relations if it were to survive and asked Hughes if 
France had formally rejected the New Haven proposal.  Pointing out the all-too-obvious lack 
of French interest, Hughes only promised Wiedfeldt that his proposal was still open if the 
French chose to accept it.32   On 27 January Cuno made a follow-up visit to Houghton during 
which he again urged for American intervention and, while maintaining Germany’s 
insistence that France must withdraw before an international conference could be convened, 
made a futile offer to compel French acceptance by erecting a custom barrier around the 
Ruhr.33  
 The Cuno government remained fixated on the possibility of American intervention, to be 
achieved either unilaterally or with the British if Germany could only hold out against the 
French.  This fixation remained through the first months of the crisis, despite America’s 
disinclination to active involvement and Wiedfeldt’s persistent reminders that, because 
American action was unlikely, Germany should look to Britain to take the diplomatic lead.  
News of Senator William Borah’s anti-occupation speeches in the United States Senate made 
a great impression in Germany, although Carl von Schubert, head of the American section of 
the Foreign Ministry (Abteiling III) agreed with Wiedfeldt’s warnings that little could be 
expected from the United States.  “It would be difficult for the American government to take 
the decisive step in Paris,” von Schubert wrote to Wiedfeldt, “above all because it is not clear 
to them what exactly to do and because they are afraid that by some clumsy step, to again 
                                                          
 32 Memorandum of Interview with the German Ambassador, 20 Jan 1923, reel 122, cont. 
157, Hughes Papers. 
 33 Rupieper, Cuno Government, p. 131, citing Houghton Diary, entry of 27 Jan 1923. 
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 become mixed up in European affairs.”34
 Still, the German Foreign Ministry continued to eagerly search for any encouragement of 
its American strategy.  The American ambassador to London, George Harvey, provided just 
that when he told the German ambassador, Friedrich Sthamer, that the American government 
might indeed take an active position on the German-French conflict.  Sthamer reported that 
according to Harvey the time was not yet ripe; “France must first have her experience in the 
Ruhr,” which would likely be of shorter rather then longer duration, and then America would 
be willing to intervene.  Harvey told Sthamer that “it must be the Americans as they are the 
only ones who could do it as the British cabinet is reluctant.”35   Such reports, along with 
Borah’s actions in the United States Senate, sustained the Cuno’s government’s hopes for 
impending American intervention and an eventual international conference to settle 
reparations, despite the skepticism of von Schubert and Wiedfeldt.  These wishful 
expectations on the part of Cuno and Rosenberg approach outright denial of the reality of the 
international situation that Germany faced in January and February 1923.36
  
The Reaction in Washington 
 Washington's reaction to the Ruhr occupation was heavily influenced by public opinion.  
Contrary to Cuno’s expectation that Americans would decisively oppose the occupation, the 
                                                          
 34 Schubert to Wiedfeldt, 29 Jan 1923, ADAP Bd. VII, pp. 133-35. 
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 nation was sharply divided.37   Isolationists, opposed any American involvement in Europe 
on principle and many Americans, including senior Republican legislators and officials, saw 
France as a wartime ally that deserved reparations and support.  Hughes informed the British 
ambassador, Geddes, that those who held this view were quite influential and that this was an 
important body of opinion.38   The Eastern Establishment" of New York and Boston shared 
the sentiment that Germany "had not acted in good faith" and that "France should have a 
chance of finding out whether present methods may help after all."39  
 By late February, a “revival of war spirit” began to move public opinion away from 
Germany; except in the Midwest, most Americans believed that “Germany knows no 
argument but force” and that the task of proving to Germany that it was defeated, left 
unfinished in 1918, must now be taken up again.  Great sentimental feeling remained for the 
justness of the French cause, augmented by the idea that France’s ability to pay its war debts 
to the United States was bound up with its success in the Ruhr.40  
 The State Department echoed these views.  Houghton was confronted with such strong 
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 38 Memorandum by the Sec. of State of a Conversation with the British Ambassador, 25 
Jan 1923, FRUS 1923 II, pp. 52-54. 
 39 Dresel to Houghton, 12 Feb 1923, Houghton Papers. 
 40 Geddes to Curzon, 26 Feb 1923, DBFP XXI, no. 118, pp. 126-27. Geddes reports, 
“Almost grotesquely a certain note of criticism of Great Britain is even becoming audible 
on the ground that she has withdrawn from participation in this work.”  Noting that the 
thriving U.S. economy prevented it from feeling the economic effects of the European chaos 
brought on by French action, Geddes remarked, “America can enjoy the luxury of exulting 
in the discomfiture of Germany to an extent which is denied to British.”  He also added that 
there is “a distinct feeling that it may not be bad for American trade that British trade should 
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 opinion as he pleaded the German case and urged American action, perhaps with an attack on 
the franc.41   Castle wrote to him, “From the point of view of the Nation, however, the 
French move was for the purpose primarily of getting reparation payment, which Germany 
was not making.  There can be no blinking of the fact that Germany did not try to pay all that 
it was possible to pay, nor the fact that the German industrialist who were making enormous 
amounts of money, were not using any of that money--if they could help it--to pay 
reparations.”  Castle also reminded Houghton that France needed reparations “to repair 
incalculable damage caused by the war, which was a German war,” noting that “Germans 
have, I think, on the whole the most disagreeable characteristics of any great nation--their 
brutality when in the ascendant and their servility when face to face with something more 
powerful.”  Castle discounted stories of French harshness in the Ruhr as German propaganda 
by stating, “I am unwilling to admit that the French can be as brutal as the Germans were.” 
 These opinions were not, of course, official policy, but they do provide insight into the 
thinking of those responsible for implementing America’s neutrality policy in Western 
Europe.  According to Castle, Hughes believed “the time will come when the influence of the 
United States can be thrown into the balance in such a way as to bring about amelioration of 
conditions and a possible solution of the European problem which will mean justice.”  But 
the solution would not let Germany go “scot-free.”  If that were done, Castle declared, “I 
believe from the bottom of my heart what within ten years Germany would again be on the 
neck of the world.”42  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
suffer through disorganization of the continent of Europe.”  
 41 Houghton to Hughes, 6 Mar 1923, Houghton Papers. 
 42 Castle to Houghton 17 Mar 1923, file 51, Castle Papers. Castle notes that these 
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  Both the United States and Britain agreed that the French "were determined to prosecute 
their undertaking" and what will there was in Germany to pay reparations "was rapidly 
departing."  In Hughes's view, it was "a contest in which neither party was willing to yield," 
and each side would have "to enjoy it own bit of chaos" until they were ready to stop.43   The 
response of the British foreign office to Geddes’ report was to dismiss the role of the United 
States: “Mr. Hughes is quite unable to do anything even if he wanted to... Mr. Hughes is no 
more dependable than the rest of his country where European politics are concerned.”44  
 
Disagreements between Ambassador Houghton and the State Department 
 In Berlin, Ambassador Houghton was feeling the same frustrations as the British.  From 
his vantage point the situation in Germany was so grave that he had difficulty understanding 
the domestic constraints upon Hughes and the administration’s foreign policy priorities 
which mandated passivity of United States towards Europe.  Houghton sympathetically 
described the German situation in his reports to Washington and emphasized that, to 
Poincaré the French desire for security trumped its need for reparations even if this meant the 
destruction of German military, financial and economic strength and the indefinite presence 
of French troops on the Rhine.  The personal affinity Houghton felt for Cuno and his belief in 
the “business-like” attitude of Cuno’s government with which he thought reasonable nations 
could negotiate underscored his belief that the United States was missing its chance to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
opinions do not represent those of Hughes, but suggests that the ambassador will appreciate 
the American point of view when he gets home. 
 43 Memorandum by the Sec. of State of a Conversation with the British Ambassador, 23 
Feb. 1923, FRUS, 1923 II pp. 55-56. 
 44 Cited in O’Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, p. 52. 
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 intervene and was standing by as Europe sank into economic and political chaos. 
 The irony of the situation intrigues me.  Germany had gone under new leadership.  
These men are not warlike. They are business men. They were willing to accept 
conditions as they found them.  They sought to make Germany’s future a peaceful 
one, and believed that in this way they would gradually wear out French antipathy.  I 
know them.  I have talked intimately and confidentially with them.  I know what they 
sought to accomplish.  There was real and good reason for hope.  Now, even these 
men believe that peace is impossible.  
 
Houghton also reported that the new attitude about to reparations was “if no payment will 
satisfy France, why make any?”  He saw Europe as in a “sorry mess” and noted that the 
United States “might save some of the sum it loaned Europe, but it may also look forward to 
a new war soon that may destroy European civilization.”45
 Writing directly to Hughes, Houghton made it clear that while the Cuno government 
recognized the difficulty of Hughes’s position, it expected help from the United States.  The 
feeling among the Germans, Houghton noted, was that the United States had the moral and 
financial power to restrain the French if it were only willing to try.  As for the Cuno 
government’s opinion of Hughes’s reserved reaction to the crisis, “[t]hey have a sort of 
smiling and cynical contempt for what we have done up to date.”  
 Cuno asked Houghton to again convey the position of the German government that it can 
not treat with the French while they are in the Ruhr, but also dropped the hint that American 
intercession would be welcomed.  According to Houghton, “if the French would withdraw, 
and some nation, say America, would offer to mediate, he would accept the mediation gladly 
and eagerly.”  The ambassador passed the hint along “for what it is worth,” admitting that it 
had no present significance but suggesting it might be useful later.46  
                                                          
 45 Houghton to Castle, 17 Jan 1923, file 51, Castle papers. 
 46 Houghton to Hughes, 29 Jan 1923, Houghton Papers. 
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  By February Houghton’s concern about the situation in Germany and his despair over 
American inaction reached the point that he raised the question of his resignation: “So long 
as I can keep the confidence of the Department, and so long as there is a possibility that the 
government sooner or later may use its influence and power to better the appalling conditions 
that surround us, I am willing to remain.  And not one minute longer.”  Again Houghton 
expressed his frustration and his sense that the United State was missing its chance to take 
decisive action:  
 We had our chance to do something.  Success was then a probability.  It is now a 
possibility.  A few weeks from now even the possibility will disappear.  I have felt 
from the outset as you know that the real problem here was moral and not financial, 
and that we should reap far more industrial gain from conditions of peace than the 
sort of situation that is being developed by pursuing the other plan.  I hope and pray 
that I am wrong and that you people in Washington are right.  A terrible 
responsibility rests somewhere.  Time is going to tell. 47
 
 Warren Robbins, the embassy consul in Berlin, shared Houghton’s view of French 
policy, believing that the French goal was to keep Germany crippled rather than to obtain a 
settlement; however, far less sympathetic than his chief regarding the attitude of the Cuno 
government, he was more aligned with State Department policy on American intervention.  
He reported that Germans were becoming increasing cynical regarding the attitude of the 
United States, which he viewed as a positive development since they “have been banking too 
much on the assistance of the United States,” noting that “I never lose an occasion to tell 
them that we are not in a position to do anything at present.”48   Robbins felt that the 
Auswärtige Amt was deluding itself by overestimating Germany’s ability to hold out while 
                                                          
 47 Houghton to Castle, 12 Feb 1923, file 51, Castle Papers. 
 48 Castle seems to have agreed with the sentiment as he marked this passage in the text.  
Robbins to Castle, 30 Jan 1923, file 51, Castle Papers. 
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 unrealistically fixating on French financial weakness. 
 From a confidential source Robbins found out that Gustav Stresemann, leader of the 
German Peoples Party, had been meeting with leading industrialists who also realized that 
Germany could not carry on under the present conditions.  In Robbins’s opinion, sooner or 
later Germany would have to give in, but he questioned whether honest or accurate 
information was being supplied by Foreign Ministry and Foreign Minister von Rosenberg, 
who consistently maintained that Germany remained united and would never give in. He also 
speculated that von Rosenberg, whom he viewed as a “fire-eater,” might “not even know the 
situation.”49   Robbins provided a view from Berlin that was fully compatible with Hughes’s 
disinclination to sponsor any American initiative.50   
 American diplomats in Germany and officials in Washington continued to differ in their 
judgments of Germany and France.  Houghton warned that France had an underlying security 
agenda and was seeking to subordinate Germany militarily and economically.  State 
Department officials, however, argued that while the French occupation was a "tactical 
mistake," it was not a "profound moral question with a clear right and wrong."  Considering 
the French action “a crazy plan” to get reparations from a Germany that was not “paying all 
that they could,” Castle wrote to Houghton, “If I felt by going into the Ruhr the French could 
get some reparations I should be all for it but it seems to me that all they can hope to get is 
                                                          
 49 Robbins to Castle, 7 Feb 1923, file 51, Castle Papers.  
 50 Ibid. Robbins’s remarks were made with Houghton’s knowledge.  In a handwritten 
postscript Robbins explained: “As regards any attitude on the present situation I have talked 
at length with the Ambassador & we have, in a happy & friendly way, agreed that it may be 
a good thing to have a Counselor with a few opposed ideas to his chief as in that way there 
is always safety.” 
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 the undying hatred of the German people-- a hatred which must eventually result in war.”51
   Regardless of individual views on the rights and wrongs of the issue, there was 
unanimous agreement within the State Department that, presently, nothing could be done.  
Hughes defended State Department policy in a letter to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, stating, 
"The help that the Continental nations have desired from us in connection with their 
economic matters was not advice contrary to their wishes but either the cancellation of their 
debts or such relief from their debts as would be entirely opposed to the views of Congress."  
The United States could not call for an international conference because undesirable linkage 
between war debts and reparations would arise, a dilemma Hughes made clear to Lodge:   
 Any action by this Government at this moment which could be construed as 
taking the part of Germany, and thus as having the effect of sustaining and stiffening 
German resistance, would be bitterly resented in France and she would at once place 
upon the American Government the responsibility for all subsequent action by 
Germany and for whatever disastrous consequences might further ensue.  On the 
other hand, any action which might be regarded as supporting the French in their 
coercive measures would be regarded as encouraging the French to maintain a 
position from which they would soon otherwise have receded, and as the cause of 
Germany’s subsequent injuries and perhaps her ultimate ruin.52
  
Having decisively refused to engage on the issue of debt relief, the United States would 
simply wait until the combination of British pressure and French financial weakness forced 
France to accept a settlement that suited American interests. 
 
The March Initiative  
 In March 1923 Germany, which been unsuccessful in its direct appeals to the United 
                                                          
 51 Castle to Houghton, 12 Jan 1923, file 51, Castle Papers; Houghton to Castle, 20 Feb 
1923; Castle to Houghton, 17 Mar 1923, Houghton Papers. 
 52 Hughes to Lodge, 1 Feb 1923, Hughes Papers. 
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 States, sought to capitalize on growing anti-French sentiment in Britain by asking the British 
to call for an international committee of experts to settle the reparation issue, hoping that the 
United States would join this British initiative.  The proposal not only failed to persuade 
Britain to goad the United States into action, it irritated Hughes and further solidified his 
policy of strict neutrality.  The Cuno government would be forced to change diplomatic 
tactics as a result of this counterproductive initiative. 
 By February, lack of a U.S. response to German appeals for intervention and the growing 
negativity of American public opinion about Germany were matters of great concern both in 
Berlin and the Washington embassy.53  A demoralized Wiedfeldt asked to be allowed to 
return to Krupp unless Foreign Minister Frederic von Rosenberg felt he could be of some use 
in Washington.54  Rosenberg, however, needed Wiedfeldt to stay in Washington for at least a 
little longer as no solution could be reached without American participation and he had a 
new strategy for bringing the Americans in. 
 It was now clear to von Rosenberg that America “does not have an independent foreign 
policy, rather it follows the lead of Downing Street.  Should England intervene, the USA 
                                                          
 53 Rosenberg to Wiedfeldt, 12 Feb 1923, Nr.123, Büro RM-USA, R28488, D618648, p. 
105. 
 54 Wiedfeldt to Rosenberg, 17 Feb 1923, Büro RM-USA, R28488, D618707, p. 201. 
Wiedfeldt, as chairman of board of directors at Krupp had only taken on the job as 
ambassador to Washington as a short-term necessity at the urging of then-Foreign Minister 
Rathenau and President Ebert in spring 1922.  Krupp had been assured that Wiedfeldt 
would only be gone six to nine months and was anxious to have him back.  Although he 
found the work at Washington interesting, Wiedfeldt wanted to return as soon as possible to 
Krupp, where his heart was.  Noting the snobbery of Washington society, Wiedfeldt 
recommended that an aristocrat be sent to replace him.  But because connections with 
American bankers and businessmen were viewed as vital to German interests, and because 
the much-hoped-for commercial treaty still to be negotiated, Ebert, Cuno and Rosenberg 
wanted the businessman Wiedfeldt to remain in Washington.  
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 would support them but a unilateral action is out of the question.”55  Wiedfeldt agreed, 
noting that the Americans had little understanding or interest in German problems, but the 
British, due to the closer trade and banking ties, understood the German position far better.  
Britain must lobbied to take the lead; the U.S. would then follow.56  
 The Germans saw their chance to approach and persuade Britain after the conclusion of 
Anglo-American war-debt funding negotiations in early February; they assumed that the 
settlement signaled a renewed American interest in Europe’s economic troubles and hoped it 
could serve as a model for a more comprehensive international-debt conference, along the 
lines of the New Haven proposal.57  Germany believed that the time was now ripe for a 
German proposal, directed at both Great Britain and the United States, for an international 
experts committee including German and American members to decide the amount and 
method of payment of  German reparations.  It was expected that such a proposal would 
make an outstanding impression on both governments which, having just come together over 
debt settlement, would then rapidly issue a joint demarche to force France into an 
international conference.58  
  Through Count Harry Kessler, Cuno established contacts with sympathetic Liberal and 
                                                          
 55 Auszug Rosenberg, 19 Feb 1923, Büro RM-USA, R28488, p. 193. 
 56 Wiedfeldt to AA, 1 Mar 1923, Nr. 98, Büro RM-USA, R28488, p. 165. 
 57 Stellung der Vereinigten Staaten zu den europäischen Wirren in ersten Halbjahr 1923 
und die Aussichten für ihr Eingreifen, Wiedfeldt to AA, 30 Jul 1923, Botschaft Washington, 
Po. 2b, 964, p. 7.  In early February 1923, the American War Debts Commission and British 
financial representatives negotiated a “business solution” adopting a basis similar to 
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91; Leffler, The Elusive Quest, pp. 68-69.  
 58 Schubert to Wiedfeldt, 5 Mar 1923, Nr. 182, Büro RM-USA, R28488, D618681, p. 
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 Labor Members of Parliament who suggested that Cuno make a proposal to Bonar Law that 
included clear German intentions to abide by the decision of impartial experts.  The British 
opposition parties would then raise the issue in the House of Commons.59  Cuno prepared a 
letter stating that once a committee of experts decided how much Germany had already paid, 
what it could and must pay, and how payment could be made, Germany was prepared to 
obtain an international loan and provide the necessary guarantees, including the use of 
agricultural and industrial properties as securities. The cessation of passive resistance, 
however, would depend upon French withdrawal from the Ruhr.  Germany intended first to 
present this proposal to the British foreign office, so it could not be accused of trying to of 
going behind the back of the British government.  The plan collapsed, however, when the 
Foreign Office refused to accept the note which effectively curtailed any chance of debate in 
Parliament.60  
 When the German Ambassador to London, Friedrich Sthamer, met with British Foreign 
Secretary Lord Curzon on 14 March, he was informed that responsibility for taking the first 
step indeed belonged to Germany, but that a German initiative would have to include a 
reasonable offer addressed to all the Powers, including the American government.  Curzon 
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 59 Rupieper, The Cuno Government, p. 132; Peter Grupp, Harry Graf Kessler, (Frankfurt: 
Insel Verlag, 1999), p. 283; Laird M. Easton, The Red Count: The Life and Times of Harry 
Kessler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 323-25. Kessler’s own 
account, taken from his diaries, is found in Harry Kessler, In the Twenties (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 211-26. 
 60 Von Rosenberg to Sthamer, 9 Mar 1923, ADAP, pp. 322-24; von Schubert to Dufour, 
9 Mar 1923, ADAP, p. 355; Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors von Schubert, 29 Mar 
1923, ADAP, p. 408; Rupieper, The Cuno Government, pp. 132-33, Kessler, entries of 15 
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 also warned that it would be unwise for the Germans to simply repeat the New Haven 
Proposal, as the French were clearly not interested and Hughes’s plan left the question of the 
Ruhr occupation “wholly untouched.”6  1   The following day, Curzon and Bonar Law 
informed Sthamer in a joint meeting that the German proposal was inadequate.  Bonar Law 
suggested that only German acceptance of his January 1923 proposal would open the 
possibility of negotiations and that Germany would, in addition, have to consider concessions 
to French security interests that might include demilitarization of the left bank of the Rhine 
and control of railroads by the League of Nations.62  
 Germany also hoped to interest the United States in the plan as soon as possible; on 3 
March, von Rosenberg met with Houghton to inform him of the initiative.  Then, on March 
16, despite the failure to interest Britain in the proposal, Counselor of the German Embassy 
Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff presented the plan in a memorandum to Hughes (Wiedfeldt was out 
of town).  Houghton had already informed Hughes of the German proposal, on 15 March, as 
well as of a request by Rosenberg that the memorandum “be treated in the highest 
confidence.”6  3   Putting the best face on the recent German failure with Curzon in London, 
                                                          
 61 Sthamer to AA, 14 Mar 1923, ADAP, p. 339; Curzon to D’Abernon, 14 Mar 1923, 
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 63 Houghton informed Hughes that the German proposal was based on Cuno’s idea of a 
Rhine pact and provided a guarantee of French security.  Following the advice of the 
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the memorandum presented to Hughes on 16 March contained no such provisions for 
French security. “Memorandum, Handed to the Secretary by the Counselor of the German 
Embassy, March 16, 1923,” reel 122, cont. 157, Hughes Papers; Dieter Bruno Gescher, Die 
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 236 
 Dieckhoff told Hughes that Curzon had received the proposal favorably and had noted that it 
enlarged Hughes’s New Haven proposal, but Curzon also had suggested that “the British 
reckoned on the United States.”  In reply, Hughes simply remarked that the United States had 
no word from London on this and refused to make any comment beyond what he had said at 
New Haven.  In addition, he observed there was no indication that the French, now in the 
Ruhr, favored the proposal, a reality with which Dieckhoff could only agree.64  
 Within hours of the meeting, what had been just another inadequate reparation offer 
presented in an inept manner turned into an angry confrontation which significantly cooled 
German-American relations.  An account of the London meeting between Sthamer and 
Curzon was leaked to press; there were rumors that the proposal had also been made the 
United States.  An angry Hughes summoned Dieckhoff back, informing him that the German 
proposal could no longer be held in confidence and that the United States could not tolerate 
rumors about its joint participation with Britain in a reparations initiative.  Because the 
memorandum made no formal request of the American government, Hughes refused to be 
placed in a position where the United States “might be embarrassed by misapprehensions” 
and asked that the memorandum be made public without revealing that it was published at 
the request of the United States.  He also warned that the United States would feel free to say 
“what ever should be necessary to avoid misapprehension” regarding the American 
position.65   
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  After the meeting, Hughes immediately cabled Houghton with instructions to inform von 
Rosenberg not only of the American position but also that Hughes saw no reason for German 
views to be expressed privately to the United States: “Such secretiveness will only start 
rumors of supposed collaboration with respect to some plan of intervention by Great Britain 
or the United States and put this government in a false position.”  Rather then involve the 
United States, Hughes advised that “if Germany desires to make such a propositions to the 
French government it can be made directly.”66   
 Hughes’s stern message had the effect of a bombshell in the German Foreign Ministry, 
which wondered why Hughes had been so angry over a leak to the press.  A bewildered 
Schubert bitterly wondered why government should even bother to employ diplomats, “if a 
diplomatic officer were not permitted to leave a confidential memorandum with the Secretary 
of State.”  Presenting the German point of view to Castle, Houghton attempted to convey the 
puzzlement within the Auswärtige Amt:  “If they had asked us to do something for them, 
either directly or indirectly, the matter would be quite different, but inasmuch as they were 
accepting the Secretary’s proposition and wanted only to give him in all frankness their own 
position, they simply do not understand why, because some newspaper men guessed about 
the matter, it necessitated so stern an attitude on his part.”  Houghton, noting the changed 
atmosphere, suspected that the German foreign office was debating whether Hughes’s 
attitude was hostile to Germany.67
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Papers.  
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  Shortly after the failure of the March initiative, the German Embassy in Washington sent 
the Foreign Ministry an assessment of Hughes’s attitude toward Germany that made clear 
both his lack of sympathy and the embassy’s growing frustration with Hughes’s passive 
approach to the Ruhr crisis, opposition to credits that would relieve financial pressure on 
Germany, and perceived obstruction of the release of German property held by the Alien 
Property Custodian--an issue of fundamental importance to the embassy.  Hughes had also 
used his influence to block congressional efforts to demonstrate support for Germany and 
opposed granting credits to relieve the pressure on Germany.  While acknowledging that 
Hughes did not approve of Poincaré’s reparations policies, the assessment declared, “That 
Mr. Hughes sympathizes with France can hardly be doubted.” The report noted that although 
Hughes often asserted that he had no power over the French, many other politicians observed 
that Hughes did indeed have a strong lever in regard to the French war debt, a lever Hughes 
would never pull until he had secured French ratification of his pet project of a disarmament 
treaty.  In analyzing Hughes’s attitudes, the report observed that Hughes still saw himself as 
the pro-war presidential candidate of 1916 and has never forgiven German-Americans for 
contributing to his defeat.   It concluded that Hughes lacked “the necessary inspiration 
needed for active help in the solution of European problems” and suggested that “this key 
lies in London.”68    
                                                          
 68 Wiedfeldt to AA, 8 Apr 1923, Nr. 343, “Staatsekretär Hughes und seine auswärtige 
Politik,” (Reisser), Botschaft Washington, 960, PAAA. In summing up his report, Reisser 
quotes from some critics of Hughes’s foreign policy and commented that “we could have 
written this sentence in Germany: ‘the United States while refusing to recognize 
obligations, has insisted on its rights and privileges.’” The report also offers some 
interesting insight into the worldview of the German diplomats; Reisser complained that 
Hughes had no appreciation for the “loss of German culture and the inevitable downfall of 
the West that will accompany the collapse of Germany.” 
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  The Germans’ bungling of this initiative decreased the State Department’s trust in Cuno’s 
diplomatic abilities; as a result, relations with Germany became markedly more distant.  
While the source of the leak was never definitely established, Castle believed that Germany 
was behind it--not because of a deliberate policy decision from the Cuno government, but 
rather from the “old stamp” in the German foreign office who had the intention of “forcing 
us in whether we wanted to get in or not.”  In any case, the leak had put the State Department 
“terrifically wrong” with the press and the French.69  
 On 17 March, perhaps in response to the events of the previous day, Castle seized the 
opportunity to answer Houghton’s pleas for some American efforts on Germany’s behalf.  
While Castle considered the occupation of the Ruhr to be a “tremendous tactical mistake,” he 
also believed that all nations act on selfish motives and therefore did not see it as a moral 
issue.  While recognizing French failings in their handling of the populace of the Ruhr, 
including brutality, he discounted German claims of outrageous treatment as propaganda and 
judged the French invasion as having been undertaken primarily to gain reparations 
payments which Germany was not making.  Germany had not tried to pay all that it was 
possible to pay, particularly German industrialists who were making enormous profits. 
 Castle believed that the most likely outcome would be a solution by negotiation, or 
“possibly we may suddenly find ourselves faced with a great German-French industrial 
combination which, for a few years, will be economically dominant.”70   Noting that 
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perturbed about the possibility of a German-French industrial combination.  The issue was 
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of the Ruhr occupation, which included reduced German competition, until the specter of a 
 240 
 memories of the war were still strong and that American opinion was becoming more pro-
French, Castle defended Hughes’s position.  Hughes would take vigorous action if he 
thought there was a chance of success and that the influence of the United States could bring 
“a possible solution of the European problem which will mean justice.”71
 
The German Reparations Note of 2 May 
 The Cuno government, which by April had little to show for its foreign policy while 
conditions in Germany continued to deteriorate, faced pressure from both foreign and 
domestic sources to attempt another reparation proposal in order to initiate negotiations..  
Lord Curzon, responding to his own domestic pressures, made a carefully hedged speech in 
the House of Lords on 20 April in which he urged Germany to declare its willingness to pay 
reparations and provide economic guarantees to France.  As per the Hughes proposal, the 
amount to be paid should be fixed by an international committee; Curzon also offered the 
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 deliberately vague suggestion that Britain might then become a “very useful agent” in 
negotiations.”72   Von Rosenberg asked D’Abernon for a verbatim copy of Curzon’s speech 
and information “for the exact indication of the offer that Curzon considered it advisable to 
for the Germans to make.”73
 Cuno had already dispatched Paul Reusch, a personal business acquaintance, to London 
on 17 April, to informally propose to Bonar Law that Britain and the United States call for an 
international conference to fix reparations.  Until the fixed amount was determined, Germany 
would offer 16 billion gold marks that would be raised by a loan. Once the loan was secured 
there would be simultaneous ending of passive resistance and withdrawal of French troops.  
Guarantees would be provided for the loan, the exact nature of which would be left to the 
expert committee.74  
 Cuno’s hopes for British intervention in favor of an international conference were 
quickly disappointed.  Curzon backtracked in the face of French outrage at his speech, 
declaring that his remarks were not meant to signal actual, imminent British intervention.  In 
an attempt to mollify France the French ambassador was informed that Britain continued to 
view “the maintenance of the Entente as the corner stone of her foreign policy.7  5   As the 
situation in Germany continued to deteriorate, the Cuno cabinet was compelled to produce a 
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1923, Das Kabinett Cuno, Nr. 133, pp. 412-15; Rupieper, The Cuno Government, p. 146; 
Feldman, The Great Disorder, p. 662. 
 75 Curzon to Crew, 27 Apr 1923, BDFP XXI, no. 196, p. 235-56. 
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 specific reparation proposal.  When the German embassy asked Britain for advice about what 
this offer should contain and whether or not a definite amount should be specified, it was 
informed that British policy still placed the responsibility on Germany to make a “reasonable 
offer to France as soon as possible” and that Britain had “no intention in suggesting in any 
way what that German offer be.”76  
 Cuno now had no other choice but to come up with a new reparation proposal without 
formal foreign support and with a cabinet that held very divergent opinions.  Von Rosenberg 
preferred that no offer be made; however knowing that the French would refuse any German 
plan, he saw the submission of an offer as a means of silencing domestic criticism from the 
SPD and perhaps driving a wedge between the British and the French.  Both he and Cuno 
believed that any offer exceeding the 30 billion gold marks mentioned on 2 January would be 
unacceptable, because a higher figure would imply that Germany, even after four months of 
disruption in the Ruhr, could afford more than it had already offered.  Such a discrepancy 
would provide justification for the French occupation.  Citing Wiedfelt, von Rosenberg also 
pointed out the negative effect that raising the offer made in Paris offer would have in 
America.  Other cabinet members, however, were willing to go higher. 
 Nor was there any consensus on which German assets could be used for guarantees.7  7   
The plan was, in the words of Carl Bergmann, “strangely disfigured and diluted to meet the 
misgivings stubbornly voiced by several ministers as to its effects on internal politics.”78 
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 These disagreements, over both the construction of the May proposal and the recriminations 
that followed it, reveal not only the weakness of the Cuno government but also the divisions 
within German society that made a cohesive reparation policy so difficult.  There was no 
agreement about how the burden of paying for reparations should be distributed among 
industry, agriculture, labor, and state enterprises such as the railroads.79  
 The final proposal, submitted on 2 May to each of the Allies and also presented to the 
United States, offered 30 billion in three installments. Twenty billion was to be paid through 
loans by July 1927 and the remainder in two installments of five billion apiece, in 1929 and 
1931, also through loans.  Should the payments not be considered adequate Germany was 
prepared to submit to an “international commission uninfluenced by political considerations 
as suggested by Mr. Hughes?”  Germany also was prepared to provide guarantees, but their 
specifics would have to be negotiated with the international loan committee and the 
Reparations Commission. 
 The German offer, however, was contingent on a complete French withdrawal from the 
Ruhr as well as the Rhine bridgehead ports occupied in 1921.  French security was to be 
guaranteed by a Rhineland pact, offers of which had become a standard feature of any 
German reparation proposal.80   The proposed interest structure of the loans set the real value 
of this offer at 15 billion gold marks, an increase over the 12 billion gold mark real value of 
the January 1923 offer, but still far short of Bonar Law’s January plan, which had a real 
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 value of 25 billion gold marks.81  
 When shown the German proposal by Curzon, French Ambassador Count de Saint-
Aulaire informed Curzon that he considered its tone “derisory” and together with Belgium he 
would send a curt rejection.  Despite his chagrin over the inadequacy of the German offer, 
Curzon’s response to Saint-Aulaire was more charitable, characterizing the proposal as 
“inadequate, stupid, and in some respect shadowy and obscure” but nonetheless a starting 
point for negotiations.82   Even so, his formal reply sternly informed Berlin of Britain’s 
disappointment urged Germany to “display a great readiness to grapple with the realities of 
the case and to discard all irrelevant and controversial issues” and make a contribution “more 
serious and precise than any which has yet been forth coming.”83  
 German policy continued to be based on eventual American involvement and assistance, 
but Hughes provided little comfort about the issue of reparations.  The United States 
government did not officially respond to the 2 May proposal, much to the disappointment of 
von Rosenberg, who felt that America was holding back from the Ruhr affair.84  Wiedfeldt, 
who had recommended to von Rosenberg that Germany not exceed the Paris offer, was well 
aware that the proposal fell short of the expected 30 billion. He defended the proposal to 
Hughes as being on the border of what the German government as a democracy that had to 
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 answer to public opinion could guarantee to fulfill and that it could serve as a starting point 
for negotiations.  Hughes retorted that the entire affair seemed to be intended to bring 
international pressure on France and would cause “an unpleasant French reaction,” having 
the real effect of making negotiations more difficult.  He recommended that, because the 
offer was contingent on French evacuation from the Ruhr, the best starting point for 
negotiations would be for the Germans to accept the fact that the Ruhr was now in the hands 
of the French and that is where negotiations had to begin.85  
 Hughes did, however, acknowledge that the German note could serve as a starting point.  
In a meeting with the Belgian ambassador, he also argued for Germany, France and Belgium 
to find some way of conducting negotiations for a reasonable solution, warning that for the 
sake of the parties’ ability to compromise, this should not be done in the “public square.”  In 
all probability, he also did not appreciate having American passions stirred up and the 
intensification of pressure on the United States to become involved at a time he believed was 
inopportune.86  
  German officials in Berlin were less rigid than Wiedfeldt in regard to the total sum 
Germany might afford to pay.  D’Abernon had warned von Rosenberg before the offer was 
sent out that it would be disappointing and that the British ambassador was sure von 
Rosenberg already knew this himself.  However, convinced no other options existed for the 
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 government, von Rosenberg “urged that the German offer was not absolutely final, and might 
be modified by discussion round a table.”87   This broad hint was confirmed by Finance 
Minister Andreas Hermes, who told Ellis Loring  Dresel, then visiting his old post in Berlin, 
that the 20 billion was only a minimum offer. Von Rosenberg explained to the former 
American chargé that the government was hesitant to make any offer it was not sure it could 
live up to and reminding him that a higher sum could be set by a meeting of experts.  Even 
after the strongly worded French rejection was received in Berlin, von Rosenberg’s first 
reaction was that the reply might serve as a basis for further negotiations.  Clearly the May 2 
note was intended as a starting point for negotiations with the hope of achieving the 
internationalization of the reparations question.88  
 In spite of Germany’s intentions and hopes, the 2 May note was a complete failure.  Not 
only did it provoke a vehement rejection by France and Belgium, their joint response united 
the two Allies in the midst of their considerable differences over the goals the Ruhr 
occupation.  The joint response, penned by Poincaré, added a new hindrance to the solution 
of the crisis with the demand that Germany give up all resistance in the Ruhr before any 
German offer would be considered and the declaration that the Ruhr would not be evacuated 
until Germany discharged her reparation payments.  The May Note’s result was to further 
weakened the Cuno government as French resolve strengthened, thereby making the 
possibility of a negotiated compromise solution to the crisis all the more unlikely.89  
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 89 Bergmann, History of Reparations, pp. 192-96; Französische Antwortnote, 6 May 
1923, Ursachen und Folgen Bd. V, Nr. 1044c, pp. 125-30. 
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The German Reparations Note of 6 June  
 Divisions that had complicated cabinet debate over the 2 May proposal continued when 
the Cuno government began its consideration of a new proposal.  Von Rosenberg, still 
placing his hopes on a split between Britain and France, insisted that the previous limit of 30 
billion gold marks not be exceeded.  Minister of Finance Hermes, and others, demanded that 
the offer should be increased to come close to the amount in the December Bonar Law 
plan.90   The cabinet’s struggled to resolve its internal differences, receive support or tacit 
consent from the major parties and state ministers, and negotiate guarantees from industry 
and agriculture.  Once again the weak Cuno government was forced to negotiate with 
industry as if it were an independent entity.  Moreover, in exchange for desperately needed 
industrial contributions, the government had to accept industry’s conditions of reduced state 
intervention and regulation, conditions the SPD considered unacceptable. This disunity 
reflected the disintegrating authority of the State. A compromise proposal was presented to 
the Allies on June 7.91 Dissatisfaction with and disdain for this new proposal was conveyed 
to the United States Embassy by a leading German economic expert, Julius Moritz Bonn, 
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 even before it was formally submitted.92   
 The proposal made no mention of passive resistance or the German demand for French 
withdrawal, but did acknowledge Germany’s responsibility to pay reparations and solved the 
question of whether the total sum offered should exceed previous ones by leaving the 
decision about Germany’s capacity to pay to an international committee of experts.  It 
proposed annuities if a loan could not be obtained, and for the first time contained specific 
guarantees in the form of mortgages and taxes.  In addition, the Reichsbahn would function 
independently of government administration.  Once placed under special administration, 
starting in July 1927 it would issue bonds worth 10 billion gold marks, at five percent 
interest, and would provide 500 million gold marks per year.  Another 500 million gold 
marks would be guaranteed by industry, trade, agriculture and banking either through taxes 
or mortgages.  Proceeds from duties and taxes on tobacco and alcohol would also be used as 
a mortgage.93
 In May, an ailing Bonar Law was replaced by Stanley Baldwin.  Ambassador Sthamer, in 
presenting the new proposal to Curzon, made it clear that although Germany had heeded 
Curzon’s suggestion to delete the contentious issues of German passive resistance and 
France’s insistence that evacuation would begin only as reparations were paid in a formal 
note, the German government had not changed its position on these critical matters.  
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  Knowing that the French would inevitably ask Britain to jointly respond to the German 
note with the mutual demand that Germany end passive resistance, Curzon sought some 
wiggle room for negotiation by distinguishing between government-directed resistance and 
the resistance of the local population.  However, Sthamer refused to go along, telling Curzon 
that Germany was resting its whole case upon “the illegality of the French and Belgian 
occupation” which justified the German government’s economic support of passive 
resistance.94  
 Curzon’s apprehensions were soon realized when he was informed on June 11 by Comte 
de Saint-Aulaire of Poincaré’s demand that the German government end all official acts that 
interfered with French and Belgian operations in the Ruhr.  The French ambassador also 
listed the region’s immediate productive assets that would be demanded by France as 
guarantees (mines, railways, custom receipts) and reminded Curzon that there was a strong 
party in France in favor of independent action even if it meant a break with Britain.  Taking 
umbrage and declaring that “M. Poincaré was conferring a favor on Great Britain in 
approaching us at the present time instead of acting independently,”  Curzon informed de 
Saint-Aulaire that the British felt the proposal “marked a serious advance” and for it to be 
flatly rejected “would not be countenanced by public opinion here.”95   
 Despite the struggles in the German cabinet and its disunity over the offer, the 7 June 
note contained the first reparation plan that had some possibility of success, at least as the 
basis of a compromise solution.  The note’s inclusion of annuities backed by mortgages 
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 which would begin payments starting in 1927 was a real advance; in fact, these arrangements 
were similar to those eventually established by the Dawes Plan.  Perceiving the German note 
as an honest effort, the British and the Belgians were interested in further negotiations.  
Poincaré, however, immediately curtailed that possibility by rejecting the note.  France 
holding fast not only to the principle that there would be no negotiations until passive 
resistance ceased, rejected the plan on the grounds that it offered no concrete sum, replaced 
the Reparations Commission with an international experts’ commission, and provided only 
theoretical pledges without securities.96
  The thrust of U.S diplomacy throughout June and July 1923 was to encourage direct 
negotiations between the Allies and Germany.  When Wiedfeldt presented Hughes with the 7 
June proposal, Hughes simply repeated his admonitions that little would be solved by the 
exchange of written notes and that direct oral discussions were necessary.  To encourage 
such negotiations, Hughes shared his opinion with the Belgians that Germany was willing to 
enter into negotiations and that the new proposal demonstrated movement by Germany that 
could lead to useful results if direct oral negotiations took place.97  On 23 June, when the 
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 Italian ambassador attempted to ascertain his current thoughts about an international experts 
commission, Hughes pointed out that France was not at the point of considering it and that  
German recognition of its obligations was an essential prerequisite for settlement.  In what 
could reasonably be construed as a reference to the Cuno government’s hopes that Britain 
and Italy would persuade France to accept an expert commission, Hughes warned that “the 
German industrialists must feel that they could not rely on other governments to aid 
Germany in evading her just obligations.”  Always sensitive to the issue of public opinion, he 
further observed that sentiment in Germany and France favored a partisan advisor rather than 
an impartial one.  The United States would not dictate in any way nor make uninvited 
suggestions.98
 
The Work of the Embassies in Berlin and Washington   
 With Houghton on vacation in the United States during May and June, activity subsided 
at the embassy in Berlin and Cuno and von Rosenberg were deprived of their close and 
advisory relationship with Houghton. Robbins, acting in Houghton’s stead, was surprised 
that von Rosenberg had not sought him out for consultation prior the dispatch of the 6 June 
note, an omission he attributed to the lack of any U.S. response to Germany’s 2 May 
initiative.  Still, Robbins warned von Rosenberg not to be misled by the pretty pictures of 
American sentiment painted by various American politicians who often visited Cuno.  Von 
Schubert told von Rosenberg that he no longer expected any response from America in 
regard to the crisis since he had been informed by Robbins that the United States saw the 
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 Ruhr as basically a European affair.9    9 Although desperate for American help and 
intervention, von Rosenberg began to realize such support would not be forthcoming in the 
immediate future. 
 Von Schubert’s reading of the State Department’s attitude was well justified.  Castle 
echoed Hughes’s opinion that Germany must prove to the world that “it recognized the fact 
that it was beaten and meant to pay all that it could” although it “had never been able, or 
perhaps willing, to prove any such thing.”  While recognizing Houghton’s sincere desire to 
help Germany, Castle advised the ambassador that the greatest service he could render would 
be to accurately portray American sentiment and “make the Germans once and for all realize 
that America is not going to help in any way, shape or manner until Germany shows its 
willingness to repair damage for a war which it brought on and lost.”100   Castle hoped 
Houghton’s two meetings with Hughes had adequately conveyed that American opinion 
continued to remain pro-French and that policy could not be formulated or implemented 
contrary to public opinion.  Castle also hoped that Houghton understood the centrality of 
Hughes’s conviction that “inasmuch as this country is the one stable point in the world this 
government cannot afford to make any demarche which may not be successful.”101
 Robbins, from his perspective in Berlin, echoed Castle’s and Hughes’s opinion that the 
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 United States should avoid involvement.  Having little use for the American businessmen 
and politicians visiting Berlin, he felt that if only the embassy could prevent “self-appointed 
envoys from going to Cuno and suggesting how they would like to help Germany, a great 
deal more could be done for Germany.”  But Robbins was also now beginning to wonder if 
France really preferred a settlement to an indefinite occupation.102  
 
Britain vs. France  
 When its 6 June note failed to elicit any change in American policy, Germany became 
more dependent on Britain for help. The German note had precipitated a sharp dispute 
between Britain and France.  Britain viewed the note as “serious advance” that met many of 
Britain’s demands and from which negotiations could proceed.103   The stumbling block was 
the French demand that German passive resistance to the occupation end before any 
negotiations could take place coupled with the German insistence that the French occupation 
was illegal and France must withdraw.  Although Curzon tried to find a loophole by 
distinguishing between government-directed and grassroots resistance, France demanded 
both complete cessation of resistance and full cooperation with the occupation authorities. 
 An angry exchange of notes ensued between Britain and France.  Curzon insisted that 
France could not ask Germany to surrender while offering nothing; in turn, Poincaré accused 
Britain of prolonging the struggle by not demanding that Germany end passive resistance.104   
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 Each side hinted that the other’s position was threatening the Entente.105  The ever-present 
issue of war debts arose also as France insisted that its share of the A and B bonds was 
sacred, a stance implying to Curzon that any reduction in German reparations would come 
out of Britain’s share.  France also suggested that its war debts owed to Britain could be paid 
off with its share of the C Bonds, a proposal that Britain, which had no more desire than the 
United States to see French war debts paid through German C Bonds, immediately 
rejected.106   
 Germany, faced with the deadlock between France and Britain, tentatively explored the 
possibility of a compromise with France based on a phased ending of German passive 
resistance and a phased French withdrawal.107   But by late June both Britain and the United 
States recognized that passive resistance could not be sustained for much longer.  While the 
Cuno government debated the precise degree to which it should be abandoned, Curzon noted 
that the question “might be solved by the capacity for passive resistance ceasing to exist.”108  
When France refused to alter its position, Curzon on 20 July attempted to encourage the 
opening negotiations by circulating among the Allies his version of what the joint Allied 
response to Germany should be.  This draft called for an end to Germany’s passive resistance 
and the implementation of Hughes’s proposal for a committee of experts. It  proposed that as 
soon as the economic sureties and guarantees recommended by the experts were put into 
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 effective operation, “the occupation of all German territory outside of the limits laid down in 
the treaty of Versailles would come to an end”109  Poincaré’s immediate reply of 21 July, to 
British Chargé Sir Eric Phipps, clearly imparted both France’s rejection of the proposal and  
its continued insistence “that no negotiations could be opened with the German government 
until passive resistance came to an end.”11  0   Official French and Belgian notes of rejection 
were sent on 30 July.111   
 D’Abernon, comparing the diplomatic situation to that of 1809-1812 in his diary, 
described the United States as the “new element of force” that could help control France but 
wondered, “Will they act?  Will they even exercise their moral influence or intervene to 
apply financial pressure?”112   Curzon would learn that the answer was a polite “not yet” on 
25 July, when British Chargé Henry Chilton sounded out Hughes on that issue and Hughes 
evasively replied that he hoped the United States would be able to help “when the right 
moment arrived.”113  
 Hughes had already met with Jusserand, on 12 July, at which time Jusserand, upset about 
press reports that the United States was closely cooperating with Britain in developing the 
proposals which would be presented in Britain’s 20 July note, asked specifically whether  
“the Secretary was still of the view that nothing should be done which was unacceptable to 
France.”  Hughes replied that he “would not like to approve anything that was opposed to 
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 French interests,” but once again suggested that his New Haven proposal still remained the 
best way to resolve the issue.  Denying the press reports, Hughes reassured Jusserand that not 
only had there been no communication formally or informally between Britain and the 
United States on that subject, he had yet to be approached by Britain at all. Jusserand, 
reminding Hughes that if the German government “could be persuaded to direct the 
discontinuance of passive resistance then the way would be open to an agreement,” then 
asked Hughes if he had any comments. Hughes replied, “Not now.”114  
 Hughes’s refusal to commit himself freed Poincaré to carry on both his dispute with 
Curzon and his program in the Ruhr without worrying about active U.S. intervention on 
either Britain’s or Germany’s behalf.  Houghton, however, reported from Berlin that both he 
and D’Abernon recognized the “real underlying fact” that without American support 
“England will be unable to oppose France,” leaving France able to continue policies that 
Houghton saw as “ruin and dismemberment.”  Well aware of the prevalent opinion of 
Washington, Houghton could only express his hopes that “the real truth of this situation will 
make itself known in the United States. And just what will happen then, we shall see when it 
does happen.”115  
 
The Question of a Rhineland State 
 Houghton, from his vantage point in Berlin had good reason to worry about the domestic 
situation in Germany. By the summer 1923, the strains of long-term occupation and passive 
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 resistance threatened the potential dislocation the Reich itself.  The printing of enormous 
quantities of paper money by the Reichsbank, done to support the unemployment insurance 
that enabled passive resistance in the Ruhr, had produced runaway hyper-inflation that 
threatened to disintegrate the nation’s economy.116   The areas of greatest desperation, the 
Ruhr and Rhineland, were sealed off from the rest of Germany by the occupying forces, but a 
resurgence of separatist movements throughout the country pushed solutions ranging from 
the creation of an autonomous Rhineland federal state, split off from Prussia but still within 
the Reich, to the establishment of an independent buffer-state under a French protectorate.117  
Well pleased with this resurgence of separatist feeling, French High Commissioner in the 
Rhineland, Paul Tirard,  believed the chaos engulfing Germany would result in the 
establishment of an independent state or states dominated by France and communicated his 
appraisal to Poincaré who, after hardening his position regarding Germany over the course of 
the summer, was now beginning to shift his policy from forcing an end to German resistance 
to the establishment of a Rhenish buffer state.118  The internal situation in Germany was 
                                                          
 116 According to Feldman, “The crisis of 1923, therefore, was a far deeper crisis than that 
which brought forth the controlled Revolution of 1918-1919 because it was characterized by 
a despair and rage provoked by monetary disorder and social disruption which threatened 
the very existence of civil society itself as well as the political order and integrity of the 
German state.” Feldman, The Great Disorder, p. 699. 
 117 For example, Konrad Adenauer, mayor of Köln and future first chancellor of the 
German Federal Republic, was willing to support a demilitarized Rhineland federal state if 
it would lead to the evacuation of the Ruhr and prevent the outright separation of the region 
from the Reich. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer: A Geman Politician and Statesman 
in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, vol.1 (Providence: Berghahn Books, 
1995), pp. 174-75;  Harry E. Nadler, The Rhenish Sepratist Movements During the Early 
Weimar Republic, 1918-1924 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987), p. 237 and for 
dissatisfaction in the Rhineland, pp. 264-68. 
 118 Nadler, The Rhenish Sepratist Movements, pp. 277-78. Nadler points out that Tirard 
was over-optimistic, mistaking support for regional autonomy from Prussia with a demand 
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 becoming dire.  
 Hughes and Castle attempted to justify the United States’ position of neutrality and 
inaction in a July 24 meeting with Wiedfeldt and Count Kessler.119   Kessler painted a dark 
picture of economic life in Germany, warned of social chaos there, and asked for American 
intervention.  Hughes, as usual, referred to the problem of American opinion.  However, if  
Wiedfeldt’s report of the meeting is accurate, Hughes described U.S. public sentiment as 
having shifted from entirely pro-French to an even split, with hundreds of letters flooding in 
from both French and German advocates and asked Kessler for concrete suggestions about 
what America could do. 
 Kessler suggested that the United States officially enter the Reparations Commission, so 
England would not stand alone.  Hughes replied that the British were also in favor of this 
step, but that it was a matter for Congress which was in recess.  When Kessler suggested that 
America could mount an attack on the franc, Hughes told him that the United States 
government did not have the same close relationship with American banks that British 
government had with the Bank of England and noted that although the government had some 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
for independence from Germany. The true separatist extremists were few and totally 
dependent on France for support. Trachtenberg feels this shift in policy came on 25 August 
in response to feelers from Ruhr Industrialists, especially Otto Wolff. Trachtenberg, 
Reparation in World Politics, pp. 314-21. 
 119 Count Harry Kessler had recently returned from his stint in London where he had 
been instrumental in advancing the German March initiative.  A close friend of von 
Schubert, Kessler was one of the few Germans actually sent by the Auswärtige Amt to the 
U.S. on a propaganda trip. Intellectual and cosmopolitan, the count could always be counted 
on to create a good social impression.  Apart from his meeting with Hughes and Castle to 
present the German viewpoint to the State Department, Kessler was also to lecture at 
Williamstown, MA where he was received very favorably by the American press. Grupp, 
Harry Graf Kessler, p. 285; Easton, The Red Count, p. 328.  
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 influence, opinion in the banking community was also divided.120  
 What interested Hughes and Castle were reports from General Allen, citing  D’Abernon, 
of rumors that the German government would be willing to consider administratively 
separating the Rhine provinces from Prussia to form an autonomous state within the Reich.  
Kessler stated that personally he was in favor of holding a plebiscite in the district; since 
France would feel satisfied that the mere fact that it had been held would prove its point.   
But Wiedfeldt, alarmed at the direction the conversation was taking, immediately interrupted 
with the argument that the Rhineland, “having been Prussians before they were 
Germans...felt themselves still Prussians first and Germans secondary.”  Castle thought 
“there would be absolutely compelling reasons, naturally, against the formation of an 
autonomous state on the Rhine” but could offer no compelling reason not to separate the 
Rhine provinces from Prussia “except Prussian pride.” In describing his view of the matter to 
Houghton, Castle opined that if the Rhineland were separated from Prussia, German 
influence would prevail and thus not give security to France in the future, “but that seems to 
me of comparatively little importance if its creation would lead France now to institute 
reasonable economic discussions because she felt herself rightly or wrongly secure.”121   
 Castle’s persistent interest in the question of a Rhenish state raised Wiedfeldt’s 
suspicions that, under pressure from France and perhaps England, discussions with the 
United States on the issue were in progress.122   Castle’s apparent indifference to the unity of 
Germany raised the possibility that if Britain and France reached a compromise, with the 
                                                          
 120 Wiedfeldt to AA, 31 Jul 1923, Nr. 89, ADAP VII, pp. 232-35. 
 121 Ibid; Castle to Houghton, 25 Jul 1923, file 52, Castle Papers. 
 122 Wiedfeldt to AA, 31 Jul 1923, Nr.89, ADAP VII, p. 234. 
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 blessing of the United States, Germany would be forced to agree or lose the battle for 
American opinion.  Rhineland autonomy would also raise the danger of a break up of 
Germany if Bavaria were also to seek a more autonomous status.  Kessler warned Castle that 
the whole world is standing before great difficulties due to the naive pride of the Americans.  
Castle replied that America is the only healthy nation and the only one with a stable 
government and that most be maintained for the sake of the world’s future.123   
 
The Death of Harding 
 When Vice President Calvin Coolidge assumed office after the death of Harding on 2 
August, he immediately announced that he would carry out all of Harding’s policies and 
programs.124   At a press conference following the first cabinet meeting on 14 August, he 
reaffirmed support for Hughes’s New Haven proposal and declared that the United States 
was ready to cooperate if the proper opportunity was presented.  But Coolidge added that the 
government “hesitates to make any offer” and will wait to be invited.  Coolidge warned, 
however, that the United States would not give favorable attention to any plan “which would 
commit this government too far.”  The plan had to be “practical and offer a final solution to 
the whole problem” and meet with the approval of all of the interested parties.”  In addition, 
                                                          
 123 Ibid, cited on p. 235.  Kessler reported to Schubert his impressions of Hughes whom 
Kessler found frightened to take any action for fear of domestic criticism of any failure. “He 
will only move if sure of foreign policy success or in the highly unlikely case that the 
Republican Party forces him for domestic reasons.”  Kessler gives his overall impression 
that it is unlikely that America will take any action at the instigation of England at the 
moment. 
 124 Murray, The Harding Era, p. 501. 
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 he announced that he wholeheartedly supported the collection of all war debts.125
 In London, Coolidge’s statement was hailed as a “welcomed change” in American policy 
implying that the United States might respond to a British call for an expert commission.  
Hughes utilized the Associated Press to state in response, only as an unnamed high official, 
that the “welcomed change” interpretation was both inaccurate and too optimistic. He also 
sent cables to American embassies in the European powers affirming that American policy 
remained the same.  News of these cables increased speculation that the United States was in 
fact actively renewing its offer. The London papers again searched for special significance 
and clues, noting that Hughes had never before sent out such an explicit pronouncement of 
policy.126   Although the death of Harding did not alter U.S. policy toward Europe, the 
Europeans were primed to look at any official statement that might reflect a new course away 
from the passivity that characterized American policy that summer.   
 
Curzon’s Note of August 11   
 As Coolidge and Hughes were making their statements about American policy on the 
Ruhr crisis, Curzon, believing that Germany had made real concessions in their 7 June note, 
tried to pressure France into negotiations.  On 11 August he sent a strongly worded note to 
France and Belgium stating that the French and Belgian efforts to extract reparations by 
occupying the Ruhr were “doomed to failure” and that France’s threat to delay complete 
                                                          
 125 Ibid; New York Times, 15 Aug. 1923, p. 1; Wiedfeldt to AA, 18 Aug.1923, Po2b 
(964), Botschaft Washington, PA-AA. 
 126  This account is drawn from Wiedfeldt’s explanation to v.Schubert in response to v. 
Schubert’s inquiry about contradictory press report in London and Germany. Ibid; Schubert 
to Washington, 18 Aug 1923, Nr. 419, R28489, Büro RM-USA, D618884, p. 20. 
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 evacuation until Germany fulfilled its entire obligation would lead to “disastrous” political 
and economic consequences.127   The note urged France and Belgium to accept Hughes’s 
proposed committee of experts.  As an inducement Curzon repeated Bonar Law’s offer that 
Britain would seek from the inter-allied debt owed to it and German reparations only the sum 
needed to pay its debts to the United States. The note also pointed out that the plans proposed 
by Belgium and France gave those nations a disproportionate share of the reparations at the 
expense of  Britain.128   Curzon also raised the possibility that Britain could join Germany in 
challenging the legality of the occupation under the Versailles Treaty and International 
law.129   The note also made clear that British advice to Germany  to abandon passive 
resistance was political advice and in no way constituted British acceptance that German 
passive resistance was contrary to the Treaty of Versailles.  Curzon also reminded France 
that Britain was deferring payment on the French war debt.130  The concluded with a 
statement that Britain “was reluctant to contemplate the possibility that separate action may 
be required to hasten a settlement which cannot be much longer delayed with the gravest 
consequences to the recovery of trade and peace of the world.”131    
 Curzon’s note was largely a bluff since he did not have cabinet support for any of the 
actions “contemplated” within it.  Political opinion in Britain remained divided and several 
                                                          
 127 Curzon to de Saint-Aulaire and Moncheur, 11 Aug 1923, no. 330, DBFP XXI, pp. 
467-82 (quotes on pp. 477, 479). 
 128 Ibid., pp. 470-71. 
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 cabinet members were opposed to the note.132   Britain did not have the unified political will 
to accept a break with France if necessary to lever France out of the Ruhr.  Curzon’s note did 
appease some anti-French sentiment in Britain to some extent, but at the risk of charges of 
political impotence should Poincaré choose to call its bluff.  Settlement of the Ruhr crisis 
would require combined British and American pressure. However, Coolidge’s and Hughes’ 
statements made clear that the United States would not become involved without French and 
Belgian agreement.    
 Poincaré wasted no time in calling Curzon’s bluff, first with press releases and then with 
a long note containing the expected “full blast of French disapproval.”133   France’s position 
was that its war debts had been incurred “to make a greater military effort and to save 
English and American blood, whereas the German debt represents the Allied blood which 
was shed.”134   Poincaré affirmed the demand that France receive 26 billion gold marks and 
in addition requested a sum equal to what it was obliged to pay the United States and Britain, 
which could be provided through the German C bonds.135   
 Belgium’s immediate response was to protest what appeared to be a British attack on the 
priority promised to Belgium in 1919 for German reparation payments, and to express 
                                                          
 132 O’Riorden, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, pp. 82-92; Rupieper, Cuno Government, pp. 
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 offense that identical notes to both France and Belgium had cast Belgium “more and more 
into the arms of France.”  Next, it attempted to determine what help the United States might 
offer about war-debt reduction.   On 16 August, the Belgian chargé met with Hughes to 
discuss the American position in light of the recent diplomatic activity.  Caught in the 
crossfire of the battle between Curzon and Poincaré,  Belgium wanted to confirm Hughes’s 
thoughts about a settlement. 
 Without hesitation, Hughes dispelled all hopes either that war debts owed to the United 
States could be reduced to facilitate a settlement or that the United States would accept 
German C Bonds as a means of settling war debts.  There was not the “slightest chance” that 
Congress would permit it.  Nevertheless, Hughes did not view the reparations problem as 
unsolvable, noting that the total disputed amount was 45 billion gold marks (France wanted 
26 billion, Belgium 5 billion, and Britain 14) and expressing his belief that not only could 
experts easily determine Germany’s capacity to pay, but also that payment schedules and 
guarantees could be arranged with international supervision.136  
 Hughes was careful to add that because no request had been made to the United States, 
albeit the European powers directly concerned in the Ruhr crisis were in communication, he 
could make no official statement regarding the American  position.  However, speaking in 
what he termed a “personal and unofficial way,” he did outline his view of the settlement 
process.  Although Germany had avoided payment in the past and possibly might be unable 
to pay in the future if conditions deteriorated further, he saw the current situation as a 
“favorable moment” and the Belgians as “[f]aithful allies of France;” while “understanding 
the position of Britain,” Belgium would be “a useful agent as achieving a compromise.” 
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  Hughes recognized France’s frontier security concerns but was suspicious of French 
intentions regarding the Rhineland and the Ruhr.  He wanted Poincaré to make “a definite 
and reasonable proposal as to what France demanded for security” and cautioned that it was 
a “mistake to insist on the termination of passive resistance as a condition precedent to direct 
discussions.”   Hughes warned that survival was doubtful for any German government that 
abandoned resistance without assurance of settlement terms, but also remarked that he 
expected Germany to end its public demands for immediate French troop withdrawal. 
 Germany and France should negotiate the amounts of payments, terms of payments, and 
guarantees by pledging the available resources of Germany with supervision “of an 
international character” to ensure that the payments were made.  When substantial agreement 
had been reached, Germany could declare passive resistance ended and France could 
announce the end of the military occupation of the Ruhr.  As a further incentive to 
negotiations, Hughes hinted that a European settlement which included disarmament might 
shift American public opinion toward supporting war-debt reductions, but also warned that if 
no settlement agreement was reached, conditions in Germany might deteriorate to the point 
that arrangements for reparation payments would become impossible.13   7 Despite Hughes 
growing concern regarding the situation in Germany, in mid August 1923 with President 
Coolidge only days in office, the policy of the United States remained one of reluctance to 
become actively involved in the European imbroglio.   
Conclusion 
 From the start of the Ruhr crisis, Germany’s foreign policy centered on the United States, 
whose economic and financial power was viewed as essential to Germany’s recovery.   The 
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 Cuno cabinet was created as a “businessman’s” government whose goal was to settle the 
reparations issue on an economic basis and reduce reparations to a level compatible with 
what “businessmen” would agree was feasible and credible for Germany to pay and still be 
able to recover economically.  It was an approach designed to appeal to American 
sensibilities. 
 Germany had initially hoped that Hughes’s expert-committee proposal, made at New 
Haven, would forestall French action; after the occupation began, Germany expected that 
American and British economic interest in its recovery would lead those powers to intervene.  
When the United States failed to take any follow-up action to Hughes’s proposal, Germany 
did not relinquish its view of the centrality of the United States but instead resorted to a 
policy of attempting to use Britain, which was more immediately affected by the crisis, as a 
vehicle to achieve U.S. intervention.  Germany pursued this unrealistic course of action 
despite warnings from both Wiedfeldt in Washington and Sthamer in London that early 
intervention was unlikely.  
 Since the vast majority of Germans were outraged by the occupation, Cuno’s decision to 
organize and support passive resistance is understandable; any other policy would have been 
viewed as surrender to France.  But the Cuno government, supported by the bourgeois parties 
heavily influenced by industrial interests, failed to take the necessary steps to financially 
prepare Germany for its struggle with France. While insisting on passive resistance, neither 
the parties nor industry were ready to sacrifice their economic interests and accept the tax 
reforms required to support it unless they were compensated at the expense of the workers.  
As a result, the weak Cuno government was forced to run ever- growing budget deficits that 
caused rampant inflation. 
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  In foreign policy the Cuno government relied on the hope for British intervention against 
France, which might in turn convince the United States to adopt a more active policy.  
However, the same interest groups in Germany that opposed financial reform also limited 
their financial support for German reparation proposals to levels lower even than British 
expectations, which greatly complicated the process of gaining British and American 
support.   Germany’s difficulty in creating satisfactory reparation proposals also stemmed 
from increased nationalism, which was sparked by the occupation, which had intensified the 
public’s loathing of reparation demands that were seen as not only excessively high but also 
as punitive and unjust.  It was also believed, not without reason, that no realistic reparation 
proposal would satisfy France. 
 A possible foreign policy initiative might have been for the Cuno government to have 
recognized its weakness and then to have considered the abandonment of passive resistance 
after the 7 June note, as demanded by France and Belgium in exchange for the opening of 
negotiations and the promise of partial French withdrawal from the Ruhr.  However, there 
was no guarantee that ending passive resistance would bring the United States on board and 
this would have run the risk that France would simply prolong negotiations until Germany 
collapsed.  Therefore, reliance on the promise of British support continued. 
 As inflation increased, the working class became demoralized.  Passive resistance 
thereby became less of a viable policy and more of a means of justifying government policy.  
Although the resistance had initially united Germany, by July the financial and economic 
stress of maintaining by July led to greater contention between domestic interest groups.  In 
was only in the last days of it administration, when Germany had reached the verge of 
economic collapse, that the Cuno government was able to take the first steps toward 
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 economic stabilization. But by then, the government was bankrupt. 
 The United States looked to Great Britain to take the leading role in resolving the Ruhr 
crisis.  Britain believed that ultimately it stood to gain more through commerce with a 
recovered Germany than it could extract in reparations from a bankrupt Germany, but at the 
same time it did not want to break with France.  Faced with this dilemma, Britain hoped for 
United States involvement, which it saw as essential for any resolution of the crisis, and it 
resented America’s policy of disengagement.  The latter was a luxury Britain could not 
enjoy, because of its occupation of the Cologne zone and its representation in inter-Allied 
commissions, both of which involved Britain in French-German disputes over railroads, 
customs, and trade.  Britain initially pursued a policy of benevolent neutrality, but as conflict 
between Germany and France in the Rhineland and Ruhr grew the British position became 
more difficult.  By April, Britain was engaging in tentative intervention by encouraging 
Germany to make reparation proposals that could become the basis for negotiations which 
Britain could mediate.  This experiment led Germany to rely on British support rather than 
make the hard decisions necessary to stabilize its finances and make credible reparation 
offers. 
 The June note represented a real advance in German willingness to pay reparations but 
failed to lead to negotiations.  Instead, it simply encouraged Poincaré to harden his policy.  
Frustrated by what he considered French intransigence, Curzon made the mistake of taking a 
harder line in his 11 August note, whose net effect was to demonstrate British impotence.  
With a divided cabinet and without American support, there was little Curzon could do to 
force France into negotiations.  In August, Hughes made clear that the United States was still 
not willing, or prepared, to become actively involved. 
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  The Cuno government’s inability to achieve any foreign policy success, and its failure to 
prepare Germany for prolonged struggle with France, led to hyper-inflation which began to 
cripple the economy.  This situation was becoming truly desperate when the government 
finally fell on 12 August.  A fragile “great coalition” government was formed under Gustav 
Stresemann, encompassing the Social Democrats and the middle-class parties, on 14 August.  
Its immediate task was to confront both the deteriorating economic and financial situation in 
Germany and Poincaré, whose policy had shifted from compelling Germany to pay 
reparation to more ambitious possibilities that looked to achieving security needs beyond 
what France had obtained at Versailles.  It would not be until the unity of Germany itself was 
threatened in late 1923 that the United States and Britain would concede that France had 
gone too far and pressure France into negotiations to end the crisis.  
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 Chapter VI 
 
The Way toward Intervention: 
America and the Resolution of the Ruhr Crisis 
August - December 1923 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter explores the period between August and December 1923, when the Ruhr 
crisis reached its peak and threatened the collapse of Germany.  As the crisis reached its 
climax, events necessitated that the United States re-engage Europe, but it would do so only 
on its own terms, prescribed by domestic political constraints.  With Germany prostrate and 
France weakened and isolated by the prolonged conflict, the way was finally open for 
Hughes’s December 1922 proposal for an experts committee to devise a plan for a solution of 
the reparation problem which had sparked the crisis.  This chapter will examine changes at 
the height of the crisis that allowed the intervention of the United States, so keenly sought by 
Germany since the conflict began in January 1923. 
 In August, the new German government of Gustav Stresemann sought to stabilize 
Germany’s economic crisis and re-establish credibility.  By achieving these goals it hoped to 
involve the United States, whose intervention Stresemann considered essential to the 
reconstruction of Germany.  With the United States still reluctant to become involved, 
Stresemann sought the aid of Britain in obtaining French agreement to withdraw from the 
Ruhr in exchange for German guarantees of reparation payments.  Britain’s diplomatic 
 attitude, however, was one of vacillation and reluctance to become involved, due to a cabinet 
stalemate over policy about France and Germany.  Meanwhile, Poincaré refused to give up 
his productive pledges until Germany completely ended passive resistance.   
 In late September, imminent economic collapse forced Germany to do just that.  But 
Poincaré, who entertained ambitions of separating the occupied territories from Germany, 
refused Stresemann’s desperate pleas for negotiations and tightened his hold.  Domestic 
unrest and political instability continued to escalate in Germany which by October raised 
concerns in both Britain and the United States.  Coolidge reaffirmed Hughes’s proposal for 
an expert committee, while British diplomacy was able to put enough pressure on Poincaré 
for him to participate in difficult negotiations about the scope of the experts committee until  
a solution was found that  satisfied Hughes’s purpose and allowed Poincaré to save face.    
 The major concern of this chapter is the question of what motivated the United States to 
alter its disinclination to become involved in the European crisis and to engage in active 
diplomacy on Germany’s behalf that would pressure France to accept the New Haven 
Proposal.  The chapter answers that question by examining the nature of the change in 
American opinion that occurred as the crisis became more urgent; it maintains that the 
determining factor in this change was the threat of Germany’s economic collapse and 
political disintegration, as the result of France’s actions in the Ruhr and Rhineland that were 
taken to resolve French security concerns.  This broadened the nature of the crisis from an 
economic dispute over reparations to a political crisis that endangered American hopes for a 
peaceful reconstruction of Europe and threatened the Versailles settlement as well.  
Increasingly both the American public and the American government came to believe that 
Europe would not be able to resolve the crisis on its own and that and that resolution required 
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 American involvement.    
 This chapter also examines changes in Germany and steps taken by the Stresemann 
government that led America to believe that intervention by the United States could be useful 
and successful, both prerequisites for American intervention.  Answering the question of how 
Stresemann changed the strained atmosphere of the first half of 1923 necessitates an 
examination of his foreign and domestic policy.  The chapter will argue that two essential 
components were Stresemann’s belief that foreign policy and domestic economic reform 
were linked and his ability to act accordingly in spite of domestic political and personal 
consequences.  This conviction, along with the knowledge that America was essential to both 
the resolution of the crisis and Germany’s long-term future, convinced him to follow 
American leads in conducting policy.  In turn, his ability to hold Germany together allowed 
for Coolidge’s and Hughes’s political decision in favor of American intervention.  
 Since French agreement to the New Haven proposal was necessary to begin the defusing 
of the crisis, the chapter also analyzes the complex reasons for Poincaré’s acceptance of 
Hughes’s proposal. What were his motivations behind his relations with Germany? How did 
the over-reaching of Poincaré’s German policy play a decisive role in the American decision 
to intervene?  Finally, this chapter examines how the conflict between Poincaré and Hughes 
over the mandate of the experts committee threatened to undo the entire solution.  Was 
Hughes’s threat to walk away from the whole project was a bluff or perhaps more accurately 
a further example of the constraints under which American policy towards the European 
crisis operated.   
  
The Stresemann Government 
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  The long-anticipated resignation of the Cuno government finally took place on 12 
August.  By then, the weary chancellor had lost all credibility as the government’s lack of 
diplomatic success was underscored by the ever-deepening domestic economic crisis.  In 
November 1922, Cuno had been entrusted with forming a government that would bring the 
United States into the European crisis; Hughes’s New Haven proposal had buoyed these 
hopes.  With the United States demonstratively avoiding involvement and the failure of 
British diplomacy to relieve Germany’s situation, Cuno left office at a time when prospects 
for a resolution of the foreign policy and the domestic political and economic crises were 
dim.  His government was replaced on 14 August by a great coalition government that hoped 
to provide a broader base of support for the very difficult choices Germany would soon have 
to make if the Reich were to remain intact.  The new cabinet, headed by Dr. Gustav 
Stresemann, who served as chancellor and foreign minister,  was composed of a broad 
coalition that included the Social Democrats (SPD), the Center party, the German 
Democratic Party (DDP) and Stresemann’s own German Peoples Party (DVP).1
 Stresemann had long sought to be Reich Chancellor, but perhaps not under such 
circumstances.  His background was one evolution from early opposition to the Weimar 
system to support of parliamentary democracy with lingering hopes that some day the 
monarchy could be restored on a constitutional basis.2   As head of the DVP and the 
                                                 
 1 Rupieper, The Cuno Government, pp. 211-17; Die Kabinette Stresemann I and II, ed. 
Karl Dietrich Erdmann and Martin Vogt (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1978), 
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 2 Turner notes that Stresemann’s transition from opponent to defender of the Weimar 
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of whom see him as an opportunist and others as having made a sincere conversion.  Turner’s 
view is that Stresemann was a conservative pragmatist who wanted the restoration of the 
country’s power and prosperity and the preservation of as much of what had been the pre-
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 Reichstag’s foreign relations committee in the Reichstag, Stresemann had been loyal to the 
Cuno government but had gradually become frustrated by its string of diplomatic failures 
while the German financial situation was strained to the breaking point.  Like Cuno, 
Stresemann was known for his ties to the United States; he had co-founded Deutsch-
Americanische Wirtschaftsverband, an interest group dedicated to improved economic 
relations with the United States. 
 Although Stresemann was well aware of the difficulty in engaging the United States in 
the European crisis, he hoped that by a strategy of closely following Hughes’s 
recommendations made to the Belgians on 17 August, Germany could attempt to engage 
France and his government might make more headway then its predecessor.  As the pressures 
on and within Germany mounted, his primary concern was maintaining the Reich as a 
sovereign whole long enough for his foreign policy initiatives to take effect.  For Stresemann, 
foreign policy was intimately connected with the issues of domestic currency reform and 
bringing hyper-inflation under control.  Once these goals had been accomplished, the 
government might make an acceptable reparations offer or at least open the way to 
negotiations with France, with the hope then of internationalizing the reparations question by 
means of the Hughes proposal.3  Stresemann told the Reichstag, “We are expected to show 
activity in foreign affairs.  The best activity of that kind which we can display is in the 
                                                                                                                                                       
revolutionary order as was possible, “but was willing to be flexible about the means of 
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of Rathenau for his conversion to the defense of the Weimar constitution and against the 
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 3 Manfred Berg, Gustav Stresemann und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika: 
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 settlement of our own affairs at home.”4  
 The U. S. State Department’s initial appraisal of Stresemann was far from favorable. 
Robbins saw him as a mere politician and not “a high type of patriot,” someone “who had 
been gunning for the job” since the beginning of Cuno’s incumbency.  But with the exception 
of Rudolf Hilferding, the finance minister and a member of the SPD, Robbins considered the 
entire cabinet to be an extremely weak lot of “old dodos.”5  He felt that Cuno had been under 
the “thumb of the industrialists” who were responsible for the serious condition of Germany, 
and assessed Stresemann as “being of the same persuasion though far less scrupulous than his 
predecessor.”6  
 The new government, however, was sharply divided in regard to domestic policy.7  The 
SPD wanted steep increases in corporate and income taxes, to raise government revenue and 
combat inflation.  It also wanted governmental protection of real wages, as well as social 
security and pension benefits-- all of which were being ravaged by accelerating inflation.  
The DVP demanded further sacrifices from workers and an increase of the eight-hour work 
day, a demand fiercely opposed by the SPD.   The support of the SPD, however, was crucial 
                                                                                                                                                       
Verlaggesellschaft, 1990), p. 145. 
 4  Gustav Stresemann, His Diaries, Letters and Papers, ed. and trans. Eric Sutton, vol. 1 
(London: Macmillan, 1935) p. 90.  Originally published as Gustav Stresemann, Vermächtnis: 
Der Nachlass in Drei Bänden (Berlin: Ullstein, 1932).  All citations are to the English 
version, hereafter cited as Diaries. 
 5 Robbins to Castle, 15 Aug 1923, file 52, Castle Papers. 
 6 Robbins to Castle, 28 Aug 1923, file 52, Castle Papers. 
 7 For opposition to the government, see Erdmann and Vogt, Die Kabinette Stresemann I, 
p. xxvii and Parteiführerbesprechung, 22 Aug 1923, Nr. 14, Die Kabinette Stresemann I, pp. 
56-60. 
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 to maintaining workers’ willingness to continue passive resistance.8    
 During August and September Germany struggled over how the sacrifices that currency 
reform would require should be distributed among the various sectors and classes of society. 
The explosive question of the stabilization of German finances, which had been at the heart 
of the reparations debate since 1921, could no longer be avoided.  Successive German 
governments had reverted to the printing press to assure domestic peace.  Now, with total 
economic collapse brought on by months of paying for passive resistance, these issues had to 
be directly confronted.  Questions regarding the retention of the eight-hour workday struck at 
the core gains of the 1918/19 revolution. These issues were critical to the survival of both the 
government and the internal viability of the Reich itself.  From their respective extremes, the 
Communists and Fascists provoked strikes and demonstrations.  Sentiment favoring some 
form of separation from grew in the Rhineland, as did nationalistic feeling in Bavaria.9  In 
the Ruhr, workers had become almost completely demoralized; as France tightened its hold 
and expelled Germans who refused cooperation, some businessmen began to seek 
accommodation with the occupiers.10
                                                 
 8  Feldman, The Great Disorder, pp. 698-708; Conan Fischer, The Ruhr Crisis, 1923-1924 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 76-79.   
 9 Along with nationalism, there existed in Bavaria strong particularist and separatist 
sentiments,  Conservative Bavaria distrusted the central government in Berlin, which was 
considered to be left-leaning, and there was much talk in Bavarian rightist circles of either 
marching on or breaking from Berlin. This should also be seen in the context of the 
longstanding regional and religious differences dating from the formation of the Reich in 
1871.  See Introduction, Politik in Bayern: Berichte des wüttembergischen Gesandten Moser 
v. Filseck, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Stuttgard: Deutsch Verlags Anstalt, 1971), and Werner 
Gabriel Zimmermann, Bayern und das Reich, 1918-1923 (München: Richard Pflaum Verlag, 
1958). 
 10 For a detailed account of the crisis throughout Germany, see Feldman, The Great 
Disorder, pp. 698-708; for a detailed account of the growing crisis within the Ruhr area, see    
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Stresemann’s Appeal to the United States and Britain 
 Stresemann fully realized that Germany could not continue passive resistance much 
longer.  In a cabinet meeting on 23 August he described Germany’s position as desperate and 
stated that passive resistance could not be continued into the winter without creating extreme 
social unrest.  Ending passive resistance, however, risked strong reaction from the 
nationalistic right in unoccupied Germany.  Although Britain was attempting to isolate 
France by splitting off Italy and Belgium as well as attempting to bring in America, no 
immediate help from Britain could be expected.  Stresemann’s initial strategy therefore was 
to attempt to prod the British into standing by Curzon’s notes of 20 July and 11 August while 
at the same time exploring the possibility of negotiations with France. 
 There was general agreement that accepting Poincaré’s demand for the end of passive 
resistance would be a blow to the prestige the government, but with its capacity for continued 
resistance nearly exhausted, Germany could no longer let pride interfere with a practical 
solution.  It was willing to consider abandoning passive resistance and to negotiate economic 
guarantees provided they did not alter the political status of the Rhineland and the Ruhr.  The 
cabinet’s decision, however, was to maintain the policy for the time being while Stresemann 
explored diplomatic options.11  
 Stresemann could not expect immediate help from the United States either.  After a 
meeting with Hughes, Wiedfeldt reported that there would be little chance of American 
intervention on Germany’s behalf.  Coolidge still held to Hughes’s New Haven proposal but 
would only participate in an international conference if France accepted the proposal and 
                                                                                                                                                       
Fischer, The Ruhr Crisis, pp. 192-218. 
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 requested American participation.  When Wiedfeldt complained that the American neutrality 
was in practice actually favorable to France, Hughes replied that he could not disagree but 
also did not think this would change.  Wiedfeldt wondered what had happened to the earlier 
support among many Americans for some U.S. engagement and noted that American 
politicians returning from Europe, such as Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon, were 
saying that the time for American involvement had passed and that America should step back 
from European chaos.  Hughes agreed that conditions for American involvement had become 
more difficult.12  
 But for the first time Hughes, instead of just listening to Wiedfeldt’s recitation of 
Germany’s difficulties, asked specific questions.  Off the record, Hughes wanted to know 
whether conditions were really so bad that there was a Bolshevik danger.  Wiedfeldt replied 
that the threat of a German collapse was imminent, that disintegration was already beginning, 
and that it would provide the Bolsheviks with a great opportunity.  Hughes commented that 
he still did not think “Germany would go under,” to which Wiedfeldt retorted that the United 
States bore some responsibility for Germany’s situation since it had left Germany after the 
war “under a treaty that could not be fulfilled.”  Wiedfeldt then asked if the United States 
could pressure France with financial issues or make a declaration standing behind the British 
initiative; Hughes replied that such means were too weak and that he doubted such an 
initiative would have any success.13  
 On 27 August Houghton informed Hughes of Stresemann’s plans to stabilize the currency 
                                                                                                                                                       
 11 Kabinettssitzung, 23 Aug 1923, Nr. 18, Die Kabinette Stresemann I, pp. 75-83. 
 12 Wiedfeldt to AA, 23 Aug 1923, Nr. 309, D618891, Büro RM-USA, Bd. 3, p. 27 
 13 Ibid.
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 and attempt to reach an agreement with France, but reported that a “sense of hopelessness” 
was hampering the initiatives and discouraging democratic elements from the nationalistic 
right and also from the left, where there was a danger of a German form of communism 
developing.  Although Houghton had confirmed Wiedfeldt’s statements, Hughes remained 
content to wait upon developments and refrain from risking American and administration 
prestige on uncertain outcomes.14
 Germany continued to remain dependent on Britain for immediate support, but by late 
August Baldwin’s position had changed.  Curzon’s 11 August note had caused an uproar 
among pro-French members in the British Cabinet, who demanded that Baldwin repair 
relations with France and accept an invitation from Poincaré to meet with him during 
Baldwin’s vacation in France in September.15  By late August, with the cabinet divided and 
                                                 
 14 Houghton to Hughes, 27 Aug 1923, Houghton Papers. Werner Link states that by 
August, the U.S. was increasingly ready to intervene, “more so then Stresemann knew.”  Die 
amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, p. 203.  Link judges that U.S. economic interest 
dictated an intervention in the crisis as the Ruhr occupation began to hurt U.S. business and 
the threat of a Franco-German economic co-operation out weighted the benefits of destroyed 
German competition; he sees the turning point in the summer of 1923.  Link, “Die 
Vereinigten Staaten und der Ruhrkonflikt,” p. 46.  Even if this doubtful proposition was true, 
there is no indication that such calculations affected Hughes in his directing of U.S. foreign 
policy. 
 15  For a discussion of this evolution of British policy see O’Riordan, Britain and the 
Ruhr Crisis, pp. 89-100 and Rupierper, The Cuno Government, p. 222.   Matters were further 
complicated in late August when Belgium and Italy replied unfavorably to Curzon’s 11 
August note.  The Belgians’ reply, less harsh than the French, suggested that they might 
accept the exchange of productive pledges in the Ruhr for more general pledges, and were 
willing to consider an experts committee under Reparation Commission. But it adhered to 
Poincaré’s position that this could not occur until passive resistance ended. Grahame 
(Brussels) to Curzon, 31 Aug 1923, no. 341, DBFP XXI, pp. 498-99 and memorandum on 
the French and Belgian notes, 14 Sept 1923, no. 362, DBFP XXI, pp. 522-24.  Italy, 
responding that its position was “to protect Italian interests,” saw a deadlock since Germany 
had not given up passive resistance and Britain had not “explicitly declared that the she 
would she remit Allied debts,” an issue most dear to Italian hearts.  Graham (Rome) to 
Curzon, 31 Aug 1923, no. 342, DBFP XXI, pp. 499-500. 
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 receiving neither Belgian and Italian support nor an indication of active support from the 
United States, British policy was at a stalemate.  The Foreign Office now favored a delay in 
any new action until policy could be discussed at the Imperial Conference scheduled for 
October. 
 Stresemann soon discovered he could not count on the British support for which he had 
hoped.  On 23 August, he asked Sthamer to notify the British that Germany’s desperate 
situation would require it to make some important hard decisions and to ask the British for 
their views and intentions.16  Since Baldwin, Curzon and Crowe were all on vacation, 
Sthamer met with William Tyrrell, an assistant under-secretary in the Foreign Office.  
Tyrrell, however, was an ardent supporter of maintaining the Entente with France; Sthamer’s 
entreaties were unproductive.17
 After this failure, Germany next tried D’Abernon.  On 29 August, Schubert met with 
D’Abernon and reiterated Sthamer’s pleas.  D’Abernon, doubtful that British-French talks 
would produce anything fruitful given Poincaré’s obstinacy, suggested that Germany might 
give up passive resistance, negotiate with France and accept some French control in 
exchange for a lightening of the occupation, after which a settlement meeting could be held 
                                                 
 16  Stresemann to Sthamer, 23 Aug 1923, Nr. 114, ADAP VIII, pp. 288-91. 
 17 Germany, having informally heard of the demands contained in Poincaré’s reply to the 
British reparation proposal, hoped that Curzon’s 11 August note might soften the French, but 
it was now clear that this was not to be and that further British action was necessary.  
Sthamer tried to impress upon Tyrrell that the situation was desperate and that Germany 
needed British help, stressing that Germany was doing all that it could in the way of 
reforming its finances, but could not take draconian measures without domestic disorder.  He 
asked for elaboration of the details in the 20 July British reparation proposal and stated that 
Germany was willing to do anything in its power to make it easier for the British to influence 
France.  Although ready to give up questions of prestige and pride, Germany was facing 
capitulation to France and possible internal collapse.  It needed to know British intentions 
quickly, because decisions about ending passive resistance had to be made. Ibid., see also 
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 among France, Germany and Britain.  For Schubert this was a “monstrous demand” that 
Germany would have to consider.  If Britain could not help diplomatically, von Schubert 
asked D’Abernon to inquire whether it could at least ease Germany’s desperate financial 
situation by allowing British receipts from the Reparation Recovery Act to be used as 
guarantees to British exporters of coal to Germany.  This Britain declined to do.18  
 Without financial help from Britain, Stresemann recognized that passive resistance would 
have to be ended quickly.  Meeting on 30 August, the cabinet decided to place strict 
limitations on future unemployment funds for the occupied territories, a move that presaged 
ending of passive resistance, and established a committee to investigate the creation of a new 
fixed-value currency to replace the rapidly depreciating Reichmark.  The cabinet explicitly 
recognized that Germany’s economic instability impeded its foreign policy.19  
 Politically, however, Stresemann could not afford for the ending of passive resistance to 
be seen as surrender and a defeat.  He needed to obtain some concession from France that 
                                                                                                                                                       
O’Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, pp. 91-94. 
 18 Tyrrell’s minutes of D’Abernon’s report would declare, “The Germans know as well as 
we do that unless they make the first move as regards passive resistance the French toes will 
remain dug in: the key is in Berlin.” Von Schubert, Aufzeichnung, 29 Aug 1923, Nr. 123, 
ADAP VIII, p. 312-14; D’Abernon to Curzon, 1 Sept 1923, no. 343, DBFP XXI, pp. 500-
501, n. 3.  D’Abernon noted in his diary that British policy of insisting on extracting 
payments under the Reparation Recovery Act (which taxed German imports to Britain at 
26%, paid for by the German government) and various payments to the Rhineland 
Commission was counterproductive, contributed to the German inflation and “injured to a 
certain extent our moral position and we have gained very inadequate compensation for it.”  
D’ Abernon, An Ambassador of Peace vol. 2, p. 247.  On 6 September, D’Abernon 
personally urged Britain to accept this proposal or provide some other financial assistance.  
The request, however, was refused, on the grounds that Britain was reluctant to give up its 
reparation payments at a time when France and Belgium were doing everything in their 
power extract all that they could from Germany.  Britain was also hesitant because such 
assistance could be misinterpreted by France and Belgium and denounced as affording 
support to German resistance.  D’Abernon to Curzon, 6 Sept 1923, no. 353, DBFP XXI, p. 
513; Curzon to D’Abernon, 13 Sept 1923, no. 360, DBFP XXI, pp. 520-21. 
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 would allow him to make the ending of passive resistance appear as a diplomatic exchange 
made to preserve German unity and defuse the crisis.  On 2 September, in a speech to 
representatives of the press at Stuttgart, he stated that the government was willing to offer 
security pledges both from private property and properties owned by the Reich, if this would 
open the way to a solution of the conflict and freedom for the Ruhr.  He also made the usual 
offer of a Rhine peace pact guaranteeing the Versailles borders, predicated upon French good 
will in not attempting to separate the Rhineland from Germany.20
 
Stresemann’s Attempts to Negotiate with France   
 In the absence of any British initiative, Stresemann attempted to ascertain what 
compromises could be obtained from France.  Already on 17 August, Stresemann had 
informally sounded out the French ambassador, Pierre de Margerie, as to the goals of French 
policy regarding Germany.  Margerie denied that France wanted to meet security needs by 
annexing the Rhineland, but with the statement, “The fate of the Rhineland hinges on the 
Rhineland”21 (i.e. the decisions of the Rhinelanders) he left the door open for possible 
alternation in its status. 
 On 21 August, Cologne industrialist Otto Wolff informed Stresemann that he had spoken 
with General Degoutte, commander-in-chief of the French troops in the Ruhr, regarding what 
could be done about conditions in the Rhineland and prospects for industrial cooperation in 
                                                                                                                                                       
 19 Kabinettssitzung, 30 Aug 1923, Nr. 33, Die Kabinette Stresemann I, pp. 155-68, n. 3. 
 20 Aus einer Rede Dr. Stresemanns in Stuttgart, 2 Sept 1923, Nr. 1071, Ursachen und 
Folgen V, pp. 191-92. 
 21 Aufzeichnung Reichskanzler Stresemann über den Besuch ausländischer Botschafter, 
17 Aug 1923, Nr. 8, Die Kabinette Stresemann I, pp. 18-23. 
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 the Ruhr.22   Stresemann agreed to allow further discussion, in the interest of expediting a 
solution to the Ruhr conflict, but only under guidelines indicating the limits of what Germany 
could accept.  The railroads, for example, were not to be used as a pledge for a foreign loan, 
and the possibility of a Rhenish republic was not to be discussed.23    
 On 25 August, Poincaré decided to adopt a policy of attempting to loosen ties between 
the Rhineland and the Reich while strengthening its ties to France.  He decided that the best 
way to accomplish this would be to encourage initiatives by the Rheinlanders based on a 
right to self-determination rather than on authority granted by Berlin.  The importance of 
support from German industrialists to such an independence movement had been stressed by 
Degoutte, therefore French intentions were to prolong and even aggravate the German crisis 
and thereby stimulate Rhine and Ruhr industrialists to make an arrangement favorable to 
French political goals.24  Parallel to this policy, Paul Tirard, the French representative on the 
Rhineland Commission, pursued a more direct method to solve the problem of French 
security by seeking a redefinition of the Rhineland’s political status.  To this end he began 
                                                 
 22 Wolff, head of the concern holding the Phoenix and Rheinstahl works, had told 
Degoutte that French maltreatment of the German population and confiscation of property 
were merely intensifying German desires for revenge, suggesting a political understanding 
between Germany and France and economic cooperation to improve the situation. France, 
however, would have to invest in German industry so that Germany could afford to pay 
reparations to France.  He also suggested to Stresemann that with economic collapse in the 
Rhineland, support was growing for the establishment of a Rhineland State that would also 
include parts of the Ruhr.  Stresemann, Diaries, p. 91; Peter Wulf, Hugo Stinnes: Wirtschaft 
und Politik,1918-1924 (Stuttgard: Klett-Cotta, 1979), p. 396. 
 23 Aufzeichnung über eine Unterredung Otto Wolff mit General Degoutte, 29 Aug 1923, 
Nr. 30, Die Kabinette Stresemann I, pp. 142-44. 
 24 Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics, pp. 320-21. The policy had been followed 
more informally since the hardening of the French position in June and July.  Anticipating 
the collapse of passive resistance, the French had stepped up their overtures to Ruhr 
industrialists.  Paul Tirard reported to Poincaré in July that such contacts were increasing and 
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 openly supporting separatist attempts to seize control of the region and establish an 
independent Rhenish republic.25  
 On 3 September Stresemann met with Margerie, whose attitude during the interview 
reflected Poincaré’s newly adopted policy of exploring the possibility of separating the 
Rhineland from Prussia or Germany.  When Stresemann offered negotiations based on 
Curzon’s 20 July proposal, Margerie interjected that the conflict in the Ruhr was a matter that 
concerned only France, Belgium and Germany; England was not involved.  In any case, 
Margerie insisted, passive resistance must cease before France would enter into any official 
discussions; nonetheless he was interested in Germany’s views.  Stresemann discussed the 
use of general reparation pledges, suggesting an economic agreement with France based on a 
closer relationship between French and German industries.  To his offer of a Rhine security 
pact, Margerie retorted that France would rely on the Treaty of Versailles.  Well aware that 
Germany’s ultimate need was to involve the United States, Margerie reminded Stresemann 
that this offer was similar to the 7 June proposal which Hughes had “unofficially rejected.”26
 Stresemann wanted to know if French policy was immutable or whether there was a 
chance of reaching an understanding on the important differences.  This line of inquiry was 
                                                                                                                                                       
he was sure they would soon give in.  Die Kabinette Stresemann, Nr. 30, p. 142, n. 1. 
 25 Nadler, The Rhenish Separatist Movements, pp. 303-10; McDougall, France’s 
Rhineland Diplomacy, pp. 299-300. Britain had followed the beginnings of the separatist 
movement since July.  On 18 August, British High Commissioner on the Rhineland 
Commission, Lord Kilmarnock, reported that a movement for an independent Rhineland state 
was beginning to get organized under French sponsorship but was not having much success 
and that he believed, similarly to General Degoutte, that success was unlikely “without the 
cooperation of the great Rhenish industrialists.”  Kilmarnock to Curzon, 18 Aug 1923, no. 
338, DBFP XXI, p. 491. 
 26 Stresemann, Aufzeichnung, 3 Sept 1923, Nr. 126, ADAP VIII, p. 319-22; Stresemann, 
Diaries, pp. 97-101. Stresemann told Margerie that if Germany could not pay reparations due 
to the Ruhr conflict, that was a matter which did involve Britain; Bradbury agreed. See 
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 impeded, however, by the issue of passive resistance, which he stated could only be ended if 
the future status of the Ruhr was settled; without the Ruhr, Germany could not make 
reparation payments.  He also insisted upon the immediate return of Germans deported from 
the Ruhr and the release of German prisoners.  In addition, Stresemann turned away a 
suggestion from Margerie that the Ruhr should be evacuated only in stages proportionate to 
payments made by Germany, insisting that France should begin withdrawal as soon as 
pledges became effective.27   
 D’Abernon, who had heard of these negotiations, warned Schubert that Britain wanted to 
be informed of any German negotiations with France, most especially if they involved 
reparations in which Britain wanted to be involved.  Failure to do so would make a “bad 
                                                                                                                                                       
Bradbury to Baldwin, 4 Sept 1923, enclosure in no. 352, DBFP XXI, pp. 508-13. 
 27  France wanted to create productive pledges by starting an international railway 
company in the Rhineland and annexing German mines in the Ruhr, whereas Germany 
wanted to raise money for reparations with mortgages on industry and agriculture and a 
pledge of Reich property.  Stresemann wanted to know if the French need to secure coal and 
coke could be met by a mortgage on German total production, through treaties between the 
states or by private agreements guaranteed by Germany.  Stresemann also offered a closer 
relationship between French and German industry that might lead to an economic agreement, 
and was willing to discuss the extent and amount of delivery in kinds.  Stresemann, 
Aufzeichnung, 3 Sept 1923, Nr. 126, ADAP VIII, p. 319-22; Stresemann, Diaries, pp. 97-
101. The next day, Ago von Maltzan met with Margerie and gave him a note outlining 
Stresemann’s ideas.  When Margerie re-emphasized that Poincaré would not accept official 
negotiation until passive resistance ended, von Maltzan adopted a stratagem, suggested by 
D’Abernon, that this might be understood as an informal conversation between two 
gentlemen.  Von Maltzan then implied to Margerie that Germany could accept the French 
condition of no negotiations prior to the end of passive resistance, by suggesting that 
Poincaré give Germany informal assurances that following the ending of passive resistance, 
Poincaré  would voluntarily give concessions such as amnesty for German prisoners, the 
return of Germans exiles that France had expelled from the occupied regions and the 
restoration of the administration, including the railways, to German authorities. Von Maltzan, 
Aufzeichnung, 4 Sept 1923, Nr. 128, ADAP VIII, pp. 324-25.  For D’Abernon’s suggestion 
for informal agreements, see von Maltzan, Aufzeichnung, 3 Sept 1923, Nr. 125,  ADAP VIII, 
p. 317. 
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 impression in Britain.”28  Meeting with von Maltzan, he urged that Germany not just 
capitulate but also negotiate with the French.  Maltzan pointedly countered that if England 
could not provide Germany with help, Germany would be forced to end passive resistance.29  
Britain’s strategy was to attempt to maintain conveying a neutral stance to France and 
Germany regarding conditions in the Ruhr, and then to become involved when actual 
reparations payments were discussed.  
 On 4 September Stresemann informed D’Abernon that he was not opposed to financial 
and industrial groups in Germany and France making private arrangements, but he would 
officially negotiate only with the Allies.30  In fact, on 29 August he met Stinnes, Albert 
Vögler and other industrialists who informed him of their discreet inquiries regarding the 
French conditions for ending the struggle, which they had been told would include a 10% 
stake in German industry.  Vögler warned Stresemann that resistance could not last much 
longer in the Ruhr as the population was worn down; in four weeks at the most, resistance 
would have to be stopped.  Stresemann agreed but felt this outcome was “extraordinarily 
tragic,” as he was positive that by holding out “we could have won the game with England’s 
assistance.”  This was not possible, however; even aside from conditions in the Ruhr, the 
national economic situation prohibited it.31  
                                                 
 28  Von Schubert, Aufzeichnung, 29 Aug 1923, Nr. 123, ADAP VIII, pp. 312-14, n. 8; 
D’Abernon to Curzon, 1 Sept 1923, no. 344, DBFP XXI, pp. 501-2. 
 29 Stresemann, Diaries, p. 101; Stresemann, Aufzeichnung, 3 Sept 1923, Nr. 126, ADAP 
VIII, pp. 319-22. 
 30 Stresemann, Diaries, p. 102; D’Abernon to Curzon, 4 Sept 1923, no. 346, DBFP XXI, 
pp. 503-4. 
 31  Von Schubert, Aufzeichnung, 29 Aug 1923, Nr. 122, ADAP VIII, p. 311.  In an effort 
to reassure Britain, Poincaré instructed the French chargé d’affaires in London to inform the 
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    In a speech on 9 September, Poincaré stated clearly that he preferred “positive pledges 
and we shall not give them up against general pledges which perhaps should be written down 
on paper, but not bring any realities, and we shall not withdraw until we are paid.”32   
Nonetheless, he wanted to know more about Stresemann’s proposal.  Stresemann again met 
with Margerie on 10 September, to explain a plan for mortgages on the German economy to 
be held by a trust that would include Allied representation.  These mortgages could be used 
to obtain an international loan that would give immediate payments to France, which in turn 
would allow France to withdraw from the Ruhr.  Margerie, however, was primarily interested 
in the details of what Stresemann meant by the end of passive resistance. 
 Poincaré’s interest was not in a negotiated settlement but rather the vindication of his 
Rhineland policy, to be accomplished by Germany’s capitulation.33  Stresemann knew that 
                                                                                                                                                       
British of Margerie’s conversations with Stresemann.  Although desirous of concealing the 
conversations from the press, Poincaré stated that he wanted to keep the British fully 
informed.  The Foreign Office’s opinion was that Britain would welcome any measures that 
would liquidate the Ruhr crisis, reasoning that acceptance by Poincaré of Stresemann’s 
pledges in exchange for ending the occupation would have, from the British standpoint, two 
benefits.  First, it would get rid of the “incubus on British trade” which the Ruhr situation 
represented; and second, it would clarify Britain’s financial situation by ascertaining how 
much money could be expected from Germany and the Allies and when Britain could expect 
it.  Britain would therefore welcome any measure which would liquidate the Ruhr crisis, 
provided it did not jeopardize a reparation settlement satisfactory to British interests.  The 
problem, as the Foreign Office saw it, was that Stresemann was “willing to give any sort of 
undertaking, however impossible of fulfillment, to get the French out of the Ruhr” and 
Poincaré was disinclined to end the incursion until it had “been demonstrated beyond all 
doubt that German had been utterly defeated, and their determination that this shall not 
happen again in the case of the Ruhr. We must realize that a German admission of defeat is 
more M. Poincaré’s present object than the defeat itself.”  Curzon to Crewe, 8 Sept 1923, 
enclosure of a note by Sir W. Tyrrell, no. 358, DBFP XXI, pp. 516-18, quote in n. 4, p. 518.  
 32  Cited in Stresemann, Diaries, p. 111. 
 33  Stresemann, Aufzeichnung, 10 Sept 1923, Nr. 136, ADAP VIII, pp. 350-53. 
Stresemann’s plan was very similar to the Dawes Plan.  It is very unlikely that Poincaré was 
interested in an international loan since this would have meant negotiation with international 
bankers which, considering his experience in summer of 1922, was not an attractive 
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 Poincaré was unlikely to accept his offer but hoped to find out what would satisfy Poincaré, 
for future negotiations.  Von Schubert felt that capitulation was inevitable; the difficulty for 
Germany was the uncertainty of what would happen afterward: “If only we knew that the 
giving up of resistance would lead to lighting the occupation of the Rhineland and the Ruhr 
and the certainty that we would then enter into intensive negotiations.”34    
 Germany’s frustration and fury at what it felt was abandonment was apparent in the tone 
of diplomatic conversations.  On 8 September, when meeting with Chairman of the House 
Committee on Foreign Relations Stephen G. Porter, who was visiting from America, 
Stresemann delivered a harangue on American lack of action in which he expressed the view 
that the United States bore the greatest share of guilt for the present conditions in Germany.  
Stresemann recalled that at the time of the armistice Germany had not made an unconditional 
surrender and had been betrayed by Wilson at Versailles.  He condemned the United States 
for leaving Europe “to stew in its own juice” but also explained that he was not referring to 
technical responsibility, but rather moral responsibility. 
 When Porter pointed out that Hughes’s New Haven speech had been passed over by the 
Allies and therefore there was nothing more the United States could do, Stresemann argued 
that the United States had not done her full duty by making a proposal and then relapsing into 
passivity upon its rejection, adding that America’s moral obligation was to ensure the 
proposal’s adoption.  Stresemann then exploited what he believed was the American great 
fear by asserting that a U.S. statement of interest in the proper settlement of the reparations 
problem would nullify reactionary and communist (i.e., Bolshevik) dangers.  These 
comments reflected not only the pervasive German belief that it was only the powerful  
                                                                                                                                                       
proposition and would limit his freedom of action. 
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 United States that could save Germany and German resentment that the U.S. had failed to do 
so, but also a tendency to castigate the United States with one breath and plead for help with 
the next.35  
  
Delaying the Inevitable 
 On 15 September the German cabinet agreed to delay the decision to abandon passive 
resistance until after the meeting of Poincaré and Baldwin that was to take place in Paris on 
19 September.  In preparation, Stresemann would begin a flurry of diplomatic activity in 
hopes of obtaining at least some concessions for abandoning passive resistance and thereby 
avoid the appearance of total capitulation.36  Also on 15 September, Sthamer met with 
Tyrrell and asked if it would be safe for his government to call off passive resistance; he also 
wanted to know if the British were satisfied that the French were not bent on the 
dismemberment of Germany.  Tyrrell replied that Poincaré had declared to the world that he 
                                                                                                                                                       
 34  Schubert to Hoesch, 12 Sept 1923, Nr. 142, ADAP VIII, pp. 370-71.  
 35 Houghton to Hughes, 8 Sept 1923, Houghton Papers.  Germany also succeeded in 
infuriating the British foreign office.  On 12 September, the German Chargé d’ Affaires, 
Alfred Feronce-DuFour, read to a British foreign officer extracts from two letters from von 
Schubert in which he condemned the “silence and inaction” of England as “stultifying” the 
policy that von Schubert had pursued with Britain, which apparently proved that those in 
Germany who had always maintained nothing could be expected of Britain were correct and 
that by placing his hopes in Britain, Schubert had “backed the wrong horse.”  When he 
became aware of this incident, Tyrrell indignantly complained to Sthamer, but made it clear 
he blamed von Schubert not Dufour.  He also told Sthamer that when he found out that von 
Schubert had been appointed head of the English section, he had “regretted it exceedingly, as 
I did not think he was a fit and proper person for such a post.”  When Sthamer wisely made 
no comment, Tyrrell inferred that Sthamer agreed with his assessment and went on to say 
that he hoped the incident would lead to Schubert’s removal.  Record by Sir W. Tyrrell of a 
Conversation with the German Ambassador, 15 Sept 1923, no. 363, DPFP XXI, pp. 325-26.  
 36 Kabinettssitzung mit dem Preussischen Staatsministerium, 15 Sept 1923, Nr. 59, Die 
Kabinette Stresemann I, pp. 273-84. 
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 had no political aims.  Tyrrell also denied that Britain was concerned that German 
capitulation would result in French economic hegemony, since the other Allies would not 
allow it. 
 Sthamer then suggested that it would be easier for his government to come to terms with 
the French over the Ruhr if Britain consented to act as a mediator between the two parties, 
since it would be easier for Germany politically to back down, and would deflect full 
responsibility for ending passive resistance from the Stresemann government, if it were done 
on the advice of England.  Tyrrell sidestepped this request by pointing out that Poincaré 
would not accept mediation and that Britain would be exposed to further rebuff if it made 
such a suggestion, and then reinforced his arguments for the ending of passive resistance by 
reminding Sthamer that Germany had to choose between surrender to France or certain 
chaos.  In his minutes of Tyrrell’s report, Curzon wrote, “I approve of everything he said.  
Our business is to stand aside at the present moment.”37  
 Seeking the aid of Belgium, Stresemann met with its ambassador on 16 September and 
                                                 
 37 Record by Sir W. Tyrrell of a Conversation with the German Ambassador, 15 Sept 
1923, no. 363, DBFP XXI, pp. 525-26 and n. 3.  In Berlin, Stresemann warned D’Abernon 
on 18 September that Germany was in the position of having to end both passive resistance 
and financial assistance to the occupied territories, in which case Belgium and France would 
have to assume responsibility for provisioning the district.  Germany would then consider the 
Treaties of Versailles and Berlin invalidated, and in view of the loss of the Ruhr and the 
Rhineland, would have to refuse any further fulfillment of them.  D’Abernon asked whether 
Stresemann was saying that the Treaty of Versailles was already broken.  Stresemann replied 
that he was not, but repeated that Germany would not be able not carry out its terms under 
such conditions.  Stresemann’s threat to D’Aberdon was no doubt intended in influence the 
British in their discussions with Poincaré, but the effort failed. The Foreign Office, which 
still expected that British and French negotiations over reparations would follow the ending 
of passive resistance, stated in minutes of D’Abernon’s report that it would not be wise to 
intervene between France and Germany: “What Germany must do is to abandon passive 
resistance and then offer the Allies jointly some adequate guarantees which there is some 
reasonable chance of the allies accepting.”  The Foreign Office expected that the French 
would then be much more likely to modify conditions.  Stresemann, Diaries, pp. 124-25; 
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 pointed out that if German authority were returned to the Ruhr and the general pledges 
accepted, Belgium could receive reparation payments in 1924.  Stresemann’s real purpose, 
however, was to use Belgium as a check on French designs of creating an autonomous 
Rhineland state after Germany gave up passive resistance.  He insisted that Germany would 
never agree to the establishment of such a state as a solution to the Ruhr problem, because it 
would set up another Bavaria rather than a peaceful democratic state, all of which would 
have a terrible effect on the rest of Germany.  The Belgian ambassador agreed, noting that 
such a state would not be in Belgium’s security interest.38  Stresemann then met with 
Margerie on 17 September, only to be told decisively that Poincaré would not negotiate until 
passive resistance was totally abandoned and also, with some embarrassment but under 
instructions from Poincaré, that Margerie would not accept any written communication.39    
 Von Maltzan notified the German embassies in London and Rome that Belgium and 
France were refusing any negotiation and that Germany was asking for at least some 
informal, unofficial understanding that there would be a lightening of the occupation which 
would relieve some of the extreme domestic political pressure.  Realizing neither London nor 
Rome would take any initiative on Germany’s behalf, the embassies were not instructed not 
to ask for any action; the missives were only to let them know how France and Belgium were 
behaving in response to Germany’s request.  All Germany could do was to try to shift public 
                                                                                                                                                       
D’Abernon to Curzon, 18 Sept 1923, no. 365, DBFP XXI, p. 528, n. 4. 
 38 Stresemann, Aufzeichnung, 16 Sept. 1923, Nr. 149, ADAP VIII, pp. 383-86; 
Besprechung des Reichskanzlers mit dem belgischen Gesandten, 16 Sept 1923, Nr. 61, Die 
Kabinette Stresemann, pp. 290-94. Von Matlzan met with the Belgian ambassador to 
reinforce the message the next day.  Maltzan, Aufzeichnung, 17 Sept 1923, Nr. 150, ADAP 
VIII, pp. 386-87. 
 39 Stresemann, Aufzeichung, 18 Sept 1923, Nr. 152, ADAP VIII, p. 392; Unterredung mit 
dem französichen Botschafter, 17 Sept 1923, Nr. 62, Die Kabinette Stresemann, pp. 294-95. 
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 opinion in its favor, hoping it might check Poincaré once passive resistance was ended.40   
 German efforts to change opinion did find some success in Washington.  Houghton 
warned Castle that, with the approaching end of passive resistance, the situation in Germany 
was explosive and that he feared for Stresemann’s life, noting that he already had been shot 
at but that the news had been suppressed.  Stresemann was also worried that France would 
turn the Rhineland into a buffer state, as well as about the increase in Bavarian separatist 
sentiment.  Houghton noted that Stresemann planned to merely announce the inability of the 
government to further finance resistance in the Ruhr and the Rhineland, but anticipated that 
Poincaré “would no doubt demand a formal surrender.”41
   Castle wrote Houghton that Stresemann’s offer to end passive resistance if France agreed 
gradually to withdraw troops “was just about as liberal a proposition as could have been 
made by any prime minister who did not expect promptly to fall.”  He also noted that his 
opinion of Stresemann was changing: “I had great doubts of Stresemann, possibly because I 
thought of him merely as an orator and because I liked and trusted Cuno.  I am beginning to 
wonder whether Stresemann may not be a very much better man for the place than Cuno 
from the very fact that he is a politician, practical and able to carry people along with him--
that Cuno could never do.” 
 Castle, who consistently held the opinion that Germany deserved “rigid justice” when it 
came to reparations and who agreed with the idea that “the German people should have to 
stagger along under a heavy load of debt for many years to come,” nevertheless felt that there 
was “a point beyond which Stresemann cannot go.”  He wrote Houghton, “I hope that France 
                                                 
 40 Von Maltzan to London and Rome, 18 Sept 1923, Nr. 153, ADAP VIII, pp. 393-95. 
 41 Houghton to Castle, 18 Sept 1923, Houghton Papers. 
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 will not force him to overstep that limit.”  While Castle continued to have little sympathy for 
Germany as a nation or as a people, his changed attitude toward the French -German struggle 
foreshadowed a softening in American opinion.42
 
The Meeting of Baldwin and Poincaré and the End of Passive Resistance 
 In an attempt to reconcile the differences within the Entente regarding Germany, Baldwin 
agreed to a meeting requested by Poincaré to attempt to establish a common policy, which 
took place on 19 September at the British Embassy in Paris.  In their discussion, Baldwin 
warned Poincaré that British opinion was moving against France; the Labor and Liberal 
Parties were taking a line that, if not pro-German was surely anti-French, a feeling that 
existed to some extent among Conservatives as well.  There was also a feeling that France 
had recognized neither Britain’s concessions about inter-Allied debts to help secure a 
settlement nor that the occupation itself, by dissipating German assets, was making a 
settlement more difficult.  As Baldwin noted, “English temperament was peculiar in certain 
respects and doubtless difficult to French understanding; but the average Englishman pre-
eminently disliked the military occupation of a civilian district; it antagonized and roused 
him.”  
 Baldwin told Poincaré that no British government would be able to fully cooperate “in 
order to make the Entente what it ought to be as long as the military character of the 
occupation of the Ruhr remained unchanged,” and pressed Poincaré for his thoughts about 
                                                 
 42 Castle to Houghton, 18 Sept 1923, file 52, Castle Papers. For the time being, American 
public opinion remained split.  Diekhoff reported that the reporting on the abandonment of 
passive resistance ranged from the New York Times, which heralded Stresemann as “a man 
with fibre and strength enough to do what has to be done,” to the New York Tribune which 
celebrated the victory of Poincaré.  Diekhoff to AA, 26 Sept 1923, Nr. 324, D618950, Büro 
 294 
 currency stabilization, a possible moratorium, and a rate of payment after the end of passive 
resistance.  Without answers, Baldwin doubted he could influence public opinion and 
predicted grave results.  Poincaré replied that he, like Britain, also had to follow public 
opinion and, resorting to rhetorical hyperbole, estimated that his Ruhr policy was approved 
by 99% of the French population. He stated that the military occupation was necessitated  by 
German resistance to the occupation.  Stresemann, who had sought the failure of the 
occupation through passive resistance, would now “reap the harvest himself.” for bring about 
its inevitable end.  In addition, Poincaré warned that if Baldwin wanted to continue the 
“useful interchange of personal views” it was essential that “no alien factor should be 
allowed to intervene” and that France would not tolerate a discussion at the League of  
Nations.  Poincaré then assured Baldwin that as soon as passive resistance had ended he 
would welcome the prospect of further consultation, either with ambassadors or in personal 
conversation, from which Baldwin inferred that Poincaré had formulated no immediate 
plans.43  
 At the end of the meeting a press communiqué was issued, stating that the French and 
British prime ministers “had been happy to establish an agreement of views and to discover 
that on no questions is there any difference of purpose or divergence of principle which could 
impair the co-operation of the two countries.  This press release smoothed over a growing 
divergence on issues ”44   Once it had been announced to the press that the two governments 
                                                                                                                                                       
RM-USA, Bd. 3, p. 74. 
 43  Note on conversation between Mr. Baldwin and M. Poincaré, 19 Sept 1923, no. 367, 
BDFP XXI, pp. 529-34. 
 44  For those in Britain who favored a policy of intervention, the communiqué was a 
disaster.  D’Abernon noted that what was meant as an “innocuous communiqué” led to a 
false interpretation of British policy and as a result “we lost influence in determining Anglo-
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 were in agreement regarding Germany, Stresemann was convinced that any further delay in 
giving up passive resistance in favor of further attempts at negotiations would be futile and 
Germany should begin to prepare for ending passive resistance.45  Unfortunately, the 
communiqué mischaracterized the discussion, during which sharp differences had emerged 
between Britain and France.  Although these differences would eventually result in a 
renewed British effort to engage the United States, it is doubtful that Germany could have 
held out until then, given France’s intransigence. 
 The Stresemann cabinet began to prepare the nation for the end of passive resistance on  
24 September by meeting party representatives and delegates from the occupied areas to 
explain the financial situation of the Reich and the impossibility of obtaining concessions 
from France;  continuing passive resistance offered no advantage.  With the exception of the 
Nationalists, the parties supported the decision.  Stresemann then met with the 
representatives of the industrial groups, including Stinnes, and achieved an agreement to 
abandon passive resistance.  However, Karl Jarres, mayor of Duisburg and leader of the 
DVP’s right-wing faction, argued that the government should openly declare itself no longer 
bound by the Versailles treaty.  Stresemann refused, arguing that this would mean 
                                                                                                                                                       
French policy and became subordinate to our Ally.”  D’Abernon, An Ambassador of Peace 
vol. II, p. 261.  Reflecting on the event in a later diary entry, D’Abernon noted, “It might be 
wise to apply to English Prime Ministers the rules governing the peregrinations of a Lord 
Chancellor and forbid them leaving England.” Ibid., pp. 284-85.  According to Harold 
Nicolson’s account, Curzon, reading the communique from his sickbed, was aghast.  He took 
it as a repudiation by his own prime minister of his policy of neutrality between Germany 
and France, an opinion Nicholson regarded as unjustified.  Baldwin had told Curzon in 
advance that the point of his trip was to impress upon the French government that there were 
no longer two foreign policies in London, but only one.  That the communique gave just the 
opposite impression was in Nicholson’s view not the fault of Baldwin, who was not present 
when it was drafted.  Harold Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925 (London: 
Constable and Company LTD, 1934), p. 372-73.  Baldwin, however, can be faulted for 
allowing a crucial communiqué to be drafted and released without his review and approval. 
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 abandoning the population of the occupied territory to its fate and sacrificing the unity of the 
Reich, an unacceptable option to the cabinet.46  
 With no realistic options left, on 26 September the government issued a proclamation to 
the German people announcing the ending of passive resistance, praising the heroic sacrifices 
of the occupied population and acknowledging that it was now calling for an even greater 
sacrifice, yet also assuring the nation that German sovereignty would be preserved and 
promising to work for the return of the expelled and amnesty for those arrested.  A separate 
decree canceled all the regulations and ordinances that had been promulgated in support of 
passive resistance.  At the same time, a state of emergency and a suspension of constitutional 
guarantees were declared throughout the Reich.47  On 27 September, the official 
announcement was made to the ambassadors of France, Belgium, Italy, Great Britain, Japan 
and the United States.48
 
The Reverberations from the German Domestic Crisis   
 The Bavarian state government, opposed to ending passive resistance and fearful that 
                                                                                                                                                       
 45 Kabinettssitzung, 20 Sept 1923, Nr. 71, Die Kabinette Stresemann I, pp. 320-24. 
 46 Besprechung mit Vertretern der 5 Parteien und Vertretern des besetzten Gebiets and 
Besprechung mit Vertretern der Wirtschaftsverbände, 24 Sept 1923, Nr. 76 and Nr. 77, Die 
Kabinette Stresemann, pp. 334-45. The Cabinet met the next day with the Minister Presidents 
of the German States and the party leaders. The DNVP wanted to continue passive resistance 
with vigor.  The Bavarian Premier, Eugen von Knilling, recognized the abandonment was for 
financial reasons but felt French actions were such outrages to justice and breaches of the 
Versailles treaty that the treaty could no longer be considered binding.  Besprechung mit den 
Ministerpräsidenten, 25 Sept 1923, Die Kabinette Stresemann, pp. 349-56. 
 47 Aufruf der Reichsregierung zum Abbruch des passiven Widerstandes, 26 Sept 1923, 
Nr. 1079, Ursachen und Folgen V, pp. 203-4. 
 48 Von Maltzan, Runderlass, 27 Sept 1923, ADAP VIII, p. 422. 
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 Stresemann might accept any terms the French might present, possibly setting off violent 
reactions within Bavaria itself, appointed Gustav von Kahr as Generalstaatskommissar with 
dictatorial powers.49   Anxiety was also growing within the Bavarian government about 
possible communist influence in border-state governments.  Of particular concern was Adolf 
Hitler’s National Socialist movement, then taking the lead among the radical right and racist 
organizations assembled in Bavaria.  It was in response to the challenge from Bavaria, among 
other threats to its authority, that the Stresemann’s cabinet declared a state of emergency.50  
 A dispute with the SPD over changes to the eight-hour day led to a cabinet crisis; on 3 
October the cabinet resigned. When efforts to form a new cabinet without the SPD 
deadlocked, Stresemann briefly considered forming a cabinet of talents.  Wiedfeldt, then 
visiting Germany, was considered for finance minister but was passed over since his absence 
had prevented him from becoming intimately familiar with the country’s financial problems. 
The cabinet crisis was resolved when the SPD agreed to legislation retaining the eight-hour 
                                                 
 49 Die Kabinette Stresemann II, pp. 281-83; Kabinettssitzung mit dem Preussischen 
Staatsministerium, 15 Sept 1923, Nr. 59; Der Vertreter der Reichsregierung in München an 
die Reichskanzlei, 27 Sept 1923, Nr. 84, Ibid., pp. 387-89; Der Vertreter der Reichsregierung 
in München an die Reichskanzlei, 28 Sept 1923, Nr. 87, Ibid., pp. 393-96. 
 50 The Federal Government in Berlin interpreting events in Bavaria as threats to its 
authority, reacted by appointing Defense Minister Otto Gessler as federal “dictator” 
outranking the Bavarian “dictator.”  Matters came to a head over the National Socialist 
newspaper, the Völkische Beobachter, which had been publishing attacks on the government 
in general and General von Seeckt in particular.  When the Reich government ordered a ban 
on the paper, Otto von Lossow, commander of the Bavarian Reichswehr, refused to enforce 
it. The matter then then became a much more serious contest over whether the Bavarian 
government had the right to retain its military district commander against Berlin’s demands 
for his dismissal.  Meanwhile, the dispute provided cover for right-wing extremists, most 
notably the Nazi movement, to plot against both the Berlin and Bavarian governments. 
General Seeckt to General Lossow, 9 Oct 1923, Dok. 31, Ibid., p. 205; Knilling to 
Stresemann, 12 Oct 1923, Dok. 37, Ibid., pp. 210-13; Der Vertreter der Reichsregierung in 
München to Reichskanzlei, 21 Oct 1923, Nr. 161, Ibid., pp. 683-85. 
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 day as a norm but allowing for exceptions in the national interest.51    
 Germany’s ability to conduct diplomacy was hampered by a series of domestic crises that 
interacted with foreign affairs; lack of success in diplomacy led to domestic crises, which in 
turn made diplomacy more difficult.  On 30 September, with French support, the first 
separatist demonstrations took place in Düsseldorf.  On 1 October, an abortive mutiny of the 
“Black Reichswehr,” the so-called Küstrin Putsch, occured in response to the giving up of 
passive resistance.52  From the other end of the political spectrum, there was a serious threat 
of communist uprisings.  With Moscow’s approval, the German Communist Party hoped to 
exploit the deteriorating situation to launch a revolution within Germany, and   Baden 
actually experienced a minor communist uprising in late September.  The fact that 
Communists entered into the coalition governments in Saxony and Thuringia further 
aggravated tensions with conservative Bavaria.53   
 On the eve of the end of passive resistance, Houghton’s anxieties were heightened by a 
visit from Stinnes, who informed him that Germany was heading toward a dictatorship 
                                                 
 51 Stresemann, Diaries, pp. 135-45; Besprechung mit Parteiführern, Nr. 99 and 100, 2 Oct 
1923, pp. 436-45; Kabinettssitzung, 2 Oct 1923, Nr. 102, pp. 447-52;  Kabinettssitung, 3 Oct 
1923, Nr. 104, 105, 106, pp. 454-62. Wiedfeldt was relieved not to have been offered the 
finance ministry, a relief shared by the Auswärtige Amt since Wiedfeldt had told them that 
his first official act would be to cut their budget in half.  Schubert to Wiedfeldt, 31 Oct 1923, 
R28041 Büro RM-Personalfragen Bd. 4, K170783, p. 86.  
 52  Elements of the Black Reichswehr, a group of short-term volunteers illegally trained 
to provide a reserve for the Reichswehr, attempted to seize the fortress at Küstrin as a signal 
for a rightist revolt.  See Bruno Buchrucker, Im Schatten Seeckts: Die Geschichte der 
“Schwarzen Reichswehr” (Berlin: Kampf Verlag, 1928).   
 53 Ruth Fischer, Stalin and German Communism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1948), pp. 335-42. For detailed discussion of the plans for an October revolution, see Werner 
T. Angress, Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid for Power in Germany, 1921-1923 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 378-474 and Otto Wenzel, 1923: Die 
Gescheiterte Deutsche Oktoberrevolution (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2003), especially pp. 175-
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 replacing parliamentary government.  Stinnes predicted that a royalist movement in Bavaria 
would be joined by all the parties of the right, who would be supported by the industrialists.  
This would lead to a fight with the Communists, who would attempt to start a revolutionary 
outbreak.  Ebert would then name either an individual or a three-man committee as dictator 
and the military would quell the uprising. 
 Stinnes, expecting communist agitation to begin in Thuringia and Saxony, was concerned 
that the right would take precipitous action but wanted the Communists to make the first 
move so that world opinion would not be automatically prejudiced against the new 
government.  Stinnes expected all this to begin in mid-October, but a puzzled Houghton 
wrote, “I am completely at a loss to know how seriously to take Stinnes’ statement.”  
Houghton did think, however, that if industrialists were determined to give financial and 
organizational support to the right-wing parties, “a very serious crisis may be impending.”54   
Houghton had good reason to be puzzled, since Stinnes’s own allegiance was not at all clear, 
and also had reason to be concerned about German-American relations; if there was one 
group of Germans disliked and distrusted by the State Department, it was right-wing 
industrialists and Stinnes in particular. 
 Although the crisis was resolved constitutionally, both President Ebert and General von 
Seeckt, Chief of Army Command of the German Reichswehr, were very worried that 
following the defection of the SPD from the cabinet, Stresemann’s minority government 
would not have enough authority to govern effectively.  While Wiedfeldt was in Berlin in 
early October to discuss the construction of the new cabinet and the outlook for a commercial 
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 54 Houghton to Hughes, 21 Sept 1923. Cited in George Hallgarten, Hitler, Reichswehr 
und Industrie (Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1955), pp. 65-66. 
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 treaty with the United States, he met with von Seeckt to discuss Germany’s domestic and 
foreign crises.55   Von Seeckt suggested the possibility of forming a directorate with 
dictatorial powers under Article 48 of the German constitution, which gave the president the 
right to invoke emergency powers to suspend the constitution.  The proposed directorate 
would be headed by Wiedfeldt as President Ebert’s trusted man, since he was wary of 
establishing a dictatorship and regarded it as a last resort.56  Wiedfeldt’s participation would 
guarantee that the directorate would not move to destroy the constitution and also help gain 
American acceptance, perhaps even support.57
 Ebert was correct in his assessment of Wiedfeldt, with whom he had a long working 
relationship.  The ambassador, unenthused by Stinnes’s version of the planned directorate, 
told him that a dictatorship would be impossible unless German opinion was solidly behind it 
and that he, Wiedfeldt, did not want the job in any case.  If forced to take the position, 
                                                 
 55 Wiedfeldt met with von Seeckt on 2 October. Schröder, “Otto Wiedfeldt als Politiker 
und Botschafter der Weimarer Republik,” p. 219. 
 56 The directorate would comprise Wiedfeldt, Friedrich Minoux, General Director of the 
Berlin section of the Stinnes concern, and General von Seeckt. Von Seeckt, as head of the 
Reichswehr, thought it inappropriate that he himself head this directorate lest it be perceived 
as a military dictatorship. Friedrich von Rabenau, Seekt: Aus seinem Leben 1918-1936, 
(Leipzig: v.Hase & Koehler Verlag, 1940), p. 370; von Seeckt to von Kahr, 2 Nov 1923, 
reprinted in Die Kabinette Stresemann II, Anhang Nr. 4, p. 1211-15; Schröder, Otto 
Wiedfeldt, p. 142-43. 
 57 Ebert’s fears were confirmed by Stinnes’s ideas about the role and purpose of the 
dictatorship, which amounted to a reversal of the substantive gains won by German labor in 
the 1918 revolution.  In his meeting with Houghton, seeking American approval for his 
plans, Stinnes emphasized the need to establish a dictatorship in order to re-impose the 10- 
hour day, increase productivity, and move decisively against the Communists.  Furthermore, 
Stinnes told Houghton that if all went according to plan, “Socialism as a politically possible 
method of national existence in Germany will it is hoped be thus definitely eliminated and 
the laws and enactments which hamper production and serve no useful purpose will be 
forthwith repealed.” Houghton to Hughes, 21 Sept 1923, quoted in Hallgarten, Hitler, 
Reichswehr und Industrie, pp. 65-66. For the role of Stinnes in the directorate plans, see 
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 Wiedfeldt assured Stinnes that his first attempt to unite Germany would be to “promptly to 
put him in jail.” According to Wiedfeldt, Stinnes then dropped the matter of a dictatorship.58
 Immediately after giving up passive resistance, Stresemann turned to Britain for help and 
advice.59  He was informed by Curzon that Germany should make “the surrender sincere, 
unconditional and complete” as it had been “beaten by the bigger battalions of Poincaré,”  
and advised that Germany wait for Allied negotiations to be held on what really mattered, 
which was reparations.60   Next, Stresseman attempted to negotiate with Poincaré a means to 
restart the economy of the Ruhr and maintain German authority.  But when Hoesch met with 
Poincaré on 10 and 17 October, Poincaré refused negotiations, stating that he would only 
parley with local industrialists and officials and thereby raising German concerns that 
Poincaré was attempting to make Stresemann’s position in the occupied regions untenable 
and to break off the occupied regions from Germany.61  
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 58 Castle to Houghton, 2 Nov 1923, file 52, Castle Papers.  Castle noted that he believed 
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 59 Stresemann, Diaries, p. 137; D’Abernon to Curzon, 27 Sept 1923, no. 373, BDFP XXI, 
pp. 540-41. 
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Hoesch to AA, 10 Oct. 1923, Nr. 186, ADAP VIII, pp. 471-73; Hoesch to AA, 13 Oct. 1923, 
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  By 6 October, General Degoutte had already reached a preliminary agreement with Otto 
Wolff and Stinnes had begun negotiations with France.  Stresemann told Wolff his initiative 
had seriously undermined the government’s foreign and domestic authority; however, if he 
was to prevent economic collapse in the Ruhr, Stresemann had little choice but to allow 
negotiations between the Ruhr industrialists and France.  Nonetheless, he sought to do so in a 
way that preserved sovereignty.  France made significant financial demands on the 
industrialists, who in turn demanded financial help from the Reich.62  This posed a major 
dilemma for Stresemann, who was in the process of establishing a new currency that would 
halt the ever-increasing inflation threatening to bring down the economy.63   
 On 20 October, a major cabinet debate over the fate of the occupied territories. A 
decision not to fund the industrialists, because the reparation and coal-tax payments 
demanded by France would stabilize the currency in unoccupied Germany but would also 
spell economic disaster and possibly drive governments in the occupied territories to 
independent negotiation, which would put them all at the mercy of France.  Some cabinet 
                                                                                                                                                       
Nr. 188, ADAP VIII, pp. 477-81; Hoesch to AA, 17 Oct. 1923, Nr. 193, ADAP VIII, pp. 
499-502; Kabinettssitzung, 11 Oct. 1923, Nr.128, Die Kabinette Stresemann II, pp. 545-50; 
Stresemann, Diaries, pp. 154-59. 
 62 In a letter to Stinnes on 12 October, Stresseman stated that he had no choice but to 
permit the freedom to negotiate economic agreements, as long as the results did not abridge 
sovereignty.  Nr. 131, Die Kabinette Stresemann II, pp. 560-62.  Stresemann, however, 
refused to concede to mine owners’ demands for government credits of 150-200 million gold 
marks, reimbursement for both the cost of the coal that France was demanding as reparations, 
the taxes on coal also demanded by France.  Besprechung über Verhandlungen der Phönix- 
und Rheinstahlgruppe, Nr. 123, Die Kabinette Stresemann II, pp. 520-22; Kabinettssitzung, 
10 Oct 1923, Nr. 125, Die Kabinette Stresemann II, pp. 528-34. 
 63 On 15 October, the cabinet decided to establish a new currency, the Rentenmark, based 
on mortgages of agricultural land and industrial assets which would halt inflation. In 
addition, tax payments would have to be paid on a gold basis.  These moves promised to end 
the inflation that was crippling Germany.  Kabinettssitzung, 15 Oct 1923, Nr. 136, Die 
Kabinette Stresemann II, pp. 570-82; Feldman, The Great Disorder, pp. 751-53. 
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 members doubted that it was possible to hold on to the occupied territories and felt that the 
Reich was the first priority.  Stresemann, however, insisted that the integrity of all of 
Germany had to be preserved.  In the end a compromise was reached by which the 
industrialists would bear the immediate costs but later be reimbursed by the government.64 
The government also decided to increase world attention to Germany’s plight, notify the 
Reparation Commission of Germany’s inability to pay, and, under its rights in the Versailles 
treaty, request an examination of its capacity to pay.65  
 Britain had initially expected the German ending of passive resistance would lead to 
French lightening the occupation and a beginning of negotiations between France and Britain 
about reparations.  But British concerns rose as Poincaré moved to tighten his hold over the 
Ruhr and the Rhineland, particularly when French dumping of German coal, iron, and steel 
on the market at below-market prices began to affect employment in Britain.  Curzon notified 
Poincaré, “It is impossible to exaggerate the danger to the Entente and the effect of the 
attitude of the people of this country towards France.”66  Attempts by France to extend the 
Régie and enforcement of French regulations in the British zone lead to further disputes.67  
 
The Shift in American Opinion 
 By October, following the end of passive resistance, public opinion in the United States 
                                                 
 64 Kabinettssitung, 20 Oct 1923, Nr. 156, Die Kabinette Stresemann II, pp. 662-72. 
 65 Stresemann to Paris, 19 Oct 1923, Nr. 195, ADAP VIII, pp. 506-8. 
 66 Curzon to Crewe, 15 Oct 1923, no. 394, DBFP XXI, pp. 565-66. 
 67 Memorandum on Lord Kilmarnock telegrams, 15 Oct 1924, no. 395, DBFP XXI, pp. 
566-68; Record by Sir E. Crowe of a Conversation with the French Ambassador, 19 Oct 
1923, no. 404, DBFP XXI, pp. 576-77. 
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 began to shift in favor of Germany.  Lloyd George, on a tour of the United States and 
Canada, publicly urged that the United States should actively intervene in the Ruhr conflict 
and lamented the failure of the Europeans to take up Hughes’s New Haven proposal.68    In 
London, Baldwin and Curzon decided to override the opposition of pro-French Conservative 
cabinet members and force Poincaré into negotiations.  Taking advantage of the opening of 
the Imperial Conference, Curzon gave a speech on 5 October stating that since Germany had 
ended passive resistance, it was the responsibility of France to submit its views as to how the 
reparation crisis should be addressed and that Britain was waiting for this response.  The 
speech was an effort to force Poincaré out into the open as to “real plans and intentions”;  any 
reply from him would “set the ball rolling.”  Britain was willing to accept the breakdown of a 
conference, but what  to be avoided was “partial or temporary compromises which do 
nothing but reproduce the situation as it was before.”69  
 The Coolidge administration was also being pressured by a growing chorus of groups, 
including not only those with a special interests in Germany but also those more generally  
concerned about European stabilization and prosperity.  Fred Kent of the Banker’s Trust 
Company was particularly active in attempting to arouse American support for a United 
States intervention, including a reduction in war debts.  Kent’s efforts were privately 
                                                 
 68 New York Times, 6 Oct 1923, p. 1. 
 69  Crewe to Curzon, 4 Oct 1923, no. 386, DBFP XXI, pp. 557-58, n. 1; O’Riordan, 
Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, pp. 126-27.  Stresemann hoped to influence British policy by 
working through Jan Smuts, Premier of South Africa at the Imperial Conference.  Smuts used 
his speeches at the Imperial Conference to call for an international conference of experts and 
asked Britain to lower its reparation demands on Germany by giving up war pensions costs. 
Stresemann to Smuts, 29 Oct. 1923, Nr. 200, Die Kabinette Stresemann II, pp. 894-95. 
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 supported and encouraged by Houghton.70
 Finding it necessary to respond, on 9 October the White House issued a statement that 
“President Coolidge, like President Harding, was in accord with the proposal advanced by 
Secretary Hughes”; however, the statement also noted that Coolidge questioned whether 
France was ready to become involved.71  The new Coolidge administration did not want to 
go into the 1924 elections faced with the charge that American inaction had allowed Europe 
to fall into chaos, yet the American initiative had no guarantee of success.  It opened the 
door, but was dependent upon France to accept the American offer.   It would be up to 
Hughes and the British to apply sufficient pressure to achieve French acceptance.   
 On 11 and 12 October, former Chancellor Cuno, who was touring the United States, had 
the opportunity to meet with Hughes, Mellon, Hoover and Borah.  All expressed appreciation 
of Germany’s position but felt, given the intransigence of France, that it was difficult for 
America to help.  Hughes was more forthcoming than he had been in the past, stating that he 
would like to help, but France made it difficult.  He stressed that Germany had to hold 
together; if the Reich disintegrated there would be no possibility of help.  Coolidge, whom 
                                                 
 70 For a discussion of Kent’s activities in the summer and autumn of 1923 see Rupieper, 
The Cuno Government, pp. 244-45.  Rupieper argues that Kent’s campaign to mobilize 
public opinion for American intervention was a significant influence on Hughes’s decision to 
intervene.  For Houghton’s encouragement of Kent, see Houghton to Kent, 31 Jul and 21 Dec 
1923, Houghton Papers.  Prior to his 26 September speech to American Bankers Association 
calling for a partial cancellation of war debts, Kent discussed with Houghton the need to 
address the issue from the French point of view if his ideas were to have any hope of success.  
Kent to Houghton, 20 Sept 1923, Houghton Papers.  For an example of noting the importance 
of Germany to American interests see New York Times, 10 Oct 1923, p. 1, reporting that 
Germany was a major purchaser of American copper and cotton.  On 15 October Senator 
Reed Smoot, Chairman of the Senate Finance, committee urged the White House to 
immediately implement the Hughes proposal because of the deteriorating situation in Europe. 
Kent, Spoils of War, p. 229. 
 71 New York Times, 10 Oct 1923, pp. 1-2. 
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 Dieckhoff found more intelligent and informed about German matters than Harding had 
been, expressed a desire to help, but stated frankly that England had more of an interest in the 
issue than the United States.  Coolidge felt that one could not expect anything out of an 
economic conference.  In Coolidge’s view, it was England’s task since it was first in line to 
find a solution to the reparation problem.  If England could not accomplish that, he did not 
see what chance America had.72  
 Britain was quick to seize the opportunity that Coolidge’s 9 October statement had 
provided.  On 13 October Britain’s Washington chargé, Henry Chilton, met with Hughes to 
forcibly impress upon him the British views that the cooperation of the United States was 
essential for a European settlement and that Europe’s problems represented a direct and vital 
interest to the United States, “if for no other reason because the question of inter-allied debt 
is involved therein.”  Chilton conveyed the two alternatives offered by Britain, an inquiry 
sponsored by a conference of the European powers, which it favored, or an inquiry sponsored 
by the Reparations Commission.  Chilton also asked whether the United States would be 
willing to proceed in the absence of France.73
 Hughes, vehemently objecting to British linkage between war debts and reparations, 
reiterated the fundamental American position that the two were separate issues.  Although he 
emphasized once again that the United States government and the people of the United States 
did not support cancellation of debts to the Allies or the United States, or the transfer of the 
burden of Germany’s obligation to the United States, directly or indirectly, he did hold out 
the possibility of reasonable settlements, if Europe made serious reductions in military 
                                                 
 72 Dieckhoff to AA, 13 Oct 1923, Nr. 189, ADAP VIII, pp. 482-84. 
 73 Chilton to Hughes, Aide-Mémoire, 13 Oct 1923, FRUS 1923 II, pp. 68-70. 
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 outlays and worked together to achieve peace and justice.74  In any case, the Europeans 
would have to find a solution to the reparation problem that did not involve a reduction in the 
war debts owed to the United States. 
 Hughes favored an inquiry by experts appointed by the Reparation Commission, 
undoubtedly recognizing that this plan had the best chance of French acceptance.   He told 
Chilton that he could not give him any definite reply regarding the British proposal before 
consulting the president and the cabinet and that the British initiative had to be kept 
confidential until then, but that personally he hoped “something would come of it” and had 
already warned the French ambassador that France “should renounce her obdurate attitude 
and come into line with the other powers.”  Hughes’s position remained that a settlement 
could not be achieved without the concurrence of all the “European powers directly 
concerned.”  He also noted that it “would manifestly be extremely difficult to formulate 
financial plans of such importance and complexity without the participation of those whose 
assent is necessary to their fulfillment.” 
 Hughes was unwilling to say much about how the American-French relationship might 
change if unanimity could not be achieved, but if it could not, the United States would take 
the course “which will give the best promise of ultimate success in securing the desired end 
of re-establishing the essential conditions of European peace and economic restoration.  To 
that end the United States would lend its assistance in any manner found feasible.”  Hughes 
later notified Ambassador Harvey in London that the British approach was known only to the 
British, Coolidge and himself and that confidentiality should be preserved, stressing that if 
Britain presented its proposal to France, it was “very important” that it be done in a 
                                                 
 74 Hughes to Chilton, Aide- Mémoire, 15 Oct 1923, FRUS 1923 II, pp. 70-73. 
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 conciliatory manner and without any statement which would suggest a British-American 
understanding in advance.75    
 Britain lost little time in informing the French, Italian, and Belgian governments of the 
America’s willingness to participate in a reparations inquiry, requesting that they join Britain 
in inviting the United States to participate in an impartial inquiry of experts into Germany’s 
capacity to pay reparations and in drawing up an appropriate financial plan for securing 
payment.  Such a conference, in America’s view, should be advisory in nature.  
Alternatively, if the Reparation Commission appointed an advisory body to undertake the 
inquiry, the United States would also be willing to have an American participate.   Curzon 
made it clear that he preferred the first alternative, an independent inquiry.76   
   Poincaré gave preliminary acceptance to the British on 21 October, insisting that it adhere 
to the Treaty of Versailles, that it was absolutely inadmissible to curtail the powers and rights 
of to Reparation Commission, and that the experts be simply advisory to the Reparation 
Commission, whose proceedings France had been able to dominate.  Additionally, all forms 
of passive resistance by Germany must end.  The British were further informed that “M. 
Poncaré considers that the co-operation of the United States government would be an 
excellent thing, provided they would be willing to make certain sacrifices on the subject of 
                                                 
 75 Curzon to Chilton, 12 Oct 1923, no. 392, DBFP XXI, pp. 563-64; Chilton to Hughes, 
13 Oct 1923, FRUS 1923 II, pp. 68-70; Hughes to Chilton, 15 Oct 1923, FRUS 1923 II, pp. 
70-73; Chilton to Curzon, 13 Oct 1923, Nr. 393, DBFP XXI, pp. 564-65. Manfred Berg 
asserts that in his answer to the British, Hughes indicated a willingness to accept a 
conference without the participation of the French.  A more subtle reading of Hughes’s 
response, particularly in the light of subsequent events, suggests this was not so.  See Berg, 
Gustav Stresemann und die Vereinigten Staaten, p. 147. 
 76 Curzon to Crewe, 19 Oct 1923, no. 403, DBFP XXI, pp. 574-76; Chilton to Hughes, 19 
Oct 1923, FRUS 1923 II, p. 74; Fletcher to Hughes, 22 Oct 1922, FRUS 1923 II, pp. 74-75.  
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 the allied debts.”77
 Britain had concerns over the nature of Poincaré’s acceptance. In reviewing it, Crowe 
noted the narrow scope Poincaré had specified and the likely effect such restrictions would 
have on the chances of attaining American participation.78  Bradbury framed the question as 
whether or not Poincaré was really willing to have an impartial enquiry into German capacity 
to pay (subject only to saving face in regard to his previous declarations).  Bradbury thought 
that if Poincaré was allowed to dictate its terms of reference, “no sufficiently authoritative 
American would be found willing to serve on such a committee.”  He also warned that the 
committee had to be set up so that France could not use it as a vehicle for purposes of delay.  
Bradbury, however, thought he had a good chance of arranging a satisfactory outcome in the 
Reparation Commission.79    
 In Germany, Poincaré’s insistence on negotiating only with local authorities and 
industrial groups was posing a direct threat to German sovereignty over the Rhineland and 
the Ruhr.  Germany could not stabilize its finances and currency while continuing to provide 
economic support for the Rhineland and Ruhr, and on 13 October passed an enabling law 
which allowed economic decisions to be made by decree and major reductions in government 
expenses through layoffs soon followed.  Plans were put in place to introduce a new 
                                                 
 77 Crewe reported on 21 October that he had received a telephone call from Peretti de la 
Rocca (director of political and commercial affairs at the French Foreign Office) who was 
relaying a telephone conversation he received from Poincaré.  Memorandum by Cadogan, 23 
Oct 1923, no. 406, DBFP XXI, p. 581, n. 5. A note verbale was presented to the British on 26 
October. Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with the French chargé d’affaires, 26 Oct 
1923, no. 415, DBFP XXI, pp. 594-96.  Mark Trachtenberg characterizes Poincaré’s decision 
as “impulsive.” Trachtenberg, Reparation, p. 333. 
 78 Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with the French chargé d’affaires, 26 Oct 
1923, no. 415, DBFP XXI, pp. 594-96. 
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 currency, the Rentenmark, based agricultural and industrial mortgages, which would not 
begin to circulate until November.80  As a result of reduced government expenditures in the 
Rhineland and Ruhr, during October and November German industry was forced to negotiate 
agreements with the MICUM control commission.  An even more serious result was that 
economic desperation led to an eruption, beginning on 21 October, of the separatist 
movements that had simmered in the Rhineland and Ruhr with French support varying from 
tacit to active.  During October and November, Germany remained preoccupied with 
domestic issues, waited to see what would develop from the Hughes proposal and relied on 
Britain to check French ambitions.  
 The separatist putsches in the Rhineland were the greatest immediate threat to the unity 
of Germany. Tirard and the French military in the occupied zones had quietly supported 
various Rhenish separatist parties; now, with the acceptance of the experts committee, 
Poincaré made the decision to actively support the cause of a Rhenish republic.81  The 
                                                                                                                                                       
 79 Bradbury to Crewe, 26 Oct 1923, no. 416, DBFP XXI, pp. 597-602, quote on p. 598. 
 80 For an extensive discussion of financial stabilization see Feldman, The Great Disorder, 
pp. 754-69 and for currency reform, pp. 780-82. 
 81  The Belgians had supported a separatist putsch on 21 October at Aachen, in the 
Belgian Occupation Zone, out of fear that imminent French action would establish French 
hegemony in the Rhineland, leaving Belgium economically encircled.  The Belgian action 
sparked separatist putsches throughout the rest of the Rhineland.  As the matter came to a 
head, Poincaré made the decision to give full support for an independent Rhineland. Belgium 
withdrew its support under pressure from Britain, much to Poincaré’s annoyance, and the 
Aachen putsch crumbled by 2 November.  There is some debate over why Poincaré made this 
decision.  Bariéty dates it to exactly 25 October, motivated, in his view, by desires to push 
the advantages Poincaré felt he had with the experts committee, which he hoped would 
address the questions of war debts, reparations, and Rhenish separatism both aimed to 
definitely resolve the political and economic questions left open by the Versailles treaty.  
Bariéty, Die Französische Politik, pp. 22-23.  Jeannesson, Rupieper, and Nadler essentially 
agree with Bariéty that Poincaré was attempting to settle the questions of Versailles on 
French terms.  Jeannesson, Poincaré, pp. 333-38; Rupieper, The Cuno Government, p. 251; 
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 French occupation authorities provided men, money and weapons to the separatist bands, and 
French troops often escorted them into public buildings, arresting German police and 
outraged citizens who resisted and expelling them from the occupied zone.  A Rhineland 
republic was proclaimed, but local opposition both there and the Palatinate would ensure that 
the issue would remain unresolved.  Even though Tirard understood that the distinct lack of 
popular support would doom direct separatist attempts to establish an independent Rhine 
State, the threat of a radical solution served as a useful source of pressure on the more 
legitimate autonomists to come to terms with the French simply as a way of reestablishing 
order.  Despite British objections to France’s support of the so-called “revolver republic,” 
Poincaré refused any inter-Allied discussion of the matter and was particularly encouraged 
by events in the Palatinate, which seemed to favor a separatist republic or at least an 
autonomist state.82
    
The Struggle over the Experts Mandate 
 Having given the British his preliminary acceptance of an expert committee, Poincaré 
                                                                                                                                                       
Nadler, The Rhenish Separatist Movements, pp. 325-29.  McDougall thinks Poincaré was 
using separatist radicals to leverage moderates to accept either independence under the 
auspices of the League of Nations or autonomy from Prussia, including a separate budget, 
parliament, railroads and diplomatic representation, yet still within the German state. 
McDougall, France’s Rhineland Diplomacy, pp. 310-11.  Trachtenberg agrees that the 
support for separatism was mainly a threat to further the real aim of autonomy.  
Trachtenberg, Reparation, pp. 320-21.  Keiger, however, insists that Poincaré was opposed to 
Rhenish separatism and interprets French policy as “characterized by confusion and lack of 
purpose.”  Keiger, Poincaré, p. 303.  This last seems an overly charitable view. 
 82 Nadler, The Rhenish Separatist Movements, pp. 324-31.  In the Palatinate, which was 
governed by Bavaria, the opposition to the reactionary policies of the Bavarian state 
government created a certain amount of sympathy for secession.  For separatism in the 
Palatinate, see Gerhard Gräber and Matthias Spindler, Revolver Republik am Rhein: Die 
Pfalz und ihre Separatisten, (Landau: Pfälzische Verlagsanstalt, 1992). For a firsthand 
account of the events by a correspondent, see George E.R. Gedye, The Revolver Republic: 
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 wanted a clarification of American policy.  On 22 October, the French chargé in Washington, 
André Laboulaye, met with Hughes and related that Poincaré was particularly anxious to 
know if the British proposal had been made on British or American initiative.  Implicit in that 
question was the issue of whether the United States was cooperating with a British agenda or 
would be a neutral party more amenable to French concerns.  Hughes responded that while 
the formal request had come from Britain, the request had itself been stimulated by 
Coolidge’s statement.  Denying any pre-arranged American-British agenda, Hughes stated 
that he supported the British proposal, but in an attempt to maintain the appearance of strict 
American neutrality he insisted that he was supporting the proposal on its merits and not 
because it had been proposed by the British.83
 Hughes’s statements reiterated his government’s official policies: The United States had 
a deep interest in economic situation of Europe and believed that the present time was 
“particularly opportune” to deal with the issue; the ending of passive resistance made it 
necessary to develop a financial plan to meet the present exigencies; Germany should not be 
relieved of its “just obligations”; and nothing should be done to stimulate German resistance.  
The inquiry commission was advisory only and governments should not be asked to abrogate 
their functions.84   
 On the subject of war debts, Hughes repeated his oft-stated position that there was no 
present sentiment in the United States for cancellation of war debts. However, repeating what 
he had told the Belgians in July, he added that were there to be a European settlement and 
cooperation for peace, opinion might change and “the terms, conditions and time of 
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 83 Hughes to Whitehouse (Chargé in France), 24 Oct 1923, FRUS 1923 II, pp. 79-83. 
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 payments could be considered in such a way that consideration would be taken of the actual 
conditions of the European debtors in light of what settlements were made.”85  
 Hughes warned that the situation in Germany was grave, specifically mentioning Bavaria.  
He cautioned that if Germany collapsed, the French would be left with the Ruhr in its hands, 
“from which they might obtain some political security but no reparation payments.”  Hughes 
also warned that although United States opinion on the controversial questions had been 
“strongly predominantly in favor of France during the past months, sentiment “would change 
very quickly if the French, after having won their victory and broken down German 
resistance were unwilling to aid in working out a financial plan.”  Hughes emphasized that 
Germany’s unity had to be maintained and it was possible that the French could go “too 
far.”86
  Hughes was notified by Logan on 24 October of the German note to the Reparation 
Commission.  Logan reported that the Italians were questioning Poincaré’s real intentions 
and were convinced he was committed to a policy of breaking up Germany.  The Belgians 
were in favor of discussing the German request, but would need strong support from the 
Italians and British to hold out against French pressure.  Logan was also concerned about 
                                                                                                                                                       
 84 Ibid.
 85 Ibid.  Bruce Kent strong criticizes Bariéty for suggesting that Poincaré’s decision to 
accept the expert committee was based on his belief that Hughes had conceded the 
relationship between war debts and reparations in this interview with Laboulaye.  Kent’s 
criticism is strengthened by the fact that Poincaré had notified the British of his preliminary 
acceptance on 21 October.  If Poincaré had hopes of a linkage between war debt and 
reparations, they were already in his mind at that time since his preliminary acceptance 
references that in his preliminary acceptance.  There is also nothing in Hughes’s discussion 
that he had not already told the Belgians in August 1923 and was very likely already known 
by Poincaré.  Kent, Spoils of War, pp. 230-31. Bariéty, however, elaborates Poincaré’s 
thinking.  Bariéty, “Die französische Politik in der Ruhrkrise,” pp. 22-23. 
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 Poincaré’s refusal to negotiate with the German government and his intention to prevent 
discussion of the German note in the Reparation Commission.  Logan, writing as the 
separatist movement was spreading through the Rhineland, feared the “break-up” of 
Germany.  He suggested that the State Department notify the Belgian, British, French and 
Italian governments via diplomatic channels that the situation in Germany was causing the 
United States “great anxiety” and jeopardizing both American and European interests, and 
urge those governments to allow the Reparation Committee to consider the German request 
for an evaluation of its ability to pay reparations under the current circumstances. 
 Alternatively, Logan suggested an authoritative statement along similar lines that he 
would present to the Reparation Commission, noting that the disadvantage of the latter was 
that publicity could not be prevented but that it would have the advantage of focusing public 
opinion on the situation.87  Hughes cabled Whitehouse that he and Logan should state clearly 
that the situation in Germany was causing “great anxiety” and that it was “deemed most 
important” to develop a plan base on Germany’s capacity to pay, but that Hughes did not 
want any statement placed in the Reparation Commissions record.88  Hughes was not yet 
ready to exert public pressure on France.    
 In contrast to Hughes, Baldwin’s speech on 25 October to the Conservative Party 
conference at Plymouth called upon Poincaré allow the German reparation note to be 
considered and warned that the creation of separate Rhenish state within Germany would 
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 87 Whitehouse (Chargé) to Hughes, 24 Oct 1923, FRUS 1923 II, pp. 76-78.    
 88 Hughes to Whitehouse (Chargé), 25 Oct 1923, FRUS 1923 II, pp. 83-84. 
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 break the Treaty of Versailles, which Britain would not tolerate.89  Discussing Baldwin’s 
speech, Maltzan and D’Abernon concluded that the United States was crucial and must be 
won over by the British.  Poincaré would then be “done for,” since he could not hold out 
against a “combined English-American front.”90  
  On 26 October, Crowe received Poincaré’s formal acceptance of the British proposal for 
inviting the United States to participate in a inquiry by experts into the means for a general 
settlement of reparations, but with the caveat that the expert committee would be advisory to 
the Reparation Commission and not an independent entity.  Crowe informed Poincaré that he 
believed France had lost a great opportunity in not accepting a conference which could 
transcend that narrow inquiry into reparations.  Crowe was also upset that Poincaré’s 
acceptance included the condition that the advisory committee would not be free to consider 
Germany’s recent communication until passive resistance had totally ceased, pointing out 
that Poincaré did not have the right under the Treaty of Versailles to prescribe such matters to 
the Reparation Commission.  In addition, he was specifically concerned about the separatist 
movement in the Rhineland, which could rend the whole fabric of Versailles.91
 Poincaré quickly attempted to limit the scope of the inquiry that would take place under 
the auspices of the Reparations Commission.  On 26 October Laboulaye met with Hughes, 
informing him of the reply that France had made to Britain, and returned on 29 October with 
an aide-mémoire about the French position specifically noting that the Reparation 
                                                 
 89 Memorandum by Mr. Cadogan, 23 Oct 1923, no. 406, DBFP XXI, pp. 580-82, n. 2; 
Rupieper, The Cuno Govenment, p. 236. 
 90 Maltzan, Aufzeichnung, 26 Oct 1923, Nr. 209, ADAP VIII, pp. 544-45. 
 91 Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with the French chargé d’affaires, 26 Oct 
1923, no. 425, DBFP XXI, pp. 594-96. 
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 Commission, while it could alter the terms of payment, did not have the power to cancel or 
reduce to total amount of the reparation debt which had been fixed by the Allied and 
associated governments.  Remission could only be granted by unanimous agreement of those 
governments and France would not agree to a reconsideration of the amount of debt fixed at 
the London Conference of 1921. 
 Laboulaye specifically referred to an Associated Press dispatch stating France’s 
determination not to alter the total payments by Germany did not, in the opinion of 
Washington, interfere with the plan for an expert inquiry.  Hughes denied that he had even 
given out such a statement; it had been published by the Associated Press on its own 
responsibility.  Hughes explained that, far from issuing an official State Department 
communiqué, he had said nothing more than what he had often said to the press.  The rights 
under the treaty could not be altered without the consent of the parties; everyone knew this 
and therefore it required no emphasis.  The question, Hughes observed, was whether or not 
Poincaré wanted to obtain reparation payments.  He noted cuttingly that it did not appear as if 
France had been successful thus far in obtaining reparation payments and if matters 
continued as they had been going, France would not receive payments.  Poincaré could 
continue his current policy if he did not care about payments, but if he wanted reparations he 
should not “put any unnecessary obstacles in the way of securing them.”92     
  Wiedfeldt, who had been in close touch with Hughes during this period, reported to 
Berlin on 29 October about their conversations.  In discussing the German situation 
generally, Hughes had expressed particular concern about the Bavarian crisis.  Noting that 
                                                 
 92 Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the French Chargé 
Laboulaye, 26 Oct 1923,  FRUS 1923 II p. 84; Chargé (Laboulaye) to the Secretary of State, 
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 Poincaré had now accepted a conference as an “advisory-body” to the Reparations 
Commission, Hughes was willing to build a bridge to France, although he wanted the 
conference to be called as quickly as possible or it would be too late.  He had confided to 
Wiedfeldt that America would conduct negotiations on the proposed conference of experts as 
openly as possible, to shift public opinion in France and the world against the stubbornness 
of the French government.  According to Wiedfeldt, Hughes was “on the whole not 
optimistic, although France must know that a failure would provide no reparations.”93  
 Meeting again with Laboulaye on 31 October, Hughes informed him that the United 
States recognized that under the Treaty of Versailles the Reparation Commission could not 
cancel any part of German reparation obligation without the specific authority of the 
governments represented on the commission, thus French consent to any changes would be 
necessary.  But if Poincaré’s refusal to accept any revision in the amount of German 
obligation meant that the experts would not be able to consider Germany’s total capacity to 
pay, then the inquiry would be abortive and “we should all be made a laughing stock.”  
Hughes noted that “France, of course had her treaty rights and even if they took a position 
that involved the ruin of all of Europe, they would still have their treaty rights.”  Still, he 
would not accept France blocking an inquiry that could lead to a proper financial plan.  
Although France had the right to reject the plan, Hughes was well aware that international 
public pressure would make it difficult for France to reject it once it had been formulated.94
 The heightened pace of diplomatic activity continued in November.  Chilton, who met 
                                                                                                                                                       
the French chargé d’affaires, 29 Oct 1923, reel 122, cont. 157, Hughes Papers. 
 93 Wiedfeldt to AA, 29 Oct 1923, reprinted in Schröder, “Otto Wiedfeldt als Politiker,” 
pp. 220-21. 
 94 Memorandum by Secretary of State of a Conversation with the French chargé, 31 Oct 
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 with Hughes on 1 and 2 November, described him as uncertain about Poincaré’s actual 
position and whether his public statements were official.  Because Hughes requested a copy 
of the text of the French reply to Britain, Chilton’s impression was that Hughes was getting 
little information from Paris.  Poincaré, who sensed victory in the Ruhr, continued to hedge 
his acceptance of an expert inquiry.  On 5 November, Jusserand informed Hughes that the 
inquiry should be limited to Germany’s capacity to pay within a brief period. The experts 
could not recommend a reduction in the total of Germany’s reparation obligations, nor could 
the inquiry deal with the occupation of the Ruhr.  Hughes replied that it was not the purpose 
of the inquiry to deal with the legality of the occupation, an issue that Britain had threatened 
to raise, or with the “mere political questions,” but that limitations on the productivity of the 
Ruhr would be a “serious restrictions.”  He warned that there would be no reparations if 
Germany disintegrated and that if Germany subsequently reunited, France would lose both 
security and reparations.  On 6 November, Hughes sought British confirmation of his 
position by asking Chilton for the British opinion about what the commission could achieve 
in an inquiry into Germany’s current capacity to pay and whether Britain thought Germany 
could pay anything at all.  At the same time, Hughes made it clear that he “had no desire to 
infringe French treaty rights.”95  Poincaré would have to be persuaded that it was in France’s 
own interests to agree. 
 Curzon’s response to Poincaré’s conditions was to propose that Britain, the United States, 
Belgium, and Italy send a joint note to Poincaré, urging him to reconsider.96    Hughes, 
however, ever mindful of the Congressional mandate to avoid “foreign entanglements,” was 
                                                                                                                                                       
1923, FRUS 1923 II, pp. 87-89. 
 95 Chilton to Curzon, 6 Nov 1923, no. 451, DBFP XXI, pp. 642-43. 
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 not willing to associate the United States with a joint communication, nor did he think that 
sending one would do any good.  When Chilton expressed the hope that the United States 
was “not going to desert us,” Hughes responded that he was using all the arguments he could 
to convince Poincaré, but the United States would not alter its conditions for participation.97  
When Belgium proved to be reluctant to openly to join in a common front it opposition to 
Poincaré, the British initiative came to naught.98  
 In the Reparations Commission on 6 November, Logan and Bradbury discussed the range 
of possibilities that could arise from the French restriction.  Logan was firmly convinced that 
the United States would not participate if the committee was prohibited from discussing a 
reduction of the total German debt.  Logan felt that Hughes would simply wait for the receipt 
of invitations from the Allies and would use any discrepancy he found among their terms as 
an excuse to decline.  Bradbury and Logan both felt that the worst possibility would be a 
unanimously adopted compromise formula, which the United States might feel obliged to 
accept in the hope that some of the restrictions would be withdrawn once the committee 
began work.  Logan believed that if Poincaré refused any compromise, the United States 
delegates would walk out. 
 Bradbury’s fear, from the British perspective, was that the United States might agree to a 
compromise report giving Poincaré much of what he wanted, which would leave Britain 
                                                                                                                                                       
 96 Curzon to Graham, 6 Nov 1923, no. 450, DBFP XXI, pp. 640-42. 
 97 Crewe to Curzon, 3 Nov 1923, no. 442, DBFP XXI, pp. 624-26; Curzon to Graham 
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lurch,” see Chilton to Curzon, 8 Nov. 1923, No. 456, DBFP XXI, pp. 648-49. 
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 “buttoned up to some of the most mischievous elements in French policy.”  Another 
possibility the two men discussed was that Washington could appoint a prospective 
American member of the experts committee to work out terms of reference with the 
Reparations Commission itself.  Logan doubted that Washington would agree to such a plan.  
It would “leave the job to Great Britain.”  Bradbury’s preference was for the United States to 
formally reject the French restrictions and, failing that, for a British rejection.  Britain and the 
United States could then wait for either the situation in Germany, or the fall of the Poincaré 
government, to compel French acceptance of an unrestricted inquiry.99
  On 7 November Poincaré notified Hughes that the inquiry could not consider the legality 
of the occupation, the French system of collecting taxes, the productive guarantees that had 
been seized, nor any agreements with the industrialists. The only change that Poincaré 
offered Hughes was to define the end of the brief period as 1930.  Hughes informed 
Jusserand that such restrictions would make the inquiry futile, a view Hughes immediately 
confirmed with Coolidge.100  Jusserand informed Hughes that Poincaré was holding to his 
restrictions.  Poincaré thought that he held a strong position in Germany and that he still 
controlled the Reparation Committee.  Hughes then released the substance of the American -
French disagreement to the press, and negotiations stopped.  However, Hughes’s statement 
mentioned that he had closed no door and could not discuss the future.101  He hoped that 
international and French public opinion would pressure Poincaré to agree to his conditions.  
                                                 
 99 Bradbury to Crowe, 6 Nov 1923, Enclosure in no. 452, DBFP XXI, pp. 643-44. 
 100 Memorandum of the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the French 
Ambassador, 7 Nov 1923, FRUS 1923 II, pp. 91-94. 
 101 Hughes to Herrick, 9 Nov 1923, FRUS 1923 II, pp. 94-95; Chilton to Curzon, 9 Nov 
1923, no. 460, DBFP XXI, pp. 651-52. 
 321 
  
 
 The Hitler Putsch and the Reaction  
 While negotiations between Hughes and Poincaré were ongoing, within Germany the 
domestic political situation was rapidly deteriorating.  National unity, which Stresemann was 
desperately attempting to preserve, was beginning to be in doubt.  Robbins reported on the 
situation from Berlin: 
 In the meantime, everything is going from bad to worse here.  As I wrote to you 
about a month ago, there was a good chance of a Separatist movement.  This morning 
we learn that the Separatist movement in the Rhineland is going full blast, and that at 
Aachen, Wiesbaden, Bonn, Dueren, Erkalanz, etc. the independent Rhineland 
Republic has been proclaimed.  Yesterday I had a short talk with Maltzan, who told 
me that he was not worried about the Bavarian situation, though of course, as you 
know, the Bavarian Reichswehr has taken matters in its own hands and proclaimed 
absolute independence of orders from headquarters in Berlin.102  
 
Robbins noted that the Bavarians had “literally thumbed their noses” at Berlin and that 
Stresemann was apparently not able to do anything about it, “all of which shows that there is 
a little more chaos than ever.”  His postscript added, “We learn that there is the devil to pay 
in Hamburg,” a reference to the city’s 22 – 24 October Communist uprising.  Robbins hoped 
something might happen to “clear the air” but had “no intelligent reason to be hopeful just 
now.”103  
 The German government, acutely aware that the domestic situation endangered its chance 
                                                 
 102 Robbins to Castle, 23 Oct 1923, file 52, Castle Papers. 
 103 Ibid.  About conditions in Berlin itself Robbins reported that due to the staggering 
inflation it was “practically impossible to buy anything,” citing the cost of a loaf of bread at 
ten milliards, “which of course is prohibitive to the German laborer.”  Robbins found it 
“amusing” to see “all the rich Jews” getting their women out of town; however, he himself 
would be sending his wife to Warsaw for a few weeks. 
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 for a vital foreign policy success, also knew that just at this precarious moment the United 
States was deciding whether or not to participate in the proposed experts conference.  
Additionally, in the midst of the domestic crisis the German government was engaged in a 
battle with France for world, and most especially, American opinion.104   Stresemann knew 
of Hughes’s warning that if Germany should fall apart there would be no possibility of 
American help.105  From Washington, Diekhoff reported that Hughes was on the verge of 
intervening and that he would do everything in his power to contribute the solution, but 
warned that he was deeply concerned about the situation in Europe.  With the domestic crisis 
damaging Germany’s best hope for an overall solution, President Ebert, von Seeckt and 
others, even within the chancellor’s own party, began to doubt Stresemann’s competence. 
Given the indispensable importance of the United States, many at the upper levels of the 
German government thought it was time to bring Wiedfeldt back to Germany to take the 
chancellorship, in a directorate with dictatorial powers, and send Stresemann as ambassador 
to Washington.106
                                                 
 104 Hoesch to AA, 7 Nov 1923, Nr. 236, ADAP VIII, pp. 606-7. 
 105 Dieckhoff to AA, 12 Oct 1923, Nr. 332, R28489, Büro RM-USA, Bd. 3, D618964, p. 
87. 
 106  Writing to Wiedfeldt in Washington on 4 November, von Seeckt recalled their 
conversations in Berlin, noting that the Stresemann government could not last much longer if 
it could not solve the currency problems or the Bavarian conflict, or achieve any foreign- 
policy success, and sharing his fear that it would be impossible to form an effective 
parliamentary government at the moment.  He pressed Wiedfeldt for an answer, as much time 
and opportunity was slipping by.   Von Seeckt assured Wiedfeldt that “I am writing not only 
with the knowledge but also by wish of the Reichspräsident” and that both of them were 
counting on him.  The general reminded Wiedfeldt that he could bring him back by force, if 
necessary, but felt he had no right to do so.  Wiedfeldt was, however, to hold himself in 
readiness to return to Berlin and “take the decisive step to work for better conditions.” 
General von Seeckt to Wiedfeldt, 4 Nov 1923, reprinted in Die Kabinette Stresemann II, 
Anhang Nr. 5, pp. 1215-16; see also von Rabenau, Seeckt, Aus seinem Leben, pp. 370-71. 
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  Wiedfeldt understood that the United States and American opinion was now, more then 
ever, of vital importance to Germany.  As official and public sentiment began to favor 
Germany, Wiedfeldt did not want to support or to even be associated with anything that 
might turn American opinion away from Germany.  Wiedfeldt met with Castle and had a 
frank discussion about the situation in Germany.107 Clearly the relationship between the 
German ambassador and the State Department had improved since the previous summer.  
Having been informed by Houghton of the Stinnes dictatorship plans, Castle asked Wiedfeldt 
about it: “I said to him that it was probable that Germany would have to have a dictatorship 
and asked him whether a man like Stinnes would take charge.”  Wiedfeldt replied that a 
dictatorship was “almost inevitable” but Stinnes himself would not be part of it, and then 
informed Castle not only of Stinnes’s directorate plans but also that Stinnes had asked him if 
he would be willing to be one of the dictators, an offer he had refused. 
 On 5 November, Wiedfeldt wrote to the Foreign Office that the rumors of a dictatorship 
were hurting German interests in the United States.  Wiedfeldt stated explicitly that such talk 
was endangering American efforts for an experts conference, chances for grain shipments 
and the beginning of large relief efforts for Germany.  Wiedfeldt clearly laid out his position 
that what the German government and the German people needed more then anything was a 
conference that would at last bring about an end to the years of uncertainty.  Hughes, 
Wiedfeldt reported, believed he had a real chance to bring all the parties to the conference 
table, if the conference program was not so restricted that it could not produce real results.  
                                                 
 107 Castle was “glad” to have such an open conversation. “I asked him straight questions 
and he answered very frankly. We went over the situation pretty thoroughly and, as he is a 
very intelligent man, I was might glad of the opportunity to hear things from some one who 
had just been on the spot.” Castle to Houghton, 2 Nov 1923, file 52, Castle Papers. 
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 The ambassador warned against anything that might endanger this project.108   
 Despite Wiedfeldt’s stated position about the directorate, the call came on 10 
November.109  Wiedfeldt refused the offer, replying that other important matters kept him in 
Washington where he might render greater service in the German interest.110  Wiedfeldt 
certainly had in mind his work with Hughes towards American help in the reparations 
question and the commercial treaty which was about to be negotiated.    
 On 9 November the notorious Hitler-Ludendorff putsch took place in Munich.  Trouble in 
                                                 
 108 While most Germans, Wiedfeldt noted, understood that a directorate means a small 
cabinet unhindered by parties or parliament, to the Americans it meant a military dictatorship 
or restoration of the monarchy.  Wiedfeldt to AA, 5 Nov 1923, Nr. 347, R28489, Büro RM-
USA, Bd.3, D619001, p. 122. 
 109   General von Seeckt sent a secret telegram through the Hamburg-America Line, 
ordering its New York director to go immediately to Washington to deliver the message to 
Wiedfeldt that both the Commander of the Army and the German president requested that the 
Ambassador take up the position of Chancellor and Foreign Minister in a new German 
government.  The reply was also to be by secret cable, as an “official cable” to Berlin was 
“impossible.” Arndt von Holtzendorff to Julius P. Meyer, Telegramm an Hamburg-Amerika 
Linie New York, 10 Nov 1923, reprinted in Schröder, “Otto Wiedfeldt als Politiker und 
Botschafter der Weimarer Republik,” p. 219. 
 110  In his own written reply to General von Seeckt, Wiedfeldt explained his refusal.  
Although thankful for the great trust both von Seeckt and Ebert had in him, Wiedfeldt felt he 
could better serve Germany from his position in Washington.  In the first place, Wiedfeldt 
thought he was the wrong man for such a directorate, for while he had the friendship and 
trust of many influential men, he had no party or interest group behind him.  He did not have 
the trust of the agricultural sector, or the workers, and felt that his was often a minority 
opinion among the industrialists as well.  Furthermore, after almost two years’ absence from 
Germany, it would take him far too long to master the details of the current domestic and 
financial situation.  More importantly, he felt that while he could only be a burden to a “small 
cabinet,” he could influence the most important matters from his post in Washington during 
the coming months.  Wiedfeldt cited his work for food credits and private relief committees, 
noting that this would go far to relieve the hunger threatening Germany which undoubtably 
underlay the reasons such a directorate was thought necessary.   Wiedfeldt to von Seeckt, 24 
Nov 1923, reprinted in Die Kabinette Stresemann II, Anhang Nr. 6, pp. 1216-17. 
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 Bavaria had long been expected and was of concern to Washington.111  The so-called Beer 
Hall Putsch quickly collapsed when the police proved loyal and fired on the putschists, 
bringing Adolf Hitler’s first attempt to seize power to an inglorious end.112  These events in 
Munich, did, however, have an effect on Germany’s diplomatic situation, because they 
happened in the midst of the negotiations over the form and scope of the experts committee.   
 At a time when Hughes was attempting to place public pressure on Poincaré to accept a 
broader, more inclusive mandate for the proposed experts commission, the events in 
Germany handed Poincaré further arguments in support of his position.  The French seized 
on the Munich putsch, in which the former Quartermaster General Ludendorff, the most 
prominent symbol of old German militarism  played a major role, as proof of the continuing 
danger Germany posed to Europe.113  But opinion in America and in Europe was turning 
markedly against Poincaré’s intransigence.  The French press was concerned about this 
“general offensive” against France, which threatened to isolate it.  The position of Belgium 
was uncertain; and there was a further estrangement from Britain.  Of most concern was the 
strained atmosphere with the United States.  In Washington, Jusserand was instructed to do 
all he could to express the French view to the American government and public, namely that 
the Hitler-Ludendorff putsch was a timely example of the threatening nature of Germany, 
                                                 
 111  Robbins to Castle, 22 Oct 1923, file 52, Castle Papers.  Hughes saw the Bavarian 
situation as especially serious. Wiedfeldt to AA, 29 Oct 1923, D618978, Büro RM-USA, p. 
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 326 
 demonstrating that the Versailles treaty needed to be reaffirmed.  In Paris, Hoesch thought it 
likely that Poincaré would attempt to break the “anglo-saxon diplomatic offensive” by 
demanding an Allied joint demarche and shifting the moral pressure onto Germany.114
 
America Accepts the Invitation 
 Poincaré’s response to Hughes’s refusal was to move to set up an inquiry through the 
Reparation Commission where he believed he could control its conditions.  It was also a 
move which had the possible advantage of removing the onus for Germany’s condition from 
France and placing it on the United States.  On 13 November, Barthou agreed to allow 
German representatives to present their case to the Reparation Commission regarding the 
formation of an experts committee.  On 16 November, Poincaré followed up by securing his 
political base in France base in a lengthy speech before the Chamber of Deputies in which, to 
the standing applause of almost all members, he reaffirmed the determination of France to 
decline to cancel any of the C bonds except in proportion to the cancellation of the debt owed 
by France to the other Allies.    If Britain and the United States wanted France to reduce 
German reparations under the London Schedule, they should pay for it.115  
 Britain’s response to Poincaré’s initiative was to attempt to determine Hughes’s current 
                                                                                                                                                       
seiner Zeit (Berg: VGB, 1995). 
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 115 The French proposal was that the committee, which would not have a German 
representative, would be limited to evaluating Germany’s present capacity to pay reparations 
and to fix the payments through 1926.  It would also evaluate German resources and 
particularly German assets held abroad.  The Reparation Commission would set the program 
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According to the understanding of the French delegation, the committee of experts would 
take the 1921 London Schedule of Reparations as the basis of their work.  Bradbury to 
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 position.  Chilton was instructed to see Hughes on 14 November and explain to him the 
importance that the British government attached “to an accurate knowledge of the exact 
position of the United States,” without which it was impossible for Britain “to consider what 
further steps are open to them.”  Britain would also “warmly welcome” any suggestion he 
could offer.   Hughes responded that the French were aware of his terms, and that his position 
was the “onus of breaking down and of exclusion of the United States participation is 
therefore on the French and that he wished it to remain there.”  Hughes reiterated that he had 
never told the French or anyone else that the door had been closed.  He would accept an 
invitation, but not one that contained Poincaré’s limitations.  The French would have to come 
to reason, but he had no suggestion to make.116   Hughes’s position left the United States 
holding the moral high ground and the British with the task of making Poincaré see reason. 
 Poincaré’s misjudgment of his ability to control the Reparation Commission and his 
decision to utilize it as a vehicle for the expert committee inquiry gave Bradbury the 
opportunity he had been waiting for.  The first step was to hear the German presentation.  
When the German government presented its case to the Reparation Commission on 23 
November, its spokesman, Dr. David Fischer, challenged the Franco-Belgian occupation as a 
violation of the Versailles treaty.   He argued that the efforts of Germany to establish a sound 
currency and a balanced budget were thwarted by actions of the occupying powers that were 
endangering social and political order in Germany.  If France and Belgium would leave the 
Ruhr and confine their activities in the Rhineland to those prescribed by the treaty, Germany 
was prepared to continue with the fiscal and monetary reforms already begun and provide 
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 security for reparation payments at a very early date.117   
 Taking advantage of Poincaré’s effort to establish an expert committee within the 
Reparation Commission, Bradbury had been working to find a compromise position that 
would allow an expert inquiry and had made some progress with Barthou by 27 November.  
Bradbury’s plan was to create two committees, one to develop a plan to re-establish German 
credit by balancing its budget and stabilizing the mark and the other to placate the French by 
investigating German capital investment abroad and how it might be repatriated for the 
purposes of reparation payments.  Bradbury considered the second committee to be “mere 
eye-wash” designed to save the “face of the French.”  In addition he agreed to the exclusion 
of Germany from representation on the second committee but insisted on American 
representation on the first committee. 
 Bradbury was reasonably certain of Italian and Belgian support, but not about American 
acceptance.  He pointed out to Curzon that in any case the British would be “none the worse 
off for making the attempt.”  With British general elections scheduled for 6 December, the 
effort would “at least tide over the time until our elections are over and will afford sufficient 
answer to any complaint that His Majesty’s Government are doing nothing.”  Bradbury 
hoped that a joint invitation from Britain, France, and Italy would be politically difficult for 
the United States to refuse.  His plan was for to Logan to attempt to prepare the way with 
                                                 
 117 Fischer’s presentation ended with an impassioned plea. “The responsibility that the 
Reparation Commission owes to world history is tremendously great: history will judge if the 
Reparation Commission will fulfill its mission.”   In Bradbury’s opinion the problem was no 
longer getting Germany to commit to reparation payments but rather that, because of German 
anxiety to obtain relief from an intolerable situation, they would make offers beyond their 
capability of fulfillment and thus make a settlement ultimately unworkable.  Rede des 
Vorsitzenden der Kriegslastenkommission Fischer, 23 Nov 1923, Nr. 16, ADAP IX, pp. 31-
45, quote on p. 45; Bradbury to FO, 23 Nov 1923, no. 478, DBFP XXI, pp. 678-80.  
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 Hughes before Britain contacted the State Department with the proposal.118   
 Logan informed the State Department of the compromise proposal on 29 November, 
including a letter from Barthou inviting American participation. He also and told Hughes that 
Louis Delacroix, the Belgian representative on the commission, had notified him and 
Bradbury that he had assurances from Barthou that while the French representative could not 
join in a proposition to reduce the London schedule of reparations, he had given his 
“confidential and definite assurance” that he would not attempt to limit the scope of the 
discussion.   Logan explained that any open debate on this issue would make the position of 
Barthou and Poincaré impossible.119     
 The State Department, unimpressed by what it considered a “vague whispered 
suggestion,” would not regard Barthou’s statement as indicating a change in Poincaré’s 
attitude nor, having heard nothing from the British government, was it prepared to proceed 
on the basis of “an undefined secret authority.”  Nor would it countenance an American 
expert being named by the Reparation Commission without the support of the American 
government.  The department, would, however, accept a confidential assurance from the 
French government of their acceptance of an enlarged scope of the inquiry.120
 Curzon cabled Chilton to see Hughes at once, to clarify developments in the Reparation 
Committee and to convey Britain’s understanding that the first committee would have a wide 
frame of reference, including judgments on capacity to pay and moratoriums.  Hughes was 
                                                 
 118 Minute by Sir E. Crowe, 27 Nov 1923, no. 480, DBFP XXI, pp. 681-82. 
 119 Herrick to Hughes, 28 Nov 1923, FRUS 1923 II, pp. 98-101. 
 120 The State Depart had been previously informed by Harvey that Britain would not 
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 also to be informed that Britain strongly urged the United States to support the committee’s 
mission.  Hughes told Chilton on 3 December that if the scope of the inquiry was to be what 
the British understood it to be, this appeared to be satisfactory, but he wanted to know the 
nature of the promise given by Barthou and to be assured that Poincaré would not insist on 
last-minute changes.  Hughes reserved final judgment until this information was supplied by 
the British.121     
 On 3 December, at Stresemann’s request, Wiedfeldt met with Hughes and informed him 
that Bradbury was working on another compromise.  Although Germany would not be 
invited to the conference, Stresemann urged American participation; at the very least, the 
United States should send observers who could become active participants if matters worked 
out satisfactorily.  The next day, Wiedfeldt found Hughes still skeptical of the possibility of 
success.  Hughes told Wiedfeldt that as long as there were no actual assurances that the 
experts’ mandate would be usefully expanded, he would continue to reject the invitation.  
The danger was too great that the endeavor would fail, something neither the administration 
nor the Republican Party could afford.122    
 In the Reparation Committee, Logan and Delacroix concocted a letter for Barthou to send 
to Logan for transmittal to Hughes, elaborating the scope of the first committee and asking 
the United States to acquiesce in the participation of American experts.  In forwarding 
                                                 
 121 Curzon to Chilton, 1 Dec 1923, no. 481, DBFP XXI, pp. 683-85. 
 122 Wiedfeldt was told that the State Department had been working closely the whole 
month with the British.  The American position was that France’s insistence that the experts 
committee by advisory to the Reparation Commission was seen as only a formality that 
would allow France to save face.  The United States would not have rejected the compromise 
of 30 November if it had not heard that Poincaré would reject it.  Wiedfeldt noted that 
Hughes was personally hurt by the behavior of the French.  Stresemann to Wiedfeldt, 3 Dec 
1923, Nr. 35, ADAP IX, pp. 83-84; Wiedfeldt to AA, 17 Dec 1923, Nr. 66, ADAP IX, pp. 
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 Barthou’s invitation on 6 December, Logan added his own assurances that “the Reparation 
Commission would ask the experts to give it in all sincerity their professional opinion on the 
questions submitted to them” meant there would be no restrictions on the total amount of 
German reparation indebtedness or the time period of years which could be considered.123   
 Curzon instructed Chilton “to do what we reasonably can to overcome the scruples of the 
American government without at the same time assuming to direct a responsibility for their 
ultimate participation.”  The British reaffirmed to Hughes that the proposal was an 
independent undertaking of the Reparation Commission, not the result of governmental 
discussions between Britain and France.  The proposal was designed to secure a 
comprehensive inquiry but not in a form that would immediately and directly challenge 
Poincaré.   Bathou had agreed that if the experts recommended the reduction of Germany’s 
capital debt, the French experts would disassociate themselves from the recommendation but 
would not seek to restrict the liberty of the other experts’ proposals.  Bradbury did not 
believe that there would be any attempt to restrict the inquiry, because he had made it clear to 
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 123 Herrick (Logan) to Hughes, 6 Dec 1923, FRUS 1923 II, pp. 102-4.  Logan’s optimistic 
assumptions were not shared by Bradbury.  While there was nothing in the letter that went 
back on Barthou’s private assurances, Bradbury considered its tone as “ far more appropriate 
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to fight Poincaré “when, but not until, he thinks it is politically safe to do so.”  Bradbury 
cautioned that he believed that the more conciliatory attitude on the part of the French was 
due to their nervousness about the outcome of the British 6 December elections and that after 
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488, DBFP XXI, pp. 703-5 and n. 3. 
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 the French that any such attempt would result in a British withdrawal from it.124    
 When Chilton saw Hughes on 7 December, Hughes was noncommittal, asking Chilton to 
return in a few days.125   On that same day, after Wiedfeldt met with Coolidge to again urge 
American participation, he received a call from Hughes upon his return to the embassy. 
When he met with Hughes, he was told that Hughes, like the president, felt a great 
responsibility in the matter and although he had received no official or confidential 
information that negotiations in the Reparation Commission would widen the experts 
mandate, Hughes and Coolidge had decided to take the risk based on British assurances and 
the gravity of the situation in Europe.  The United States would accept an invitation to 
participate and appoint a representative of great authority, who would be the key to widening 
the mandate. 
 Hughes observed that because opinion in the United States and Congress was still split, it 
was important that Germany provide a written request for American participation.  American 
policy must be seen as nonpartisan, and American actions as both on the behalf and at the 
behest of all Europe.  After a quick consultation with Berlin, Wiedfeldt presented Hughes 
with the required note.126  From Wiedfeldt’s account it is clear that Hughes made his 
decision on 7 December.   In Wiedfeldt’s report to the Auswärtige Amt, he noted that 
American electoral considerations played an important role in the decisions.127  After years 
                                                 
 124 Ibid.
 125 Chilton to Curzon, 11 Dec 1923, no. 490, DBFP XXI, pp. 708-9. 
 126 Wiedfeldt to AA, 17 Dec 1923, Nr. 66, ADAP IX, pp. 163-67; Wiedfeldt to Hughes, 7 
Dec 1923, FRUS 1923 II, pp. 104-5. 
 127 Wiedfeldt’s account mentions that during his meeting with Hughes, Hughes had a 
long telegram on his desk which he kept glancing at during the conversation.  It is very 
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 of failed negotiations, many in the Republican Party were skeptical about the success of the 
committee and feared that the party would pay a price in the 1924 elections if this plan also 
collapsed after the administration had backed it.  But Wiedfeldt noted that it was important to 
the Republicans to attract the German vote, which had been voicing strong complaints about 
the lack of the administrations activity during the crisis.128
 Hughes accepted the Reparation Commission invitation on 11 December, carefully 
incorporating Barthou’s formulation allowing for full inquiry and making no mention of 
Poincaré’s restrictions.  Poincaré’s roadblock had been circumvented by phrasing the inquiry 
into Germany’s capacity to pay in different terminology.  In keeping with American policy, 
Hughes stipulated that the United States would be represented through private American 
experts rather than official representatives of the government.129   
 When Hughes was asked by Chilton on 11 December whether he expected any trouble 
with Congress over the acceptance of the invitation, Hughes replied that he believed that 
Hiram Johnson (a progressive and isolationist senator from California) and his adherents 
would attempt to raise criticism over it, but since all the Allied powers and Germany had 
invited the participation of America “no one could say that it was a pro-French , pro-British 
or pro German scheme.”130   Hughes had covered all his bases and protected the 
administration from domestic criticism; now, he wanted matters to proceed quickly before 
the situation in Germany, and Europe as a whole, deteriorated.   
                                                                                                                                                       
possible that this was Logan’s telegram of 6 December. Wiedfeldt to AA, 17 Dec 1923, Nr. 
66, ADAP IX, pp. 163-67. 
 128 Ibid.
 129 Hughes to Herrick (Logan), 11 Dec 1923, FRUS 1923 II, pp. 105-6. 
 130 Chilton to Curzon, 11 Dec 1923, no. 490, DBFP XXI, pp. 708-9. 
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Conclusion 
 America’s goal was a peaceful reconstruction of Europe that would benefit American 
financial and commercial interests and satisfy its desire to view itself as a force for good in 
the world.  The reconstruction of Germany was viewed as essential to these goals, which had 
been threatened by the reparation dispute, which in turn had led to the French occupation of 
the Ruhr.   During the Cuno government when Germany was making reparation offers 
deemed inadequate by the Allies, and American opinion was predominantly pro-French, 
there had been little incentive for America to intervene.  
 Stresemann’s recognition that German foreign policy was dependent on economic reform 
within Germany, and his hard decision not only to give up passive resistance and initiate 
domestic reform but also to accept the political and personal consequences, was a major 
turning point.  Unlike Cuno, who continually looked for assistance from abroad, Stresemann 
insisted that Germany’s foreign policy was linked to domestic reforms that would allow 
credible assurances of its ability to pay reparations.   In addition, Stresemann’s fundamental 
belief that the United States was essential to Germany’s success made him willing to follow 
America’s policy leads.  This changed the State Department’s initial skepticism about him 
and began a change in the general American opinion about Germany.  Stresemann also 
deserves credit for holding Germany together, for as Coolidge and Hughes made clear, if 
Germany fell apart there would be no chance for American intervention.   
 After the cessation of passive resistance, it was generally expected that negotiations 
would begin.  Even when France refused, instead tightening its hold on the Ruhr and 
Rhineland, British policy remained divided and uncertain, waiting for France to accept 
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 negotiations.  Hughes wisely chose to bide his time. The new Republican administration of 
Calvin Coolidge could not afford an embarrassing political failure that would leave it open to 
attacks by isolationist Republicans and partisan Democrats still smarting over the defeat of 
the Versailles treaty.  While Coolidge, under some domestic and international pressure, was 
willing to re-offer Hughes’s expert committee proposal in early October, both he and Hughes 
recognized that the time was inopportune.  An experts committee could not be imposed on 
France; it had to be accepted.  France, however, was pursuing a policy of attempting to 
satisfy its security needs in the Rhineland and had little interest in an experts committee.   
 But by late October, France had gone “too far.”  Its actions had pushed Germany to the 
point of economic collapse and potential political disintegration.  In attempting to satisfy its 
security needs, France had converted the economic problem of reparations into a political 
issue that threatened the stability of Europe.  Britain had become more actively involved but 
could not manage the crisis on its own.  It required the involvement of the United States with 
its promise to aid European reconstruction.  It was this political crisis that brought Hughes to 
engage in forceful diplomacy meant to compel France to accept an experts committee inquiry 
that satisfied the United States’s requirement for its scope to be wide enough to achieve 
useful results.   
 When France refused to concede to Hughes’s demand, he faced the difficult choice of 
whether or not to accept an undocumented compromise forged in the Reparation 
Commission.  If he did not accept the compromise, he risked being blamed for the collapse of 
Germany and the loss of the important German-American vote in the 1924 election.  If he 
accepted the proposal, and it failed because the experts committee was ultimately frustrated 
by Poincaré, he risked endangering the Republicans in the 1924 election.  Hughes deserves 
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 credit for taking the risk and making the correct political decision.  
 This analysis departs sharply from that of Werner Link, who argues that American policy 
was guided by economic concerns.  According to Link, the United States remained inactive 
in the first half of 1923 because American exports increased due to the lack of German 
competition, while in the second half of 1923, the chaos of the Ruhr crisis resulted in 
decreased American exports, which led America to intervene on behalf of American trade.  
He dates the American decision to intervene to summer 1923, when the dumping of steel 
depressed world prices.131  This conclusion, however, ignores the fact that both Coolidge and 
Hughes, the ones responsible for political decisions, opposed American intervention until 
October.  Furthermore, Britain, which was more affected by unemployment, did not note or 
complain about depressed steel prices until mid-October.   
 Link further postulates that Hughes’s decision to accept participation in the experts 
committee was made on 5 November and that his refusal on 9 November was a bluff.  This 
hypothesis discounts Wiedfeldt’s account and de-emphasizes work done in the Reparation 
Commission by Bradbury and Logan (who deserve much credit for their efforts) to forge a 
compromise.  It also ignores that fact that Hughes needed reassurance from Britain before 
accepting the compromise. While there is no question that Hughes hoped pressure on 
Poincaré would lead to a satisfactory compromise and that Europe’s need for American 
involvement and money would confer a leading role in the experts committee on America, 
Hughes took a risk; he did not run a bluff.   His decision opened the way for the Dawes Plan 
that would emerge from the experts committee, paving the way for a resolution of the general 
European crisis that had been building since 1921 and allowing for the reconstruction of 
                                                 
 131 Werner Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, pp.  203-10 and “Die 
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 Germany.   
                                                                                                                                                       
Vereinigten Staaten und der Ruhrkonflict,” p.  47. 
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 Chapter VII 
The Commercial Treaty 
 
 
Introduction 
 Like the negotiation of the Berlin Treaty and the Mixed Claims Agreement before it, the 
history of the German-American commercial treaty of 1923 provides a good illustration of 
both the mutuality and the constraints under which German-American relations operated in 
the years of crisis following America’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles.  Once again, 
Secretary of State Hughes struggled to maintain control of policy, in this case commercial 
policy based on an “unconditional” most-favored-nation principle, against the interference of 
Congress and outside interests.  Hughes, representing the internationalists within the 
Republican administration, sought to steer a new course for American commercial policy, 
endeavoring to establish a liberal world trading order based on free trade and the Open Door, 
a policy begun under the Wilson administration. 
 Germany, embroiled in the Ruhr conflict, had sought a new commercial agreement with 
the United States since the reestablishment of relations in 1921 and desperately needed a 
political success and the stabilizing influence an American commercial treaty would bring.  
With the commercial restrictions placed on Germany at Versailles about to lapse, Germany 
also wished to re-orient its trade policies and looked to the liberal trading system as a means 
of revising the Versailles system.   Hughes presented a model treaty for Germany to sign, 
based on American goals and the political necessities imposed by the Coolidge 
administration’s contentious relationship with Congress.  German diplomatic blundering 
allowed the State Department to once again press the Germans into a quick signing, but 
despite these well-worn tactics, the commercial treaty demonstrated that there was a great 
degree of mutuality of interests between the two nations.  
 In the end, Hughes was not able to avoid conflict with the Senate over the German 
commercial treaty, due in part to its free-trade principles but mainly to the personal 
animosities that had grown since the acrimonious fight over the ratification of the Treaty of 
Versailles.  Eventually the commercial treaty would have to be passed literally over the dead 
body of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Henry Cabot Lodge, and even 
then the model German treaty would fail in its ultimate goal of establishing the Open Door 
policy in Europe.  For the Germans, however, the commercial treaty would represent a moral 
and tangible success.  The commercial treaty, in German eyes, bound the two sister republics 
together in a community of interest in a liberal trading order, free from the constraints 
represented by the economic provisions of the Versailles system.  The treaty also represented 
the first successful step in Stresemann’s policy of revisionism.  Tangibly, along with the 
loans associated with the Dawes plan, the commercial treaty brought American engagement 
with Germany that stabilized the Weimar republic during its few good years of the late 
1920s.  
 Historians have interpreted the significance of the German-American commercial treaty 
in varying ways.  The treaty is often cited as an example of the thrust of American policy 
toward Germany in general or as an example of German-American cooperation in the 
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Stresemann period.1   Only Werner Link, Peter Buckingham and Elisabeth Glaser-Schmidt 
have analyzed the treaty to any extent.2   Glaser-Schmidt places it in the context of restoring 
a liberal world trading order after the first world war and the mutuality of interests existing 
between Germany and the United States.  Buckingham examines the treaty as part of the 
failed attempt to establish the Open Door in Europe and focuses on Hughes’s efforts to 
reorient the basis of American commercial policy.  Werner Link, writing from the economic 
deterministic perspective influenced by William A. Williams, covers the treaty both from the 
perspective of American economic expansion and German political and economic interests.  
In regard to German-American relations, Link’s valuable study has been highly influential, 
although his discussion is somewhat marred by the necessity of fitting the treaty into his 
overall thesis of America’s strive for economic dominance. 
 This chapter will place the commercial treaty in the context of German-American 
relations in the critical years 1923-1924.  The history of the treaty reveals the motivations, 
goals and determinants of American and German policy.  In this way, the history of the treaty 
is best understood as a political story rather than an economic one.   As a vehicle for 
establishing an American-dominated liberal world trading order, the treaty proved to be a 
failure.  It is in the political context of Germany and Europe’s great crisis that the real 
significance of the German-American commercial treaty lies.  
 By summer 1923, Hughes was finally prepared to submit a draft commercial treaty to the 
Germans.  A commercial treaty with the United States outside of the commerce restrictions 
                                                          
 1 Some examples are Parrini, Heir to Empire; Jonas, The United States and Germany;  
Berg, Gustav Stresemann und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. 
 2 Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik; Buckingham, International Normalcy; 
Glaser-Schmidt, “German and American Concepts to Restore a Liberal World Trading 
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of Versailles had been a goal of German diplomacy since the reestablishment of relations in 
1921.  Indeed, the negotiation of such a treaty had been one of the most important reasons for 
the appointment of the businessman Wiedfeldt as ambassador to Washington.  Likewise 
Houghton, also a former businessman, had assumed that negotiation of a new commercial 
treaty would be one of his main concerns as ambassador.3   But the State Department was in 
no rush to begin negotiations.  Castle replied to Dresel’s prompting: 
 It does not seem to that we can authorize you to say to the Germans that we would 
welcome the commencement of negotiations for a commercial treaty.  We do not 
particularly care at the moment whether there is such a treaty or not, but we know 
perfectly well that the Germans would like to have one.  Therefore, if they want to 
begin negotiations, we should probably be reasonably agreeable about it, but we do 
not want to lose our present strong position by ourselves suggesting the opening of 
such negotiations.4
 
 
 Houghton also prompted the department to begin negotiations soon after his arrival in 
Berlin.  Hoping to capitalize on the good will created by the exchange of ambassadors, he 
suggested that it would do wonders for relations if a commercial treaty was offered rather 
than “held as a club over their heads to obtain a settlement of the Alien Property.”5   But 
Hughes preferred to wait until after negotiations for the Mixed Claims Agreement, where the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
System.” 
 3 Ernst Schröder, Otto Wiedfeldt: Eine Biographie, p. 123; Alanson B. Houghton Diary, 1 
Apr 1922.  For German hopes for further negotiations following the ratification of the Treaty 
of Berlin, see Amerikanisches Angebot eines Friedensvertrags (Unsigned, Undated), ADAP 
V, pp. 216-17.  
 4Castle to Dresel, 16 Feb 1922, file 51, Castle Papers.  Castle also expressed his 
annoyance with the attitude of Hoover who had recently published a letter regarding the 
commercial treaty: “It is another instance of the Department of Commerce butting in where 
angles fear to tread.” 
 5 Note on Houghton’s interview with Haniel, 5 May 1922, RG 59, 711.622/18, DSNA; 
Schubert to Wiedfeldt, 9 May 1922, Botschaft Washington, Po2a, 959; Houghton to Castle, 6 
Jun 1922, file 51, Castle Papers. 
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prospect of a commercial treaty could be used as leverage. 
 
The New Departure in American Commercial Policy 
 The negotiations the Mixed Claims agreement, however, was not the only reason to delay 
presentation of a commercial treaty to Germany.   While writing to congratulate Houghton on 
the conclusion of the claims agreement, Hughes confided: 
 I should say, however, in confidence, that there is under consideration a new 
departure with respect to our commercial treaties in relation to the most favored 
nation clause.  This is a matter which affects several treaties that we have in course of 
preparation and is of such great importance that it requires deliberation and the 
consideration of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee.  I regret that it 
should even for a short time delay the negotiation of a commercial treaty with 
Germany, and that the reason for the delay cannot now be stated.6    
 
 
 Hughes had in mind a reordering of American commercial policies to reflect America’s 
new position in the international economy following the World War, in line with the 
administration’s commitment to the “liberal world trading system,” the Open Door policy.7   
The United States had emerged from the war as the world’s leading creditor, and a new 
dependence on foreign markets left American exports vulnerable to discriminatory tariffs.  
Most existing trade agreements were far out of date; many dating from the period before the 
Civil War and certainly did not reflect the radically changed conditions of the post- world 
war American economy.8  Hughes postulated a set of new commercial agreements based on 
                                                          
 6 Hughes to Houghton, 23 Aug 1922, reel 28, container 41, Hughes Papers, Library of 
Congress, Manuscript Division. 
 7 The Phase is Glaser-Schmidt’s, who defines liberal in this sense as “lines of conduct 
aimed at nondiscrimination and the creation of a new framework of international capitalistic 
growth.” Elizabeth Glaser-Schmidt, “German and American Concepts to Restore a Liberal 
World Trading System,” p. 354. 
 8For example, the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1 May 1828, between the 
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the use of the unconditional most-favored-nation clause, whereby there could be no 
discrimination against the trade of one nation in favor of another and any concession to a 
third nation must automatically be extended to the second party to the treaty.  The 
unconditional most-favored-nation agreements, along with the new Fordney-McCumber 
Tariff of 1922 with its penalty provision (Sec. 317), were meant to assure that the Open Door 
policy would be implemented among American trading partners.9  
 This concept was a break from the traditional “conditional” most-favored-nation policy 
followed by the United States where concessions were granted only for equivalent 
consideration.  The vagaries of what constituted equivalent consideration or compensation 
often allowed the United States to gain benefits gratuitously, without having to give anything 
in return.  Protectionists objected to abandoning the traditional policy for the “unconditional” 
form, which would provide equal reciprocal treatment for America’s trading partners with no 
conditions for concessions.   Although the “conditional” form of the most-favored-nation 
clause had seemed to serve the interests of the United States in the late nineteenth century, 
when much-needed foodstuffs and raw materials formed the bulk of its exports, the shift 
toward increased exports of manufactured goods had changed the situation to the 
disadvantage of the United States. .  In the face of increased discrimination against American 
manufactured products, switching to an unconditional most-favored-nation policy would 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
United States and Prussia. 
 9 For Hughes’s conception of the unconditional most-favored-nation principle, see 
Beerits Memorandum, “The Commercial Treaty With Germany,” reel 140, cont. 182, Hughes 
Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, pp. 3-6; Hughes to American Diplomatic 
Officers, 18 Aug 1923, FRUS 1923 I, pp. 131-33; Peter Buckingham, International 
Normalcy, pp. 153-61; Carl P. Parrini, Heir to Empire, United States Economic Diplomacy, 
1916-1923, pp. 235-43. 
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serve to enforce equality of treatment for American goods.10
 In December 1922, Acting Chairman of the Tariff Commission William S. Culbertson 
wrote a memorandum to Hughes urging the overhaul of the commercial treaty structure of 
the United States with the new treaties to be negotiated.  Culbertson explained that in 
practice, the old conditional most-favored-nation construct had broken down under the 
modern tariffs regulations, so that “tariff negotiations have developed into statistical 
controversies over the relative value of the concessions to be made,” making it “almost 
impossible to arrive at any agreement upon the equivalent concessions to be made by a third 
party.”  Culbertson summed up the present situation: 
 Instead of contributing to equality of commercial opportunity among nations, it 
has become the support of discriminatory reciprocity treaties - a policy again rejected 
by Congress within the last few months.  
 
 
 To best advance the “open door” principle of equality of treatment in trade for all trading 
nations, Culbertson recommended the unconditional form of the most-favored-nation clause 
to Hughes as “the simplest application to commercial intercourse between nations of the 
                                                          
 10 An example of the conditional form of the most-favored-nation clause in treaty 
relationships would be if country A reduced its duties on American goods in return for 
similar reductions, country B, which also had a conditional treaty with the U.S., could only 
claim those reductions provided for country A if equivalent compensation were made.  Under 
the proposed unconditional form of the most-favored-nation clause, all nations in an 
unconditional treaty relationship with the United States would automatically receive any 
concessions made without the condition of compensation.  The United States would also be 
freed from having to offer compensations for concessions claimed, thus promoting an 
environment of free trade.  For the workings of the most-favored-nation clause in treaties and 
the differences between the conditional and unconditional forms, see Beerits Memorandum, 
“The Commercial treaty with Germany,” Hughes Papers, pp. 4-5; Jacob Viner, “The Most-
Favored-Nation Clause in American Commercial Treaties,” International Economics 
(Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 17-39; Richard Carlton Snyder, The Most-Favored-
Nation Clause (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1948), especially pp. 211-22. 
 344 
equality-of-treatment principle and tends powerfully to prevent discriminations against third 
countries and all the ill-feeling, distrust, retaliation, and international friction incident 
thereto.”11   Hughes forwarded Culbertson’s memorandum to Henry Cabot Lodge, Chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who found it “very convincing,” and to President 
Harding, who endorsed it on 27 February 1923.  The unconditional most-favored-nation 
principle had become the administration’s policy.12
 With these goals in mind, Hughes convened an interdepartmental committee of advisors 
drawn from State, Treasury and Commerce to draft a model treaty of amity, commerce and 
consular rights built around the unconditional most-favored-nation principle.   The 
committee finished its work in June 1923.13   As this was intended as a model treaty, Hughes 
had to decide to which nation the model should first be offered.  Hughes had promised 
Germany a commercial treaty following the conclusion of the Mixed Claims Agreement in 
August 1922, and by summer 1923, Germany was most anxious to conclude a treaty.   
Therefore Hughes looked to Germany as the best candidate to be presented with the model 
treaty, especially as it could be assumed negotiations would go smoothly and German 
acceptance was guaranteed.14   A new French two-column tariff, based on reciprocity 
                                                          
 11 Culbertson to Hughes, 14 Dec 1922, FRUS 1923 I, pp. 121-26.  Culbertson’s memo 
was written at the request of Hughes as the culmination of a series of discussions with 
Hughes regarding the proposed change of policy. 
 12 Lodge to Hughes, 8 Jan 1923 and Harding to Hughes, 27 Feb 1923, FRUS 1923 I, pp. 
126, 128. For the formation of unconditional most-favored-nation policy see FRUS 1923 I, 
pp. 121-33 and Parrini, Heir to Empire, pp. 235-42.  For adoption as administration policy, 
Joan Hoff Wilson, American Business & Foreign Policy, 1920-1933 , pp. 80-81. 
 13Beerits Memorandum, “The Commercial treaty with Germany,” Hughes Papers, p. 2. 
 14 There was an aborted attempt to negotiate a prototype of the model treaty with Spain in 
May 1923, also built around the unconditional most-favored-nation principle.  Spain had 
denounced the 1906 commercial treaty with the United States requiring what the U.S. had 
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(bilateral as opposed to unconditional) provided additional motivation.  The State 
Department adopted the strategy of presenting the unconditional most-favored-nation model 
treaty to the former Central Powers and successor states of Europe, which needed to 
renegotiate their commercial treaties with the United States in any case, as a means of 
breaking the discriminatory French reciprocity tariff.  After Germany, the model commercial 
treaty would be offered to Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.15
 The State Department had yet another reason for picking Germany to introduce the new 
model treaty.  It was expected that Germany, especially a stabilized Germany, would become 
an important trading partner for the United States.  Before the war, Germany had been 
rapidly growing into a major market for U.S. exports and this trend was projected to 
accelerate in the postwar era if stabilization was achieved.  German stabilization and 
economic recovery were still very much open questions when the treaty was presented to 
Germany in summer 1923.  Nevertheless, with an unconditional most-favored-nation based 
commercial treaty with Germany in place, the United States would be in a better position to 
capitalize on a recovered German market than competitor producers.  The advice to the State 
Department from its diplomats in Germany was emphatic: “The time to start is now; let 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
hoped would be a quick renegotiation.  Spain, however, in its rejection of the unconditional 
most-favored-nation principle, demanded tariff reductions and provisions for the importation 
of wine.  Despite certain concession by Hughes and the threat of retaliatory tariffs under 
Section 317 of the new Tariff Act, negotiations broke down in July.  By then, the model 
treaty was ready to be presented to Germany, where its success was far more likely.  The 
treaty drafts were nearly identical.   There is no mention of failed Spanish negotiations in the 
Beerits Memorandum of the Hughes Papers.  For the failed negotiations with Spain, see 
FRUS 1923 II, pp. 831-74. 
 15 The use of the Commercial Treaty to pressure France in regard to tariffs is well 
covered in Carl P. Parrini, Heir to Empire, pp. 241-42, and Buckingham, International 
Normalcy, p. 162. 
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others do the waiting.”16   
 
The Draft Treaty 
 The German model treaty of friendship, commerce and consular rights, as the name 
suggests touched on more than just matters of commerce.  The treaty was also meant to 
finalize the process of normalizing ties begun by the Berlin Treaty and to lay the foundation 
for comprehensive relations.  Hughes was aware that several provisions would be especially 
advantageous to Germany; these were incorporated into the treaty “because they are deemed 
to promote justice as between the peoples of friendly States.” 
 The first six articles dealt with the rights of nationals residing in the territories of the 
other, giving the broadest possible rights to resident aliens.   The commercial articles of the 
treaty comprise articles VII through XVI.  Article VII was the conceptual core of the treaty, 
containing the unconditional most-favored-nation clause: 
    Each of the High Contracting Parties also binds itself unconditionally to impose no 
higher or other charges or other restrictions or prohibitions on goods exported to the 
territories of the other High Contracting Party than are imposed on goods exported to 
any other foreign country. 
 
 Any advantage of whatsoever kind which either High Contracting Party may 
extend to any article, the growth, produce, or manufacture of any other foreign 
country shall simultaneously und unconditionally, without request and without 
compensation, be extended to the like article the growth, produce or manufacture of 
the other High Contracting Party.  
 
                                                          
 16 Consul E. Verne Richardson in his report “Prospects of American Export to Germany,” 
Quoted in Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, p. 193.  Link has an interesting 
discussion of U.S. motivations regarding Germany and the treaty, pp. 190-93.  Link sees 
three main reasons the U.S. picked Germany: first, as an export land, Germany would be 
interested in accepting the unconditional most-favored-nation principle; second, it would 
wish to place U.S. exports to Germany in a favorable position following stabilization; third, 
Germany’s weakened position would allow the U.S. to get what it wanted in negotiations.  
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 The United States allowed itself a reservation for Cuba, due to the special political and 
geographic relationship. No reservation would be allowed, however, for a German customs 
union with Austria.  The treaty also contained a reservation stating that rights of transit 
through the Panama Canal were governed by other international agreements. But on the 
whole, commercial relations were to be based on a reciprocal footing.  Many of the articles 
concerning commercial travelers were drawn from recent agreements made with Latin 
American countries, the provisions of which the United States wanted to make a standard. 
Articles XVII-XXVIII concerned consular rights.  Hughes anticipated no difficulties with his 
draft treaty, writing to Houghton, “It may be said with entire candor that this treaty embodies 
no attempt whatever to attain by sharp bargaining any undue advantage over a friendly state, 
or to request any peculiar favor which the United States is not itself ready to offer in 
return.”17
  The draft treaty was presented by Hughes to Ambassador Wiedfeldt on 25 July 1923.  
The State Department had already decided that negotiations would be held in Washington, 
where Hughes could directly supervise.  Assistant Secretary of State Harrison advised Castle 
that, “all other factors being equal, it would be to our advantage to have these treaties 
negotiated in Washington,” further noting that as the Germans are anxious “to have the treaty 
negotiated and concluded as soon as possible,” they are not likely to object on this point.”18   
With the invitation to begin negotiations,  Hughes immediately pointed out the importance of 
                                                          
 17 Draft treaty marked “Final copy,” enclosed with Hughes to Wiedfeldt, 25 July 1923, 
RG 59, 711.622/2a; Hughes to Houghton, 3 Au 1923, RG 59, 711.622/22A.    
 18 Harrison to Castle, 19 July 1923, 711.62/21; Castle tells Houghton the Germans would 
prefer to have the treaty negotiated in Berlin.  Castle to Houghton, 31 July 1923, file 51, 
Castle Papers. 
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Article VII which  “makes full provision for the enjoyment of the of the most favored nation 
clause in its unconditional form.” Houghton was informed a few days earlier that the 
negotiations would soon begin in Washington and was forwarded a copy of the treaty along 
with an explanation of the terms and purposes so that he might, if required, answer any 
questions by the German Foreign Office directly.  Hughes expected the negotiations to go 
forward smoothly.  Castle echoed the opinion of his chief, writing to Houghton, “It seems to 
me a wonderfully fair document, inasmuch as we ask nothing that we are not willing to give 
ourselves.”1  9
 The counselor of the German Embassy, Karl von Lewinski, personally delivered a copy 
of the draft to Berlin. The Foreign Office was pleased to have a treaty on the table.  The idea 
of a liberal world trading system developed by the Republican administration and State 
Department corresponded well to the desired commercial policy of the young German 
Republic whose overarching goal was to reestablish the commercial sovereignty lost at 
Versailles.  The Auswärtige Amt was particularly friendly to the idea of a liberal system of 
foreign commerce and a return of most-favored-nation status, lost for five years under the 
Treaty of Versailles, as a means of relief from trade discrimination suffered since the end of 
the war.  A liberal trade policy was promulgated as the best means to reintegrate Germany as 
an equal partner in the world economy.20   The American commercial treaty represented, 
therefore, a major step towards the revision of the Versailles system. 
 As had been assumed by the Germans since the end of 1918, closer relations with the 
                                                          
 19 Hughes to Wiedfeldt, 25 July 1923, RG59, 711.622/2/a and FRUS1923 II, p. 22; 
Hughes to Houghton, 20 July 1923, RG59, 711.622/20A; Hughes to Houghton, 3 Aug 1923, 
RG59, 711.622/22A; Castle to Houghton, 25 July 1923, file 51, Castle Papers. 
 20 On German concepts of liberal commercial policy, see Glaser-Schmidt, “German and 
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United States, economic or otherwise, were the key to German recovery and revision.  The 
proposal of amity, commerce and consular rights was in itself a diplomatic victory.  This e 
was especially true in the context of American coolness towards the German situation since 
the onset of the Ruhr crisis.  Germany felt at last recognized by the United States as a sister 
republic holding mutual, liberal values and as an equal partner in reconstruction of world 
trade.21
 Negotiation and acceptance of the German treaty did not, however, move as quickly as 
the State Department would have hoped.  Despite German satisfaction with the principles 
embodied in the draft treaty and German enthusiasm for a commercial treaty with the United 
States,   the draft treaty languished in Berlin for several months following its delivery by von 
Lewinski.   It was certainly not the best time for it to receive consideration in Germany. The   
Cuno government had fallen on 12 August, just as von Lewinski would have been arriving 
with the official copy of the treaty.  Likewise, the first Stresemann government fell on 3 
October, only to be reorganized three days later amid of political chaos; just as consideration 
of the draft treaty was beginning in earnest.  Conditions within Germany, on the brink of 
economic collapse and political dislocation following the prolonged stress of passive 
resistance, inhibited decisive action on the part of the Foreign Office. 
 Despite the domestic chaos, German foreign office experts began the study of the draft in 
late September under the direction of Karl von Stockhammern, the commissioner for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
American Concepts to Restore a Liberal World Trading System,” esp. pp. 357-59. 
 21 “Zum deutsch-amerikanischen Handelsvertrag,” Handakten Ritter, Amerika, Bd.3, 
R105561, PA-AA; Wiedfeldt to Berlin, 8 Dec 1923, Abt. III, Politische Beziehungen der 
Ver. Staaten von Amerika zu Deutschland, B.6, R80136 (hereafter Abt.III, USA) ; Ernst 
Schröder, Otto Wiedfeldt, pp. 135-36. For discussion of German political and economic 
interest in the treaty, see Werner Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik in 
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commercial treaty negotiations.  By and large they were quite satisfied with what the 
Americans were offering. On 1 October, Dieckhoff was requested to ask the State 
Department for only two minor points of clarification regarding definition of terms.22   
Washington replied with a satisfactory answer on 10 October.23  
 Representatives of various departments and German states met in the Foreign Office to 
discuss the draft treaty on 11, 12, and 15 October.  Wiedfeldt, who was in Berlin at this time 
of political crisis, participated in the earlier meetings and lent his support for acceptance.   It 
was agreed that the proposed treaty dovetailed with German commercial policy objectives 
and the revisionist principle of reciprocity.  The opinion of the Reichswirtschaftsministerium 
[Ministry of Economics] was that the treaty “so surprisingly favorable” that it should be 
adopted as soon as possible.24  The use of the unconditional most-favored-nation clause was  
welcomed as it stood in marked contrast to the Entente” restriction imposed at  Versailles, 
under which Germany was required to give most-favored-nation treatment without 
reciprocity for five years.25  There was some discussion of what  the most-favored-nation 
clause mean for the concessions given in the Treaty of Versailles and the “productive 
pledges” given to the French in the Ruhr.  Wiedfeldt doubted that Washington would 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Deutschland, 1921-32 , pp. 194-99. 
 22 The points of clarification regarded the State Departments understanding of the phrase 
“or going through” in regard to the passage of persons and goods in Article XVI and the 
definition of “sodium” regarding reciprocal mineral mining privileges in Article XIII.   
 23 Dieckhoff to State Department, 1 Oct 1923, RG59, 711.622/23; Phillips to Houghton, 
19 Oct 1923; ibid; Wiedfeldt to AA, 8 Dec 1923, Abt. III, USA, K321444. 
 24 Quoted in Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, p. 194. 
 25Treaty of Versailles, Articles 264-267 and 280, FRUS, The Paris Peace Conference 
1919, vol. XII;  A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, ed. H.W.V. Temperley, vol.V 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1924), p. 73. 
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interpret the treaty provisions, but regardless, he was of the opinion that “better American 
capital in the Ruhr then French or English.”2   6  The result of these positive discussions of the 
draft were instructions sent to Wiedeldt on 6 November giving him a free hand to negotiate 
the treaty. 27
 
The German Indiscretion 
 Following its corporatist tradition, a tradition only strengthened in the early Weimar 
Republic, the German government consulted with leading and trusted businessmen and 
organizations on matters of commercial policy.  Copies of the draft treaty had been sent out 
to these Vertrauensleute [trusted advisors] with requests for criticism.28   This time, however, 
this time-honored practice would have adverse consequences for the treaty negotiation and 
endanger all-important relations with the United States just at the moment of their greatest 
success.   
 Due perhaps to the overarching corporatist proclivities of the early Weimar Republic, 
where industrial interests predominated, the loop of trusted advisors had been cast rather too 
wide and the draft treaty found its way into the hands of businessmen who either did not 
understand or did not care that it was meant to be kept secret.  Despite Wiedfeldt’s constant 
warnings that the Foreign Office should be very wary of the various German-American 
interest groups that had cropped up, a copy of the draft treaty found its way into the hands of 
a Syndicus, or corporate lawyer, of the trade organization Zentralverband des Deutschen 
                                                          
 26 Quoted in Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, p. 196.  
 27 Wiedfeldt to AA, 8 Dec 1923, Abt III, USA, K321444; “Zum deutsch-amerikanischen 
Handelsvertrag,” Handakten Ritter, Amerika, B.3; Schröder, Otto Wiedfeldt, pp. 135-36. 
 28 Houghton to Castle, 3 Dec 1923, Castle Papers. 
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Grosshandels, who passed a copy along to the very dubious Chamber of German-American 
Commerce in New York.   This organization, run by an American named Heinrich Charles, 
was just the sort of independent “interest group” of which Wiedfeldt was most wary.  Charles 
had at one point been associated with the German consulate in New York and had been a 
small thorn in the side of German diplomats ever since.  His Chamber of German-American 
Commerce began leaking information about the draft treaty to “interested parties” within the 
United States.29
 By 11 October the State Department had already begun to receive reports that the draft 
treaty had been leaked and inquiries about its provisions began to arrive soon after.30 
Considering the strong protectionist sentiment in the United States including within the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the fact that the proposed German treaty would 
signal a shift in U.S. commercial policy away from traditional protectionism, the State 
Department had cause for alarm that the draft had been.  Hughes asked Houghton to 
investigate whether the Germans had given out copies of the draft.  Houghton replied that 
indeed the Foreign Ministry had submitted drafts to trusted trade and industry organizations 
for consultation purposes, following German procedure, but no draft had been shown to the 
press or individuals. From the German point of view, the matter had been handled 
confidentially.  The Foreign Ministry was worried enough about the State Department’s 
                                                          
 29 Houghton to Castle, 3 Dec 1923, file 52, Castle Papers; Lang to AA, 8 Nov 1923, Büro 
Reichsminister, Verein. Staaten v. Nordam., R28489, PA-AA (hereafter, Reichsminister 
USA, Bd. 3), D619017; Wiedfeldt to AA, 9 Nov 1923, Reichsminister USA, Bd. 3, 
D619008. For the AA’s file on Charles see Geheim “Charles,” R30644, PA-AA.  
 30 Gladwin Bouton to Hughes, 11 Oct 1923 RG59, 711.622/24; Harrison to Charles, 29 
Oct 1923, RG 59, 711.622/27. 
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reaction that Wiedfeldt was asked to explain the German procedures and calm the waters.31  
 But by mid-November it became clear that the State Department had more than a leak on 
its hands.  Charles and his Chamber of German-American Commerce had distributed 
hundreds of copies of the German version of the draft treaty and the department was being 
bombarded with letters of inquiry from journalists, individual businessmen, organizations 
and even foreign diplomats.  Hughes did not want to appear uncandid in responding to the 
inquires, nor did he wish to discuss the draft model-treaty provisions before they were fully 
negotiated and signed.   Still worse, Congress and especially the Senate had gotten wind of it 
and were demanding to know why they had not seen the draft before it had been published.  
Senators brought the matter up with President Coolidge. This was not only embarrassing for 
Hughes but the early release of the treaty draft and the resultant inquiries before the treaty 
was signed endangered the administration’s new economic foreign policy.  As with the 
negotiations for peace with Germany in 1921 and the Mixed Claims Agreement in 1922, 
Hughes would have preferred to keep firm control over policy and negotiations.  This turn of 
events placed him in a position of great discomfort.32
 The German diplomats in Washington were quickly made to feel the displeasure of the 
State Department.  Both Dieckhoff and Wiedfeldt were taken to task at different times in late 
November.  On Wednesday, 28 November, the matter came to a head when the ambassador 
had a stormy meeting with Hughes and Castle.  Wiedfeldt noted that he had never seen 
                                                          
 31 Hughes to Houghton, 28 Oct 1923; RG 59, 711.622/27; Houghton to Hughes, 1 Nov 
1923, RG 59, 711622/28; Schubert to Wiedfeldt, 1 Nov 1923; Reichminister USA, Bd. 3, 
D618987. 
 32 Phillips to Houghton, 30 Nov 1923, FRUS, 1923 II, p. 23; Phillips to Lodge, 27 Nov 
1923, RG59, 711.622/30A; Wiedfeldt to AA, 28 Nov 1923, Reichsminister USA, Bd3, 
D619047, Wiedfeldt to AA, 28 Nov 1923, Reichminister USA, Bd3, D619049. 
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Hughes so angry.  The ambassador expressed his great regret over the indiscretion and 
assured Hughes that the embassy had nothing to do with the draft treaty becoming public.3  3   
He assured the secretary that there were “only a few points of difference between the 
American and German wishes with regard to the treaty and that possibly an early signature 
might be arranged.”34   
 But Hughes threatened that under the present conditions he would have no choice but to 
withdraw the treaty unless perhaps the Germans would be prepared to sign it right away.  
Hughes explained that he expected a long debate, given the furor in Congress, unless he 
could present them with the   fait accompli he wanted.   Wiedfeldt demurred, stating that he 
did not yet have the authorization to sign and there were still a few points the German 
government would like to have clarified.  Warning that it would be very difficult now that the 
Senate had the text to change the wording, Castle turned up the pressure on the ambassador.  
If only Wiedfeldt had the authority to sign, unpleasant discussion could be avoided in the 
Senate and the public, just now at the time when Germany was asking for food credits and 
public opinion was favoring American assistance in Europe.35
 Wiedfeldt knew that Hughes and Castle were using the situation as a means of applying 
pressure for quick acceptance.  Long debate in the Senate and public scrutiny of the incident 
                                                          
 33 The State Department was somewhat suspicious due to Charles’s earlier association 
with the New York Consulate and some funds that had been paid out to him.  Wiedfeldt 
remarked on how well-informed the State Department was, noting this was evidence of its 
outstanding intelligence service.  Wiedfeldt to AA, 8 Dec 1923, Abt. III, USA, K321450.  
 34 Hughes to Houghton, 30 Nov 1923, FRUS 1923 II, p. 23; Wiedfeldt to AA, 28 Nov 
1923, Abt. III USA, D619047. 
 35 Memorandum of interview with the German ambassador, 28 Nov 1923, reel 122, cont. 
157, Hughes Papers; Wiedfeldt to AA, 28 Nov 1923, Reichsminister USA, Bd3, D619047; 
Wiedfeldt to AA, 8 Dec 1923, Abt. III, USA, K321444. 
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were in neither party’s interest.  But the Germans needed the foreign policy victory the treaty 
represented even more than the Americans.  Accepting German fault for the indiscretion, 
Wiedfeldt did not want the Foreign Office exposed as incompetent, and he was ever mindful 
of U.S. public opinion.  On the whole the German government was quite satisfied with the 
draft treaty, so Wiedfeldt suggested what he referred to as a compromise.  Wiedfeldt would 
cable right away for the quickest possible authorization, and in the meantime they could 
discuss a few points of clarification and the most important of proposed German 
modifications.  Well aware of his weakened negotiating position, Wiedfeldt attempted to 
salvage what he could of the German wishes.  With all advantages on his side, Hughes 
accepted Wiedfeldt’s “compromise.”36
 Wiedfeldt was clearly personally embarrassed by the German indiscretion.  He had 
developed a close working relationship with both Hughes and Castle and was furious at the 
Foreign Office’s handling of the matter. He demanded that the Foreign Office investigate the 
matter and prosecute those responsible.  Stresemann suggested that Wiedfeldt should 
energetically remind the State Department that the German foreign office had acted 
according to their protocol and the only German fault lay with the Berlin lawyer who had 
broken a long- established trust. The real indiscretion had been committed by the American, 
Charles, in New York.37   The ambassador ignored this questionable tack and continued to 
place the blame squarely on the Foreign Office.  The State Department was already 
distrustful of the Foreign Office’s discretion, and this Berlin blunder did not make the 
                                                          
 36 Wiedfeldt to AA, 8 Dec 1923, Abt. III USA, Bd 6, K321444. 
 37  An investigation established that it was the Berlin lawyer Bernheimer who gave 
Charles the draft treaty.  Bernheim was to be charged with high treason. Stresemann to 
Wiedfeldt, 30 Nov 1923, Reichsminister USA, Bd3, D619054. 
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ambassador’s job any easier. 
 Wiedfeldt saw the importance of presenting Germany as an honest, reliable and 
competent partner to the United States.  As for any concessions Germany might have to 
make in the effort to achieve the primary goal of improved economic and political relations 
with the United States, they would have to be borne as the consequences of Foreign Office 
ineptitude.38 Wiedfeldt repeatedly expressed these feelings in his communications with 
Stresemann and the Foreign Office.  As an outsider to the diplomatic corps and a man of 
significant political power in his own right, Wiedfeldt allowed himself free rein to express 
his feelings.  This tendency did not make Wiedfeldt any more popular within the Foreign 
Office, but for the time being he was still regarded as necessary for the post in Washington.39   
 
The Negotiations 
 With the text, albeit the German text, of the draft treaty was out of the bag, Hughes 
wanted the final version signed as soon as possible.  He could then head off questions by 
presenting the German treaty as a done deal.  Although the State Department had been 
caught off guard by the early and unauthorized publication of the draft, it is unlikely that 
Hughes would have really pulled the treaty unless the Germans had substantially delayed 
                                                          
 38 Wiedfeldt to AA, 28 Nov 1923, Büro RM- USA, Bd3, R28489, p. 179; 8 Dec 1923, 
Abt. III USA, Bd. 6.  
 39 Stresemann and Wiedfeldt were political rivals.  This became especially true in the fall 
of 1923 as Wiedfeldt’s name came up in Germany as a possible replacement for Stresemann 
as chancellor or foreign minister and even perhaps as dictator.  Already this rivalry is 
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treaty signed, the Dawes Plan enacted and the Dawes loans secured, Wiedfeldt returned to 
Germany in February 1925.  To his replacement, Ago von Maltzan, Stresemann expressed 
his great satisfaction that the “era of Wiedfeldt” was at an end. Stresemann to Maltzan, 7 Apr 
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negotiations   Despite the snag, the model treaty remained the means to establish a new era of 
American commercial policy, and Germany was the best place to start in Europe given the 
mutuality of its commercial policy aims with those of America.  It was to be expected that 
the unconditional most-favored-nation clause would provoke a certain amount of objection 
within the senate, including the powerful Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Foreign 
Relations committee.  Hughes felt the model-treaty text developed by his interdepartmental 
commission could be nursed through the Senate without too much trouble.  As an added 
incentive, he hoped the treaty could be signed before President Coolidge’s address at the 
opening of Congress in mid-December.  Although angered by the German indiscretion, 
Hughes was happy enough to have this added leverage to force a quick signing of the treaty 
substantially as it stood.40  
 Immediately after Wiedfeldt and Castle’s confrontational meeting with Hughes on 28 
November, the German embassy wired Berlin to obtain authorization from President Ebert to 
sign the treaty.4  1   To expedite matters, Houghton in Berlin received an original copy and 
cabled confirmation to the State Department.  Discussions were held in the Auswärtige Amt 
among the representatives of the interested ministries and departments.  It was agreed that in 
view of the absolute importance of the treaty, anything that might prevent its conclusion 
should be avoided.42   As a result of these consultations, Stresemann wired Wiedfeldt with 
last-minute instructions.  In regard to the German wishes, Wiedfeldt was to press for all that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1925, H158698, NL Stresemann Bd. 23, PA-AA. 
 40 William R. Castle Diary, 28 Nov 1923, vol. 4, Houghton Library. 
 41 President Ebert and Stresemann signed the authorization on 1 Dec 1923.  See 
Wiedfeldt to Hughes, 19 Dec 1923, RG 59, 711.622/39. 
 42 Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, p. 197. 
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was possible given the circumstances.  The most important point involved a reservation to 
the most-favored-nation clause in Article VII, of the occupied Rhine and Ruhr where the 
German government was obliged to make special arrangements with the occupiers about 
imports and exports.  If the text could not be changed, then an exchange of notes dealing 
with the matter would be acceptable.  The treaty was considered so important to Germany 
that Wiedfeldt was authorized, if necessary, to sign the document without modification.43
 After the entire embassy staff worked deep into the night to prepare English translations 
of suggested German text changes and negotiations began on Friday afternoon, 30 
November, at the office of State Department Solicitor Charles Hyde.  Wiedfeldt and von 
Lewinsky were met by Hyde, Castle and three other lawyers for what the State Department 
officials thought would be a quick meeting.  According to Wiedfeldt’s account, the 
atmosphere was at first strained and the lawyers suspicious of the Germans.  A negotiating 
table had not been set up and it was clear to Wiedfeldt that the Americans wanted to settle 
the treaty without much discussion.  Ever conscious of the need for good working relations 
with the State Department, Wiedfeldt felt he needed to clear the air of lingering animosity 
from the German indiscretion.  This was especially necessary if Wiedfeldt were to convince 
the lawyers to sit down and discuss the text in a friendly, non-confrontational manner. 
 Wiedfeldt apologized for the German indiscretion and the inconvenience it had caused 
the department which made this meeting necessary, emphasizing once again that the 
Washington embassy had had nothing whatsoever to do with leak--by implication laying the 
blame with Berlin, where Wiedfeldt thought it justly belonged.  In the name of the German 
government, Wiedfeldt told the State Department officials that Germany very much 
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appreciated the treaty and that as Germany also wished to use this treaty as a model for her 
further commercial relations, there were just a few matters of language that needed to be 
cleared up.  With that, the ambassador got Castle and the lawyers to sit down.  According to 
Wiedfeldt, the discussions were concise and to the point, but conducted in the friendliest 
possible manner.44
 From the perspective of Solicitor Hyde, the German proposals were for the most part “of 
slight consequence.”  Most were resolved by a change of wording, simple explanation or in 
more important matters, agreement to provide an official letter of explanation.  Wiedfeldt 
reported that a number of the German proposals were accepted and that the State Department 
gave a satisfactory response to others.  In Hyde’s estimation, the major German proposal 
referred to the question of property confiscation in Article I of the draft, which provided 
“property shall not be taken without due process of law and without the payment of just 
compensation.”  Because Germany’s constitution permitted confiscation of property without 
compensation under certain circumstances, Wiedfeldt pointed out that the provision might e a 
violation of Germany’s fundamental law.  The ambassador further explained that while it 
was unlikely the Reichstag would ever avail itself of this right in regard to the property of 
American citizens, there was a strong feeling that the Constitution should not be interfered 
with.  The matter was settled with a letter of understanding noting that the provision did not 
contemplate yielding anything that German constitution forbade and therefore was not a 
violation of that document.45
 Due to the short time available to prepare the German modifications, Wiedfeldt and von 
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Lewinsky concentrated on the most important issues, although Wiedfeldt admitted to the 
Foreign Office that some useful improvements necessarily fell by the wayside.46   The main 
trouble was that the Americans had very little understanding of European laws and 
geography and, according to Wiedfeldt, it took lots of time to explain these things to the 
State Department jurists.  While the State Department allowed itself an exception to the 
most-favored-nation clause for Cuba, based on special economic ties and geography, for 
example, Germany was denied the possibility of an eventual customs union with Austria.  A 
tense moment arose when the jurists suddenly revoked the concession regarding reciprocity 
in coastal shipping, most likely under orders from Hughes.4   7 The Germans quickly gave in 
when they were brusquely informed that as a result of the German indiscretion, such an 
alteration would be noticed and criticized by the Senate.  Whenever the Germans pressed a 
point about the draft, the State Department used the past indiscretion as a club to avoid 
discussion of unwanted changes to the draft. Wiedfeldt reported, “This shows how strongly 
the American administration will resist giving up the slightest advantage or the smallest right 
they believe themselves to possess.”48   
  The discussions continued into the evening and resumed again on the morning of 1 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 45 Castle Diary, 30 Nov 1923; Hyde to Hughes, 5 Dec 1923, FRUS 1923 II, p. 28-29. 
 46 Wiedtfeldt to AA, 30 Nov 1923, Büro RM-USA, Bd3, R28489, p. 189. 
 47 Hughes knew that matters of shipping would create potential problems in the Senate.  
The difficulty with the ratification of the German commercial treaty and the eventual 
reservation regarding shipping show how right Hughes was to be concerned.  
 48 Wiedfeldt goes on to blame the negotiators of the Berlin treaty, which he opposed, for 
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July 1921 Berlin Treaty relying upon the eventual generosity and co-operation of the 
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December.  Shortly before noon the conference broke up and the State Department 
representatives withdrew to discuss what German modifications would be accepted.   As had 
been the case with the Treaty of Berlin, the Germans were left to rely on the good will of the 
State Department.   Wiedfeldt and von Lewinsky were called back at 6 p.m. for a final 
meeting that lasted until 11 p.m. “when the German ambassador agreed to accept the treaty, 
subject to the modifications to which the Department found it possible to yield or desired to 
offer.”49  
 
Conclusion of the Treaty 
 The State Department had been particularly anxious for the treaty to be signed before 
President Coolidge addressed the opening of Congress on December 6.  Hughes informed 
Coolidge when the treaty was about to be signed that “its early signature will relieve us from 
some embarrassment.”50   Wiedfeldt received the authority from President Ebert and 
Stresemann to sign the treaty on 1 December and Houghton in Berlin cabled the confirmation 
to the State Department as planned.5  1   The German embassy worked throughout Sunday, 2 
December, to translate the treaty and prepare a memorandum on the explanations given by 
Hyde of the German questions that had arisen during the 1 December conference.  On 
Monday morning, von Lewinski delivered the German text of the treaty and the 
memorandum to Hyde at the State Department.  Because of difficulty aligning the English 
and German texts, Coolidge addressed Congress without mentioning the treaty, but by the 
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 50 Hughes to Coolidge, 4 Dec 1923, RG59, 711.622/30B. 
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end of the week a fair copy was produced and ready for signature.  On 8 December the 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between the United States and 
Germany was signed at a small noontime ceremony in Washington.52
 After the signing, Hughes expressed to Wiedfeldt his satisfaction with outcome of the 
treaty and his gratitude for the prompt and friendly nature of the negotiations, which had 
relieved the State Department from an uncomfortable position.  The State Department could 
now refer all questions from Congress and business organizations prompted by the premature 
publication of the treaty draft to the completed and signed commercial treaty.53   Wiedfeldt, 
pleased that the tension resulting from the German indiscretion had evaporated, attributed the 
friendly atmosphere in which the signing took place to his personal diplomacy.  He regarded 
these good feelings on the part of the State Department in and of themselves as a major 
diplomatic victory for Germany.  Given the constraints on the negotiations, Wiedfeldt felt 
somewhat self-conscious about the treaty.  He admitted that the practical results of the 
negotiations were modest and wished he could have achieved more, emphasizing yet again 
that the German indiscretion had indeed caused damage to German interests that would be 
felt for years.  The Foreign Office would have to live with its own blunder. Nonetheless, 
Wiedfeldt defended and praised the treaty, noting that it was “very favorable and brings us 
some great advances,” especially in regards to the most-favored-nation principle as a model 
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for trade agreements with the smaller European states.  Furthermore, Wiedfeldt believed the 
treaty would have the important political effect of supporting the government by endowing it 
with a foreign-policy success that help unify the troubled Reich, which in December 1923 
was struggling with real separatist threats and radical political unrest.54
 The German government needed no convincing from Wiedfeldt; the successful 
conclusion of the treaty was greeted in Berlin with satisfaction. Even while the negotiations 
were still underway in Washington, von Schubert told Houghton in Berlin that Wiedfeldt had 
already been telegraphed instructions “to sign without further delay” and the treaty “would 
probably serve as model for other treaties of similar nature.”55   Despite having to give way 
on minor points, more important for precedent than for actual trade relations with the U.S., 
the establishment of the unconditional most-favored-nation principle as the treaty’s basis was 
acclaimed by Stresemann and the Foreign Office as a moral and practical victory in 
Germany’s policy of attempting to revise Versailles.  In his report on the conclusion of the 
treaty, Wiedfeldt was reacting more to the form the negotiations took following the German 
indiscretion than the seriousness of the concessions themselves.  Responding to the more 
critical comments in the ambassador’s report, von Schubert remarked “the treaty in its 
present form is absolutely satisfactory. The most important alterations were achieved.”  The 
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October the Government used the Reichswehr to subdue far left State governments in 
Thuringia and Saxony and Hamburg experienced a communist uprising.  Early November 
saw Adolf Hitler’s putsch in Munich. 
 55 Houghton to Hughes, 2 Dec 1923, RG59, 711.622/29. 
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German government could not have expected anything more.56   
 Houghton reported from Berlin on Germany’s satisfaction with the treaty. In his 
discussion with Houghton, Von Schubert downplayed the significance both of the proposed 
German changes and their rejection.  Houghton wrote to Castle, “Schubert said the German 
Government approved the treaty as a whole, and only on certain points really wanted 
changes, and these not as much because of their relation to America as because they now 
have a similar treaty to negotiate with Turkey and they are afraid of precedents.”   Houghton 
also commented to Castle on the pressure tactics the State Department seemed so fond of 
when dealing with the Germans since the reestablishment of relations:  
 I couldn’t help noting how history repeats itself.  You remember no doubt the 
agreement we made last year regarding the establishment of the Mixed Claims 
Commission, and how at a certain point, owing to the possible unfavorable action of 
Congress, a quick signature was forced?  It was given, although the German 
Constitution stood in the way, and had later to be amended, but it was given.  Now I 
note that a wicked Congress was again likely to cause trouble, and haste again 
became imperative, and so a signature was obtained once more in jig time.  In this 
instance fortunately Wiedfeldt was impressed with the necessity of quick action and 
no one but myself, I think, noticed the similarity in the procedure, but it has given me 
some quiet enjoyment.  Next time, I suspect we would do well to give ourselves 
greater leeway.57
 
 
                                                          
 56 Quoted in Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, p. 198; Gustav Stresemann, 
“Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und Europe,” 8 Dec 1923, Nachlass Stresemann, Bd. 
5, H154905, PA-AA. 
 57 Houghton to Castle, 3 Dec 1923, file 52, Castle Papers.  Houghton might also have 
mentioned that the same tactic was applied during the negotiation of the Treaty of Berlin in 
July of 1921 where the threat of congressional action forced a quick German response.  See 
Chapt. 1 above.  This tactic reflects the very real political difficulties the “internationalist” 
Hughes encountered in dealing with a more “isolationist” Congress, well aware of its powers 
and bitterly divided following the fight over the Versailles treaty.  In an effort to keep the 
administration in firm control over U.S. foreign relations, Hughes found it necessary to 
present Congress with a diplomatic fait accomplis, especially about the sensitive issues 
surrounding the reestablishment of peaceful relations with Germany. 
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 Stresemann was anxious to exploit the conclusion of the long-awaited treaty as a symbol 
of his successful foreign policy, which under his leadership had finally achieved the bilateral 
relations with and support of the United States sought since 1920.  In an article written on the 
evening of the signing, Stresemann heralded the conclusion of the commercial treaty as 
signaling a new beginning in German-American relations58   Addressing the Reichstag on the 
state of Germany’s foreign affairs, in February 1924, he emphasized German success in 
gaining the treaty along with American participation and work in the experts committees 
then meeting in Paris to resolve the Ruhr crisis and the larger issue of reparations.  That 
commercial relations would be based on an unconditional most-favored-nation principle was 
a in and of itself a success and would serve as the basis for future German trade policy.   
While Stresemann acknowledged that the treaty was still being debated in the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and Germany did not secure all it had desired, he noted, “But a closer 
study of the Treaty should convince everyone that it is an instrument that will place the 
future relations between the two countries on a healthy and sound foundation.”  Stresemann 
understood that both the treaty and the associated cooperation between the United States and 
Germany fulfilled long-standing goals and would form the foundation on which new policy 
would be built.59  
                                                          
 58 Gustav Stresemann,“Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und Europe,” 8 Dec 1923,  
Nachlass Stresemann, Bd. 5, H154905, p. 744, PA-AA.  See also Berg’s interpretation in 
Manfred Berg, Gustav Stresemann und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika: 
Weltwirtschaftlich Verflechtung und Revisionspolitik, 1907-1929 (Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellshaft, 1990), p. 157. 
 59 Gustav Stresemann: His Diaries and Letters, and Papers, trans. and ed. Eric Sutton, vol. 
1 (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1935), quote on p. 303; Gustav Stresemann, 
Vermächtnis, Der Nachlass in drei Bänden, ed. Henry Bernhard (Berlin: Verlag Ullstein), pp. 
328-33; Äusserung des Reichsaussenministers Dr. Stresemann im Reichstag, 28 Feb 1924, in 
Ursachen und Folgen: Vom deutschen Zusammenbruch 1918 und 1945 bis zur staatlichen 
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 Problems of Ratification 
 Hughes also had reason to be satisfied. His model commercial treaty was signed and 
ready to be presented to the Senate for ratification just as the new congressional session was 
opening in December 1923.  He hoped for a speedy ratification, so the State Department 
could move forward with negotiating the other pending commercial treaties designed to 
support the new policy of the Open Door, especially in Europe.  The German treaty was 
submitted to the Senate on 10 December 1923 and the Foreign Relations Committee began 
deliberations on 14 January 1924.60  Hughes had kept Senator Lodge informed on the 
adoption of the unconditional most-favored-nation principle in the model treaty and thought 
he had Lodge’s qualified support for the German treaty and the administration’s new tariff 
and commercial policies.61  Lodge however, warned ominously, “There are indications that 
we are going to have some difficulty over the favored-nation clause.”62
 Some opposition in the Senate was expected because the unconditional most-favored-
nation clause would directly challenge the protectionist provisions of the Jones Merchant 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Neuordnung Deutschlands in der Gegenwart, ed. Herbert Michaelis and Ernst Schraepler, 
vol. vi  (Berlin: 1959), p. 66; Glaser-Schmidt, “German and American Concepts to Restore a 
Liberal World Trading System,” p. 368. 
 60 Hughes to Coolidge, 10 Dec 1923, RG59, 711.622/30; Lodge to Hughes, 14 Jan 1924, 
RG59, 711.622/36. 
 61 Beerits Memorandum, “The Commercial Treaty with Germany,” Hughes Papers, p. 6 
 62 Lodge to Hughes, 14 Jan 1924, RG59, 711.622/36. Lodge requested information about 
the differences between prewar commercial arrangements between the United States and 
Germany and the new treaty.  Hughes replied with a 50-page memo that included an article- 
by-article explanation of the treaty and its antecedents. Hughes to Lodge, 17 Jan 1924, 
RG59, 711.622/36. 
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Marine Act of 1920.6  3   The commercial treaty provided Germany with so called reciprocal 
national treatment, levying the same duties and charges on foreign ships as those imposed on 
U.S. shipping (Articles VII, VIII and IX).  The United States had increased its ship-building 
tremendously during the First World War and there was significant support in Congress for 
protecting American shipping and reducing idle tonnage.  But adopting a policy of 
discrimination, Hughes feared, would result in retaliations that would be disastrous, as the 
United States exported far more then it imported.  Hughes urged the adoption of “the policy 
of the open door–of equal opportunity, and of promoting agreements which would put an end 
to discrimination breeding ill-will and strife.”  In regard to the shipping issue Hughes felt 
“that with the equality of opportunity the United States could hold its own throughout the 
world.”64  
 William S. Culbertson, Hughes’s close associate in the effort to revise America’s tariff 
and commercial structure, testified at the committee hearings to defend the German treaty.  
In the face of protectionist resistance, fortified by the testimony of Republican Senator 
Wesley L. Jones, author of the Jones Merchant Marine Act, that  national treatment 
provisions about shipping would cripple the American merchant marine, Culbertson justified 
the adoption of the unconditional most-favored-nation clause as the guiding principle of 
commercial policy in line with the new tariff policy.  Culbertson urged that the benefits of 
Open Door and the chance to break the preferential tariff systems of Europe not be sacrificed 
                                                          
 63 Section 34 of this act directed the president to inform foreign nations of the unilateral 
abrogation of commercial agreements not conceding the right of the United States to give 
preferential treatment to its shipping vessels.  Presidents Wilson, Harding and Coolidge 
ignored Section 34for as many as 32 treaties would have to be abrogated.  Peter H. 
Buckingham, International Normalcy, p. 164.  
 64 Beerits Memorandum, “The Commercial Treaty with Germany,” Hughes Papers, pp. 8-
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to American shipping interests.6  5   Hughes took up the defense of the treaty directly in a 13 
March letter to Senator Lodge, focusing on the two points of contention most associated with 
the policy goals embodied in the treaty: “national treatment” and “unconditional” most-
favored-nation treatment. 
 Citing examples from commercial treaties then in force, Hughes pointed out that 
providing national treatment was not a new concept, but that the refusal to provide national 
treatment would be a departure from the policy embodied in existing treaties.66   Hughes 
warned of the danger of retaliatory discrimination if the United States imposed 
discriminatory tonnage or cargo duties. He specifically indicated the effect on shipping: “The 
effect of such retaliatory measures would probably be that if American ships coming from 
abroad entered American ports with full cargoes they would go back empty.”  Challenging 
the goals of the protectionists, Hughes reminded Lodge that a policy of discrimination could 
not be an end to itself but rather “merely to enforce proper regard for our own interests.” He 
concluded that discriminatory policies would be “fatal to our interests, not only in the highest 
degree embarrassing so far as our shipping interests are concerned, but having by-products in 
resentment and ill-will and in the encouragement of other efforts to cripple our trade which 
would make us pay dearly for our experiment.”67
 In contrast to the national treatment principle, the unconditional most-favored-nation 
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 65 Buckingham, International Normalcy, pp. 164-66. 
 66 Hughes quoted at length the Treaty of 1815 with Great Britain and the Treaty of 1853 
with Argentina. He also noted the reciprocal national treatment provisions in the treaties with 
Denmark, Norway, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Netherlands, Bolivia, Paraguay, Honduras, 
Italy, Belgium, Spain and Japan.  Hughes to Lodge, 13 Mar 1924, FRUS 1924 II, pp. 184-86.  
 67 Hughes to Lodge, 13 Mar 1924, FRUS 1924 II, p. 188. 
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provisions of the German treaty were an innovation and signaled a shift in policy.  Hughes 
reminded Lodge that it had been the decision of both the Harding and Coolidge 
administrations to abandon the old practice of conditional most-favored-nation treatment in 
order to expand the principles of the Open Door around the world.   Hughes noted that the 
old constructions were out of date given America’s new economic position in the world.  
Hughes wrote, “As the United States attained to a position of first rank as a World Power, 
we, in defense of our essential interests, became an active champion, in fact the foremost 
champion of the principle of the ‘Open Door’ in the field of international commercial 
relations.”  Regarding the need to shift to the unconditional most-favored nation practice, 
Hughes wrote, “Under present conditions, the expanding of foreign commerce of the United 
States needs a guarantee of equality of treatment which cannot be furnished by the 
conditional form of the most-favored-nation clause.” This process was already underway, 
explained Hughes, by the Tariff Act of 1922, which shows “that Congress realized that we 
had entered upon a new era, calling for new methods and new attitude.” Hughes continued, 
“The time has come for demanding that conditions of commercial competition be placed 
upon a basis which will both assure our own interests and contribute to the peace of the 
world by eliminating unnecessary economic contentions.”   Hughes explained that if the 
Senate approved the German treaty, similar treaties would be negotiated with other powers 
on the basis of unconditional most-favored nation treatment.  The letter concluded with the 
statement, “If the treaty with Germany is approved, we shall be in a position to conclude 
negotiations with other Powers upon the same basis and in this way most effectively to 
remove whatever discriminations may now exist to the prejudice of the United States.”68
                                                          
 68 Hughes to Lodge, 13 May 1924, FRUS 1924 II, pp. 189-92. 
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 Hughes expected that his explanations to Senator Lodge would be conveyed to the 
Foreign Relations Committee in order to address Congressional concerns and smooth 
acceptance of the treaty.  However, after the initial hearings in early 1924, nothing further 
was done and the treaty did not move out of the Senate Committee.  Throughout 1924 
Hughes would continue to respond to certain questions and objections to the treaty reported 
in newspapers or the Congressional Record by writing “elaborate memoranda” to Lodge. Yet 
still the Senate took no action.  In the meantime, while the fate of the treaty remained in 
doubt the State Department could not offer the draft treaty to other nations.  When Lodge 
died on 9 November 1924, to be succeeded by Senator William Borah as Chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, still no action had been taken on the German treaty.  
Hughes discussed the matter with Borah and was astonished to learn that Lodge had never 
presented any of Hughes’s letters of explanation answering objections to the treaty.  Lodge 
had pigeonholed the treaty in committee.69
 
German Pressure for Ratification   
 Germany was anxious to have the treaty ratified and in effect as quickly as possible, and 
the Foreign Office was frustrated by the delay.  Wiedfeldt suggested that Hughes should be 
asked, during his short visit to Berlin in July 1924, to explain why the treaty was tied up in 
the Senate, reminding the Auswärtige Amt to emphasize the common goals in creating a 
liberal trading order.  The ambassador, however, was doubtful about how forthcoming 
Hughes would be about difficulties in the Senate, explicitly citing the personal animosity 
                                                          
 69 Beerits Memorandum, “The Commercial Treaty with Germany,” Hughes Papers, pp. 6-
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between Hughes and Lodge as the real reason.7  0   The point was to give Hughes a gentle 
reminder that Germany wished to get on with the implementation of the treaty. 
 Germany sought to reestablish its commercial relations with other nations on the basis of 
an unconditional most-favored-nation policy and hoped to use a ratified American treaty as a 
precedent.  With the commercial restrictions placed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles 
y due to expire, during 1924 the Foreign Office had begun negotiations with France and 
concluded commercial treaties with Spain and Great Britain.  Staatssekretär Ago von 
Maltzan, informing Wiedfeldt about the treaty with Great Britain, noted that “a speedy 
ratification of the German-American treaty would very much improve our position by the 
remaining commercial treaty negotiations, especially with France, Italy and Belgium.” 71  
 Both the State Department and the Commerce Department were concerned over the 
nature of German trade negotiations with the other European countries, especially France.  
There was a fear that the United States would lose some advantages as Germany concluded 
other treaties before the American commercial treaty came into effect.  In particular, it was 
rumored that the negotiations with France included special provisions about Alsace and 
Lorraine that might contradict the most-favored-nation clause of the American treaty. But as 
a memorandum from the State Department’s Office of the Economic Advisor pointed out, 
“As long as we do not ratify [the Commercial treaty with Germany] we are in a weak 
                                                          
 70 Wiedfeldt to AA, 8 July 1924, Nr. 190, ADAP X, p. 477.  In the copy found in the 
Reichsminister’s files, Stresemann underlines Wiedfeldt’s suggestion in blue pencil, R28490, 
Reichsminister USA, Bd. 4, D619402, p. 40, PA-AA. It is uncertain whether Stresemann did 
bring the matter up with Hughes.  For Hughes’s visit to Berlin, see Chapter. IX. 
 71 Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, p. 327; Maltzan to Wiedfeldt, 1 Dec 
1924, Nr. 242, R28490, Reichsminister USA, D619491, p. 134.  As State Secretary, Ago von 
Maltzan was the administrative head of the Foreign Office and would replace Wiedfeldt as 
ambassador to Washington in 1925. 
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position to insist that Germany maintain unimpaired the pledges which the treaty contains.”72   
 After Lodge’s death the German foreign office sought to exert what pressure it could to 
get the commercial treaty ratified.  In late November, Hughes assured Wiedfeldt that the 
administration and the State Department were pushing hard for the treaty and that he was 
sure it would be quickly accepted during the current congressional session.73   With growing 
impatience, von Schubert wrote to Wiedfeldt on 19 December asking for a cable report on 
the outlook for the treaty’s acceptance. 
 Commercial relations between the two nations were tentatively proceeding under an 
agreement reached in September that had extended most-favored-nation status on a 
provisional basis, but this was due to expire on 10 January.  Von Schubert told Wiedfeldt that 
this would not necessarily by automatically extended but should be regarded as a special 
concession. The ambassador wired back the next day reporting that the treaty was still in the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where questions were being raised over how the most-
favored-nation clause of Article 7 would affect American shipping interests.  While the State 
Department felt that the shipping interests would be won over, the administration had no 
control over the Senate and Hughes had yet to meet with the committee. 
 Von Schubert thought it was time to try to exert some explicit pressure on the United 
                                                          
 72 Quoted in Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, p. 329.  Link, approaching 
the topic as an economic determinist, emphasizes the fears of the State and Commerce 
Departments that the U.S. might be left out, seeing them as the main reason Hughes took the 
initiative to force the treaty through the Senate.  As for the reasons the treaty languished for 
so long in the Senate, Link cites conflicting commercial interests--especially the shipping 
lobby.  Link, however, makes no mention of the personal conflict with Lodge which even 
Wiedfeldt knew was holding up the treaty in 1924.  The importance of personal agency is 
often overlooked in broad theoretical approaches. 
 73 Wiedfeldt to AA, 26 Nov 1924, Nr. 263, R28490, Reichsminister USA, Bd. 4, 
D619486, p. 129. 
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States.  On 24 December he handed Houghton a memorandum observing that the speedy 
ratification of the commercial treaty was in the interest of both the United States and 
Germany.  He warned:  
 Should the ratification not be obtainable before January 10 the German 
Government is ready to allow the present status to continue but hopes that the treaty 
will be accepted by the present congress.  In case this is not done it would be 
necessary to discuss a further provisional arrangement beyond March 4. It must 
however be pointed out that a discriminatory treatment of German shipping on the 
basis of the Jones Bill would be unendurable and would make the treaty containing 
such provisions unacceptable to us.74
 
 
 Although Germany was hardly in a position to place real pressure on Hughes, this 
pressing no doubt added to the sense of urgency with which Hughes now took up the matter 
with the Senate. 
 
  Ratification with Reservations 
 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee took up the German treaty in earnest in January 
1925.  Borah arranged for Hughes to address the committee directly to defend his treaty and 
advance it on to the Senate floor.  Because the principles embodied in the treaty were an 
indispensable part of the administration’s goal to reorient the commercial policy of the 
United States, Hughes was very much attached to this endeavor.  It was a nervous Secretary 
of State that gathered his subordinates at his home to rehearse his testimony before he 
addressed the committee on 2 February 1925.75  
                                                          
 74 Quoted in Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, p. 331.  This threat, as 
events would later show, was almost certainly a bluff but it is an indication of how much had 
changed in German-American relations, especially since the implementation of the Dawes 
Plan and securing the accompanying loan.  
 75 Beerits Memorandum, “The Commercial Treaty with Germany,” Hughes Papers, pp. 8-
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 The focus of his address centered on the issue of reciprocal national treatment, the point 
where the treaty met its most vigorous opposition.  Hughes again warned against a policy of 
discrimination, arguing that “retaliation would be the certain consequence,” and noting that 
as other maritime powers imported more from the United States than they exported, it would 
be the United States that would be the chief sufferer.  His testimony highlighted the effect of 
the Open Door, “of equal opportunity,” in diminishing international ill-will, strife and its 
promotion of world peace.76   While strongly urging the adoption of reciprocal treatment 
provisions, Hughes acknowledged a suggested compromise whereby the Senate might adopt 
a reservation providing for the termination of the reciprocal national treatment clauses “on 
reasonably short notice.”  Hughes was willing to accept such a compromise, giving the 
president the authority to cancel national treatment, if it would allow the German treaty to be 
accepted by the Senate.77
 The following day, the committee accepted the treaty with the compromise reservation 
and passed the matter to the full Senate.78 However, objections were raised there that the 
power to cancel national treatment had been left to the executive.  Protectionists, led by 
Senator Jones, amended the reservation giving Congress the right to terminate the shipping 
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210. 
 76 Beerits Memorandum, “The Commercial Treaty with Germany,” Hughes Papers, pp. 8-
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 77 Ibid.
 78 There was a second reservation specifying that nothing in the treaty could be construed 
to conflict in any way with immigration restrictions passed by Congress.  New York Times, 4 
Feb 1925, p. 12; Buckingham, International Normalcy, p. 167. 
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clauses after the treaty had been in force for twelve months.79
 On 10 February, the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Germany 
was ratified by the United States Senate.80 The German Embassy expressed its dissatisfaction 
with the nature and form of the Senate’s reservation, but the embassy counselor was 
informed that the State Department was gratified the Senate had gone no further and that 
Germany “was deemed fortunate to have the opportunity to accept the treaty as it came from 
the Senate.”81  
 The Senate’s shipping reservation was not well received in Germany.  The Hamburg 
Senate, representing German shipping interests, called for the right to cancel treaty 
provisions as well.  They were quickly joined in this demand by the Bavarian state 
government and the Reich Finance Ministry.  It was former Ambassador Wiedfeldt, just 
recently returned to Germany, who managed to calm the storm by pointing out the central 
reality still governing the German-American relationship: Germany needed the United 
States.  With this fact in mind, it was senseless for Germany to place reservations on the 
treaty that would lead to its collapse.  Germany, Wiedfeldt argued, would not be offered 
another commercial treaty by the United States any time soon and certainly not one so 
favorable to German interests.  The German interest in the treaty was far greater then that of 
                                                          
 79 The compromise reservation provided that the clauses and articles regarding shipping 
would remain in force for twelve months from the date of the exchange of ratifications and if 
not terminated on 90 days’ previous notice, Congress would have the right to cancel those 
provisions with 60 days’ notice, leaving the rest of the treaty intact.  Beerits Memorandum, 
“The Commercial Treaty with Germany,” Hughes Papers, pp. 9-10. 
 80 Dieckhoff to AA, 10 Feb 1925, Nr. 38, R28490, Reichsminister USA, Bd. 4, D619579, 
p. 222. 
 81 Charles Cheney Hyde, “Charles Evans Hughes, The American Secretaries of State and 
Their Diplomacy vol. X, ed. Samuel Flagg Bemis (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 
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the United States and with Germany increasingly dependent on American credit, Germany 
could not afford the ill-will the collapse of the treaty would engender.  Wiedfeldt reminded 
the critics that both Hughes and Secretary of Commerce Hoover personally identified with 
the treaty and had a political stake in achieving its goals.  Wiedfeldt pointed out that in the 
end German shipping would not be any worse off if the treaty were accepted than without 
any treaty at all.  Just the opposite would be true, in fact, as it was highly unlikely the United 
States would cancel the shipping provision while President Coolidge was in office.82   
Although unhappy with the reservations, the critics accepted Wiedfeldt’s arguments.  On 
May 21, 1925, the new Ambassador Ago von Maltzan presented a letter to the new Secretary 
of State Kellogg stating that Germany agreed to the Senate reservations.83  
 Hughes left office in March 1925 and declared himself pleased with the treaty as the 
Senate accepted it, asserting that the theory of the treaty had been respected “to an extent that 
surpassed his hopes.”84   The shift from the conditional to unconditional most-favored-nation 
principle was indeed successful; the adoption of reciprocal national treatment, however, had 
been severely undermined by the Senate’s reservation.  With the qualified success of the 
German treaty behind it, the State Department under Frank B. Kellogg proceeded with the 
negotiation of other commercial treaties based on the model treaty and carrying on the 
struggle against the national treatment reservation.85  
                                                          
 82 Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik, pp. 334-35.  Link quotes Wiedfeldt’s 
arguments from a report by the Hamburg representative to Berlin. 
 83 FRUS 1923 II, p. 46.  Maltzan took over the Washington embassy on 11 Mar 1925.  
Hughes had resigned as Secretary of State in early 1925, to be replaced on 4 Mar by Frank B. 
Kellogg, who had been serving as Ambassador to the Court of St. James. 
 84 Beerits Memorandum, “The Commercial Treaty with Germany,” Hughes Papers, p. 10. 
 85 With the ratification of the German treaty, other treaty negotiations that had been 
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 The German Reichstag accepted the treaty with the Senate reservations on 12 August, 
and ratifications were exchanged in Washington with President Coolidge proclaiming the 
treaty in force on 14 October 1925.86    The German-American commercial treaty served the 
Weimar republic well, but with the coming of Adolf Hitler to power in 1933, German 
priorities in commercial policy changed.  Hitler abrogated the treaty in 1934, despite 
warnings from both Hans Luther, then the German ambassador to Washington, and from the 
head of the trade section of the Auswärtige Amt, that such a step would antagonize the 
United States and harm German trade.  The treaty was extended in 1935, but without the 
central most-favored-nation provision.  In 1953, the 1923 treaty was again brought into 
force.87  
 
Conclusions 
 This chapter places the commercial treaty in the context of German-American relations 
of the period as a whole and thereby attempts to illustrate the nature of those relations at the 
end of the crisis year of 1923.  Detailed examination of the history of the treaty illustrates 
more completely the motivations, goals and determinants of both American and German 
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policy.  There is no doubt that the treaty was driven by the economic and commercial 
priorities of the State Department.  But the fate of the treaty in the Senate also makes clear 
that these priorities were far from broadly accepted, even within Hughes’ own Republican 
Party. 
 As with the Berlin Treaty of 1921 and the Mixed Claims Agreement of 1922, Hughes’s 
struggle for the commercial treaty’s acceptance underscores the limits imposed by the 
necessity of congressional approval, limits within which American foreign policy had to 
operate when it came to the sensitive issues around the reestablishment of full relations with 
Germany.  Glaser-Schmidt is correct to emphasize the mutuality of economic interests.  But 
more than that, the commercial treaty represented to Germany a great success in regard to its 
tightly interwoven economic and foreign policy.  It was the first tangible victory for the 
policy of revisionism.  With the signing of the treaty in December 1923, Germany had 
succeeded in its policy, followed since before the Berlin treaty, of establishing full relations 
with the United States on a basis outside of the Versailles treaty system, and this opened the 
door for commercial relations that would propel Germany into the prosperity of those few 
good years of the Weimar Republic in the late 1920s. 
 The history of the commercial treaty reveals that it is a political story first and foremost, 
rather then economic one, and best understood in the political context.  Houghton felt he was 
sent over to Berlin to negotiate a trade agreement, and Wiedfeldt was plucked from his office 
at Krupp and sent to the United States with the sole mission of reestablishing economic and 
commercial ties.  Germany had pressed for a commercial treaty since wartime conditions 
were ended in 1921.  Germany’s interest in a commercial treaty was far more than just 
economic; it was eminently a political interest which sought to use the prospect of increased 
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trade with America to establish a community of American banking and business interests to 
press for American support for Germany. 
 Manfred Berg may be correct in interpreting the treaty as the beginning of Stresemann’s 
America-oriented revisionist foreign policy,88  but it was even more dramatically the 
culmination of German’s policy of the primacy of America, followed since 1921.  The 
signing of the commercial treaty marked the high point of Wiedfeldt’s embassy and he felt he 
had completed his mission.  Wiedfeldt was anxious to return home to Krupp as relations 
normalized with the United States, and with his political rival Stresemann at the helm, 
Wiedfeldt’s relations with the Auswärtige Amt deteriorated in 1924.  
 The discussions over the commercial treaty also shed light on the motivations and forces 
acting on Germany and the United States in regard to policy development.  Those who see 
American policy as driven by single factors must remember that, after Wilson, Congress was 
reasserting itself and various--often conflicting--interests often inserted themselves into 
foreign policy considerations, limiting the State Department freedom of action.  Historians 
who sought to broaden the field of American foreign relations from the confines of the 
economic determinist view have developed the idea of “corporatism,” which emphasizes the 
role of corporate entities in the formation of foreign policy.89   However, the example of the 
commercial treaty calls into question the applicability of the corporatist theory to Germany 
and Europe in the postwar period of crisis. 
 Within the United States the interests of the various corporate entities were often very 
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much opposed and not the least unified on policy goals.   It is for this reason that the 
Secretary of State sought to keep a firm hand on policy, dreading the interference of 
Congress where corporate entities such as agriculture, labor, banking, and in the case of the 
commercial treaty, shipping interests, all exerted their narrow interests.  Conflicting interests 
within the Senate first held up the German treaty and then placed very unwelcome, from the 
State Department point of view, reservations on the treaty as well as those other European 
commercial treaties which followed.  
 Conversely, the treaty reveals the level of real corporatism found in the development of 
German foreign policy.  Corporatism was a dominant feature of the political structure of the 
Weimar Republic as the various economic and social groups sought a place at the political 
table following the 1918 revolution.  There was a long tradition of German businessmen 
serving as top advisors to the Auswärtige Amt and this practice was only amplified as 
reparations issues and revision of the Versailles restrictions dominated foreign policy 
considerations.   The State Department was astounded that the German foreign office would 
discuss the still-secret draft treaty with business interests groups, a practice that was quite 
normal for the Germans.  While Hughes did all he could to avoid interference from interest 
groups, holding the treaty a secret, the Germans invited interest-group participation, which 
resulted in the leaking of the draft treaty to the great embarrassment of the State Department.   
 Much has been made of the way the State Department pressured the Germans in the 
negotiations.  Link, Glaser-Schmidt and Berg all make a point of the weak position of 
Germany in regard to the United States with the implication that Germany had little choice 
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but to sign on Hughes’s terms.90   However, all concede that the treaty was a great success 
for Germany and conformed to German interests.  It was the form rather than the content of 
the negotiations which bothered Wiedfeldt at the time and has since inspired critical 
comment.  Yet the conclusion of the commercial treaty fulfilled fundamental and long-
standing goals of German diplomacy and the signing was clearly understood by the Germans 
as a moral and diplomatic victory. 
 The commercial treaty provided Germany with most-favored-nation status with the 
United States, thus breaking out of the commercial restrictions imposed by the Allies at 
Versailles and providing a German success in its struggle for revision.  This was, as it turned 
out, only a moral victory since ratification was held up until 1925 and the Versailles 
restrictions had already expired.  But more importantly, the commercial treaty brought 
Germany closer ties with the United States.   The treaty gave America an interest in Germany 
and established Germany as an equal partner.   
 The conclusion of the commercial treaty occurred at a time when Germany desperately 
needed a diplomatic success, for in early December 1923 the establishment of the experts 
committee was still unsure.  It confirmed that the United States was interested in Germany as 
an equal partner.  Some commentators see the commercial treaty and the Dawes Plan as 
interdependent and part of a thought-out new American economic policy toward Germany 
and Europe.9  1   This is perhaps an over-interpretation.  Both the treaty and the Dawes Plan 
did work toward bringing Germany back to prosperity.  The treaty facilitated American trade 
                                                          
 90 Link, Die amerikanische Stabiliserungspolitik, p. 193; Glaser-Schmidt, “German and 
American Concepts to Restore a Liberal World Trading System”, p. 367; Berg Gustav 
Stresemann und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, p. 132. 
 91 Link, Die amerikanische Stabiliserungspolitik, p. 199; Glaser-Schmidt, “German and 
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with Germany that boomed after the adoption of the Dawes Plan.  German reconstruction 
would be supported by the wealth of America. 
 In the end, although Hughes got his model treaty without much of a fight from the 
Germans, the State Department was to be disappointed with the outcome of the commercial 
treaty project.  It did not lead to an Open Door in Europe.  It did not affect the French tariffs 
or the British system of imperial preference.  The commercial treaty was, by contrast, a great 
diplomatic success for the Germans.     
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 Chapter VIII 
The Dawes Plan 
January - June 1924 
 
Introduction 
 The experts committees established by the Reparation Commission began meetings in 
January 1924, and in April submitted their report on the economic and fiscal rehabilitation of 
Germany and the resolution of the reparation crisis, known as the Dawes Plan after the 
committee’s chairman, Charles G. Dawes, who was president of the Central Trust Company 
of Illinois and a prominent Midwestern Republican.1   The plan began the process of the 
settlement of the Ruhr crisis, but it would require an international conference held in London 
in the summer of 1924 to work out the details of the French withdrawal from the Ruhr that 
ended the threat to Germany’s territorial and economic unity at the expense of French 
dominance in Europe.  The plan also established the groundwork for an increased American 
economic involvement with Europe, thus beginning the fulfillment of Germany’s goal of 
modifying the Versailles settlement through its relationship with the United States.  
Together, the work of the Dawes Committee and the subsequent London Conference marked 
a diplomatic turning point in the modification of Versailles.  
                                                          
 1 Dawes had been a brigadier general in France during the war and afterward served as 
the first director of the U.S. Bureau of the Budget.  He was known as energetic and pro-
French.  Following the success of the Dawes Plan, he was elected vice president in 1924. 
 The Dawes Plan set a reparation schedule based on Germany’s capacity to pay, the first 
significant reduction from the 1921 London Schedule that Germany had long desired to 
revise and a precedent for further downward revision.  Avoiding the issue of the total sum of 
German reparations, it established a rising scale of payments.  The plan called for the 
reorganization and stabilization of the German monetary system, tax reforms, the financing 
of reparations through mortgage bonds on industry and the German railroads, and excise 
taxes.  A system for the transfer of reparation funds, designed to prevent destabilization of 
the German monetary system, proposed a loan of 800 million gold marks to help the 
stabilization of Germany’s currency and aid the initial reparation payments. This would set 
Germany on the road to economic recovery.  The plan also marked the beginning of the 
fulfillment of the long-held German goal of American involvement Europe and economic 
engagement with Germany, which were key elements in Stresemann’s foreign policy.   
  How historians view the Dawes Plan depends in part on the nations and issues they 
examine and the theoretical framework they choose. The consensus, however, is that the 
Dawes Plan marked a transition in European diplomacy.  Historians who utilize a framework 
of economic determinism tend to see the Dawes Plan as a vehicle for American economic 
expansion into Germany.   Werner Link’s study of American-German relations, which  
approaches the Dawes Plan from the perspective of a revisionist in the tradition of William 
Appleman Williams, therefore views the plan as reflecting the American interest in economic 
penetration of Germany.2  To Link, the decisive reason for American engagement was that 
the Dawes Plan opened the door for economic expansion into Europe.  According to Link, 
                                                          
 2 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. For Williams’s 
view of the Dawes Plan, see p. 136. 
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“The United States was primarily interested in this agreement because only an economic and 
political peace in Europe could guarantee the expansion of American exports, which the 
United States understood as the conditio sine qua non for its own well being.”  This accounts 
for the “astoundingly wide consensus” in the United States for the Dawes Plan and explains 
the energetic participation of the Coolidge administration in pushing for the acceptance of 
the plan at the London Conference in the summer and fall of 1924.3   This view, however, 
underplays the role of political interest, but for Link political and economic interest are 
inexorably bound together. 
 Michael J. Hogan analyzes the Dawes Plan through his modified economic construct of 
corporatism.  He conceptualizes the Dawes Plan as the application of principles of the 
emerging American corporatism to international affairs.  “The Dawes Plan and the bankers’ 
loan to Germany were further realizations of the American Plan to organize cooperation in 
European recovery through private programs, arranged by financial experts, and proceeding 
through normal investment channels.”4   Hogan’s study places the emphasis on American-
British cooperation by arguing that the implementation of the American program was made 
possible by an Anglo-American economic entente that reached its height in 1924 -1925.  
This entente was reflected in central and private bank cooperation and in a common British 
and American approach to debts and reparations.  He sees in it the implementation of 
Hoover’s ideas and cites Hoover, who termed the Dawes Commission “a peace mission 
without parallel in international history”5   While Hogan recognizes that the Dawes Plan 
                                                          
 3 Link, Die amerikanische Stabiliserungspolitik, p. 267, quote on p. 272. 
 4 Hogan, Informal Entente, p. 71. 
 5 Ibid, p. 77. 
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provided only a temporary reprieve to the European crisis, the study is limited by its focus on 
the American and British relationship with little analysis of the broader international crisis.  
 Bruce Kent examines the Dawes Plan in the context of his economic study of the history 
of war debts and reparations from 1918 to 1932, in which he sees the political leaders 
attempting to evade the domestic financial consequences of the war.  He views the Dawes 
Plan as a “flimsy improvisation which depended for its survival on continuing financial and 
political fair weather within Germany and abroad” rather then a “realistic settlement” which 
would have required the United States and Great Britain to make the “necessary gestures of 
financial renunciation.”  While Kent accepts that in the shorter term it provided “a substantial 
breathing space and an institutional framework more suitable than that of the London 
schedule for working out a viable long term reparation scheme,” he concludes that Dawes 
was just a milestone on the road to the collapse of the entire interlocking structure of war 
debts and reparations with the onset of the depression.6  The close focus on economic issues 
de-emphasizes the political and security concerns involved in the Ruhr crisis.   
 The title of Schuker’s major work, The End of French Predominance in Europe, states his 
thesis that the Dawes Plan marked the deterioration of France’s security position against 
Germany.  Schuker sees it as offering both a hope and a challenge: “a hope of ending the 
stalemate in the Ruhr and in the chancelleries of Europe, and a challenge for each nation to 
negotiate a reparation settlement most advantageous to its political and economic interests.”7   
The major emphasis in Schuker’s extraordinarily valuable study is on the position of France.  
In his political analysis of the Dawes Plan and its implementation, he reaches the conclusion 
                                                          
 6 Kent, The Spoils of War, pp. 260-61. 
 7 Schuker, The End of French Predominance, p. 186. 
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that French financial weakness forced it to accept a liquidation of the Ruhr crisis on 
unfavorable terms that marked the deterioration of France’s security position against 
Germany.  Schuker’s perspective is thus the ending of an era.  Sally Marks shares this 
perspective.8  
 Historians specializing in German history often have a more positive assessment of the 
Dawes Plan and its effects.  Gerald D. Feldman’s masterful study of the German inflation, 
The Great Disorder, also places the Dawes Plan at the ending of an era.  The financial 
reforms which preceded and followed its implementation put an end to great German 
inflation.  The Dawes Plan, although not the definitive settlement of the reparations question, 
did provide Germany with “breathing space” in the form of a moratorium and restored the 
basic economic unity for which Stresemann had fought so hard.9   
 Manfred Berg sees the Dawes Plan, along with the commercial treaty, as heralding a new 
era of American-German cooperation and paving the way for Stresemann’s policy of 
peaceful revision.  Berg argues that Stresemann’s actions during 1923-1924 (the cessation of 
                                                          
 8 Sally Marks’s views on the Dawes Plan follow from her long-standing view that 
Germany could pay the reparations set by the London Schedule.  She views French policy in 
the Ruhr as an attempt to save the Treaty of Versailles and its reparations clauses.  France 
won the battle but lost the war when Britain organized a coalition of “erstwhile allies plus 
Germany to undo the French victory.”  Marks, similarly to Schuker, views the reparations set 
by the Dawes Plan “as being unquestionably within German capacity” and the plan as 
“constituting the first major revision of the Versailles Treaty as well as a bitterly decisive 
defeat for France.”  See Sally Marks, “Smoke and Mirrors,” in The Treaty of Versailles: A 
Reassessment after 75 Years, ed. Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman and Elisabeth 
Glaser (Washington: German Historical Institute, 1998), p. 368; “The Misery of Victory: 
France’s Struggle for the Versailles Treaty,” Historical Papers (1986) pp. 127-28; The 
Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe: 1918-1933 (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1976), p. 54.  Walter A. McDougall also judges the final reparations agreement as “a 
crushing defeat for France.”  McDougall, France’s Rhineland Diplomacy, p. 369.  
 9 Feldman, The Great Disorder, p. 834. 
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passive resistance, the stabilization of the Reichsmark, his unambiguous support for the work 
of the Dawes Committee, and his firm stance in the domestic quarrels over the Dawes Plan) 
served to convince the United States that Germany was willing the “to meet the political and 
economic conditions” that America required before it would agree to participate in the 
solution of the reparation problem.  The political benefits for German revisionism would 
materialize during the ensuing years.10   
 This chapter examines the American role in the creation of the Dawes Plan within the 
context of the European crisis precipitated by the occupation of the Ruhr.  It will illustrate 
how the plan provided the basis for a compromise solution, very much on American terms, 
which would end the persistent crisis and stabilize Germany and Europe until the trauma of 
the Great Depression.  While recognizing the importance of economic issues, its analysis is 
predominantly political.  It views the Dawes Plan not only as establishing the basis for the 
ending of the European crisis but also as providing the solution to the efforts of the United 
States since 1921 to find its new role in European political and economic life within the 
strictures of domestic political realities.  Whereas Schuker and other historians emphasize the 
defeat of France and the consequences in the 1930s, this chapter’s analysis is colored by a 
viewpoint that sees a success for the United States and through it a success for Germany with 
the possibilities for a more peaceful and prosperous Europe.   
 The Dawes Plan was predicated on the idea that if a practical compromise could be 
achieved between the European nations regarding reparations,  American capital could then 
be mobilized to provide the loans and investments that would lead to an European economic 
recovery.  It was not designed as “a solution of the whole reparation problem” but rather as a 
                                                          
 10 Berg, Gustav Stresemann und die Vereinigten Staaten, quote on p. 441. 
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foreshadowing of a “settlement extending in its application for a sufficient time to restore 
confidence” and would facilitate “a final and comprehensive agreement as to all the problems 
of reparations and connected questions as soon as circumstances make possible.”11   While 
some political conflicts over economic issues were resolved within the context of the plan, 
major issues regarding security matters were recognized and deliberately sidestepped with 
the recommendation that they would be settled within a political framework.     
 To accomplish their task the Dawes experts committee would have to face the 
contentious struggle of agreeing on the amount of reparations that Germany was capable of 
paying.  It also had to determine the revenue sources from which reparations payments could 
be drawn and a means of payment that would not destabilize the German currency that they 
were charged with stabilizing.  Most of the issues within the committee were subject to 
contentious debate not only between the national delegations but also within each nation’s 
delegation.  Dawes, who had strong Francophile inclinations, strove to accommodate French 
interests whenever he deemed  them not destructive to the overall integrity of the plan, but 
joined with the British to resist French attempts to subvert the overall vision. 
 While the American role in the creation of the Dawes Plan is mostly seen as mediating 
between the positions of France and Britain to achieve a settlement of the German 
reparations problem and the Ruhr crisis, there was also an underlying struggle between the 
United States and Britain over which nation would  predominate in the economic 
                                                          
 11 Charles G. Dawes, A Journal of Reparations (London: Macmillian and Co. Ltd., 1939), 
Appendix III, p. 347.  The text of the Experts Report has been reprinted in many forms.  For 
the purpose of this discussion all references to Report of Committees of Experts to the 
Reparation Commission are those reprinted in the appendixes of the readily available Dawes, 
A Journal of Reparations and are hereafter cited as Report of the First Committee of Experts 
and Report of the Second Committee of Experts.  Dawes entries in his journal are cited as 
Dawes, Journal with page numbers.  
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reconstruction of Europe.  In the end the need of each nation for some workable plan, 
combined with Dawes’s continuous drive to forge a unified plan, led to the necessary 
compromises that produced the final report.  
 
The Development of the Plan 
 The Dawes Committee was advertised to the American public as a sensible and practical 
“business committee concerned with facts and the constructive inferences that could be 
drawn from them.”12   Prior to leaving for Paris, Dawes met with Hughes and a variety of 
experts in the areas of business, banking, and European affairs.13   In their press statement in 
Paris on 8 January, Dawes and Owen Young made a point of announcing that the carefully 
selected and screened American experts were there “as private citizens without instruction 
and without obligation of making reports except to the Reparation Commission.”14   In 
reality the report produced by the committee was “a compromise between economic 
principle and political necessities.”15   
 In an effort to court French opinion, Dawes made a show of meeting with French military 
leaders with whom he had worked during the war, expressing his happiness in “finding 
myself among my old comrades, once again in France--a country so near the hearts of all 
                                                          
 12 Dawes, Journal, p. 12. 
 13 Ibid., pp. 1-5. 
 14 Dawes’s statement to the press, Paris, 8 January 1924, reproduced in Dawes, Journal, 
pp. 11-12. 
 15 Quote from an essay originally intended as preface for A Journal of Reparations, but 
finally omitted. Cited in Schuker, The End of French Predominance , p. 174.     
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members of the American Army who were here during the Great War.”16    Dawes had been 
a supporter of the French occupation of the Ruhr.  In January 1923, he had given an 
interview to the Literary Digest stating that in his view the occupation of the Ruhr was 
essential to bring Germany to the realization that it had to pay reparations and France to the 
realization that only reasonable reparations could be collected.  In a 6 February journal entry, 
he reiterated his view previously expressed in that Literary Digest interview and noted that 
the French Army had been “the safeguard of Western Civilization in Europe.”  He asserted 
that without the occupation of the Ruhr the experts committee would have never come into 
existence.1   7   
 In his opening address to the Reparation Commission, Dawes spoke of his experiences 
during the war and recalled the hundreds of thousands of Allied soldiers sacrificed for 
victory.  He reassured the commission that the experts committee would work on the basis of 
the status quo and would not challenge the legality of the occupation of the Ruhr, a threat 
that Britain had held over Poincaré’s head.  Dawes defined the experts’ task as being within 
the scope of the Reparations Committee’s powers for “considering the means of balancing 
the budget and the measures to stabilize the currency,” and he conspicuously omitted any 
reference to reducing the total sum of German reparation obligations.18
 Dawes’ speech was well received by the State Department, which hoped that he could 
keep the discussions of the committee in the public eye and “prove to French opinion that 
                                                          
 16 Dawes, Journal, p. 39. 
 17 Literary Digest, 27 Jan 1923, reproduced in part in Dawes, Journal, pp. 77-81. 
 18 Address delivered before the Reparation Commission, 14 Jan 1924, reproduced in 
Dawes, Journal, pp. 21-31. 
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conditions in Germany were not as rosy they felt.”  The State Department felt that a great 
deal could be accomplished but believed speed, and not non-essential details, were 
“absolutely essential,” a feeling shared by Dawes who noted in his journal,  “Action is the 
by-word. We must reach agreement.”19   
 Dawes organized the experts into two committees consisting of two primary 
representatives from the United States, Britain, France, Italy and Belgium, who were assisted 
by a staff of technical experts from their respective nations. The First Committee of Experts 
was charged with stabilizing Germany’s budget and currency as well as establishing a new 
reparations plan.  Dawes, who served as a co-chairman with Owen Young, had a dominating 
role in the construction of the plan.20   The Second Committee was charged with 
investigating what German assets were held abroad and could be utilized for reparations.  
The primary representatives, who did not hold current governmental positions, were drawn 
from business, banking and finance.  Many had past experience in government in areas 
relating to budgeting and taxation.  The American technical experts were for the most part 
drawn from Herbert Hoover’s Department of Commerce.21    
 In determining the reparation schedule, Dawes and Young from the very onset  
recognized that “the French are the key to the situation” and throughout the deliberations 
attempted to accommodate  French concerns.22   They decided on 13 January, even before 
the committees formally met, to concede to Poincaré’s demand that no change be made from 
                                                          
 19 Castle to Houghton, 16 Jan 1924, file 52, Castle Papers; Dawes, Journal, p. 61. 
 20 Owen Young was Chairman of the Board of both General Electric and RCA.  
 21 Dawes, Journal, p. 70.  
 22 Ibid., p. 13. 
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the 1921 London Schedule total reparations sum of 132 billion gold marks and relied on “the 
great common sense of the British and their right-mindedness” to accept their decision, since 
in the final analysis Britain would not allow the experts committee to fail over this issue.23  
Dawes argued that with differing expert opinions on the matter of what Germany could pay, 
only actual experience, as Germany recovered economically, would provide an answer.  By 
making the total sum of reparations a question “of the future” the committee could focus on 
the immediate practical question of “what substantial can be given to Poincaré for whatever 
tangible he gives us in the Ruhr in order that Germany under a new plan can put itself in 
shape to commence a general reparation-paying policy.”24   
 Poincaré, facing upcoming elections and forced to defend both his Ruhr policy as well as 
his need to raise French taxes, welcomed the experts committee in his speech to the Chamber 
of Deputies in which he set forth French demands.  Poincaré claimed credit for the 
committee asserting that it was a product of his initiative in the Reparation Commission.  He 
took comfort from the implication in Dawes’s address that the “peril” of having the German 
total reparation sum reduced was “warded off.”  He insisted on an minimum of 26 billion 
gold marks from the A and B bonds and a reduction in the C bonds only to the extent that 
French war debts were reduced by Britain and the United States.25   He invited the Allies to 
join France in exploiting the French pledges in the Ruhr and Rhineland where France was 
                                                          
 23 Ibid., p. 17. 
 24 Ibid., p. 73. 
 25 Here again it is clear that the C bonds had a real worth.  There is no reason to doubt 
that Poincaré was serious in his plans and did not consider the C bond obligations a “fiction” 
as they have been characterized by Sally Marks.  At the least, the C bonds were a powerful 
bargaining chip in the hands of Poincaré.  See Sally Marks, “Reparations Reconsidered: A 
Reminder,” Central European History 2 (1969): pp. 356-65. 
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willing to lighten but not end its military occupation.  He declared that the function of the 
committee was to establish to reparation pledges in unoccupied Germany.  Poincaré also 
demanded cessions of railroad and mines for reparation purposes and “as a guarantee of 
French and Belgian security.”  French occupation costs should paid before reparation 
receipts were to be paid and that the larger part of any loan to Germany was to be assigned to 
reparation payments.26  
 Dawes optimistically took Poincaré’s speech as indicating that France would not oppose 
the reestablishment of normal business relations between the Ruhr and unoccupied Germany 
and would accept reducing its military forces to the minimum simply to ensure that Germany 
make reparation payments.  Dawes accepted the continued military occupation of the Ruhr as 
a matter of course.2   7  By early February the outline of a reparation plan which had general 
agreement began to take shape.  A new German bank would be established to issue currency, 
reparations would be determined on a definite amount per year that would be established 
based on a percentage of Germany’s total national revenues rather a fixed sum for a definite 
period of years, and German assets such as railways could serve as securities.  The final plan, 
however, would not emerge until April as the committee struggled over the details of what 
they could offer Poincaré in the way of secure reparations that also would obtain the 
                                                          
 26 Poincaré’s speech to the Chamber of Deputies, 20 Jan 1924, reproduced in part in 
Dawes, Journal, pp. 40-49, quote on p. 46. 
 27 Ibid., p. 49. Young was also willing to accept a strictly military occupation if that was 
what it took to satisfy the French, noting “if the French want to continue armed forces in the 
occupied regions, well and good; but they must not interfere with production, and France 
must pay for them.” But privately Young worried that the continued occupation might retard 
German economic recovery.  Quoted in Buckingham, International Normalcy, p. 136. 
 395 
acceptance of the other powers and how that could be accomplished in actual practice.28   
 On 8 February, the French economic advisor Charles Louis Seydoux2  9 signaled the 
British Embassy what aspects of the general line being taken by the Dawes Committee might 
be acceptable.  He recognized that the policies of the Labor Government that had recently 
taken power under MacDonald were likely to be “more widely separated” from French 
policy than those of Baldwin had been.  Seydoux suggested that France could agree to the 
following proposals: the new bank in Germany that would issue a new currency, an 
international loan, pledges based the German railroad revenues, and excise taxes that would 
be paid into a special reparation account which could be used as security for the loan to pay 
reparations or returned to Germany to help balance the budget during a moratorium period.  
France would also accept rendering the military occupation of the Ruhr almost invisible so 
there would be minimal interference with the economic life of the population. 
 But France would not accept a complete military withdrawal from the Ruhr or making 
the repayment of the loan the first charge on German assets, ranking before reparations, 
because France was uncertain as to what Germany could actually pay.30  Dawes was 
informed by French military contacts that President Millerand and General Foch also favored 
a minimal military presence in the Ruhr that would not interfere with normal business and 
economic life, agreeing that military pressure was not necessary.31  For their part, Young and 
                                                          
 28 Dawes, Journal, pp. 88-91. 
 29 Seydoux was Deputy Director of Political and Commercial Affairs in the French 
Foreign Ministry as well as General Secretary of the French delegation to the Reparation 
Commission. 
 30 Crewe to MacDonald, 10 Feb 1924, enclosure, no. 357, DBFP XXVI, pp. 538-40.  
 31 Dawes, Journal, pp. 128-31. 
 396 
the British insisted on the “lifting of any embarrassing economic pressure which would 
harass business or lessen the confidence of investors in the plan.”32
 On 29 February, Dawes achieved the agreement of Jean Parmentier, the leading French 
representative in the First Committee, that the existing political guarantees and penalties that 
were intended to assure German reparations hampered reconstruction and would be 
withdrawn or modified as soon as Germany put the new proposed plan into operation.  They 
would not be re-imposed except in the case of a German flagrant failure to fulfill the 
conditions of the plan.  Dawes now believed that “all doubts as the unanimous report of our 
committee was over.”3  3   Poincaré, however, had not yet consented to Seydoux’s 
acquiescence to German economic unity or to Paramentier’s ideas. 
 
The French Financial Crisis  
 The more accommodating attitude by French officials reflected France’s deteriorating 
international position.  As the Dawes Committee began its deliberations in late January, 
France was slipping into a financial crisis.  The franc had begun to depreciate with the 
beginning of the Ruhr Crisis in January 1923 and by December 1923 had lost 30 per cent of 
its exchange value against the dollar.  France had also exhausted its capacity for domestic 
borrowing.  By early March, the franc was under attack by speculators.34  
 With the end of passive resistance in September and the signing of the MICUM 
                                                          
 32 Ibid., p. 130-31. 
 33 Ibid., p. 132. 
 34 For an extensive and cogent discussion of the French financial crisis see Schucker, End 
of French Predominance, pp. 31-56, especially the table of franc-dollar exchange rates from 
January 1922 to March 1924 (p. 53).  For French limits on long term borrowing, see p. 33.  
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agreements in November 1923, the occupation of the Ruhr had begun to turn profitable.  
However, Poincaré was forced to admit that when the costs of occupation were subtracted 
from the profits, the net yield for 1923 was only approximately 130 million gold marks and 
the estimates for 1924 would be only 600 million gold marks, of which France was only 
entitled to 52 percent.35  In January, Poincaré  proposed a 20 percent across-the-board 
increase in taxes, the double décime, rather than a broad program of tax reform, but it 
became a matter of protracted debate in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate and was not 
passed until March 1923.36   The domestic support of Poincaré was beginning to erode as the 
economic premises of the his policies were called into doubt.    
 France was forced to resort to an international loan and turned to J. P. Morgan & Co., a 
long-standing supporter of France. Morgan was willing to double the French request for $50 
million but insisted on the passage of the proposed French tax program and that expenditures 
be kept in line with revenue without further borrowing. 37  Hughes, without consulting his 
staff, bypassed the normal loan review process and approved the loan with the condition that 
it not adversely affect the chance of the experts’ plan being accepted.38  Houghton was of the 
opinion that success of the experts committee depended on the franc falling which would 
                                                          
 35 Kent, Spoils of War, p. 251. 
 36 For an extended discussion of the legislative debates and party politics see Schuker, 
The End of French Predominance, pp. 57-88. 
 37 There is a debate among French historians as to whether Morgan or the United States 
government required a French pledge to accept the Dawes Committee plan as a condition of 
the loan.  Schuker found no evidence for this in The End of French Predominance, pp. 108-9. 
Review of the historical debate in n. 58. 
 38 Ibid., p. 112-13. 
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force France to treat with the Germans.39
 Dawes and Owen Young, however, in giving approval for the loan, were of the opinion 
that the loan to support the franc would do no harm and that what really mattered was French 
acceptance of the experts’ plan.  Unless the committee produced a unanimous report (Dawes 
was confident it would) and France accepted it, “the franc would go far towards joining the 
mark.”40   The Morgan loan enabled France to repel speculative attacks against franc, but 
Houghton was correct in pointing to French financial weakness.  It exposed the French 
vulnerability and ultimately would weaken its position when it came to defending French 
policy interests when the Dawes Plan came to be implemented.  
  
The Final Construction of the Dawes Plan  
 By middle of March 1924, the committees had reached the point where the various 
components of the Dawes Plan were ready to be put together and the final details worked out.  
Dawes, as usual, urged speed.  One of the British representatives, Sir Robert Kindersley, 
concerned that Britain would have to live with what the American dominated committee 
rushed through, strongly urged that the plan “must be well considered and matured, for 
mistakes made now could not be corrected hereafter.”41 Bradbury reported that all the three 
main plans, the new German bank, the railways, and the assignment of revenues are 
“hideously complicated and bristle with both political and administrative difficulties.”42
                                                          
 39 Robbins to Castle, 12 March 1924, file 52, Castle Papers. 
 40 Dawes, Journal, pp. 159-60, quote on p. 160. 
 41 Ibid., p. 161-63. 
 42 Bradbury to Phillip Snowden, the new British Chancellor of the Exchequer, 17 March 
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 The crucial issue of how much Germany would be required to pay in reparations was not 
completely settled until the final days of the committee.  The guiding principle was that 
Germans should have to bear a tax burden equivalent to the highest one paid by any of the 
Allies.  In calculating this, the committee noted Germany’s internal debt had been virtually 
eliminated by inflation as had the debts of industry, agriculture, and railroads, and that these 
segments of the German economy should carry a burden commensurate with other nations to 
eliminate the trade advantage over other nations.4  3   The First Committee recognized that on 
a practical basis such fully commensurate sums were unrealistic and would be unacceptable 
to Germany.  Jean Paramentier, one of the two French representatives, demanded that the 
standard German annual reparation bill be set at 3 billion gold marks.44  Sir Josiah Stamp, 
the British tax expert on the First Committee, argued for a standard payment of 2 to 2.25 
billion marks.45  Owen Young, however, held out for 2.75 billion.46   
  Among the American experts, opinion was divided. The American technical experts 
agreed with the British viewpoint, and Dawes was also inclined toward the lower figure.  
Owen Young, who in Bradbury’s judgment had “an entirely exaggerated notion of 
Germany’s recuperative power and her capacity to pay,” argued for a 2.75 billion gold mark 
figure which was close to Poincaré’s demand of 3 billion gold marks, a position which the 
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British saw as making it more difficult for them to get the French and Belgian to lower their 
demands.  The problem, as Bradbury viewed it, was that the Americans “were afraid of a 
reduction of the German reparation liability getting them into political trouble through its 
repercussion on European debts to America.”47   Dawes acknowledged that he and Young 
had to “face the fear” that the setting of “the maximum Germany can pay may create a 
feeling of hopeless that inter-allied debts can ever be met.”48   Dawes, and especially the 
other American experts, however, were more inclined to the British point of view than was 
Young.   
 When the compromise figure of 2.5 billion gold marks was settled upon, the American 
technical experts whose opinion had been largely ignored in considering the reparations sums 
bitterly called the schedule “absolutely unrealizable” and threatened to denounce the whole 
plan and declare that any loan to Germany would be “unsound.”  Houghton, who met with 
Logan and Young in Paris, held a personal view closer to that of the experts, but 
nevertheless, recognized that “Young was not so much interested primarily in a sum as in an 
agreement on a sum” and credited Young with getting France to reduce its demands by 
siding with the French and allowing himself to be “moved” down, ultimately reaching a 
figure which at least “bears some relationship to reality.”49   
 Dawes was willing to support Young’s compromise figure.  When a newspaper published 
a report that he and Young differed as to Germany’s ability to pay, he asserted that “Young 
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and I have no difference of opinion at any time.”50   Dawes had little patience with the 
critical attitude of the American technical experts.  He was convinced that “international 
bodies largely dominated by expert opinion rather than practical opinion, get nowhere.”  He 
condescended to show them a copy of the final report for “their own peace of mind” but 
noted that their comments “would have as much effect on our committee as snow flakes 
falling on a red-hot stove.”51
 While Dawes could dismiss the American technical advisors, he could not dismiss 
Stamp, who by threatening a minority report, forced a last-minute reduction in the German 
payments in the last two of the partial moratorium years (the third and fourth years under the 
plan.)52   In his account, Bruce Kent notes that Parmentier told Poincaré that the French 
experts had to back down over the size of the reparation German annuities because the 
Americans threatened to publish the American expert belief that even a standard payment of 
2.5 billion gold marks was unreasonable and unacceptable.53   
 The Dawes Plan fixed German reparations payments as beginning with one billion gold 
marks for the first budget period, 1924 - 1925, and then rising until it reached a standard 
payment of 2.5 billion gold marks in 1928 - 29. 54   The report avoided setting the total 
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reparations sum by providing no mention of the number of years Germany would be required 
to pay reparations as well as no mention of whether the annual payments represented interest 
or principal.  If the payments were to be continued without change for the 64 years of the 
London Schedule without any increase based on German prosperity, it has been estimated to 
have had a current capital value in 1924 of 40 billion gold marks, a significant reduction 
from the full London Schedule.55
 But the Dawes Plan was designed as an interim plan that could resolve a crisis situation 
and not as a decades-long, definitive solution to the reparation problem.  The immediate 
difficulty, because the annual payment represented “all the amounts for which Germany may 
be liable to the allied and associated powers arising out of the war,” was how the reparation 
payments would be divided up among the powers.  In the preparation of the final report, 
Dawes and Young had included the term “associated powers” which preserved the United 
States’s claim to having its occupation costs paid out of Germany’s annual payment, a 
demand to which Britain had strongly objected.56  
 The funding of the reparations was fixed so that approximately half the standard payment 
would come from the German budget, with the remainder obtained from the interest on 
mortgage bonds issued by German industry and railways.  Revenues from customs and taxes 
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on alcohol, tobacco, beer and sugar were to serve as a secondary guarantee of funds.  An 
international loan of 800 million gold marks was to be used for the establishment of a new 
bank and the stabilization of currency issued by that bank as well as to provide funding for 
deliveries in kind during the transition period.   
 The problem of how Germany could transfer reparations payments without destabilizing 
its currency was dealt with by having all the sums required by Germany under the plan 
deposited into a special reparation account in a new Reichsbank, the bank that would also 
establish and issue a new currency for Germany.  A transfer agent would be responsible for 
the administration of the plan and would serve as chairman and member of a six-member 
Transfer Committee, the other five members consisting of members from France, Italy, 
Britain, Belgium and the U.S.  The Transfer Committee would determine how much could be 
safely transferred.  If the full reparation sum could not be safely transferred, the Transfer 
Committee could authorize the investment of the funds unable to be transferred in loans or 
bonds in German industries.  Since the Transfer Committee subsumed some of the functions 
of the Reparation Commission, its composition effectively ended French domination of the 
Reparation Commission.57   
 While the Dawes Plan constructed a plan for Germany’s economic rehabilitation and a 
vehicle for the payment of reparations, it was forced to leave some issues vague and define 
other important issues as being outside its jurisdiction.  Any chance of restoring Germany’s 
credit and obtaining the loan necessary to implement the plan was dependent on achieving 
German fiscal and economic unity, and therefore both the Americans and British were 
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emphatically insistent on this condition.  The Dawes Plan stated that it was based on the 
assumption that “the fiscal and economic unity of the Reich will be restored.”58   Without 
mentioning the MICUM agreements specifically, the Plan pointed out that “existing 
measures in so far as they hamper that activity will be withdrawn or sufficiently modified as 
soon as Germany has put into execution the plan recommended.”  Such measures were not to 
be re-imposed except in the case of “flagrant failure” on the part of Germany to fulfill the 
conditions of the agreement.  It specified a procedure that would make the re-imposition of 
unilateral sanctions difficult and unlikely.  The report specified that there had to be “common 
agreement” on the “flagrant failure.”  In case of such failure it was up to the creditor 
governments acting with “consciousness of joint trusteeship for the financial interests of 
themselves and others who will have advanced money upon the lines of the plan, and then to 
determine the nature of sanctions to be applied and the method of their rapid application.”59   
The plan rejected, except in extreme circumstances, direct or indirect control of all of 
Germany’s revenue and expenditure and suggested that taxes on customs, alcohol, beer, 
tobacco and sugar serve as a collateral security.”60   
 The Dawes Plan defined the question of the military occupation as being outside its 
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jurisdiction, leaving it an open question.6  1   Dawes strongly believed that military occupation 
of the Ruhr as distinguished from economic control had to be conceded to France, “not only 
in the interest of her proper protection, but as safe-guarding the performance of the entire 
program in the future.”62  Young, however, wanted military evacuation included in the report 
but deferred to Dawes so as not to split American opinion in the report.63  When pressed by 
the British for assurances that France would eventually evacuate the Ruhr, Dawes took the 
position that the pressure of public opinion for a settlement was such that England and 
France would both accept the committee’s report whether it advocated immediate military 
evacuation in the Ruhr or recognized it with the proviso that it was not to interfere with 
normal economic functioning.64    
 Since the French held that control of the Rhineland railway system was necessary to 
maintain their military occupation, Dawes left open the possibility for some French-Belgian 
control of the Rhineland railroads.  The Dawes Committee recognized that the conversion of 
Germany’s railroad system into a joint stock company would be a major source of reparation 
revenues, but left the administration and management of the railroads to German 
management.  It also suggested that the German railroad system could be divided into 
different systems without detrimentally affecting their financial unity.65   France could now 
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argue that the Régie, which it considered necessary for the support of its occupying troops, 
could be operated as a separate system without impairing fiscal unity.  For France, the Ruhr 
represented a security issue as well as an economic one and Dawes was willing to 
accommodate France on all issues where economic productivity of reparations was not 
affected in order to achieve French acceptance of the plan. 
 The Second Committee, charged with investigating German assets abroad that could be 
reparation payments, played little role in the formation of the Dawes Plan.  Estimates of the 
different sources of capital abroad varied; the best that the committee could do was to arrive 
at a guess of between 5.7 billion gold marks and 7.8 billion gold marks and conclude that the 
average of two figures, 6.75 billion gold marks, was the approximate total.  Nor did they 
think that there was any realistic way to compel the return of capital to Germany.  They 
concluded that the best way to prevent the exodus of capital from Germany and to encourage 
its return to was to halt the inflation and allow the capital to return on its own.66  
 
The Gold Discount Bank 
 The Dawes Plan sought to stabilize Germany’s currency as a central part of the 
reconstruction of Germany, which was seen as essential to the reconstruction of Europe as a 
whole.  To that end it called for a 800 million gold mark loan which would fund a new 
Reichsbank that would issue a stable currency and allow for the funding of Germany’s initial 
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reparation payments required under the plan.  Since this bank would play a crucial role in 
German and European recovery, the United States and Britain, which both sought a dominant 
role in European reconstruction, had competing interests on whether that new bank would be 
established on a gold or sterling standard. 
 This competition came to a head when Germany sought the Dawes Committee’s approval 
to establish a Gold Discount Bank that would serve as a temporary measure to provide 
credits for foreign imports desperately need by industrial firms.  Since it was expected that 
this specialized bank would be folded into new Reichsbank, Britain would have a leg up in 
having the new Reichsbank similarly based on sterling.  That in turn would give Britain an 
initial advantage in trade with Germany and Central Europe and would keep the pound 
sterling as the major international currency for finance and trade.  If the Discount Bank were 
based on gold, these advantages would go to the United States.     
 Prior to the war London had been the world’s financial center, but by 1924 the United 
States, the only major power remaining on the gold standard, had become the world’s largest 
creditor with over half of the world’s gold supply, which gave it financial predominance. The 
ever-increasing gold supply posed the risk of domestic inflation.  The United States could 
accept some inflation and expand the money supply, thus reducing the value of the dollar, 
and making it easier for the Europeans to pay off their debts and compete with the United 
States.  The United States could also choose to cancel or reduce war debts which would 
reduce the inflow of gold, but there was little appetite for either reducing American 
competitiveness or remission of the war debts in the Coolidge administration during an 
election year.67    
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 Benjamin Strong, the governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, believed that 
American trade suffered because the Europeans lacked the reserves required to stabilize their 
own currencies.  He sought a international currency stabilization based on the gold standard, 
believing that unproductive American gold should be used for international loans and 
investments which would help European recovery and increase American trade.  This plan, 
however, required that Britain return to the gold standard.68   To do so, Britain would have to 
decrease its international lending to accumulate the reserves necessary for a return to a gold 
standard and overvalue the pound at $4.86, which would leave Wall Street the leading 
international finance center.  If the new German currency to be issued by the new bank were 
stabilized on a gold standard, there would be increased pressure on Britain also to return to 
the gold standard to avoid a trade disadvantage.  This was well recognized by Britain.  Sir 
Otto Niemeyer, Controller of Finance at the British Treasury, warned of a “serious problem 
for this country” if Germany “gets back to gold standard before we do.”69  
 The American-British rivalry surfaced in the initial meetings of the Dawes Committee 
when the committee was immediately confronted with the problem of the stabilization of the 
German currency which Dawes saw as the first priority.70   Hjalmar Schacht, the new 
Reichsbank president, met with the committee on 19 and 21 January to seek the committee’s 
approval to start the new Gold Discount Bank.  The bank would mobilize some part of the 
free reserves of the gold and foreign currencies which still might exist in Germany and also 
                                                          
 68 Ibid., Schuker, The End of French Predominance, pp. 161-63. 
 69  Memorandum by Mr. Niemeyer on the Reparation Experts Report, 14 April 1924, no. 
430, DBFP XXVI, p. 633.  Britain would return to the gold standard in April 1925. 
 70 Dawes, Journal, 15 Jan 1924, p. 20. 
 409 
obtain some foreign capital.  Backed by gold, the bank could begin to service German 
industrial firms so that they could obtain much-needed imports.71
 Schacht had already met in early January with Montagu Norman, the Governor of the 
Bank of England, and obtained his support and a promise of a three-year, five million pound 
credit at 5% interest.72  Norman, who favored Britain’s eventual return to the gold standard, 
wanted to delay that return until Britain had reestablished its position of financial leadership 
in European trade.73  Norman went so far as to teasingly play to Germany’s revisionist 
dreams by inquiring of Schacht  if, in the event of a German takeover of Danzig and an 
Anschluss with Austria, Germany would remember its debts to the Bank of England.74  
 Norman and Schacht believed that Germany’s economic difficulties required immediate 
attention and could not wait until the experts committee finished its report.   The French were 
opposed to the idea and other members of the committee had concerns that Schacht’s new 
bank might in some way compromise their proposals for the new Reichsbank which were not 
yet fully formulated.  Dawes and Young, however, were concerned that the committee’s 
disapproval of the plan could precipitate a financial crisis in Germany for which the 
committee could be blamed.  They compromised by issuing a qualified public endorsement 
on 23 January 1924.  At the same time, they insisted that Schacht’s new bank would 
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eventually have to be merged into a reconstituted Reichsbank that the Dawes Committee 
would eventually establish to issue a new German currency.75    
  The approval of the Gold Discount Bank was a major diplomatic victory for Germany 
with important dividends in both the short and long run.  The immediate effect was to 
improve Germany’s position in the occupied Rhineland and the Ruhr.  At the end of 1923, 
Rhineland leaders such as Konrad Adenauer, the mayor of Cologne, along with industrialists 
and bankers, the most prominent of which were Hugo Stinnes, Louis Hagen and Albert 
Vögler, argued that the Rhineland and Ruhr should separate itself from Prussia as an 
autonomous state within the German Reich and orient itself towards France.76  Agreements 
between French and German heavy industries would be established giving each minority 
participation in the other’s industry and trade agreements.  A Rhenish-Westphalian bank with 
French backing would be established that would be able to provide much-needed credits to 
German industry.  For Paul Tirad, the French High Commissioner in the Rhineland, the bank 
represented the best opportunity for prying the Rhineland loose from Germany since the 
separatist movement had already begun to collapse with the exception of that in the Bavarian 
Palatinate.77  
 The approval by the Dawes Committee of Schacht’s temporary Gold Discount Bank, 
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which allowed German industry foreign credits, strengthened the hand of Marx and 
Stresemann in hindering the creation of a Rhineland Bank.  Stinnes informed Houghton “the 
industrialists would not sign up with the French pending the outcome of the Committee’s 
work.”7  8   Britain pitched in by refusing to participate in any French-controlled Rhineland 
Bank, thus effectively killing the project and dealing a crippling blow to the movement for an 
autonomous Rhineland. 
 The United States saw British support of the Gold Discount Bank as an effort to have 
Germany eventually stabilize its currency on a sterling standard which would give Britain a 
dominant position in the monetary and financial reorganization of European trade.  Paul M. 
Warburg, president of the International Acceptance Bank, sent Owen Young a cable asking 
“Could not America be brought into the first line right now pari-passu with British banks. 
Pardon this cable, but I am frankly alarmed at the thought that we may miss this unique 
opportunity for putting America’s discount market on the map and complete our position as 
world leaders.”79 Warburg organized a consortium of American banks which offered the 
Gold Discount Bank a $20 million credit at 6.5 percent, topping the British offer by $5 
million, a generous offer since the Federal Reserve discount rate was 4 percent.80   
 The Discount Bank was established in April, with Schacht accepting first only $5 million 
and later the full $20 million from the American banking syndicate along with the British 
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financing.81  The British ambassador in Washington recognized that the significance was 
“much wider” than just $5 million or $20 million  credit.  He warned MacDonald that 
Warburg’s American syndicate represented the 21 largest banks in the United States and was 
being characterized in the press “as assuring complete revival of German-American prewar 
trade.”8    2 But for Germany this American involvement not only helped stabilize its currency 
but also heralded the flow of American capital into Germany, which Germany had long seen 
as the instrument of German recovery and escape from the strictures of Versailles.  
 In the Dawes Committee there continued to be opposition to the American insistence that 
the new Reichsbank be established utilizing a gold standard.  Norman expressed 
apprehension as to the effect on Britain.  French experts attached to Jean Parmentier, the 
French representative on the First Committee, argued that it was unfair to authorize a gold 
standard for Germany while France was still struggling with an un-stabilized currency.  But 
Parmentier supported Dawes and Young.83
 Norman hoped to have the new Reichsbank act as a partner to the Bank of England.  By 
threatening to withdraw the support of the Bank of England from the new Reichsbank and 
the proposed 800 million gold mark loan, Norman was able to stop the proposed American 
plan to have the new Reichsbank placed under foreign control.84   Norman was also 
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successful in forcing the Americans to temporarily postpone the gold convertibility of 
banknotes to be issued.  While they would be valued on a gold basis they would not be 
immediately convertible to gold.8  5   But the United States had won the larger battle.  The 
German Reichsbank would be based on the gold standard and the Bank of England would be 
forced to return to the gold standard in 1925.    
 The Dawes Plan taken as a whole was an important step toward the resolution of the 
reparation crisis and offered a framework for the reconstruction of Germany.  It may have 
represented the best practical compromise that could be obtained at the time.  It promised 
Germany unity and provided a breathing space by demanding relatively moderate initial 
payments.  But many of the compromises required leaving important issues unresolved.  It 
left the door open for continued French-Belgian military occupation and control of German 
railroads.  To obtain French agreement, it set a level of reparations payments which most 
experts believed was too high and failed to specify what sanctions for noncompliance would 
be applied to Germany, thus leaving the door open for French unilateral action. 
 The United States had prevailed in its effort to have the new Reichsbank established on a 
gold-standard basis and in having its army occupation costs covered through German 
reparations.  Britain resented Dawes’s and Young’s dominance during the proceedings.  
Bradbury believed that Dawes’s insistence on forcing unanimity came at “price of 
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indefiniteness in matters that provoked controversy.”8    6 At the British foreign office, Sir Eyre 
Crowe angrily noted, “The less we allow the American to meddle the better. They do nothing 
but complicate and spoil matters.”87  
 But despite their reservations, the British experts were willing to accept the final plan.  It 
offered the promise of American economic involvement with Europe.  It also provided a 
framework which carried moral authority around which the various powers would have to 
negotiate.  The plan was presented to the Reparation Commission on 9 April.  
 
Reactions to the Dawes Plan  
 Stresemann and Marx quickly decided to accept the Dawes Plan in its entirety as a 
practical basis for a rapid solution to the problems of reparations. The German cabinet’s 
decision to accept the Dawes Plan, however, was made only after a contentious debate in a 
meeting with the Minister-Presidents of the German States on 14 April.  The difficulty was to 
obtain an agreement to accept the report in its entirety, without questions or reservations.  
Concerns were raised regarding the following issues: the explicit restoration of Germany’s 
political and administrative sovereignty in occupied areas, French willingness to end the 
military occupation in the Ruhr, guarantees for the release of prisoners held by France and 
the return of those expelled from the Ruhr, the danger of  re-imposition of sanctions by 
France and concerns that in the implementation of the plan, controls would be placed on 
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Germany that went beyond those detailed in the report.88   Schubert informed D’Abernon 
that the plan would be presented to the Reichstag as a treaty fully accepted by Germany, to 
avoid the perception that it was yet another ultimatum imposed upon Germany by the Allies, 
as had been the case at Versailles and at the London Reparation Conference of 1921.89  
 Prior to the meeting with the Minister-Presidents, Stresemann had informed D’Abernon 
that he had expected resistance in the meeting; MacDonald responded by making it clear that 
he expected Germany to accept the plan “in its entirety without hesitation or delay.”90   
Houghton added the weight of the United States by informing Stresemann “to swallow it 
whole.”91 Both the United States and Britain sought to preserve the momentum provided by 
the Dawes Plan’s achievement of a report that all the experts had accepted, but both nations 
needed German acceptance before throwing their weight behind the plan.  Dependent on 
American and British support, Germany, despite its reservations, could ill afford not to 
follow the tactical lead of the United States and Britain.  Germany notified the Reparation 
Commission of its acceptance on April 16.92  
 MacDonald was concerned that a German refusal to renew the MICUM agreements due 
to expire on April 15 would result in coercion by France which could jeopardize the Dawes 
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Plan.  Urged by MacDonald, Germany agreed to extend the MICUM agreements for an 
additional two months with covert German government subsidies to the industrialists.93   
 Great Britain announced its full support of the Dawes Plan on 24 April.94   MacDonald, 
while acknowledging that some of the proposals could be improved, emphasized that the 
report was unanimous and that “such a report supported by such authority must command 
general assent.”  He emphasized that the report was “an indivisible whole” and had to be 
accepted “in their entirety.”  In a message to both Germany and France he asserted that the 
plan had “to be given a real chance” and “waiting to make any modifications which may 
appear necessary after experience and by common agreement” would not be desirable, a 
comment specifically directed at Poincaré.95   
 Unofficially, Britain had many concerns.  In the Treasury Office, Sir Otto E. Niemeyer 
considered the reparation scheme to be a “facade.”  Niemeyer believed that German 
reparations were set too high and criticized the plan for leaving the total sum of German 
reparations open.  Niemeyer considered the prosperity index, which increased the standard 
payment based on measures of economic growth, as a “dubious proposition.”  He saw 
multiple difficulties with how the plan would work in actual practice.  He also envisioned 
difficulties arising from those issues the plan had bypassed.  These included such matters as 
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disagreements among the Allies as to how the German reparations, which were to be all- 
inclusive, would be divided among the Allies and also problems related to the MICUM 
agreements.  He also expected that France would pressure Britain to commit to enforcing 
sanctions, including reoccupation, if Germany defaulted, an action which “might ruin the 
(mainly English and American) subscribers to the loan.”  Niemeyer was also concerned that 
unless there was an evacuation of the Ruhr it would be impossible to raise the loan. 
 Despite these and other criticisms, Niemeyer’s conclusion was that the report had to be 
accepted.  It carried with it the “implication of American assistance in solving Europe’s 
financial problems” and was the only constructive suggestion “to escape from the present 
position which, if left, must inevitably lead to war, open or concealed between France and 
Germany.”96   
   Official Washington, which had been concerned as to whether to Germany would accept  
the plan, was delighted with the acceptance of the experts report by the Reparation 
Commission and by the German cabinet.97   The public reaction in America to the Dawes 
Report was overwhelmingly positive.  The details mattered less than the fact that it was 
perceived as “Made in America.”  American opinion was that just as American intervention 
and troops brought victory to the Allies, American experts serving as honest brokers and 
applying American common sense had again saved Europe.98   D’Abernon noted in his diary 
that “[t]he Experts Report has many merits. Among others this one–that it is regarded by the 
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Americans as their child–they treat any criticism of it or any hesitation to apply it almost as 
an insult to the American flag.”99   
 On 17 April, MacDonald urged Coolidge to make a public statement in support of the 
plan, explaining that such a statement might help European governments (i.e, Germany and 
France) who were in difficult circumstances because of elections “to do the right thing.”  
Hughes informed the British Ambassador, Sir Esme Howard, that Coolidge was waiting until 
he was assured that public opinion was favorable.10  0   On 22 April, with American public 
opinion having crystallized in favor of the plan, Coolidge gave a ringing endorsement to the 
plan as the basis “for a practical solution to the reparation problem.”  America, Coolidge 
proclaimed, “was justified in looking at the results with great pride.”  He acknowledged 
Germany’s willingness to cooperate and stated: “Nothing of more importance in Europe has 
occurred since the armistice.”  Coolidge gave what amounted to a presidential endorsement 
to the anticipated 800 million gold mark loan ( $200 million) in stating that not only would 
American private capital participate in the loan but also that “there were sound business 
reasons” to do so. 
 Coolidge further noted that adoption of the Dawes Plan “would benefit trade and 
commerce” and, courting the Midwest farm vote, specifically noted agricultural exports.  In 
accordance with the Federal Reserve policy, Coolidge noted America’s “notorious” growing 
accumulation of gold and promoted greater international loans and investments by 
suggesting that some of America’s gold “can be used more to our greater financial advantage 
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in Europe than it can be in the United States.”  Coolidge expressed hope for a further 
disarmament conference and a hope that disagreements could be settled through the Hague 
Tribunal or the International Court of Justice.101
 Coolidge and Hughes had taken a political gamble in allowing American participation, 
albeit by “non-official” experts, in the attempt to solve the European reparation crisis without 
involving the issue of war debts, and it had been successful.  For Germany the benefit of 
Coolidge’s speech was that the administration was now politically committed to the 
successful implementation of the Dawes Plan, which had left many issues for later resolution 
for which Germany would need American help.102    
  Poincaré’s overall goal was to maintain as much of his productive pledges, including the 
coal tax and the custom barrier, for as long as possible.  He also sought to maintain military 
forces in the Ruhr, and to maintain control of the Régie.  Those interests that he might have 
to give up he hoped to trade for concession in war debts owed to Britain and the United 
States.  He wanted British agreement that if Germany defaulted, Britain would join France in 
a reoccupation of the Ruhr or at least allow unilateral French action.  His initial intended 
tactic was to stall the acceptance of the report in the Reparation Commission, but was 
convinced by Barthou that France would be isolated if it attempted to delay a vote in the 
Reparation Commission.  On 11 April Barthou achieved a compromise with Bradbury and 
the Reparation Commission accepted the experts’ report, approving the conclusions and 
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methods of the report insofar as they were within its jurisdiction but only recommending 
those conclusions relating to matters that fell under the authority of the Allied 
governments.103  
 With the French election scheduled for 11 May, Poincaré could not afford to allow the 
Dawes report to be seen as a diplomatic defeat for France.  At a speech at Luna Park on 15 
April, he pointed out that the Dawes report demonstrated that Germany could pay reparations 
that would eventually rise to a sum greater than that proposed by Bonar Law in 1922.  He 
noted that since it did not fix a final sum, France could exchange the C bonds for inter-Allied 
debts.  France also could only be asked to exchange its present productive pledges against 
other more remunerative payments, but only after Germany had put into execution a definite 
plan.  Furthermore, there was no question that France would withdraw from the Ruhr before 
payment of the share due to France.  France retained the right to impose sanctions in the case 
of the default and would hold on to the Régie, which would make it easier to impose them.104  
Poincaré also insisted that in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles, German delegates 
could be heard by the Reparation Committee but could not be called into consultation.105   
 Poincaré’s reply to the Reparation Committee on 25 April reflected this program.  
Poincaré insisted that Germany pass unconditionally all the necessary legislation for review 
by the Reparation Commission before the commission gave its approval to the Dawes Plan.  
Similar to the procedure at Versailles, Germany would be allowed to be heard but not to 
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negotiate.  The governments involved would also have to give approval to the German laws.  
Furthermore, the governments would have to decide among themselves which productive 
pledges held by the French and Belgian governments could become the object of a fusion or 
of an exchange for the pledges to be handed over to the Allies.106   
 In an interview with Crewe on 26 April, Poincaré asked that Britain approve the 
resumption of economic and industrial controls of the Ruhr as a sanction if Germany 
defaulted, controls he was prepared to abandon if the Dawes Plan was implemented.  
Poincaré, however, insisted on maintaining a skeleton military force in the Ruhr in case of 
default.  Poincaré indicated that he had heard from the French ambassador in Berlin that 
Germany would accept such a force.  Crewe pointed out that three British governments had 
refused to admit the legality of the Ruhr occupation and that that policy was not likely to 
change.  Poincaré also insisted on Allied representation on the railway board that would 
control the Rhineland-Ruhr railway system so as not to leave the French and Belgian troops 
“in the air.”  When Crewe pointed out that this would have to be negotiated with Germany, 
Poincaré accepted the idea of negotiations as long as the Allies had the right to impose the 
system if negotiations failed.107
 In Berlin, D’Abernon immediately picked up on Poincaré’s statement that Germany 
would not raise any serious objection to the maintenance of a skeleton military force in the 
Ruhr after French and Belgian economic evacuation.  He noted that at a speech at 
Magdeburg on 29 April, Stresemann had claimed that the all-inclusive clause of the Dawes 
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Plan, which threw the costs of military occupation primarily on France, would result in an 
early reduction of French troops and eventual total withdrawal.  D’Abernon’s soundings in 
the German foreign office gave him the impression, perhaps derived from Stresemann’s line, 
that the foreign office considered Germany’s unity in financial, economic and administrative 
spheres as its first priority and that it was willing to leave the question of military occupation 
aside for the time being and wait for economic pressure on France to force the withdrawal of 
the troops.  But they were well aware that German public opinion could change their 
views.108  
 
Separating Belgium from France 
 Aware that Belgium was eager to find some compromise position to end the reparation 
crisis, Mac Donald attempted to separate the Belgians from France.  Meeting with the 
Belgian Ambassador on 17 April, he insisted that the Dawes report be accepted in its 
entirety.  He argued that to threaten Germany with sanctions would have a “psychological 
effect upon Germany which was thoroughly bad” and would simply strengthen the 
nationalist movement.  He proposed that a better solution was to internationalize the problem 
of any future German default by involving the League of Nations.  He also questioned 
whether the American loan could be obtained if Germany was under the threat of 
reoccupation as a sanction.  He further informed the Belgian ambassador that Britain had no 
intention of wiping off the war debts owed to it.  He warned that if the Allies did not accept 
the experts’ report, he would not continue “the passive attitude” of the previous British 
governments.   He reminded the ambassador that Britain had always denied that the extent 
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German default in 1923 justified the occupation of the Ruhr, that it never accepted the 
legality of the Ruhr invasion; that it had protested against the MICUM arrangements; that it 
opposed the Régie; and that it had not agreed the extension of powers taken by the Rhineland 
Commission during the occupation.  He also noted that Britain did not believe that the 
Rhineland Commission was in strict accordance with the treaty and other agreements.  
MacDonald, however, readily agreed to a Belgian proposal for a conference to settle 
outstanding issues.  He stipulated that it should be held in London, which would give the 
British the “home court” advantage.109
 MacDonald’s warning stiffened Belgian resistance when Georges Theunis, the Belgian 
Premier, and Paul Hymans, the Belgian foreign minister, met with Poincaré in late April.  
They resisted Poincaré’s demand for a gradual release of the economic control of the Ruhr 
corresponding to German performance under the Dawes Plan and obtained his agreement 
that the economic evacuation would begin once Germany had passed the necessary 
legislation and the Reparation Commission had accepted it.  They also resisted Poincaré’s 
demand that the operation of the Transfer Committee, in which France held only one vote out 
of six, be delayed for two years during which time the Reparation Commission, which 
Poincaré hoped to dominate, would exercise the Transfer Committee’s powers and make sure 
that no significant amount of cash would be allowed to accumulate, thus guaranteeing France 
the maximum payment allowed under the Dawes Plan.  The Belgians argued that such a plan 
would end the possibility of obtaining the Dawes loan.  No agreement was reached on 
military evacuation of the Ruhr, although the Belgians questioned the utility of the current 
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level of troops.  It was, however, agreed that some security for troops left in the Ruhr was 
necessary, but how the Régie was to be modified so as to provide security without impairing 
the economic activity of Germany was to be left for experts to decide.  While not abandoning 
Poincaré completely, Belgium was no longer prepared to support his hard line.110   
 When Theunis and Hymans visited Britain 2-4 May, they sought some compromise that 
would save Poincaré’s face since French elections were scheduled for 11 May.  Taking a 
hard line, MacDonald asserted that since the Dawes Plan required Germany to accept 
conditions that went beyond the Treaty of Versailles, the workings of the plan would have to 
be discussed with the Germans.  MacDonald also hinted that the international banking 
community would require military evacuation if a loan were to be obtained.  Theunis asked 
for British agreement to sanctions consisting of boycotts of German goods or a naval 
blockade, the type of sanctions contemplated by the League of Nations.  MacDonald would 
not accept specifying economic sanctions in advance; he was willing to involve the League 
of Nations’s moral authority.  MacDonald pointed out that if Poincaré were confronted by a 
united front of Britain, Belgium and Italy, he would have to give way.11  1  MacDonald was 
clearly attempting regain the diplomatic initiative which France had held since the 
occupation of the Ruhr.  Governing with the support of the Liberal party, MacDonald had 
limited opportunity to implement an ambitious domestic program, and his accomplishments 
would be measured by the success of his foreign policy.    
 The importance of splitting Belgium off from France was also recognized by Hughes, 
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whose continuing concern was the ability to raise the American loan upon which the Dawes 
Plan depended.  On 2 May, Kellogg, at Hughes’s request, informed Theunis and Hymans that 
the military occupation must not affect the ability of Germany to meet its reparations 
payments and that the Ruhr-Rhineland railway system would have to be incorporated into the 
German railway administration if a loan was to be raised.  Hughes followed MacDonald in 
refusing to agree in advance to an economic boycott in the event of a German default.  
Hughes warned that if France and Belgium did not accept the experts’ report, they would 
forfeit “the last chance they would get of any assistance from the United States or any 
outside powers.”112   
 Neither the United States nor Britain, which both looked forward to economic trade with 
Germany, wanted to see confidence in German economic stability impaired by the threat of 
economic sanctions if Germany defaulted.  Hughes, like MacDonald, also had domestic 
political concerns.  After Coolidge’s ringing endorsement of the Dawes Report, the 
administration could not afford politically to see it fail.  But unlike MacDonald’s more public 
diplomacy, Hughes’s preference remained for quiet diplomatic maneuvering.  
 By the beginning of May, the controversial issues which would dominant the agenda of 
the London Conference had come into focus:  the military evacuation of the Ruhr, the 
preservation of the Régie, the freeing of prisoners held by the French, the return of those 
Germans who had been expelled from the occupied territories, the nature of potential 
sanctions, the requirements for a loan, the powers of the Reparation Commission as opposed 
to the Transfer Committee, and the question as to whether or not Germany would be a 
participant in the conference.  But before that conference could be held, May elections in 
                                                          
 112 MacDonald to Howard, 5 May 1924, no. 458, DBFP XXVI, pp. 676-77. 
 426 
both France and Germany would alter the diplomatic scene. 
 
The Elections in German and France 
  Stresemann, faced with elections on 4 May, immediately sought to capitalize on the 
publication of the Dawes report and made it the centerpiece of his campaign in an election 
where it was widely expected that the government coalition would lose representation in the 
Reichstag.  The Dawes report, along with the yet-to-be-ratified American commercial treaty, 
represented the first major successes of Stresemann’s policy and allowed him to counter the 
criticism from the Nationalists for his termination of passive resistance.  Stresemann argued 
that acceptance of the reparations and controls imposed by the Dawes report was preferable 
to the continuation of the occupation of Ruhr by France which threatened the unity of 
Germany.11  3   
 Most importantly, the Dawes Plan marked the re-involvement in European affairs of the 
United States, which Stresemann saw as essential to German prosperity and return to Great 
Power status.   In a campaign speech at Magdeburg on 29 April, Stresemann reassured those 
who believed that Germany had been deceived by Britain and France in the past and who 
feared that Germany would ultimately not receive the benefits promised in the Dawes Plan.  
While he did not believe that Britain could do very much against France, the “participation of 
the United States suggested that the prospects would be carried through.”  Stresemann also 
argued that since the proposed reparation payments covered all the German costs, France 
would be forced to move its troops out of the Ruhr because it would not be able to afford to 
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keep them there.114   The prospect of an international credit of 800 million gold marks, which 
would come primarily from the United States, also led the Reichsverband der deutschen 
Industrie to strongly endorse acceptance of the Dawes Plan and continue its financial support 
of the DVP.115  
  Stresemann’s political dilemma was that his need to shore up support among the right 
wing of the DVP conflicted with his need to maintain a favorable opinion in the United 
States.  In a major political blunder, he yielded to monarchist opinion in the DVP by 
including in the election platform a pledge to seek a republican monarch for Germany.  The 
New York Times immediately seized upon this with an editorial headlined, “Stresemann 
joins the Junkers.”  Stresemann was forced to follow up with an interview with the New 
York Times in which he defended himself by stressing the point that favoring a constitutional 
monarchy did not interfere with his loyalty to a republican form of government.116  
 From the Berlin embassy, Robbins reported that nationalism was on the rise, noting that 
Ludendoff’s acquittal and Hitler’s light sentence reflected the strength of nationalist 
sentiment.  He reported that the DNVP was gaining support at the DVP’s expense and that 
Stresemann was facing a serious political crisis.  Von Schubert reassured Robbins not to take 
Stresemann’s monarchist comments seriously since they were made for domestic political 
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consumption.  Nevertheless, Castle termed Stresemann’s action “the most amazing political 
statement on the part of a responsible minister which I have ever heard.”  Castle was 
concerned that the fall of the French franc, while making France more willing to 
compromise, might have led the Germans to believe that if they held out long enough they 
could “avoid paying much of anything in the way of reparations.”  Castle felt that this 
attitude could be reinforced by the fact that British Labor appeared to be friendlier to 
Germany than the Baldwin government had been.  Castle thought that Germany was now 
more likely ultimately to refuse the Dawes Plan than was France.  All this reinforced the 
State Department’s negative impression of Germans as being psychologically “an amazingly 
stupid crowd.”117   
 Although the Dawes Plan represented a real success for Marx and Stresemann, the plan 
could not save the Marx government from a major defeat in the 4 May election.  There was a 
swing to the extremes with the Nationalists (DNVP) emerging as the largest party, with 106 
seats, and the Communist Party, with 62 seats, gaining at the expense of the SPD, whose 
seats were reduced from 171 to 100.  The middle class parties that comprised the government 
all lost seats.  The government’s advocacy of the Dawes Plan was not decisive in the 
                                                          
 117 Robbins to Castle, 2 April 1924 and Castle to Houghton, 5 April 1924, file 52, Castle 
Papers.  Wiedfeldt in Washington was horrified at Stresemann’s comments.  Never missing a 
chance to have a go at his political rival, Wiedfeldt wrote to President Ebert complaining of 
the difficulties made by Stresemann’s speech in pressing Germany’s case in the United 
States.  Stresemann angrily denied ever having spoken in favor of a monarchy and 
challenged Wiedfeldt to show where in the speech such words could be found.  Wiedfeldt 
replied that it was not a matter of what Stresemann actually said in Hanover, but rather the 
impression made on foreign correspondents.  The ambassador noted that, as per his 
instructions, he had worked with great care for two years to build good will in the U.S. and 
Stresemann’s speech has made a very bad impression on American politicians, businessmen, 
intellectuals and church groups.  Stresemann to Wiedfeldt, 26 May 1924, H155822, and 
Wiedfeldt to Stresemann, 20 June 1924, H155988, NL Stresemann. 
 429 
election, which reflected the multiple economic grievances that resulted from passive 
resistance and inflation.  The SPD losses stemmed from the high levels of unemployment and 
the SPD’s acceptance of the loss of the eight-hour workday and other labor rights that 
accompanied the emergency decrees, as well as poor economic conditions.  The Nationalist 
gains reflected the anger over Germany’s humiliation at the hands of France but also 
stemmed from such domestic issues as the layoff of large numbers of civil servants, middle 
class anger over the devastating effects of the inflation, higher taxes, and the failure to 
stabilize the currency at a higher level, as well as disappointment over the failure of the 
government to provide a higher revaluation of government bonds widely held by the middle 
class.118  
 After the election the Marx cabinet questioned whether it could remain in power but 
decided to stay in office until the Reichstag reassembled in June.  The Nationalist’s gains in 
the election raised British anxieties regarding final German acceptance of the Dawes Plan.   
Geoffrey George Knox, the British chargé in Berlin, met with von Schubert to express his 
concern that the German Nationalists would insist on attaching conditions to the German 
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acceptance of the Dawes Plan.  The reorganization of the German railway system called for 
in the Dawes Plan required modification of the German constitution, which needed a two-
thirds  majority vote in the Reichstag, a majority that could not be achieved without some 
Nationalist votes.  
 Von Schubert, thumping the table, replied that “by hook or by crook,” Germany would 
accept the report.  If necessary the Reichstag would be dissolved and new elections held or 
Germany would hold a referendum.  Knox’s concern was that any failure of the new 
Reichstag to accept the report would be “unfavorably regarded outside of Germany and even 
if a referendum were successful it would reveal a large block of irreconcilable opinion 
definitely opposed to acceptance” which would make foreign impressions of Germany even 
worse.119  
 Hughes shared the British concerns.  With the nature of the future German government 
uncertain, he wanted to know if he could rely on German acceptance of the Dawes Plan.  
Houghton, having been told by German Nationalists that they would ultimately have to 
accept the Dawes Plan, informed Hughes of the likely acceptance of the plan.  Houghton, 
however, wanted reassurance from Stresemann.  On 13 May, Houghton reminded 
Stresemann that German acceptance of the Dawes Plan without reservations was essential to 
obtaining a loan from America.  Stresemann promised Houghton that the plan would 
eventually be accepted, by new elections if necessary or by a referendum.  Stresemann then 
took the opportunity to push for American pressure on France by telling Houghton that 
unless Germany obtained from France “a clear understanding as to the date on which the 
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Ruhr would be evacuated,” the German government could “not withstand public opinion.”120
    When the German cabinet met on 15 May, it decided that since the SPD was unwilling to 
enter the government unless the eight-hour workday was restored, it would have to negotiate 
with the DNVP in hopes of forming a majority government.121  This further alarmed 
Houghton who, meeting with Stresemann again on 19 May, noted that he “could not shake 
off a strong sense of anxiety” when he reflected on the DNVP’s announcement that they did 
not regard the decision of the Marx government to accept the Dawes Plan without 
reservations as binding on them.  Houghton again warned that the essential American loan 
could not be obtained in such an uncertain political situation.122  
 In the political negotiations regarding the DNVP joining the government, the Nationalists 
overreached and demanded that Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz be given the chancellorship and 
that modifications in the Dawes Plan be made.  The Center party rebelled at this and made it 
known it would not enter a government under Tirpitz’s leadership.123   Knox attempted to aid  
Stresemann in his party struggles by informing him that Tirpitz’s appointment as chancellor 
would be poorly accepted in Britain, where he was held responsible for the unrestricted 
submarine campaign during the war.124
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  The German government, hoping to attract Nationalist support, sounded out the 
Americans and British as to what flexibility the government had in offering concessions to 
Nationalists demands.  Von Schubert discussed with Knox the possibility of attracting 
Nationalist support for the government by adding a qualification to the German acceptance of 
the Dawes Plan asking for military evacuation of Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort, the three 
cities occupied under the London Ultimatum sanctions of 1921, as well as the Ruhr.  When 
Knox replied that Germany would be ill-advised to raise this issue, von Schubert, himself, 
had to agree that it was necessary to allow France to save face on this issues.125   
 When Stresemann met with Houghton on 19 May, he raised the question of German 
prisoners held by the French and the thousands of Germans who had been expelled from the 
occupied territories.  Houghton replied that it was not possible to accompany the report by 
any reservations and offered only the comfort that the moral argument would be understood 
in America.126   With little to offer the Nationalists, the cabinet on 26 May submitted its 
resignation to President Ebert, who asked that it continue to carry on for the time being.  
Marx continued to negotiate with the Nationalists, who now agreed to have Marx continue as 
chancellor but refused to accept the Dawes Plan unconditionally.127   
     Houghton, surveying the scene, informed Castle that most likely Marx would form a new 
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cabinet and that the Dawes Plan would be accepted.  He did not believe that the Nationalists 
“ever seriously considered rejecting the plan.”  But while the middle parties would accept it 
unconditionally, the Nationalists wanted conditions.  Houghton felt party politics were 
getting tiresome. “There seems to be no large sense of obligation to the country.  Everything 
is based on party interest.”12   8
 Marx continued to negotiate with the Nationalists until 2 June.   The Nationalist asked for 
Stresemann’s replacement as Foreign Minister.  For four days Stresemann’s fate was 
undecided until Marx and Karl Jarres, the leader of the right-wing faction of the DVP, ended 
negotiations when the Nationalists further demanded the end to the Great Coalition 
government of the State of Prussia.  A new minority government consisting mostly of 
ministers of Marx’s first cabinet, including Stresemann as foreign minister, was approved by 
the Reichstag with SPD support on June 6.129  But it was a government that remained 
hostage to pressure from the Nationalists since the support of some of their members was 
necessary for the two-thirds majority to pass the Dawes Plan. 
 Houghton, meeting with Stresemann on June 4, once again wanted reassurance that the 
plan would be accepted.  Optimistically, Houghton told Stresemann that he was positive that 
once the plan had been accepted and France realized that it would obtain its share of 
reparations, the military occupation would have to end.  Houghton, attempting to managing 
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Germany’s public relations and repair some of the damage to American and world opinion 
caused by the election, asked Stresemann to make some statement that “a new era was 
approaching, but that it could only bring peace to Germany if it were supported by a renewed 
confidence in Germany.”  Stresemann dutifully accommodated Houghton in a speech at 
Dessau on 19 June.130   D’Abernon noted that while the Nationalists were divided as to their 
future policy, they were united in disappointment at “being out in the cold” and intended to 
make full use of their freedom.  His assessment was “Solution attained --although admittedly 
of precarious duration.”131  
 In the 11 May election, the Bloc National coalition headed by Poincaré was defeated by a 
coalition of left-oriented parties, the Cartel de Gauche led by Edward Herriot who headed the 
Radical Socialist Party.  Herriot and the Radical Socialists had gradually moved away from 
Poincaré’s policy when the end of German passive resistance failed to produce the promised 
benefits for France.  In January they broke with Poincaré by voting against his foreign 
policy. 
 While opposition to Poincaré’s foreign policy played a role in his defeat at the polls, 
domestic issues also played a large role in the outcome.  The fall of the franc with resulting 
inflation and the high indirect taxes imposed by the double décime angered the working 
class.  The turnover taxes hit the small businessmen who formed much the Radicals’ base of 
support.  Economy measures imposed by Poincaré resulted in layoffs of government 
employees. 
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 The Left also indicted the Bloc National for its clericalism.  The cartel won a clear 
victory in seats but not in votes.  The election represented a protest vote rather than a 
reflection of confidence in the cartel itself.   The new majority was prepared to accept an 
American reconstruction of Europe and an end of the turmoil of the reparation crisis through 
the Dawes Plan.  But Herriot’s government, which would not take office until 15 June, was 
dependent on the support of moderate republicans who shared much of Poincaré’s thinking 
but did not want to break with the Radicals, which limited how far Herriot could go in 
sacrificing Poincaré’s position vis-à-vis Germany.  American and British diplomacy thus 
confronted a situation where both German and French foreign policy options were limited by 
the more nationalist elements in their nations.132  
 While the United States election would not take place until November 1924, the 
Republican convention opened on 10 June.  Coolidge, who had been perceived as a weak 
president since he assumed office, dominated the convention.  The outstanding question was 
the choice of a vice presidential candidate.  Coolidge wanted a vice-presidential candidate 
from the progressive wing of the Republican Party in the Midwest, to counter Robert 
LaFollette.133   The choice fell on Frank Lowden, governor of Illinois, who was nominated 
on the second ballot.  In a major surprise, Lowden declined the nomination.  In the confusion 
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that followed Dawes was nominated, defeating Hoover on the third ballot.13   4   In an election 
that was charged with domestic political scandal, Coolidge wanted to tout Republican 
foreign policy successes.  Dawes would serve that purpose nicely and Coolidge would use 
Houghton as well to actively campaign for him among German-American voters. 
 Wiedfeldt notified the Auswärtige Amt that he questioned how much of a benefit Dawes 
would add to the ticket since he was not liked by workers and the farmers, and that leading 
Republicans were not happy with him as he is “acclaimed more than his work deserves.”  
Wiedfeldt recommended that Germany recognize his nomination but “not celebrate it.”135   
Nevertheless, the selection of Dawes heightened American interest in the Dawes Plan, 
thereby strengthening the Coolidge administration’s interest in seeing it successfully 
implemented before the November election and being willing to use American pressure to 
see that it was. 
 
Conclusion 
  The Dawes Plan provided a major turning point in the diplomatic history of the 1920s. It 
was the product of complex diplomatic, political, and economic negotiations.   The Dawes 
Plan provided a possible detailed framework for a compromise that aimed to end the 
persistent crisis over reparations.  It proposed the mobilization of American capital for the 
reconstruction of Europe, the prospect of which was vital in achieving unanimity in the final 
report.  In exchange for the reestablishment of the economic unity of Germany it offered 
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France guarantees of future reparation payments above what it was able to extract from its 
occupation of the Ruhr.  The plan allowed, through its silence, the French security priorities 
of maintaining a military occupation and some control of the railway system to remain an 
open question with the understanding that these measures should not interfere with German 
economic life.  The crucial issue regarding the military occupation of the Ruhr would have to 
be settled later at the London Conference.  Reparation payments were set at a level that most 
regarded as too high, but transfer mechanisms provided a check on excessive payments.   
 The United States accomplished its primary goals.  The Dawes Plan set Europe on a 
course towards resolution of it crisis, thus vindicating the foreign policy of the Republican 
administration during an election year.  It did so while avoiding any discussion of revision of 
war debts and preserving American claims for its occupation costs.  The United States 
preserved its freedom of action and avoided any “European entanglement.”  The United 
States succeeded in its goal of stabilizing Germany’s monetary system on a gold standard 
rather than on a sterling basis.  The plan offered the prospect of a more peaceful and 
prosperous Europe which would benefit the America economy.   
 For Germany, the primary importance of the Dawes Plan was the decisive return of the 
United States to Europe and its involvement in Germany, whose recovery was seen by the 
United States as essential to the recovery of Europe.  This in turn promised the reintegration 
of Germany into Europe with the hope of a future return to Great Power status.  It provided 
Germany with the hope for a better future.   When the situation of Germany in October and 
November 1923, when it was threatened by dismemberment, revolt and the loss of economic 
sovereignty via the MICUM agreements, is compared with that of April 1924, Germany was 
far better off.  Its currency had begun to stabilize and the plan offered further stabilization 
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through a large loan. The standard of living, which had been devastated by inflation, was 
beginning to improve as the currency again began to have value.  The Gold Discount Bank 
diminished separatist and autonomist sentiment in the Rhineland, thereby removing the threat 
to political unity.  The Dawes Plan was predicated on the return of economic unity to 
Germany.  An atmosphere of hope for a better future was created. 
 While Germany had to accept high reparation payments along with international controls, 
these represented the lesser evil compared to continuation of the French occupation.  The 
annual reparation payments were less then those of the London Schedule and the plan 
promised the end the system of exploitation of productive pledges.  The requirement that 
sanctions only be applied in case of flagrant default protected Germany against an imposition 
of later sanctions.  The all-inclusive feature of the payments would mean that France would 
have to pay its occupation force in Germany at its own expense.  France would have to weigh 
the security advantage provided by its military occupation of Ruhr against the costs of 
providing for it.   
 While the Marx government paid a price in the May elections for the domestic problems 
Germany had suffered through since September 1923, it was in large measure able 
reconstitute itself and could look forward to negotiating with a France led by Herriot and not 
Poincaré.  
 Nevertheless, in June 1924 the plan was not completely assured of success.  Many details 
remained to be settled and the United States and Britain faced the task of forcing a German-
French compromise which offered Germany enough to attract the necessary support to carry 
through its legislative implementation.  Germany had not been formally involved in the 
construction of the plan and to that extent its critics would call it a second Versailles.  In 
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reality, however, it looked forward to the beginning of a revision of the Versailles system as 
interpreted by France under pressure from the United States and Britain.136  
 How much of its security position France would be able to maintain at the upcoming 
London Conference remained to be determined. The Dawes Plan was only a plan.  It still had 
to be accepted by the governments involved and the loan had to be secured.  There was no 
agreement on the French military occupation, the fate of the Régie, amnesty of prisoners, 
return of the expellees, the relative powers of the Reparation Commission and Transfer 
Committee, or the role Germany would have in these negotiations.  These controversial 
issues would have to be settled among the powers, but because of the promise of the Dawes 
Plan and the American involvement with it, the negotiations would take place in an 
atmosphere where world opinion was expecting a settlement.  This expectation would 
facilitate American and British efforts to push Germany and France into a compromise both 
could accept. 
    
 This examination of the internal deliberations that created the Dawes Plan also offers the 
opportunity to examine the utility and limitation of the corporatist synthesis model in a 
specific case setting of international history.  In reference to the 1920s, advocates of the 
corporatist model view Herbert Hoover as “the central figure in efforts to implement this 
brand American brand of corporatism.”137   One aspect of corporatism as described by 
Hogan is the reliance of policy makers on experts drawn from academic circles.  Another 
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feature is that decision making is bureaucratized, thus constraining the freedom and power of 
the individual in decision making.  This implicitly de-emphasized the personal characteristics 
of the individual.138   This de-emphasis is noted by John Lewis Gaddis in his skeptical 
analysis of corporatism.139
 At the organizational level the workings of the Dawes committee do not fit well into the 
corporatist paradigm.  Dawes was chosen to head the experts committee precisely because he 
was known for ignoring the consideration of the details in favor of action.  Sir Josiah Stamp 
noted that the personality of Dawes himself, who was noted for “his prompt action, vigorous 
and picturesque speech,” as well as keeping himself free from detail, allowed him to serve as 
a “final court  judgment” in the deliberations of the committees.140    The advice of the 
American technical experts who were noted by Dawes as being  “for the most part were 
drawn from the organization of Herbert Hoover, who should always live in history - and that 
perhaps is the best statement to make in order to explain their qualifications” was devalued 
and disregarded in favor of political compromise.141     
 While consideration of economics, domestic politics and geopolitical issues remain 
essential for diplomatic history, attention should be given to the individual personalities of 
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essential actors.142   The weapons which Montagu Norman had to defend the pound were 
weak and he had to rely on what he termed “personal influence” to attain his ends.14  3   The 
importance of the individual was noted by Dawes, who observed that meetings with 
personalities such Norman and Schacht  “face to face with actual conditions” played an vital 
role in the decisions.144   
 While the nature of the task of the Dawes committee was economic, its economic 
rationalization was compromised by political considerations outside the realms of 
economics, most specifically the security interests of France.  A more multifaceted approach 
than that of corporatism provides a more useful analysis for the study of international crises 
with multiple interacting actors.  
 The Dawes Plan was created in response to an international crisis.  Michael H. Hunt 
suggests that it is useful to recognize that “participant nations will view the crisis from their 
own perspective and framework and will tend to conceptualize the other participants from 
that framework.”145   In is therefore necessary to understand the interaction of these 
frameworks during a crisis and how each participant struggles to understand and accept 
compromises that stem from the framework of other actors and the immediate necessities of 
the crisis. 
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 Chapter IX 
 
The London Conference 
July and August 1924 
 
Introduction 
 The London Reparation Conference of July and August 1924 was called to complete the 
work of Dawes Plan and put it into operation.  It was the largest international conference 
since Versailles.  It was also the first time since 1919 that United States had taken part in a 
diplomatic conference settling European affairs.  At one level the meeting worked out the 
economic details of the Dawes Plan and at another, and more important political level, it 
settled the Ruhr crisis. 
 France and Germany struggled over the issue of the ending of the military occupation of 
the Ruhr, the future ability of France to apply sanctions on Germany, and the nature of their 
economic relationship.  Germany sought revision of the Versailles framework while France 
tried to keep Germany in check so as to maintain its dominant position in Europe.  Both 
France and Germany had to struggle with domestic nationalistic opinion that opposed 
compromise.  The United States and Britain, each with their own political needs, would serve 
as mediators attempting to forge a compromise between Germany and France.  Not an 
official part of the conference, but crucial to its success, were the bankers who would have to 
underwrite the loan to Germany upon which the Dawes Plan depended and who had own 
their views of a political settlement that would make the loan viable.  At stake was the nature 
of the United States’ relationship with Germany and the future of Europe.  
 This chapter examines the interaction of various actors in producing the final settlement 
and the role that the United States played in the settlement.  It recounts how U.S. influence 
was exercised, officially and unofficially, how important was it, and what were its 
consequences.  It also examines German diplomacy—how well the Germans played their 
hand, how much of their revisionist program they were able to obtain, and what it all meant 
for the future of Germany.  In addition, this chapter considers the questions of what the 
Dawes Plan meant for Britain and its relations with France, Germany and the United States; 
and what results were for international relations in general and the prospects for Europe in 
the 1920s. 
  There have been few detailed studies of the London Conference.  Stephen Schuker’s 
major study of the Dawes Plan and the London Conference, The End of French 
Predominance in Europe, stands out as the definitive work to date and is a necessary 
reference for anyone engaging the topic for the wealth of material he has gathered.  But 
whereas his work focuses on France, his examination of the conference places the emphasis 
on the German-American relationship.  Historians who have examined the conference in 
larger studies have reached varying verdicts regarding the conference.  There is almost 
unanimity that the conference marked a defeat for France, but these studies differ in 
emphasis as to the causes of the France’s defeat and as to its implications. 
 Schuker sees French financial weakness as its primary weakness.  He credits Stresemann 
for his skillful tactics at the conference but does not like its results.  He views the London 
Conference as marking the loss of France’s ability to contain Germany and suggests it began 
a line of revisionism that could not be contained “within the confines of Europe’s exiting 
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political structure.”1 Sally Marks, who also views the conference as a turning point, sees a 
“wily” Stresemann and an “underrated MacDonald” as having “ganged up” on a 
disorganized and idealistic Herriot and also sees the American bankers as having “dictated” 
the terms of the conference and being “concerned chiefly of getting maximum security for 
their money.”2   Walter MacDougal’s view is that given the strength of the French position in 
November 1923, the London conference can only be seen as a “crushing defeat for France.”3   
Writing from the British perspective, O’Riorden sees the London Conference as a triumph 
for the British position, but views Herriot’s willingness to compromise as the reason for 
Britain’s success.  The role of America receives less attention and she believes that it is open 
to debate whether the British would have been so successful had Poincaré been at the helm of 
France.4
 Historians whose studies have dealt with Stresemann view the outcome more favorably.  
Henry A. Turner sees the negotiations as convincing Stresemann that rapprochement with 
Britain and France was the pathway for German revision of Versailles.  Jonathan Wright 
views the conference as a major success for Germany and emphasizes that it marked “the 
moment when Germany again met the Allies on equal terms and began to be treated as a 
more as a partner than an ex-enemy.”5 Manfred Berg characterizes the results of the London 
                                                          
 1 Schuker, The End of French Predominance, p. 393. 
 2 Marks, “The Misery of Victory: France’s Struggle for the Versailles Treaty,” Historical 
Papers  (1986), pp. 117-33, quotes on  p. 128. 
 3 McDougall, France’s Rhineland Diplomacy, p. 369. 
 4 O’Riordan, Britain and the Ruhr Crisis, pp. 171-72. 
 5 Turner, Stresemann and the Politics of the Weimar Republic, p. 175; Jonathan Wright, 
Gustav Stresemann, pp. 289-90. 
 446  
Conference as confirming the correctness of German, as well as American policy.  
Stresemann’s difficult strategy of holding out for American intervention and a multilateral 
solution was crowned with success at London.  Despite the compromises demanded by 
America, Berg views the London Conference an “extraordinary success” for Stresemann and 
Germany, opening the way for Stresemann’s revisionist policies.6     
 For Werner Link, whose study of American policy toward Germany emphasizes the 
economic determinants, the German and American success at London was based on parallel 
economic interests in stabilization and reconstruction which led to Germany’s integration 
into the western capitalist system.  As the price of this integration, Germany would obtain 
revision to the Versailles system with freedom from coercion, greater sovereignty and equal 
rights as a state.  This parallel economic interest, in which American bankers wanted to make 
loans and Germany wanted to borrow the money, led to American advancement of German 
political interests at the conference.  For Link, London is also a turning point where the 
American role as a balancer in European affairs is institutionalized and Germany is 
transformed into an economic check on France by the British and American bankers.  As a 
result, the intervention by the United States created a period of stabilization allowing for 
economic penetration of Germany and its development as a market for American 
overproduction.7  
  All these interpretations view London as a turning point.  Many of them explicitly or 
implicitly make judgments regarding the winners and losers of the conference.  Given the 
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position of Germany before and after the conference, for them the conference was a clear 
success, despite the grumbling of Stresemann afterwards.  For the United States, the 
conference also was a success, opening the way for a fuller engagement with Europe.  This 
chapter will examine the supposition that perhaps the London conference was success for all 
the participants, including France which retained possibilities for a reconciliation with 
Germany.  This study will address these interpretations and examine the possibilities for 
Europe that existed at the time.  
 
Prelude to the London Conference     
 Since the Dawes Plan had left open important political questions, Edouard Herriot, who 
had assumed the duties of President of the Council and Foreign Minister of France on June 
15, was anxious to meet with British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald to diminish the 
conflicts regarding Germany and to establish better relations with Britain.  When the meeting 
took place at Chequers on 21-22 June, MacDonald was able to obtain Herriot’s agreement to 
an inter-Allied conference to establish the necessary arrangements for putting the Dawes 
Plan into operation.  In addition to Belgium, Italy and Japan, the United States would also be 
invited.  After the conference reached agreement Germany would be invited to attend, but 
not, MacDonald insisted, “in order to be confronted with a document definitely settled which 
she shall be required to take or leave, but to meet the allies in conference for discussion and 
negotiation.”  MacDonald proposed a reciprocal and binding protocol with Germany by 
which, once Berlin had completed the necessary legislative measures, all fiscal and economic 
sanctions would be withdrawn.  Herriot accepted the proposal reserving only the sensitive 
issue of the railways. Thereby Herriot abandoned the strict adherence to the Versailles 
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framework which had characterized Poincaré’s policy. 
 When MacDonald raised the question of adequate guarantees for the American loan, 
Herriot acknowledged that evacuation might be necessary and offered to withdraw the 
military in proportion to the commercialization of the German railway and industrial bonds 
called for in the Dawes Plan.  Withdrawal would thus only take place as France was paid.  
But since it would be almost impossible to find buyers for the bonds given the conditions in 
Germany, MacDonald found it easy to dismiss the idea.  MacDonald conceded that Britain 
would not object to a skeletal occupation of a few key points provided it was not an 
aggressive presence, but insisted that Britain would not agree to establishing in advance 
definite sanctions that Germany would face for a flagrant default. 
 He then addressed the powers of the Reparation Commission.  He maintained that since 
the Dawes Plan required German agreement to measures beyond those specified by the 
Treaty of Versailles, the Reparation Commission did not have the legal power to declare a 
default.  He suggested that a financial committee of the League of Nations might be brought 
in for that purpose.  Herriot demurred on this issue and no agreement was reached.8  
 When Herriot explored what France might receive in exchange for giving up its position 
in the Ruhr, MacDonald would offer little. When Herriot brought up the issue of France’s 
war debt to Britain, MacDonald took a hard line and disavowed Bonar Law’s offer to ask of 
the Allies and Germany only what it had to pay to the United States.   MacDonald also 
refused to offer any security pact, offering Herriot only a moral commitment for 
collaboration.  He precluded these issues from the agenda of the conference.  MacDonald had 
                                                          
 8 MacDonald to Sir R. Grahame (Rome), 23 Jun 1924, no. 493, DBFP XXVI, pp. 732-35. 
For a detailed discussion of the Chequers meeting see Schuker, The End of French 
Predominance, pp. 237-45. 
 449  
obtained significant concessions from Herriot while avoiding what Herriot wanted most, a 
French-British security pact and a reduction in the French war debts owed to Britain.9
 Recognizing the importance of the United States to the settlement, MacDonald had 
informed the American ambassador, Frank B. Kellogg, on 18 June, that he would like to have 
United States participation in the conference and that the representative should be a figure of 
prominence whose presence would add influence.10 Hughes did not respond until 24 June, 
when he informed Kellogg that he would not welcome an invitation for the United States 
government to be represented at the London Conference.  While conceding the American 
interest in having the Dawes Plan put into execution, Hughes did not want to involve the 
United States officially in what he continued to categorize as a European project.  Logan 
could informally serve United States’ interests at the conference.11   
 But before Kellogg could inform the British of Hughes’s position, MacDonald had 
already announced in Parliament that an invitation would be sent and Crowe had sent out the 
formal invitation.  The invitation spoke of the “greatest importance attached by the Allied 
governments” to United States representation and called attention to the fact that the Dawes 
Plan was largely a product of American experts.  More importantly, the plan was dependent 
on the Dawes Loan which would be predominantly raised in the United States.12
 Kellogg reassured Hughes that MacDonald in his announcement of the conference to 
Parliament had clearly stated that the subject of inter-Allied debts would not be discussed at 
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the upcoming conference and added that he believed that an American refusal would have a 
“depressing effect” in Britain.”13 After consulting with Coolidge, Hughes decided in view of 
the attention the issue was already receiving in the press that United States could not afford 
to decline a public invitation and designated Kellogg as representative for the “purpose of 
dealing with such matters as affect the interests of the United States and for information 
purposes.”  Logan was assigned to assist.14   Thus, the often-celebrated first official 
participation in an international conference dealing with the European reparation crisis by the 
United States did not come about because of any major change in policy, but rather through 
the accidental delay in the timing of diplomatic exchanges between the United States and 
Britain.15  
 The State Department recognized that the likely results of the London Conference would 
be some form of a protocol “which would avoid the appearance of a treaty specifically 
modifying the Treaty of Versailles even if it had the practical effect of so doing.”   Hughes 
instructed Kellogg that the United States was “not in a position to join in an undertaking to 
execute the recommendations of the Dawes report.”   Hughes specifically did not want any 
protocol “necessitating submission to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification” since 
he believed that it “would involve delay which was important to avoid.”1  6   Hughes did not 
want a repeat of the fight over the Versailles treaty in an election year.   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 12 Kellogg to Hughes, 24 Jun 1924, FRUS 1924 II, p. 27. 
 13 Kellogg to Hughes, 25 Jun 1924, FRUS 1924 II, p. 31. 
 14 Hughes to Kellogg, 25 Jun 1924, FRUS 1924 II, p. 31. 
 15 For Kellogg’s account see David Bryn-Jones, Frank B. Kellogg: A Biography (New 
York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1937), pp. 144-45. 
 16 Hughes to Kellogg, 27 Jun 1924, FRUS 1924 II, pp. 32-35. 
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 Hughes made it clear that the United States was not a party to economic and military 
sanctions and would not accept formal participation in a sanction protocol.  He instructed 
Kellogg that the United States to was to use its “moral influence” to see the Dawes Plan 
executed “with out the introduction of elements of political controversy which might tend to 
prevent satisfactory settlement.”  The overall American objective was to be “promotion of 
the economic recuperation and recovery of just claims against Germany in such a manner as 
will render unnecessary impositions of sanctions as has been imposed in the past.”  Therefore 
Kellogg “should do nothing by which it would be made to appear that this Government was 
participating in imposition on Germany of onerous conditions.”  He should use his influence 
informally so that “measures of compulsion which may not flow from the plan and from its 
spirits be avoided.”  Hughes’s ‘big stick’ was the American loan.  He told Kellogg that while 
he could not express “the exact views and feelings” of the American investment community, 
he could “without involving this Government in any responsibility” informally indicate to the 
French that retention of measures which would amount to economic interference in the 
occupied territory would mean “on the basis of your knowledge of views of the American 
investment public, that under those conditions the loan could not be floated in the United 
States.”17
  Hughes did see a specific American interest in the proceedings at the scheduled London 
Conference.  Since the Dawes reparation payments were all-inclusive, Hughes wanted to 
protect United States’s interest in having the costs of the American Army of Occupation and 
the American claims arising from the Mixed Claim Agreement reimbursed from German 
reparations.  Both of these issues were important to Congress, and Hughes vigorously 
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maintained that these American rights were covered by the Treaty of Berlin.  Hughes 
engaged in a back-and-forth correspondence with Logan as to how to best preserve the 
American claim in any protocol relating to the division of the all-inclusive German annuities 
among the Allies.18   Logan finally warned  that any attempt to preserve these rights in a note 
verbale would only be regarded as another “bombshell by the French” and if France and 
Britain could not come to an agreement at the London conference, the United States could be 
improperly blamed for the conference’s failure.19  Hughes agreed to defer the issue until a 
meeting after the London Conference of the finance ministers.20  
 In sending out the invitations to the London Conference, Crowe had made an admitted 
diplomatic blunder.21 Acting on Herriot’s concessions at Chequers, he stated that Britain 
favored a plan in which the terms of agreement would be signed by both the Allies and 
Germany and a fixed date would be set by which the legislation required by Germany would 
be completed and that two weeks later all the fiscal, economic and other sanctions affecting 
the economic activity of Germany would be ended.  It also stated that the terms of the Dawes 
Plan went beyond the Treaty of Versailles and that the duty of deciding whether a flagrant 
default had been committed was not to be entrusted to the Reparation Committee but rather 
to the financial committee of the League of Nations.  The French reaction to these 
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concessions was predictable.  The newspapers with the exception of those of the Left 
exploded with statements that Versailles had been “overthrown,” that the “rights of France” 
had been denied and that Herriot had been “tricked.”22  
 Stresemann had been encouraged by what appeared to be the initial conciliatory attitude 
of the new Herriot government.  As a “general act of grace,” Herriot, on 19 June, offered a 
partial amnesty of prisoners and granted permission for some minor German officials and 
employees who had been expelled from the occupied provinces to return.23   Uncertain as to 
Herriot’s policy and what understanding he and MacDonald had reached at Chequers, 
Sthamer in London attempted to press Crowe as to the nature of the French-British 
discussions.  Crowe termed the inquiry “indiscrete” and refused to discuss the meeting.  
Sthamer, however, was able to glean from the press office of the Foreign Office that 
Germany would not simply be given an ultimatum but rather would participate in some 
manner.  The press officer advised Sthamer that Germany should trust Britain, but 
acknowledged that Germany had been told that before only to be disappointed.24   
 But after Herriot’s return to Paris and the French reaction to Crowe’s memorandum, 
Germany became more apprehensive regarding French policy.  Under domestic pressure, 
Herriot began to retreat from the concessions he made at Chequers and informed Hoesch that 
the Reichstag would have to pass necessary legislation before the London Conference and 
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rely on French good faith for the French economic evacuation.  Stresemann replied that if 
France wanted German legislation prior to the London Conference, Germany would need 
agreement on a protocol regarding the implementation of the Dawes Plan from the Allies, 
which would also include a fixed date for a military evacuation.25  
  Stresemann, concerned that MacDonald might yield to Herriot’s demands, sought to 
stiffen the backs of the British.  He told D’Abernon on 2 July, and argued that it was 
impossible to get a vote from the Reichstag before Germany had an agreement showing what 
Germany would obtain in exchange.  Stresemann stated that he was willing to be flexible as 
to the date of a military evacuation, but needed a fixed date to obtain the necessary 
Nationalist votes.  Stresemann also raised the issue of the evacuation of the three cities seized 
as sanctions in 1921 (Düsseldorf, Duisburg, and Ruhrort).  
 In the British foreign office, Crowe and Lampson advised that the issue of the three cites 
should best be left alone until more important issues were settled.  The Foreign Office felt 
that at a time when an effort was being made in Paris to unseat Herriot it was not in British 
interests “to expedite the process.”2  6   MacDonald, who had been informed of Herriot’s 
retreat from the understanding at Chequers, made it clear to Herriot that Britain would insist 
on a protocol formally pledging a date for the economic evacuation (the giving up of 
productive pledges) of the Ruhr, before the Reichstag took up the issue of passing the 
legislation that was necessary to implement the Dawes Plan.  As soon as the legislation was 
passed, the protocol would be implemented and the economic withdrawal would begin.  He 
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pointed out that it would be difficult enough to obtain a majority in the Reichstag even with 
the protocol.  MacDonald warned that if Herriot persisted in his plan to have Germany pass 
the legislation prior to a protocol on economic evacuation, it would be impossible to achieve 
passage.  Herriot’s position would “gravely imperil the success of the conference and 
endanger the whole prospect for a reparation settlement.”27   
    
The Paris Meeting, 8-9 July 
  By 6 July Herriot, caught between the uproar in the French press and MacDonald’s and 
Germany’s insistence on an evacuation protocol, asked that MacDonald meet him in Paris.  
Sir Eric Phipps, the British Chargé in Paris, strongly supported the meeting, informing 
MacDonald that Herriot was in danger of being overthrown and urging that he meet with 
Herriot to satisfy French amore propre and offer some support to Herriot.28   MacDonald 
agreed to meet with Herriot in Paris on 8 and 9 July.  
 Prior to that meeting, Stresemann strove to keep the pressure on Herriot.  On 7 July, he 
informed Herriot that France’s demands that Germany pass the Dawes legislation prior to the 
London Conference was impossible for Germany to accept and was endangering the steps 
toward a new relationship between Germany and France.  Germany could also not pass the 
necessary Dawes Law without an agreement for a military evacuation of the Ruhr.  If France 
persisted in its demands, Stresemann threatened to resign as foreign minister.29  
 Again on 8 July Stresemann, while expressing an understanding of Herriot’s situation 
                                                          
 27 MacDonald to Crewe, 2 Jul 1924, no. 500, BDFP XXVI, pp. 741-42. 
 28 Phipps to MacDonald, 6 Jul 1924, no. 503, DBFP XXVI, pp. 744-47. 
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and a desire to work with France, insisted that a declaration of the timing of the military 
evacuation was absolutely necessary to get legislation through the Reichstag.  In an effort to 
soften Herriot up for MacDonald, Stresemann increased the pressure by instructing Hoesch 
to make it clear to Herriot that if he maintained his present position, the German government 
would fall, the entire reparations process would collapse, and as a consequence Herriot’s 
own position would be endangered.30   
 At the Paris meeting areas of disagreement immediately arose regarding the powers of 
the Reparation Commission as Herriot adopted much of Poincaré’s agenda.  Herriot strove to 
maintain the integrity of the Treaty of Versailles and the powers of the Reparations 
Commission, maintaining that allowing “any wedge to be driven into the treaty” would 
“simply lead to war.”31 He continued to insist that he would not sign a protocol with 
Germany and demanded that any economic evacuation of Germany take place only after the 
enabling German legislation had been approved by the Reparation Commission.  Economic 
evacuation would then take place only as a concession by the Reparation Commission.32   He 
also insisted on the undiminished power of the Reparation Commission to declare a default, 
offering only as a concession to the fact that the American bankers would provide the bulk of 
the loan, that an American could sit and vote with the Reparation Commission when an issue 
of default arose.   MacDonald suggested that the Agent General of the Transfer Committee, 
to be set up under the Dawes Plan, could serve as an arbitrator.  
                                                          
 30 Stresemann to Hoesch, 8 Jul 1924, Nr. 188, ADAP X, pp. 470-73. 
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 France was willing to have the Agent General sit on the Reparation Commission but not 
serve as an outside arbitrator since that would weaken the powers of the Reparation 
Commission.3  3   MacDonald and Crowe insisted that since the requirements of the Dawes 
Plan affected internal German affairs that were outside of the scope of the powers the 
Versailles treaty had given to the Reparation Commission, it had no authority to regulate 
internal German matters.  Since no agreement could be reached on this, Herriot and 
MacDonald deferred the issue by agreeing to have French and British jurists examine the 
issue.34   
 MacDonald was determined to prevent a system whereby the majority vote in the 
Reparation Commission could determine a default and a government was free to apply 
unilateral sanctions.  MacDonald argued that even if Germany accepted giving the 
Reparation Commission the ability to declare defaults, Britain would insist on a unanimous 
vote.  Alternatively, if the Reparation Commission could declare a default by a majority vote, 
the sanctions would require the unanimous vote of the governments.  For Herriot this 
amounted to “tying the French ministers first by the right and then by the left arm.”35
 Britain was also unable to obtain French agreement to the proposition that Germany had 
accepted the Dawes report on the basis that it provided for the economic evacuation of the 
Ruhr and that the evacuation would not be a concession the Reparation Commission could 
choose to grant or not grant.  MacDonald’s view was that once the Dawes Plan was put into 
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operation the economic occupation of the Ruhr should end in fifteen days.  Herriot once 
again insisted that the evacuation should only take place after the Reparation Commission 
had decided it was fully operational.36   On the question of sanctions, MacDonald conceded 
in the end to a formula which stated that the Dawes Plan provided for the necessary 
mechanisms to determine defaults of a minor or technical nature by means of its Transfer 
Committee, but in the case of a general and willful default, the Reparation Commission could 
declare that such a default existed and the governments would immediately confer to decide 
the action necessary to protect themselves and the lenders.  The language specifically 
avoided the issue of unilateral action by one or more of the governments.  Herriot also 
postponed any final decision as to whether the Agent General would serve as an arbitrator if 
the vote in the Reparation Commission was not unanimous.  It was also agreed that in the 
eventuality of certain difficulties of interpretation, the matter would be referred for 
examination to legal advisors.37  
 Herriot was no more successful when he broached question of a security agreement with 
Britain, raising the specter of a new Bismarck arising in the future and recouping the left 
bank of the Rhine.  MacDonald simply noted that, because of the Dawes Plan, if Germany 
attacked France, it would essentially be in a state of war with all the Allies including the 
United States, but to put this into a formal pact would be unacceptable to public opinion in 
Britain and the Dominions would not accept it.  He put Herriot off with vague suggestions of 
an entente with Britain that would engage the League of Nations.  MacDonald suggested that 
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the best solution would be through disarmament.  He predicted that regardless of whether the 
Democrats or Republicans won the next American election, Washington would seek a 
disarmament conference with a view of protecting the security of all states.38  
 The Paris meeting, while providing support for Herriot, failed to achieve agreement on 
crucial issues.  There was no agreement on the details of the economic evacuation, when 
Germany would be invited to the London Conference and what role it would play, how a 
default would be decided, whether sanctions would require a unanimous agreement, whether  
the Régie would be continued, when a military evacuation would take place, and multiple 
other technical issues.  These questions would be fought out in the London Conference. 
 
The Selection of an American Agent-General  
 Hughes received a British memorandum on the Paris conference which included  
a joint British and French request for an American to serve on the Reparation Commission in 
case the Commission had to decide a question of a default, or if that were unacceptable, 
requesting that the Agent-General, who should be an American, serve in that capacity.  
Hughes could not accept an American serving in an official manner on the Reparation 
Commission.  Once again, such an appointment would require congressional approval and 
once again, Congress would not be back in session until December.  Hughes had no objection 
to the appointment of an American as Agent-General and the Reparation Commission was 
free to avail itself of his opinion if it chose to do so.39
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  The selection of an Agent General, however, turned into a controversial issue that 
reflected the politics of an American election year.  Logan wanted the position and was 
backed by both Dawes and Houghton.40   The British, however, considered him of 
insufficient stature for such a position.  Norman asked Morgan to recommend someone with 
the experience and reputation that would provide investors with a greater degree of 
confidence in the loan.  Morgan selected his own partner, Dwight Morrow.41   Houghton and 
Young, however, questioned whether German Nationalists would accept Morrow since he 
had taken charge of French financing in America.  
 More important, Coolidge became concerned that German-American and Irish-American 
voter who had opposed the war would turn to Senator Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin, who 
was running on the Progressive ticket.  The choice of Morrow could also antagonize 
Midwestern voters who were suspicious of and disliked Wall Street bankers whom Morrow 
epitomized.  Coolidge vetoed the choice of Morrow and asked Owen Young to take the 
position.42   Young, however, would only agree to serve temporarily and it would not be until 
after the conclusion of the London Conference that Seymour Parker Gilbert, a 32-year-old 
lawyer, was chosen as the Agent General.   
 Hughes informally solicited Germany’s opinion as to the selection of an Agent General.   
Germany’s primary concern was that the position go to a strong, influential and experienced 
individual who was aware of the goals of various politicians and knew the “tricks of 
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negotiations over reparations.”  Wiedfeldt was convinced that the Dawes Schedule of 
Reparations was unrealistic and wanted somebody who, when the plan failed, would have the 
influence to protect Germany from being blamed.  The individual had to have sufficient 
authority to demonstrate that the Dawes Plan was impractical and required a further revision 
of Versailles.  Wiedfeldt personally liked Logan but felt he was “too small a fish.”  Owen 
Young would be the ideal candidate, in Wiedfeldt’s assessment, as Young invented the 
transfer system and would know how use it on Germany’s behalf.  Wiedfeldt personally had 
no objection to Morrow although he believed that German public opinion would “yell about 
how he had financed our enemies.”43  
 
The Bankers  
 The primary source of American influence at the London Conference would be the 
bankers.  The 800 million gold mark ($200 million) loan was an essential feature of the 
Dawes Plan.  It was generally assumed that J.P. Morgan & Co. would be the lead bank.44   
The initial reaction at the Morgan bank was favorable to the idea of the loan.  Dwight 
Morrow, a leading partner at the bank, initially believed that a prosperous Germany could 
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pay reparations.  He saw the conflict as being more political than economic and believed that 
if all parties agreed that French and Belgian troops could remain in the Ruhr as long as they 
did not interfere with the economy of the region, then the bonds could be successfully 
marketed and had so advised the Dawes committee when consulted in February and March.45
 But as the Morgan bank began a detailed analysis of the completed Dawes report in 
April, the problems that resulted from Dawes’s forced compromises became apparent.  
Russell Leffingwell, who performed the initial financial analysis at the bank, believed that 
the German payment of reparations began too soon and rose too high.  Germany did not have 
sufficient current capital to allow for economic expansion and was unlikely to accumulate it 
under the Dawes Plan, a conclusion that had also been reached by American and British 
technical experts during the creation of the plan.  Leffingwell concluded that there was 
insufficient certainty regarding Germany’s economic recovery to market the plan to 
investors.46  
 Despite this initial analysis, Morgan informed Bradbury and Barthou on 26 April that the 
loan could be arranged once the European governments had reached an agreement on the 
Dawes Plan and there was sufficient security and protection for the bondholders.  The 
optimism among the Morgan bankers was reinforced by a reduction of interest rates by the 
Federal Reserve.  Coolidge’s public endorsement of plan gave the Morgan bank further 
reason to support it and hope that political difficulties could be resolved.  Yet there remained 
a sense of uneasiness regarding the financial viability of the loan, given the uncertainty of the 
political conditions.  Unwilling to make any public statement which could appear as dictating 
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political conditions, the bankers decided  informally to inform Owen Young and Bank of 
England Governor Norman of their concerns.47  
 By July the Morgan Bank, which had questions about Germany’s economic ability to 
meet the eventual standard payment of the Dawes Plan, wanted to have at least political 
security for the loan in case of a future reparation crisis.  The Morgan partners wanted an 
assurance that France would not reoccupy the Ruhr and unilaterally seize productive pledges.  
Morrow was not opposed to France maintaining a skeletal military force in the Ruhr; it 
would save face and allow France to claim that it had satisfied its security interest which 
might allow it to make greater concessions on the issue of reparations.  Morrow was more 
concerned that Germany would not be able to meet its required deliveries in kind and that if 
the Allies re-imposed sanctions the economic disruption would jeopardize the payment on 
the loan.  He wanted the Agent General to have the power to suspend reparation payments.  
Alternatively the Agent General or the Reparation Commission could serve as a fact-finder 
and a conference of prime ministers would rule on any question of default.  If they could not 
agree, the matter could be referred to the World Court or the League of Nations.48     
 Thomas Lamont, a Morgan partner, was sent to England in early July to negotiate the 
European contributions to the loan.  He was met by Montagu Norman, whose expressed goal 
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was to cripple the power of the Reparation Commission.  Lamont’s feeling regarding the 
Reparation Commission was shared by MacDonald, who believed that since the Dawes Plan 
was outside the framework of Versailles, the powers of the Reparation Commission should 
be limited.  France, Belgium and an often-unpredictable Italy could outvote the British and 
any possible American representatives.  
 MacDonald turned to Norman who enlisted Lamont in agreeing that Transfer Committee, 
which the Americans and British dominated, should have the power to declare a default.49   
Norman went even further, drawing up a memorandum which also demanded the immediate 
military evacuation of the Ruhr, a timetable for the gradual evacuation of the Rhineland and 
the end to the Régie.  Norman then passed this memorandum on to Owen Young and Logan, 
who had arrived at London for the conference.50 The American bankers also felt that the loan 
should be used to stabilize the German currency and not to pay for reparations.  They 
proposed that one-quarter of the loan should be raised in Britain and another quarter in 
France and other European nations, so that those nations would have a stake in a favorable 
outcome for Germany.51   
 Norman and Lamont then made a tactical decision to formulate their maximum demands.  
With the differences between France and Britain not settled, they were concerned that 
Young, Logan and others would promote compromises at their expense and therefore they 
should start with maximum demands.52  In the Reparation Commission, which had been 
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invited to the conference,  Bradbury was forced to accept the French position that the plan 
would not be considered to have been brought to the point of execution necessary to secure 
the economic evacuation of the Ruhr until the loan had been obtained, a concession to France 
that had been originally made by Owen Young during the formulation of the Dawes report.  
Bradbury, however, was able to reassure Crowe that the concession would not have much 
impact, since bankers were making it perfectly clear that there would be no loan until the 
economic evacuation of the whole occupied territory and possibly the military evacuation of 
the Ruhr are “faits accomplis.” 53   
 
German Preparations for the Conference  
 On 3 July, the Marx cabinet met with the Minister-Presidents of the States to review 
Germany’s situation prior to the opening of the London Conference and to win approval for 
the cabinet policy of accepting the Dawes Plan with the hope of bringing it into operation by 
October.54 The central theme of the meeting was that Germany’s political, financial, and 
economic situation left it no other option than to accept the Dawes Plan and rely on the 
United States and Britain.  Finance Minister Luther painted a dismal picture of the capital- 
starved German economy.  Without foreign long term credits Germany faced the danger of 
further inflation which would be a catastrophe for its economy, particularly agriculture.  No 
matter how hard Germany worked to improve production, it had to accept that for a certain 
period of time it would need help which could only come from the United States and 
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England.55   
 Stresemann argued that Germany would have to temporarily accept the reparation 
schedule but it was not as bad as it appeared.  Under the transfer scheme Germans would 
never be able to meet the 2.5 billion gold mark reparation payment since that would require a 
German position in the international economy greater than it had in 1913, a situation which 
would be unacceptable to Britain.  From his conversation with Reginald McKenna, who had 
served as the British chairman of the second Dawes committee, Stresemann believed that the 
Americans and British had arranged things “with a wink to the political side of the matter” to 
show the world that reparations question did not work as once thought, where Germany 
would simply just be told “Germany must pay so-or-so much.”  Stresemann argued that the 
fact that no final sum was mentioned in the Dawes Plan was not so bad for Germany.  He 
was not afraid of taking that risk since, “In a few years people will think about the final 
capacity to pay and they will think differently from now.”  He was certain that with the 
developments over the next years reparations would “decrease and not increase.”56
  Coolidge’s statement following the publication of Dawes Plan regarding American 
investment abroad as well as the competition between the United States and Britain 
regarding the Gold Discount Bank and the future Reichsbank was evidence of American and 
British interest in Germany.  What Stresemann was counting on was that the Dawes Plan 
would bring international capital, predominantly from the United States, into Germany which 
would not only be a great help in Germany’s current crisis but also would result in greater 
interest in Germany and, in the long run, would help restore Germany’s participation in the 
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world.  He pointed out that if American capital had not been mobilized against Germany, it 
would not have lost the war.57   He asserted that “England alone against France is weak.”  
Engaging in some wishful thinking, Stresemann added that if the United States were to “push 
the button” and demand France pay its interest on the war debts owed to the United States 
(an action Hughes had specifically avoided taking throughout 1923), the French economy 
would collapse.  He concluded that, “Therefore the French cabinet could not say ‘No’ in 
opposition to the United States.”58  
 Stresemann acknowledged that Germany would have to accept controls on its military, 
but argued that it would be easier to bear psychologically if compliance “brought us the 
freedom of the Rhine and the Ruhr.”  When pressed by a Nationalist minister regarding the 
idea that future military action would sort out the problems of Europe, Stresemann 
recognized that such a time could come.  But while he agreed that “in the end all great 
questions are decided by the sword,” he hoped and wished that such a time should be 
postponed for as long as possible.  Stresemann pointed out: 
 I can see only destruction of our people as long as we actually don’t have the 
sword.  If we think that the time will again come when the German people will be 
strong enough to play an important role, we must then first give the German people a 
foundation on which to do so!  Only then can they hope for the future.  There must 
first be a foundation and to establish this is what we are dealing with at this hour.59
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 After the results of the meeting between MacDonald and Herriot became known, 
Stresemann was no longer as confident as he had been at the cabinet meeting of 3 July.  
Stresemann complained to D’Abernon on 11 July that the results of the Paris meeting had 
created an intolerable situation for Germany.  He was dismayed by the fact that it was now 
likely that Germany would not be invited to the conference and that the military evacuation 
of the Ruhr had not been openly discussed at Paris.  Stresemann warned that he could not 
hold a majority in the Reichstag for acceptance of the Dawes Plan if he could not get some 
explanation regarding the military evacuation of the Ruhr.  Stresemann also did not see how 
adding an American to the Reparation Commission would help matters much.  
 D’Abernon acknowledged that mistakes had been made at Chequers, but tried to soften 
the blow by pointing out that things had not gone well for Germany when it attended 
conferences at Cannes, London and Genoa and that negotiations would be better if carried on 
through quiet diplomacy in Berlin.  He agreed to inform London that complete economic and 
military evacuation was an indispensable condition for obtaining the necessary Reichstag 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
revision of Versailles.  He points out that Stresemann had little use for Germany’s attempt to 
secretly rearm since Germany could not produce heavy artillery or thousands of planes 
without damage to its foreign policy that would bring no benefits.  Nor did he see closer 
relations with the Soviet Union as having any realistic chance of immediate successes.  
Wright does suggest that Stresemann later looked to a time when Russia would again be a 
Great Power and Germany might be able to capitalize on its central position to mediate 
between East and West and in so doing, achieve its aims regarding Poland.  Wright, however, 
denies that Stresemann was contemplating a war.  Jonathan Wright, Stresemann pp. 285-86 
and “Gustav Stresemann: Liberal or Realist,” in Persoanlities War and Diplomacy: Essays in 
International History, ed. Thomas G. Ott and Constantine A. Pagedas (London: Frank Cass, 
1997), pp. 96-97.   Schuker, however, suggests that Stresemann shared the Nationalist 
“outlook and ultimate goals,” represented by the German policy of rejecting a reconciliation 
within the confines of the post-Versailles European structure, a policy which eventually did 
lead to war. Schuker, The End of French Predominance, pp. 263, 393.  
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majority.60  
 As the 16 July date for the opening of the conference approached, Stresemann turned his 
attention to Herriot in an attempt to soften France’s stance.  Hoesch warned Herriot that the 
German government would fall unless it obtained a quick economic evacuation of the Ruhr 
and some agreement on a military evacuation.  Stresemann cautioned that public opinion in 
Germany was turning against acceptance of the Dawes Plan.  He did not require that a 
specific day or month be given for the Ruhr to be completely evacuated, it could be attached 
to some event which was directly related to the fulfillment of the Dawes report, but he 
needed some final deadline for the last French soldier to leave the Ruhr if he was to maintain 
any support in the Reichstag.61
 When Hoesch met with Herriot on 14 July, he found him pessimistic and under 
significant strain.  When he told Herriot that Germany could not get a loan without a military 
evacuation, Herriot erupted, exclaiming that he was being placed under “infamous pressure.”  
Herriot doubted that he would be able to come to an understanding with the British.  He had 
conceded the admission of an American on the Reparation Commission to the British, but he 
could not run the risk “of making a country so damaged by the war a victim to a possible 
regrouping of powers.”  He believed that the current system of defaults and sanctions should 
continue for “years to come.”  He would not alter his conditions for the military evacuation 
of the Ruhr, but was willing to make accommodations to Germany that were compatible with 
the Treaty of Versailles and was inclined to invite Germany to the later sessions of the 
                                                          
 60 Stresemann, Diaries, pp, 360-62; D’Abernon to MacDonald, 11 Jul 1924, no. 511, 
DBFP XXVI, p. 788. 
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conference.  But he felt that the conference was premature and that he was not fully prepared.  
The conference therefore must proceed slowly and cautiously since public opinion would not 
“follow him in the surrender of deeply rooted rights, and he could not defy the onslaught of 
his critics.”62
 At the German cabinet meeting of 15 July, Stresemann assessed the situation.  He 
believed that England would not present Herriot with an ultimatum in support of a reasonable 
solution for Germany.  Mussolini was avoiding the conference because of the open conflict 
between France and Britain.  Stresemann was convinced that only American intervention 
could provide a solution.  “America must be willing to use its position as the financier of 
Europe to provide the necessary pressure” to achieve a solution.  Stresemann did not think 
that the battle for a military evacuation was lost.  He had informed the ambassadors of all the 
relevant nations that the German government would fall and with it the Dawes Plan if there 
was not an agreement on the military evacuation.  He was encouraged that Belgium, America 
and Britain had left him in no doubt that the acceptance of the Dawes report would lead to 
military evacuation.  Marx and Stresemann both agreed that it was Germany’s task to 
emphasize the “Spirit of the Plan” and the German willingness to carry it out to world 
opinion and rally support for Germany.63   
 
The London Conference 
 When the London Conference opened on 16 July, the essential task of the United States 
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and Britain was to achieve an agreement between Germany and France which would allow 
their governments, both of which were weak and opposed by nationalistic opinion, to 
survive.  At the same time they had to satisfy the bankers who would be underwriting the 
loan essential to the implementation of the Dawes Plan.  All of the controversial issues which 
had been avoided in the creation of the plan and about which MacDonald and Herriot failed 
to reach agreement would now have to find some resolution.  It would be a task that they 
would labor over for over a month.    
 The conference was divided into three committees and a council consisting of 
MacDonald, Herriot, Theunis, Ambassador Kellogg, and the Finance Minister of Italy, 
Alberto De Stefani, and later a representative from Japan.  These members and their single 
aides constituted what was termed the Council of Fourteen.  The importance of America can 
be seen in the fact that Kellogg was the only member to serve on all three committees.  The 
First Committee’s primary function was to determine the procedure in the event of a German 
default.  The Second Committee, working with the Reparation Commission, was charged 
with developing the specifics of a plan to end the economic occupation of the Ruhr and 
reestablishing German unity.  The Third Committee examined the use of reparation 
payments, issues related to the transfer of payments and the details as to how payments in 
kinds were to be made.64   
 The issue of default and sanctions in the First Committee dominated the first stage of the 
conference.  The understanding that emerged from MacDonald’s meeting with Herriot in 
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Paris was that an American citizen would vote with the Reparation Commission when it 
ruled on a default, failed to satisfy either the bankers of J.P. Morgan or Norman and 
Snowden with whom the First Committee consulted.  Lamont argued that it did not eliminate 
the possibility that the three continental powers could outvote the American and British 
representative.  Herriot met with Lamont on 22 July to plead with him for the bankers to 
relax their pressure, only to be told by Lamont that the bankers were only acting on the basis 
of what American investors would demand to purchase the German government bonds.65   
 By 23 July the First Committee was deadlocked.  MacDonald was furious that the 
controversy had been leaked to the press and warned that “from the point of view of the 
British public opinion, the matter published in the French press has done more harm to the 
success of this conference than I can describe.”6  6   With the intent of sparing Herriot political 
embarrassment, Owen Young proposed that the committee solve the deadlock by separating 
the political and financial issues.  He suggested following the Dawes Plan which the left the 
power to declare defaults with the Reparation Commission, but also to appoint a special 
committee that would negotiate with the bankers any other conditions necessary to obtain a 
loan.  As a sweetener, the loan, in the event of default and sanctions, would be the first 
charge on German reparation revenues.67  
 Confronted by Norman’s demand that the power to declare a default be taken away from 
the Reparation Commission and given to the Agent General and the Transfer Committee, 
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France agreed to an additional provision stating that the Reparation Commission would not 
declare default until after consulting with the Agent-General and a representative of the 
foreign bondholders.  This concession failed to satisfy Morgan and his partners who, joining 
Norman, simply stated that under these conditions they could not recommend the loan to 
investors.  American bankers looked forward to involvement in the peaceful reconstruction 
of Europe.  While the loan itself might be secured, any action by France toward declaring a 
German default could cause financial chaos in Europe and jeopardize other international 
loans and investments.  The bankers also had to consider the threat of an actual default.  The 
majority of American and British experts on the Dawes Committee believed that German 
reparations were set a too high a level.  Stresemann, as he announced in the cabinet meeting 
of 3 July, was already looking forward to the possibility to an eventual renegotiation and 
reduction of German reparations.68
 Lamont consulted Hughes and Mellon, secretary of the treasury, who endorsed the 
bankers’ substantive demands up point, but who also were “exceedingly anxious” to see 
“some adjustment” made.69   By 23 July, the American bankers began to feel that matters had 
dragged on too long and they ran the risk as being seen as the obstacle to the settlement.  
Leaks to the press resulted in reports that the bankers were applying financial pressure to 
support the British position.70   Lamont wrote a letter, which he first cleared with Hughes 
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and then delivered to MacDonald, stating the bankers would make the loan available if the 
Allied governments would be willing to “cover the position of both the loan and the debtors.”  
This, however, in case of a German default, would have placed MacDonald in the position of 
paying for the German Dawes Loan and was refused.71
 By 30 July, President Coolidge, who had committed the United States to the acceptance 
of the Dawes Plan and was campaigning with Dawes as his running mate, was concerned the 
that London Conference would break up in failure if the deadlock could not be broken.  He 
sent a message to Kellogg to hold the conference together because he was prepared to make 
the offer that in case of a German default, the Chief Justice of the United States would 
undertake to arbitrate.  Coolidge had cleared the proposal with the attorney general and felt 
that public opinion in the United States would support it and that France would find it very 
difficult to refuse.72    
 Coolidge’s proposal was rendered unnecessary by the personal intervention of Hughes, 
who arrived in London ostensibly to address the American Bar Association which was 
meeting there.  Hughes met at lunch with Herriot who was sympathetic but feared that any 
concession he might make would be used against him by Poincaré.  Pressed by Hughes, 
Herriot clapped his hands to his head and cried, “I’ll fall, I’ll fall.”  Hughes rejoined that he 
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that in the final analysis the dollar really talks.”  Lamont, The Ambassador from Wall Street , 
pp. 202-5. 
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would fall anyway if he did not carry out the plan.   
 Hughes also used intermediaries to pressure Herriot.  He dispatched Lamont to ask 
Belgian premier Theunis to persuade Herriot to give in or the conference would fail.  Lamont 
explained to Theunis precisely what would happen to the French franc and also to the 
Belgian franc should that occur.  In an effort to relieve the domestic pressure on Herriot, 
Hughes, then in Paris, informed Poincaré that if France turned down the Dawes Plan, France 
could expect no further economic or diplomatic help from the United States.7    3 France was in 
a particularly vulnerable position since the $100 million loan from Morgan was due for 
renewal in September.74  
 The combined pressure led Herriot to make one final concession.  He agreed on 30 July 
that if the Reparation Commission declared a default any member could appeal the decision 
to a three-person arbitration panel, the president of which would be a citizen of the United 
States.  This was unanimously accepted by the conference.75   This lengthy procedure, while 
theoretically preserving the rights of the Reparation Commission, was sufficiently 
cumbersome to make a declaration of a default highly unlikely.  Territorial sanctions would 
be difficult to obtain.  The success of the idea of arbitration in breaking the sanction deadlock 
led the conference to apply the principle to other areas in the implementation where disputes 
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could arise, a procedure which significantly expedited the proceedings.   
 The work of the Third Committee proceeded smoothly with only some technical 
problems related to deliveries-in-kind.  These issues concerned the right of Germany to 
restrict the amount of important materials such as dyes that would be delivered if they were 
needed for the German economy.   Most problems were solved by referring future difficulties 
to arbitration panels.76  
 The Second Committee, in coordination with the Reparation Commission, was charged 
with developing a specific plan for the economic evacuation of the Ruhr and the restoration 
of German fiscal unity.  On most issues, the work of this committee went relatively 
smoothly.  The committee unanimously agreed on beginning an economic evacuation of the 
Ruhr about six weeks or two months after the conditions laid down by the Reparation 
Commission had been fulfilled.  The major exception to this harmony was the controversial 
question of the Régie.77   
 Embedded in the question of the Régie was the crucial issue of the continuation of the 
military occupation.  For France, the Régie represented an issue of security.  If France could 
prolong its military occupation of the Ruhr or found it necessary to reoccupy the Ruhr, some 
control of the railroads offered some military advantage.78 Also, as long as it remained there 
was an issue over which Germany would have to negotiate with the French; it provided 
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France with some additional bargaining leverage.  
 The French and Belgians demanded that the railways in the occupied territories in the 
Ruhr and the Rhineland be placed under a single regional management which would be 
composed of Allied personnel that would be under the only general control of the German 
Railway Board in Berlin.  They were willing to accept German control of regional 
management only if there was an Allied supervisory board which would have the power to 
block any measures that might impair the security of the Allied occupation forces.79   The 
French representatives in the Dawes committee had fought hard for acceptance that the 
German railway system could have regional administrative control and Dawes had accepted 
the French position and incorporated this possibility into the Dawes Plan.  
 In London the British military recognized this as an effort by the French to maintain the 
Régie and argued that the Inter-Allied Railway commission in the Rhineland provided 
sufficient support for the troops.  As a compromise the French and Belgians offered to allow 
direct German control but while keeping some 5000 French and Belgian civilian railroad 
workers employed by the line in the Rhineland.  This compromise was accepted by the 
Second Committee and recommended in its report on 24 July, but it was recognized that it 
would require further resolution.80  Nevertheless MacDonald told his cabinet on 30 July  that 
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he was prepared to accept the arrangement provided he could obtain concessions on other 
more important points, subject to the agreement of Germany.81  Ambassador Sthamer, who 
expressed strong objections to Crowe, nevertheless notified Berlin that the French were 
likely to win the point since the United States was not particularly actively involved in the 
issue and Britain was unlikely to precipitate a crisis over it.  Thus the issue of the Régie 
would be left for Germany to negotiate with France.82  
 Germany had attempted to follow the proceedings at London to the best of its ability, but 
was only able to get scraps of information which when reported to Berlin were often 
outdated.  As the conference opened, Albert Dufour-Feronce, Councilor in the German 
Embassy in London, reported to von Schubert that he was pessimistic as to the outcome.  
Given the impasse between the British and the French, he felt that if the United States did not 
use its financial power to change the views of the French, the conference would fail and the 
blame would be placed on France.  He felt that it was not a question of money, but of a 
continuation of Poincaré’s destructive policy.   He observed that MacDonald had too many 
domestic problems to oppose the French effectively.83
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Germany at the London Conference    
 On 21 July Stresemann wrote Sthamer that he feared Germany would be presented with 
an ultimatum.  He was further concerned that there was no discussion regarding the military 
evacuation of the Ruhr.  Stresemann noted that Britain did not appear willing to bring up the 
issue, and although he had sympathy for the British concerns about difficulty in discussing 
the matter, it was a life-or-death issue for the cabinet and the fate of the Dawes Plan.  He 
feared the worse conditions would be imposed and that the Americans would not be in a 
position to stop it.84   
 On 23 July D’Abernon attempted to reassure von Schubert that Germany would likely be 
invited and would not be presented with an ultimatum.  He also reassured von Schubert that 
events were moving in Germany’s favor, but that Germany should avoid discussion of a 
myriad of details and stay on the main topics.  Von Schubert warned D’Abernon that 
Stresemann had major trouble in the Reichstag and desperately needed some agreement on 
military evacuation, as the opposition from the Nationalists had grown sharper.85 On 24 July, 
von Maltzan, desperate for some understanding regarding military evacuation, approached 
the French representatives in Berlin and asked for a confidential agreement for evacuation in 
the form of a personal letter to Stresemann which would only be shown to the party 
leaders.86   
 On 25 July, in London, a special committee of jurists reported that the Dawes Plan was 
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outside the structure of Versailles and therefore required the voluntary agreement of 
Germany.  For Germany this represented a major victory, it would negotiate the final terms 
of the agreement unlike what was in their mind the diktat of Versailles.  Germany was 
formally invited to the conference by MacDonald on 2 August.8   7 Following the report of the 
jurists, Dufour was more optimistic.  He reported that Germany’s fight was being fought by 
the Americans and that it was perhaps a good thing that Germany was not in London because 
“the American and English were doing as well as we could and perhaps even better.”  He 
was also encouraged because Sthamer was in close contact with Houghton and had seen 
Crowe twice.  Dufour had also been in contact with Norman, letting him know Germany’s 
hopes and fears.88
 On 31 July Houghton, who had returned to Berlin, met with Marx, Stresemann, Luther, 
and von Schubert to inform them confidentially of his impressions and to coach them for 
their meetings in London.  He told them that Germany had an opportunity to make a good 
impression.  They should make a “generous and short demonstration” that Germany was 
willing to implement the Dawes Plan and warned against bringing up unrelated questions, 
especially the “war guilt” question.  Germany had to demonstrate good will again and again.  
 For Houghton the central issue was the need to obtain the loan.  He was aware of the 
bankers’ concerns and did not want the Germans adding to the difficulty.  He told them to 
leave the question of the security to the bankers.  But he cautioned them not to get “caught in 
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the tow” of the British bankers (Snowdon and Norman) whose demands were complicating 
the issue in London.  Houghton was aware that the American bankers, over whom the 
Coolidge administration had some influence, were beginning to retreat from some of their 
demands.  He advised the Germans to follow the American bankers, who had “cooler heads” 
when it came to financial matters.  Houghton reassured them that the conference would come 
to a solution because the leading British and French personalities were clear on the 
consequences if the conference should fail.89  
 Von Schubert accompanied Houghton back to the American Embassy where they met 
with the American military attaché (Arthur Conger).  Schubert expressed his concern as to 
whether the economic evacuation would really be quickly carried out.  He was worried about 
the transition period during which Germany would have to continue its heavy payments to 
the French and was also concerned that a long transition period would give the French the 
opportunity to plunder the assets of the Ruhr.  On the issue of the military evacuation 
Houghton warned that the French wanted to combine the evacuation with the 
commercialization of their industrial obligations and this would take a long time, which he 
estimated as around August 1926.  Schubert declared that this would be unacceptable to the 
Germans.  He feared that the evacuation of the Ruhr would be tied to the evacuation of the 
first zone of the Rhineland.  Houghton replied that Germany would have to negotiate with 
France.  He believed that two years was too long and advised that Germany should push for 
three to six months and agree to a year after which the both the Ruhr and the sanctions areas, 
as well as the Cologne zone would be evacuated.  
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 But Houghton also recommended that Germany should not insist on a year, but at least 
that compromise would provide a framework for possible solution.  Schubert agreed and 
believed that they could find a solution Germany could live with.90   Houghton was 
continuing America’s tactics that had been evident in the formulation of the Dawes Plan.  
The United States wanted the crisis resolved as rapidly as possible and needed the agreement 
of France to accomplish that goal.  To gain that acceptance, the U.S. would require Germany 
to make the necessary accommodations in exchange for the benefits the United States had to 
offer. 
 Hughes paid a short visit to Berlin on 4 July.  Unlike his visit to London and Paris which 
were public occasions, Hughes’s visit to Berlin was quiet and discreet, with Hughes meeting 
with only a few selected individuals.  Wiedfeldt had extensively briefed Berlin regarding 
Hughes.  With the German officials following Wiedfeldt’s advice, the visit went well and 
without incident.  Hughes took the occasion to tell the Germans, as he had the French, that if 
they did not accept the Dawes Plan, American was through.  However, he reassured 
Germany that if it showed good will, the loans would come and peace in Europe would be 
secured.91
 Wiedfeldt’s briefing provides an account of how Hughes was viewed through the eyes of 
a German in Washington.  Wiedfeldt described Hughes as a learned jurist who had no 
problem giving fake reasons for his explanations.  He had an “American joy of smiling,” but 
was without real humor and was cold and careful.  He was continually worried about the 
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Senate and endangering the Republican Party in the elections.  Wiedfeldt described Hughes 
as pro-British but not anti-German.  He advised that it was important to discuss the matter of 
the military occupation, but not to discuss the MICUM, expellees, and particularly not 
territorial issues.  He also advised against talking to Hughes about the German Nationalists 
because he really did not care which party governed Germany.  Wiedfeldt cautioned against 
talking about the Bolshevik threat because that could endanger the loan.  The issue of Russia 
should be avoided since Hughes was against recognition.  Hughes was against the League 
but pro-World Court which he favored Germany and the United States joining.92
 
 The German delegation led by Marx, Stresemann, and Hans Luther (Finance Minister) 
joined the conference on 5August.  MacDonald later described the atmosphere at the first 
plenary conference as “freezing” when the German delegation was introduced and Marx 
made a short speech, Herriot “looked as though he was having a tooth drawn.”93   German 
negotiations took place at two levels.  German technical objections to specific terms of the 
three committee reports were negotiated within the conference itself, while the crucial 
negotiations with France took place outside of the conference.  On the issue of sanctions, 
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Germany objected to the absence of a specific definition of the term “flagrant default.”  They 
feared new sanctions if economic difficulties resulted in Germany being unable to make the 
required payments.  After a contentious debate the German delegation won a satisfactory 
compromise in which a flagrant default was considered to be one which was willful and 
deliberate.94   On 7 August, it was also agreed that the issue of amnesty for prisoners held by 
the French and Germany, taken during separatist conflict, would be managed by a 
commission of Franco-Belgian and German jurists.95   
 
The Issue of the Loan and the Bankers’ Demands 
 The issue of the bankers’ conditions for a loan surfaced almost immediately after the 
German delegation’s arrival.  Montagu Norman told Schacht on 6 August that the bankers 
were demanding “sharp” conditions for a loan which Stresemann felt went even beyond the 
German demands.  Norman acknowledged, however, that Morgan might not be in full 
agreement with the conditions of the British Bankers.  On 7 August, Luther insisted in a 
plenary session that the bankers be brought in to discuss the conditions for the loan Germany 
was to obtain.  France vigorously opposed the proposal.  Clémental, the French Finance 
Minister, stated that he had talked to the American bankers and that they would not be a 
problem.  MacDonald, who was aware of the bankers’ demands, realized that the bankers’ 
conditions could collapse the conference, and replied that the time to talk to the bankers was 
after a political agreement had between reached.   
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 What resulted was an acrimonious public exchange between MacDonald and Snowdon, 
his Chancellor of the Exchequer, who also insisted that the bankers had to be brought in.  
MacDonald announced that in his view an error had been made by the Reparation 
Commission in drafting the requirement that Germany be obliged to obtain the loan before 
the Dawes Plan could be considered implemented.  In his opinion, Germany had no special 
obligation, actual or moral, to obtain a loan.  If the loan was not forthcoming, no 
responsibility lay on Germany.  MacDonald then put an end to the discussion by stating 
“Either the report will be adopted, and the loan will be raised; well and good.  Or the report 
will not be adopted and the loan will not be raised, and all will be in vain; also well and 
good.”96  
 That morning Norman and Sir Robert Kindersley, chairman of Lazard Brothers & Co., 
told Schacht that the American bankers were even more stubborn than the British.  Schacht 
was concerned that Germany was being put in an impossible position with the bankers 
demanding more than the Germans were.  If they followed the bankers the conference could 
fail; if they did not press for the bankers’ demands, they ran the risk of not getting the vital 
loan.  Norman and Kindersley told Schacht that the Americans were against the Reparation 
Commission and wanted its powers ended.  Kindersley realized that Herriot could not accept 
that and that some form of arbitration would be agreed to outside the conference itself.  
Schacht, however, pointed out that Germany was in a weak position and that it would have to 
be up to the bankers to fight the Reparation Commission.  At the same time Schacht realized 
that Germany had to be careful not to create the appearance that the bankers were the 
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German auxiliaries fighting its battles.  The German delegation had to be careful that it did 
not demand more than the bankers and the bankers not demand more than Germany.97   
 On 8 August, Marx and Schacht met with Norman, who again urged that the bankers 
meet with the conference, and Owen Young, who strongly opposed that idea.  Heeding 
Houghton’s advice to follow the American lead, Marx decided not to press the issue any 
further in the conference.  For Marx, the primary issue was to obtain the loan and he was 
reluctant to antagonize Young.98 Germany was once again placing its faith in the United 
States upon whose support it counted. 
 On 9 August, McKenna warned Stresemann that the British public had the mistaken 
belief that there was complete agreement between Britain and France based on agreement on 
the technical points at the conference.  But the public was not aware of large differences over 
the difficult political issues such default and sanctions.  He feared that if the conference 
failed, Germany and the bankers would be blamed.  He informed Stresemann of the wide-
ranging conditions that both he and Norman wanted, including freedom of all the sanction 
areas, security from French sanctions, limitation of the Rhineland authority, and a court to 
decide the interpretations of the Versailles treaty.  McKenna stated that the conference knew 
the bankers’ demands, but were ignoring them.  He maintained that the conference should 
discuss the demands but that France was loath to do so.  Stresemann did not see any way out 
of the dilemma since Young had emphatically warned Germany against quoting the bankers’ 
demands at the conference.  Stresemann noted that the ever-persistent Snowden had made an 
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agreement with the Italians who would suggest that the conference meet with the bankers.99    
 Morgan and Lamont shared the concerns of Norman and McKenna regarding the lack of 
discussion of the bankers’ demands.  When Lamont met with Clémental to discuss French 
finances and the renewal of the Morgan loan for the Bank of France, he brought along a 
memorandum concerning what the bankers wanted for the Dawes Loan.  They had no precise 
formula for the withdrawal of French troops but wanted a prompt withdrawal.  They wanted 
a satisfactory declaration of plans for the evacuation of the Rhineland and on the future 
policies of Rhineland Commission.  Fearing the appearance of an ultimatum, Clémental 
asked that the memorandum not be made as a formal communication to Herriot.  Lamont 
agreed to give it to Belgian Premier Theunis, who could give a copy to Herriot 
unofficially.100
 
The Debate over the Transfer Committee    
 Within the committees, significant progress continued to be made on technical issues.  By 
9 August Germany was able to settle its differences and sign an agreement with the 
Reparation Commission.10    1  By 11 August there were only three major unresolved items for 
the committees.  The first was the issue of Régie where France and Belgium were insisted on 
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maintaining 4000-5000 railway men to maintain some control.  This remained unresolved 
until the last days of the conference when Herriot gave up the demand as a concession.  The 
second was the question of amnesty, where Germany insisted on a general amnesty that 
would allow the expellees to return to the Ruhr and Rhineland.  This was referred to a 
committee of French and Germans for negotiations which would continue after the 
conference.   
 The most contentious issue was the question of funds accumulated in the Transfer 
Committee.  On 8 August, a bitter fight arose between the French and the German delegation 
over the relations between the German government and the proposed Transfer Committee.  
The issue at stake was whether France could gain participation in German industry over 
German objections.  The Dawes Plan provided that accumulated funds, which could not be 
transferred without causing exchange-rate problems, would be held by a Transfer Committee.  
A creditor nation could request that the Reparation Commission allow a private individual of 
that nation to use the funds for long-term investment in Germany.  The creditor state’s 
reparation fund would then be credited.  The types of investment that could be made were 
subject to an agreement between the Transfer Committee and the German government, 
taking into consideration the necessity of making maximum reparation payments while 
allowing Germany to maintain control of its own internal economy.102  
 France saw this as a means of gaining participation in German industry.  It was agreed at 
the Third Committee that if there were a dispute between the German government and the 
Transfer Committee, an arbitrator would be appointed.10  3   The Germans saw this as reducing 
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German sovereignty in financial and economic matters.  The French delegation in turned 
argued that if arbitration was not allowed on this issue, then the principle of arbitration that 
the conference had recommended in all other area would be endangered.  Snowden 
vociferously argued that arbitration would be a “menace to British industrial concerns” and 
give foreigners “complete control over Germany’s industrial concerns.”  MacDonald closed 
the debate only to have it reemerge on 12 August.104    
 During the interval, France obtained a statement from some members of the Dawes 
Committee who were available in London, which held that any attempt by Germany to 
restrict the list of possible long-term investments would be considered a “financial 
maneuver” forbidden under the Dawes Plan.  When debate was resumed on 12 August, 
MacDonald asserted that the experts’ opinion was not binding on the conference and that it 
could not be regard as official since it involved only a few members of the committee.  
Ambassador Kellogg supported him by announcing that he had no intention of attempting 
any official interpretation of the Dawes report.  
 MacDonald proposed that the question of arbitration be referred to special committee.  
Herriot backed by Theunis vigorously opposed this and again threatened that if the principle 
of arbitration where denied in this case, France would withdraw its agreement to the other 
cases where arbitration had been accepted.  Luther emphasized the importance of the issue to 
Germany and insisted that if a court of arbitration was accepted, its competence would have 
to be very carefully designed.  With the support of Kellogg, MacDonald and the ever-
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vociferous Snowdon, Germany again won the day.10   5  The final agreement held to the 
original language of the Dawes report but allowed for an arbitrator to be appointed in case of 
disagreement between the Transfer Committee and Germany.106   
 This weakening of the French initiative regarding arbitration was an important loss for 
France.  As a result it would not be able to use the vehicle of the Transfer Committee to use 
German reparations owed to it to purchase a sufficient share in German industry to force 
those industries to collaborate with French industries.  France would have to negotiate the 
desired industrial collaboration with Germany directly.  The previous day Clémental had 
proposed to Stresemann a close collaboration between French ore industries and the German 
cokeries, suggesting that it might be desirable to promote French participation in German 
heavy industries by having French industries acquire at least a half-share in the heavy 
industries of the Ruhr.  Stresemann refused this suggestion.107   
  
The German - French Negotiations  
 The first negotiations between Stresemann and Herriot took place at a private dinner 
given by Kellogg on 8 August.  Kellogg urged Herriot to reach an agreement as to 
evacuation of the Ruhr.  Herriot immediately stated it was not on the agenda and that he had 
promised his cabinet that he would not discuss the matter.  He had a divided cabinet and 
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feared the opposition of Poincaré.  Kellogg insisted that there would never be a settlement 
until the troops were withdrawn or at least a definite date was fixed for their withdrawal.  
Stresemann insisted that the votes of the Nationalists were need for approval of the Dawes 
Plan, and that required that he have a definite withdrawal date and it must be months not 
years.  Herroit promised that he would meet with his cabinet and on his return make a 
definite proposition.108  
 When Herriot returned from Paris on 11 August, he informed Kellogg and MacDonald 
that after a difficult debate in the French cabinet, the most he could offer was that France 
would end the military evacuation after one year when France would be begin to receive 
reparation payments from the loan, which would soothe public opinion.  MacDonald 
suggested that Kellogg inform the German delegation.  Kellogg had already been assured by 
Hughes following his trip to Berlin that Germany would accept a one-year occupation.  
Kellogg believed that his intervention could be more useful and perhaps necessary at a latter 
stage and insisted that MacDonald should be the one to inform the Germans of Herriot’s 
decision.  Stresemann would therefore have to rely on MacDonald for help in gaining further 
concessions from Herriot.109    
 On 11 August, Herriot, Clémental and Seydoux attempted to see what economic 
concessions they could obtain from Stresemann.  The provisions in the Versailles treaty that 
allowed products from Alsace-Lorraine to enter Germany duty free and required Germany to 
extend to France most-favored-nation privileges for five years would expire in 1925.  France 
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wanted Germany to extend the duty-free exports privileges for three years, and most-favored-
nation treatment for six months.  In addition they wanted participation in German industry.  
The German industrialists in Berlin opposed using economic concessions to France as a 
means of shortening the military occupation, noting their difficult financial situation.   
Stresemann, however, insisted that the political interests of the nation could not be sacrificed 
on behalf of the industrialists.110   France made its case only weakly and once Stresemann 
realized that France was not making German concessions as a requirement for military 
evacuation, he was able to avoid any economic concessions.     
 That evening Herriot told Stresemann directly that after having met with his cabinet,  the 
most he could offer was that France would end the military evacuation in one year.  
Stresemann replied that he understood Herriot’s difficulties, which is why he did not insist 
on an immediate evacuation, but that a year was too long, and that the Reichstag would not 
pass the legislation.   Herriot replied that he personally saw the military occupation as a 
violation of international law and that he would do what he could to shorten the interval.11  1   
On the subject of railways Herriot, while he continued to insist that they were necessary from 
a military point of view, had already told the British that he was prepared to yield on this 
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issue.  MacDonald then informed the German delegation of this possible concession.112   
 August 13 and 14 were the decisive days of the conference.  On the morning of 13 
August Marx, Stresemann and Luther met with Herriot and Perretti and the Belgians, 
Theunis and Hymans. They worked through the technical issues such as deliveries-in-kind 
and then reached the crucial issue of the evacuation of the Ruhr.  Herriot maintained that he 
could not agree to anything less than a one-year delay in the military evacuation, and that it 
was not in his power to concede an evacuation by stages.  He also declined to say when that 
year would begin or under what conditions the maximum would be shortened.  Herriot told 
Stresemann that Kellogg had expressed his support for the French view that an evacuation 
within one year was reasonable.  
 Stresemann pushed for a staged withdrawal without success.  The Belgians supported 
Herriot, asserting that his proposal was a “far reaching compromise.”  Herriot did, however, 
suggest that if relations the two nations went well, he would consider reducing the number of 
troops.  Later that day, an upset Stresemann confided to Sir Maurice Hankey, General 
Secretary of the London Conference, that “if only the Americans had kept themselves 
uncommitted they might have been so great a help at this stage.”113  
 Prior to the afternoon meeting between the German and the French,  Herriot privately 
told Marx that if there were good relations between France and Germany, he would consider 
the possibility of an earlier evacuation and while he could not agreed to a staged evacuation, 
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a reduction in the army of occupation could take place during the time limit.114   But at the 
afternoon meeting at which Charles Nollet, the French Minister of War, and Clémental were 
present,  Herriot’s attitude stiffened and he refused further compromise. Luther, previously 
informed by Schacht, who had met with Norman, of the bankers’ demands, attempted to 
pressure Herriot by raising the critical issue of Germany’s ability to obtain the loan, but 
Herriot would go no further.115  
 Stresemann met with MacDonald at midnight.  MacDonald told him that Kellogg had 
expressed his support of Herriot’s position which had considerable strengthened the French 
resolve.  MacDonald not did not see what further progress could be made.  Stresemann urged 
MacDonald to press the French for some final concessions, proposing evacuation by stages 
and a quicker evacuation of Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort.  He also asked that the one- 
year time period should start from April, when the German cabinet had accepted the Dawes 
Plan.  MacDonald, however, did not think that any further concessions were possible.116   
 Early on 14 August, the German delegation cabled Berlin for advice about how to 
proceed.  The cabinet was divided, with some members suggesting an offer of economic 
concessions to France in exchange for an earlier evacuation, while others thought it better to 
accept the one-year delay and press for further concessions.  President Ebert wisely 
counseled that the tactic should be left to the delegation.  To provide flexibility two 
telegrams were sent, one rejecting the offer that could be used for pressuring further 
                                                          
 114 Marx to AA, 14 Aug 1924, Nr. 275/61, Die Kabinette Marx II, p. 956. 
 115 Marx to AA, 13 Aug 1924, Nr. 30, ADAP XI, pp. 71-72; Stresemann, Diaries, pp. 
394-97. 
 116 Ibid., p. 397. 
 495  
concessions and the second requesting Stresemann to try to obtain a firm date for the 
evacuation, an easing of the occupation, and for some area to be immediately evacuated.117
 Kellogg confirmed to MacDonald on the morning of 14 August that the United States 
accepted the French position regarding the one-year time period.  MacDonald was upset but 
agreed to accept the United States’ decision to preserve a united front.  MacDonald 
complained to Hankey that he had taken the utmost care to keep himself entirely 
uncommitted “so as to remain impartial until the last possible moment,” and felt that it would 
have helped if Kellogg had done the same.118  
 Kellogg and MacDonald then met with Herriot and persuaded him to agree secretly to 
evacuate the Dortmund district after the accords had been signed.  Herriot also proposed that 
the year should run from the date that the conference protocol was signed, which would 
provide an August rather than an October start date.119  Kellogg and MacDonald then met the 
Germans and strongly urged them to accept Herriot’s last offer.  Marx tried again to invoke 
the bankers and asked, if the occupation were prolonged a year, would the bankers provide 
the loan.  Kellogg, without clear certainty of this, assured the Germans that the loan could be 
obtained.  Kellogg believed that a “critical moment had been reached” and the time had come 
for “decisive action.”  He would “take chances on the loan” and rely on Morgan to raise it.  It 
was “worthy of trying.”120
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 Marx and Stresemann evaluated the situation.  Stresemann favored accepting the French 
offer.  He calculated that he could obtain the immediate evacuation of Dortmund as well as a 
binding agreement for the evacuation of the sanction cities.  Schacht believed that the 
government might be hostile to acceptance, but if that were the case he would hold the threat 
of restricting credit from the Reichsbank over their heads.  Stresemann also felt that 
MacDonald and Herriot were so exhausted and their nerves so strained that negotiations were 
beginning to suffer and that an agreement had to be concluded quickly.121
 Marx and Stresemann then ran a bluff.  They told MacDonald they needed to send Luther 
back to Berlin for consultations and could do nothing for four days.  MacDonald, fearing that 
conference would collapse, found Kellogg and together they convinced Herriot to agree 
formally to the evacuation of Dortmund.  Stresemann, believing that he had obtained 
Herriot’s last concession, then cabled Berlin for approval to accept. The next morning 
Germany obtained two additional concessions.  Herriot would widen the Dortmund area from 
which French troops would withdraw and agreed to evacuate the three sanction cities of 
Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhort at the same time as the rest of the Ruhr.122   
 The German cabinet met and gave its approval in principle to Herriot’s last proposal. 
Karl Jarres, Interior Minister and Vice Chancellor, considered it “favorable beyond 
expectations.”  But at Ebert’s insistence the cabinet asked Stresemann and Marx to press for 
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even more concessions.123   Stresemann would try but had little success.124    
 When Marx gave a speech at the closing ceremonies, the Americans vigorously 
applauded.  Stresemann noted in his diary that Kellogg’s applause was apparently due to “a 
very bad conscience” over having forced Germany to accept the full one-year interval before 
the evacuation would begin.  One German expert on the delegation complained to the press 
that “MacDonald and Kellogg were always to be found in the French trenches.12  5   America 
could never do enough for Germany. 
 In Paris, Herriot won votes of confidence regarding the agreement in both the Chamber 
of Deputies and the Senate, by large majorities.  For Marx and Stresemann, however, the 
Nationalists remained a problem.  Much of the necessary Dawes legislation was adopted by 
simple majority on 27 August.   It was only on 29 August, however, after the third reading of 
the crucial railway legislation requiring a two-thirds majority, that 42 Nationalists broke 
ranks and provided the majority necessary to pass the bill.  Houghton may have helped in 
this by meeting with a few industrial leaders in the DNVP, and with the stick of American 
disapproval of Germany and the carrot of American loans and investments to come gained 
their support.  On 30 August the agreements were signed in London.126   
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 In the United States the problem of the loan remained.  Morgan would not underwrite the 
loan unless all of the partners agreed.  Morrow had serious doubts about Germany’s future 
attitude toward the loan.  He wanted support from the State Department.  Hughes wrote back 
that without the loan there would be “chaotic conditions abroad ” and that he hoped they 
would undertake the participation that the “world expects and that is essential to the Dawes 
Plan.”  That was enough for Morrow and the agreement for the loan was signed on 10 
October. The offering took place on 14 October and was oversubscribed in both New York 
and London.  The Dawes Plan was now ready to be put into operation and the reconstruction 
of Germany and Europe to begin.127  
 
Conclusion  
 The London Conference marked a major turning in the post-World War I period.  It 
altered the relations between the major European powers and marked a changed in 
Germany’s relationship with the United States.  For Germany, the conference was a success.  
Its participation, albeit only in the final weeks, altered the pattern of Versailles.  Germany 
achieved the end of the military evacuation of the Ruhr within a year.  The threat of future 
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military occupations as sanctions had almost vanished.  This strengthened the position of 
Germany in the Rhineland and would work to change attitudes and expectations in the 
Rhineland, diminishing sentiment for some form of autonomy.  The unity of the Reich would 
be preserved.  The powers of the Reparation Commission would weaken as the Transfer 
Committee assumed much of its functions.  
 The London Conference also strengthened Germany economically.  It secured the vital 
loan need to stabilize its currency.  Since France made the error of bringing up demands for 
economic and commercial concession late in the conference and then with only little force, 
Germany was able to avoid making economic concessions.  Germany would preserve its 
advantage in industrial strength over France.  While France still would remain for a time the 
dominant military power in Europe, the future power balance between the two nations had 
been changed in Germany’s favor.   
 Germany’s success at the conference was achieved when the United States, Britain and 
their bankers all placed pressure on Herriot to provide a date for the ending of the military 
occupation and to accept the diminishment of France’s ability to apply sanctions to Germany 
in the future.  Their success was facilitated by Herriot’s personal opposition to Poincaré’s 
policy and the financial weakness of France. Nevertheless, Stresemann’s diplomacy deserves 
credit.  He skillfully used the threat of the agreement being rejected by the German 
Nationalists to obtain the military evacuation of the Ruhr within a year.  He avoided 
economic concessions and was able to extract last-minute concessions for the military 
evacuation of Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort from Herriot.  Germany did not get all it 
wanted, but it the end it obtained enough, along with the prospect of future American aid, to 
obtain sufficient Nationalist support to pass the agreement in the Reichstag.  His success at 
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the conference helped to establish his continuing policy of pursuing German revisionism 
through rapprochement with France and Britain. 
 For the United States, the conference was highly successful.  It accomplished all of its 
primary goals.  The Ruhr crisis had been defused and Hughes’s diplomacy was vindicated 
and celebrated just before the 1924 elections.  America could look forward to participation in 
the reconstruction of Germany and Europe in general.  It had demonstrated the influence and 
economic power of America to world.  It also succeeded in keeping the question of war debts 
from being discussed. 
 Europe’s need for United States involvement in Europe’s reconstruction gave the United 
States great influence and Hughes used it to good effect.  Hughes’s goal was a settlement that 
would allow the loan to be obtained.  Hughes personally intervened directly by telling 
France,  Belgium and Germany that the involvement of the United States in Europe was 
dependent on their accepting the Dawes Plan and reaching a workable agreement.  When in 
Berlin, Hughes came to the conclusion that Germany would accept a year’s delay before 
military evacuation. In the conference Kellogg supported Germany in making sanctions very 
difficult to obtain because it was in America’s interest to prevent a future political crisis 
erupting over reparations.  Similarly he aided Germany in its effort prevent France from 
using non transferable reparation funds to obtain large scale participation in German 
industry.  But when the conference was faltering over German demands for further 
concessions that Kellogg felt Herriot could not make, Kellogg intervened, telling the 
Germans, much to their resentment, that America would not support further concessions.  
America was not pro-German; it was for European reconstruction which required the 
reconstruction of Germany.  American diplomacy succeeded in finding the required balance.    
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 The bankers of J.P. Morgan & Co. played a significant role in obtaining French 
concessions, but their maximum demands were not met.  Although some historians such as 
Werner Link emphasize that American economic concerns directed American policy, it 
should be noted that the bankers were reluctant to make the loan and in the end required a 
request directly from Hughes.  In addition, the strongest demands for French concessions 
came from the British financial community and not American bankers.  Morgan and his 
partners in underwriting loans bore a fiduciary responsibility to buyers of the bonds and had 
good reason to be concerned about Germany’s ability or willingness to pay in the future.  
Morgan was sympathetic to France and was disinclined to invest in German loans.  It was on 
basis of the political needs of the United States and not economic incentives that the decision 
to make to loan was made.  
 For Britain the conference can also be termed a success.  While it is true that they would 
still have the unpleasant task of mediating between France and Germany over issues such as 
the military control of and the evacuation of the Cologne zone of occupation, the crisis had 
been settled and relations with France would become more harmonious.  For France, it put an 
end to its ambitions in the Rhineland which would have poisoned German-French relations, 
it provided for a period of years a source of reparation from Germany, it provided the 
opportunity to restore its finances, and perhaps most importantly it provided a period of time 
to recover from the war and the tensions that accompanied the Ruhr crisis.  It is not 
surprising the Camber of Deputies and the Senate provided Herriot with large majorities in 
their vote of confidence. It opened up possibilities for more peaceful relations with Germany 
and stability in Europe.     
 The London Conference also changed the nature of German-American relations.  By 
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ending the Ruhr Crisis, it opened the door to an increasing economic relationship between 
the two nations.  Germany would no longer have to turn to America as a supplicant in crisis.  
The relationship would be one of normal relations between two nations.  Stresemann’s 
continual conviction was that the best hope for a solution to Germany’s economic and 
political difficulties was engagement with the United States.  His hopes for greater American 
interest in Germany were realized.  During the last half of the 1920s American loans and 
investments would flood into Germany.   Possibilities for the Weimar Republic were opened 
and its “golden years” began. 
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 Conclusion 
 
 When the Great War drew to an end in 1918, it was generally recognized that the central 
problem in establishing a new international order was Germany and its future role with in the 
new system.  It was equally understood that the economic reconstruction of Europe would 
require the participation of the United States which had emerged from war as the world’s 
greatest economic power and the leading creditor nation.  This dynamic of Germany being 
the problem and America being the solution, were it to become engaged, gave the German-
American relationship its critical importance in achieving a post-war settlement that could 
allow the United States to use its economic might to foster the peaceful reconstruction of 
Europe.  Germany made engagement with the United States central to its foreign policy.  
America viewed the recovery of Germany as essential to its long term goal for a peaceful 
reconstruction of Europe that would serve America’s political and economic interests. 
 However, the complex interplay between international politics and the domestic politics 
in each nation as well as complicating cultural differences between the two nations resulted 
in the bilateral relationship proceeding in steps that would be characterized by expediency 
imposed by domestic politics of the United States.   In addition, American could not fully 
engage Germany until European crisis over reparations was resolved.  This would require 
Germany to summon the political will to reform its economy and agree to pay reasonable 
reparations.  Only then would American public opinion become more accepting of United 
States’ participation in the resolution of the crisis which would then allow for full 
engagement of Germany.  The development of the German American relation was 
intermeshed with the international politics of the early postwar years.  The purpose of this 
study has been to explicate the vicissitudes of this complex interaction.   
 The statesmen of the postwar period faced the difficult and complex task of balancing 
their perceived national interests with the need to reconstruct a new international political 
system.  The costs of the war, materially, socially and economically made European 
reconstruction a pressing problem.  But how the costs of the war were to be distributed both 
within each nation and between the nations were contentious domestic political issues.   This 
had the effect of heightening the role of domestic politics in international affairs thus 
constraining the freedom of action in democracies where governments had to carefully attend 
to public opinion.  Economic questions thus became political issues both at the domestic and 
international levels.  It was in this political environment that the statesmen of the time 
struggled to re-establish a stable post war system which could foster reconstruction.   It is 
therefore in the political analysis of the period that the motivation and priorities the 
statesmen of the period are best revealed.     
 These issues were first confronted internationally at the Paris Peace Conference.  The 
resulting Versailles Treaty and its subsequent failure to be ratified by the United States 
established the framework in which the diplomacy of the early 1920's would take placed and 
the German-American relationship forged.  Woodrow Wilson had sought a “just” peace, but 
believed that Germany should be punished and constrained.  The Treaty imposed harsh terms 
on Germany, reducing its territory, military power, and financial strength; but Wilson and 
Lloyd George refused to satisfy French desires completely by separating the Rhineland from 
Germany.  Wilson recognized that the economic recovery of Germany and its eventual 
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reintegration would be necessary for European recovery.  Germany was left with the 
potential to return to great power status as Europe’s leading industrial nation.  For Wilson, 
the League of Nations was to be the ultimate security guarantee for France reinforced by a 
promise of American and British aid if France were to be attacked.  Wilson saw American 
interests as being best served by a liberal international order based on the “Open Door” 
principle of trade.  He assumed that Europe could recover through its own efforts and the 
involvement of private American capital.  America’s refusal to link the question of Allied 
war debt owed to the United States to German reparations, a position that Britain and France 
would seek to revise, intensified the crucial issue of setting the sum of German reparations 
which was left for later resolution.  The Versailles Treaty’s blend of realism and Wilsonian 
idealism has been a subject of contentious debate from its inception to the present. It was, 
however, a product of its own time and circumstances and the compromises that had to be 
made under the pressure of time.  
 There is some justification for the interpretation that the treaty was too harsh for 
Germany to reconcile itself to its defeat and the consequences that followed from it while at 
the same time not sufficiently severe to provide France a sense of security against a 
recovered and revisionist Germany.  Germany’s consistent foreign policy goal became to 
escape from the strictures of the Treaty while France would counter with strict enforcement 
of its terms and saw reparations as a mean of limiting the strength of Germany’s recovery.  
The Treaty could have been enforced and revised, if necessary, over time with American 
participation, but Wilson’s stubborn refusal to face political realities and agree to the 
Senate’s ratification of the Treaty with reservations dealt a severe blow to the international 
system.  It would not be until 1924 that the needed American involvement and engagement 
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with Germany would facilitate the European powers adopting a workable post-war settlement 
that was freely accepted by Germany and allowed the reconstruction of Europe to begin.   
 America’s withdrawal from the arena of European affairs left Britain and France to 
manage the enforcement of the treaty and the problem of German reparations which exposed 
the significant differences that divided those nations.  They could not reach a lasting 
agreement on the sum of German reparations or the sanctions to be employed to enforce 
payment.  Britain sought to serve as the balance of power in Europe and believed that it had 
more to gain economically from the recovery of Germany than it had from extracting the 
maximum amount of reparations from it.  France, left without a security guarantee after 
America failed to ratify the Versailles Treaty and Britain’s subsequent refusal to provide a 
guarantee alone, increasingly viewed  reparations not only as essential to its recovery, but 
also as a security issue against Germany.   
 While Germany sought to exploit the divergence between France and Britain, it placed 
ultimate hope for its recovery on the United States making this the keystone of its foreign 
policy from the very ending of the war.  With some illusions about its intent, Germany had 
turned to the United States for an armistice based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points and his 
promise for a just peace.  Although the armistice terms were severe, Germany unrealistically 
retained the hope that Wilson’s influence would provide it with a lenient peace treaty and 
entrance into the new world system promised by Wilson.   It believed that having 
reconstituted its government as a parliamentary democracy, it would be viewed as having 
rejected its militant past and would find greater favor in American eyes.  The arrival of 
American food shipments further underscored the importance of the United States to 
Germany.   When the Versailles Treaty confronted Germany with the reality of defeat, it felt 
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betrayed by Wilson.  But this hostility towards Wilson did not alter Germany’s core belief 
that engagement with America was essential for the rehabilitation of Germany and the 
revision of its position in the European system.   It did, however, create a self serving feeling 
that America owed a moral debt to Germany and this attitude would often color the tone in 
which Germany couched its appeals to the United States and prove counter-productive in its 
effect.  
 German hopes for American assistance rose after the Senate’s failure to ratify the 
Versailles treaty and the Republican victory in the 1920 election.  The German Foreign 
Office, once again misreading American policy, believed that the United States’ desire for 
trade and investment opportunities in Germany would lead to a rapid American engagement 
and mediation on its behalf.   This misconception led Germany to deliberately submit an 
unrealistic reparation offer to Britain and France just prior to the London Reparation 
Conference of 1921 and then to issue an appeal for Washington to mediate a settlement on 
Germany’s behalf.  Hughes, to whom Harding had given wide latitude in formulating 
American foreign policy, shared Wilson’s belief as to the importance of Germany to the 
American goal of the peaceful reconstruction of Europe.  The new administration followed 
Wilson in holding that Germany should pay for its aggression, but that reparations should be 
based on experts’ determination of what Germany could pay and still contribute to European 
recovery.  Unwilling to separate America from the Allies, Hughes would not exert any 
American pressure on them, and would only make a confidential and informal offer for 
American participation in a committee of experts if agreeable to Britain and France.  This 
policy would serve as the framework of Hughes’ future approach to the problem of 
reparations.  The only result of Germany’s appeal was to reinforce the State Department’s 
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belief that Germany had not accepted the consequences of its defeat, was insincere in its 
reparation proposals, and was obtuse to the sentiments and interests of other nations.  It also 
underscored the potential of Germany to complicate the State Department’s relations with the 
Senate and the Allies.  Hughes would carefully seek to minimize such problems in his later 
negotiations with Germany.  
 The 1921 London Schedule of Reparations has a matter of intense debate from the 
perspective of theoretical economics as to whether it was within Germany’s capacity to pay 
and if the transfer of such sums could take place without impairing fiscal stability.  The 
problem of German reparations, however, was at its heart a political issue.  German opinion 
viewed the London Ultimatum as a second Versailles, an unjust and unrealistic punishment 
which only served to benefit its former enemies while keeping it from economic recovery.  
Critics of the reparation schedule in Britain and the United States reinforced and sustained 
this belief.  The Weimar Republic had purchased social peace through inflationary economic 
policies and feared making the political decisions that would heighten domestic conflict over 
how the economic costs of reparations should be distributed among the varying 
socioeconomic groups.  The resulting lack of political will within Germany to face its 
reparation burden would lead to the reparation crisis that dominated international politics in 
the early post-war years.   As the issue of reparations became increasingly important in 
German domestic politics, its relations with the United States were seen as the only solution 
to Germany’s dilemma.  Fehrenbach’s failure to obtain American mediation in the 1921 
reparation settlement did not alter the hope for eventual American intervention, a hope that 
already survived the disappointment of the Armistice terms and the Versailles Treaty.  The 
reparation crisis that followed the London Ultimatum simply intensified it.     
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 This analysis of German foreign policy reveals how the importance of America became 
increasing central to its diplomacy and made the engagement of the United States on 
Germany’s behalf its prime priority.  America was seen as essential for the rehabilitation of 
Germany and the revision of its position within the European system.  Germany viewed the 
United States as a nation that saw itself as being above the political fray that characterized 
Europe and thus being able to serve as a useful mediator on Germany behalf.  The successive 
German governments of Wirth, Cuno, Stresemann and Marx would cling to this view and 
would be judged domestically by the progress that they made in fostering the American 
relationship as they tacked to what they perceived as the prevailing American wind.  They 
relied on what they believed was America’s need for Germany both for trade and for the 
larger goal of having a recovered Germany serve to foster a more general European 
reconstruction to result in an American engagement with Germany.  But this belief 
overestimated America’s need for trade with Germany, underestimated the ambivalence 
regarding engagement with of Europe that characterized the American political scene and 
Hughes’ reluctance to complicate relations with the Allies.  Germany’s engagement with the 
United States would therefore only take place in steps beginning with the United States’ 
political need to resolve to the bilateral issues that resulted from America’s failure to ratify 
the Versailles Treaty.    
  The first step in the reestablishment of post-war relationship was the Treaty of Berlin, 
America’s separate peace with Germany.  The treaty was the product of the politics of 
expediency, and was not part of predetermined policy regarding Germany.  Hughes’ foreign 
policy options were constrained by domestic politics. The prevailing political mood of 
America had become more isolationist in nature.  While some agricultural, business, and 
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financial interests favored increased engagement with Europe, the general opinion that was 
that America had sacrificed enough for Europe.  It wanted lower taxes, avoidance of 
entanglement in European disputes, and a return to the “normalcy” that Harding had 
promised.   Congress, divided between Republican internationalists, Republican isolationists, 
and partisan Democrats, sought to recapture its prerogatives and limit the administration’s 
freedom of action.  At the same time it lacked any consensus regarding foreign policy.  It 
found a common purpose, however, in acting in response to the French and British reparation 
demands by legislating to preserve American financial claims against Germany.  The Knox-
Porter resolution ending the state of war with Germany claimed all the rights and privileges 
of the Versailles Treaty while not accepting the responsibility for its enforcement and 
making any American participation in its institutions dependent on Congress’ approval.  
Hughes, who agreed with the general framework of the Versailles Treaty, would have 
preferred to resubmit the Versailles treaty with reservations and without the League.   
Blocked by Senate opposition, Hughes incorporated the Knox-Porter resolution as the basis 
for the Treaty of Berlin.  
 Examination of the domestic and international politics that were in the involved in the 
formulation of the Treaty of Berlin and the negotiations that led to Germany’s acceptance 
reveals a pattern in which Hughes, constrained by Congress and needing to preempt 
Congressional action, demanded Germany accept America’s terms and timetable.   The Wirth 
government was willing to sign the treaty not only because they viewed the relationship with 
America as crucial, but also to satisfy their political need to demonstrate to the German 
public progress in the engagement of the United States.  The treaty was therefore was a 
product of what can be characterized as the politics of expediency.  The domestic political 
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needs of Hughes would set the pace and parameters of American-German relations.  This 
would be the pattern in the Mixed Claims Agreement in 1922 and the Commercial Treaty of 
1923.  
 The Wirth government had mistakenly believed that the United States’ desire for trade 
would provide sufficient leverage for Germany in the negotiations over the peace treaty to 
obtain the sequestered German assets and a commercial treaty which then could lead to 
greater economic engagement with the United States.  What Germany received was only the 
promise of further action, but even that would depend on Congress.  The Wirth government, 
desperate for some demonstration of progress in the engagement of the United States, 
accepted the treaty and promoted it to the public as a negotiated peace establishing bilateral 
relations with the United States outside of the framework of the Versailles system.  But while 
the Treaty of Berlin established the framework for American-German bilateral relationship, 
Hughes had no desire to separate American policy from the overall European settlement of 
Versailles or to create difficulty with America’s war time Allies.  It was as much of the 
Versailles Settlement as he could obtain from Congress.  Germany paid a heavy price for its 
separate peace when Congress in ratifying the treaty sought to prevent a reduction in Allied 
war debts being used to facilitate a reparation settlement and forbade any official American 
representation in the crucial Reparation Commission. 
 The Wirth government’s policy of fulfillment which was designed to demonstrate that the 
German reparation burden had to be reduced succeeded only in stimulating inflation.  When 
the United States failed to extend its relationship, Germany turned to Britain for financial 
support and protection against France only to find that Britain in the absence of American 
involvement could not constrain France.  The failure of the Genoa conference demonstrated 
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how essential the United States was the solution of the European crisis.  Rathenau’s urgent 
request at the time of the Genoa conference for Wiedfeldt to immediately take up the crucial 
position as Ambassador in Washington illustrates the continuing importance of America.    
 The United States had refused to attend the conference because it believed that it was 
premature since the Europeans would have to institute domestic financial and economic 
reforms before any progress could be made in European reconstruction.  Washington’s 
prevailing view was that American engagement, while remaining a long term goal, was not 
of such immediate importance that American would risk a confrontation with the Europeans 
over the issue of Allied war debts.   But although Hughes refused American official 
participation at Genoa, he supported J.P. Morgan’s participation in the Banker Committee as 
a private banker, but with instruction to avoid the issue of war debts.  Morgan’s participation 
represented a turning point in that it signaled the willingness of American financial circles to 
become involved in Germany’s reparation problem.  Germany’s approach to Russia at 
Rapallo, was in large measure a product of frustration over the lack of success achieved by 
Germany’s fulfillment policy, but Germany’s hope continued to rest with the United States.  
 In answering the question of how the German-American relationship developed, attention 
has to be paid to the role that Otto Wiedfeldt and Alanson B. Houghton played as 
ambassadors.  The exchange ambassadors was an important benefit that Germany did gain 
from the signing of the peace treaty.  Neither came from the foreign service.  Wiedfeldt was 
chosen specifically for his economic and business background which made him well 
respected in the American industrial and banking community whose support Germany 
sought.  Houghton, who also had extensive business and political connections, was 
sympathetic to German concerns, but was realistic in his assessments.  He was regularly 
 513 
consulted by the German government on all matters of policy. Their backgrounds and 
abilities gave both Houghton and Wiedfeldt a significant advantage in addressing German-
American issues and proved to be highly effective in the mission they were given.  
 The German-American engagement was complicated by differences in culture, values, 
customs, and ideas about political economies.  This led to frequent misperceptions and 
misunderstandings. The State Department often characterized Germans as being thick 
headed, stubborn, diplomatically insensitive, and bungling.   Germany held very mixed 
attitudes regarding the United States.  The Germans viewed Americans as naïve, uncultured 
and materialistic. While convinced that only the United States could help, it felt that America 
had a moral duty to help Germany and would resort to reminding America of that duty, 
especially when America was inactive.  This was somewhat mitigated by the fortunate choice 
of Ambassadors.  Houghton’s sympathetic, but realistic, assessments of Germany won him 
the trust of successive German governments and eventually the trust of Hughes and the State 
Department Wiedfeldt disabused the German Foreign Office of its optimistic appraisals of 
the American policy and discouraged amateurish approaches to lobby the United States.  His 
courting of influential figures in politics, banking and industry helped smooth the way for the 
eventual acceptance of American involvement in the Ruhr crisis. 
 The Mixed Claims Agreement was the necessary second step in the bilateral development 
of the German-American relationship.  Hughes skillfully achieved a successful balancing of 
domestic and partisan concerns of Congress with the practicalities imposed by the problem of 
inter-allied debts and reparations.  The Mixed Claims Commission would keep war claims 
against Germany out of the American courts where excessive Court awards would 
complicate his diplomacy with both Germany and the Allies.  The use of the Commission, as 
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opposed the court system, also served to keep emotionally charged issues related to war 
damages out of the public eye where they could further heighten public hostility towards 
Germany.    While the agreement reflected American needs and interests, both Rathenau and 
Wirth considered it of crucial importance to demonstrate German willingness to 
accommodate American priorities at a time when Germany was desperate for American aid 
as the reparation crisis intensified.  
 The final step in establishing normal bilateral relations between the United States and 
Germany, a commercial treaty, would not take place until late 1923.   The delay resulted 
from the need of United States to establish its economic and commercial priorities before 
presenting a draft treaty to Germany.  Hughes’ efforts to keep both Congress and special 
interest groups out of his formulation and negotiation of the commercial treaty, as he had 
previously done in the Mixed Claim agreement, calls into question the applicability of 
“corporatism” as an explanatory theory applied to American foreign policy of this period.  
The commercial treaty was further delayed by the inability of the German Foreign Office to 
take decisive action during the economic collapse and political dislocation that characterized 
the autumn of 1923.  While Germany was once again pressured into accepting American 
terms, it welcomed a commercial treaty which gave Germany most- favored-nation status 
with the United States allowing it the opportunity to break out of the commercial restrictions 
imposed by the Versailles Treaty.   More importantly, it confirmed American interest in 
Germany at a time when the establishment of the Expert’s Committee’s was still uncertain.  
In the long run it was more of a success for Germany than for the United States.  It did not 
lead to an “Open Door” for the United States in Europe, but after its ratification in 1925 it 
would facilitate the reconstruction of Germany being supported by the wealth of America.  
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But all this could not have taken place without a resolution of the Ruhr crisis.     
 While the Mixed Claims agreement allowed the Wirth government to demonstrate some 
progress in its relationship with America, it failed to help its central problem which was the 
building conflict over reparations and resulting inflation that was rapidly diminishing Wirth’s 
options in both foreign and domestic policy.  The ever increasing inflation exacerbated the 
tensions between industry and labor.   Industry demanded the end of the eight hour day for its 
cooperation in obtaining an international loan while labor vehemently rejected any change. 
Germany could not resolve its domestic situation without some resolution of its reparation 
problem, but it could not make credible reparation offers without domestic reforms.  It saw 
external assistance as its only politically acceptable solution.  Britain’s attempted 
intervention of the Balfour Note in August 1922 only served to anger Washington which 
rightfully recognized it as an attempt to embarrass America into intervening.  It also had the 
effect of hardening the attitude of Poincaré who increasingly looked to the seizure of assets 
in the Ruhr as a means of obtaining reparations.  Unable to make progress in obtaining 
American assistance the Wirth government collapsed in 1922.  
 Cuno’s appointment to replace Wirth as Chancellor was to a significant degree based on 
his close business connections with America.  Although promising domestic reforms that 
would allow Germany to make credible reparation proposals that would find favor in 
America, his weak government could not obtain the necessary support from industry and 
business.   With Britain unable to restrain France, Germany once again made a last minute 
plea for American intervention through an expert’s committee.  Cuno’s additional offer of a 
Houghton inspired Rhinepact had little meaning without the British and American security 
guarantees to France.  Concerned about the imminent French occupation of the Ruhr, Hughes 
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now publicly made his New Haven proposal.  This reflected not only the administration’s 
long term desire for a European settlement under America’s guidance,  but also Hughes’ 
political need to avoid partisan criticism that the administration had done nothing in response 
to the European crisis.  But after Poincaré’s earlier experience with the Morgan and Banker’s 
Committee which had recommended a reduction of the Germans reparation burden, there 
was little chance of France accepting Hughes’ proposal without an offer of a reduction in its 
war debts.   Bonar Law’s last minute attempt to avoid French action in the Ruhr failed when 
Germany, resigned to a confrontation with France, submitted an embarrassing unrealistic 
offer.  Given the United States failure to ratify the Versailles treaty and its attitude regarding 
war debts, the differences between Britain and France in their attitudes towards Germany, the 
German sense of injustice regarding the Versailles Treaty and the London Ultimatum along 
with its inability to overcome its social divisions and France’s justifiable anger at not 
receiving German reparations, there was certain inevitability to the French and Belgian 
occupation of the Ruhr.   
 Why did occupation go on for over one year before a useful intervention by America and 
Britain could be achieved through the Dawes Plan and the London Conference of 1924?  The 
crisis became acute because it rapidly became a test of national strength between France and 
Germany with each believing it would prevail.  Cuno was willing to gamble that French 
financial weakness would lead it eventually to accept American and British mediation that 
would result in a reparation settlement more favorable to Germany.   The French and Belgian 
occupation of the Ruhr led to a nationalistic reaction of outrage throughout Germany which 
initially led to a sense of national unity.  Workers responded with spontaneous non-
compliance and strikes which the Cuno government then organized and financed, believing 
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that passive resistance would lead France to negotiate.   But underneath this patriotic 
reaction, the social divisions remained and would frustrate any attempts by Cuno to make 
any reparation offers sufficient to provide an opportunity for American and British 
intervention.   
 In the United States, the initial response of Congress, which sought to avoid any 
entanglement in the European embroilment, was to insist on the rapid withdrawal of 
American occupation troops.  Hughes had little to offer after Poincaré’s refusal of his 
proposal.  In Britain, the weak Bonar Law government faced a divided public and cabinet 
opinion regarding the occupation and retreated into a policy of “benevolent neutrality.”  Both 
nations expected that negotiations would become possible within a reasonable period of time 
after Germany and France had experienced their “bit of chaos.”  But the intensity of the 
struggle between France and Germany frustrated hopes for an early solution.  
 During the spring and summer of 1923, Hughes’ policy was to wait on events and hope 
that Europe would solve its own problems.  With American opinion predominately pro-
French, the ever cautious Hughes had no incentive to adopt an active policy where was no 
likelihood for success.  Cuno’s clumsy reparation proposals that were limited by the political 
hold industry had on his government not only reinforced this attitude, but also served to cool 
relations with the United States.  Britain, whom Hughes looked to for management of the 
crisis, was unwilling on its own to pressure France and Curzon’s attempted initiatives 
faltered in the face of cabinet opposition.   It would not be until August when Germany was 
confronted with galloping inflation that threatened the disintegration of the social fabric, the 
economy and the state itself, that a new great coalition government led by Gustav 
Stresemann would accept the realities of Germany’s domestic and international situation. 
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 Stresemann took office with the firm belief that only the United States could provide the 
help Germany needed.  To his credit, he recognized that Germany’s foreign policy was 
linked to domestic reform and was willing to break through the political constraints that had 
paralyzed his predecessors to achieve it.  Unable to obtain aid from Britain, he made the 
difficult decision to give up passive resistance which under Cuno had come to be pursued for 
its own sake rather than for any useful purpose.  His strong determined leadership, in contrast 
with the weakness of Cuno, made an important difference.  Germany owed much to his 
forward looking and realistic appraisal of Germany of what was required to achieve 
American assistance.  
 When Poincaré refused negotiations, the international political dynamics changed and 
Poincaré lost his best the opportunity to negotiate a settlement under conditions most 
favorable to France.  While Britain and the United States might well have accepted strong 
French measures to achieve guarantees of it reparation payments, neither would condone a 
unilateral revision of the Versailles settlement.  Poincaré had gone too far.  It was no longer 
Germany, but instead France with its ambitions in the Rhineland and its actions which 
threatened to cripple Germany that had become the obstacle to the resolution of the crisis.   
British policy then hardened and became more confrontational towards French actions.  
Coolidge did not want to go into the 1924 elections faced with the charge that it had allowed 
Europe to fall into chaos, but at the same time he did not want to try and fail since he and 
Hughes saw America as one indispensable nation and guarantor of international stability.  
Nevertheless, under domestic and international pressure, Coolidge re-offered Hughes’ expert 
committee proposal but left it to Britain to achieve French acceptance.  At the same time he 
warned Germany, which as a consequence of giving up passive resistance faced threats to its 
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integrity from both the left and the right as well as a separatist movement in the Rhineland, 
that American intervention depended in Germany holding together.  Such was the chaos in 
Germany that this would require extra-parliamentary emergency and dictatorial measures, 
but Germany held together.  It was German weakness and not her strength that eventual 
resulted in the combined American and British intervention.  
 When Britain took the initiative and called for an expert’s committee, Poincaré accepted 
because the crisis was threatening France’s relationship with Britain.  He had only reluctant 
support from Belgium, and faced serious domestic financial problems.  He was also aware of 
the potential rewards American engagement in Europe might bring France including a 
reduction in French war debts. In addition, he believed that he would hold a strong hand in 
the negotiations and could keep open the possibilities for a change in status in the Rhineland.  
When Poincaré attempted to limit the scope of inquire, Hughes refused to associate America 
with an effort that would not provide useful results and could damage the election chances of 
the Administration and the Republican Party.   Hughes used his very public refusal to exert 
the pressure of international opinion which recognized the necessity of American 
involvement against France.  This provided British diplomacy the ability to forge a tentative 
confidential compromise in the Reparation Commission.  Hughes and Coolidge, departing 
from their cautious policy of acting only when assured of success, concluded that the time 
had come to throw the weight of America into the balance and accept the risk of 
participation.  This reflected not only their political calculations regarding the 1924 elections, 
but, also to their credit, the recognition of the gravity of the European situation.     
 The Dawes Committee and 1924 London Conference provided the basis for the 
international settlement of the crisis.  Europe’s need for American involvement and money 
 520 
gave America the leading role in the committee.  While the committee devoted its time to 
economic issues, its decisions were ultimately political in nature.  The committee succeeded 
in producing a reparation schedule and plans for a loan that offered Germany the ability to 
stabilize it currency and to recover economically.   Although most economic experts 
considered the eventual sums Germany would have to pay unrealistically high and the 
eventual total amount Germany would have to pay was left undecided, these compromises 
were politically necessary to achieve French acceptance.  Stresemann, for whom economic 
and administrative unity of Germany was of prime importance, was willing to pay the price 
of the reparation schedule.  While American-British rivalries surfaced over the issue of the 
gold standard, Britain recognized the reality of American economic dominance and yielded 
on the issue which allowed fruitful American-British collaboration. The committee 
recognized the political need to leave open military and security issues.  This together with 
threat of Hughes, who was now committed to a successful resolution, to withdraw crucial 
American involvement was sufficient for Poincaré accept the Dawes Report.   American had 
achieved its goals without involving the issue of Allied war debts.   The success of the 
committee and its enthusiastic reception in the United States ensured America’s future 
commitment to the completion of it work at the London.     
 The London Conference which worked out the implementation of the Dawes Plan 
represented a major turning point in the post-war period.  While it modified the Versailles 
settlement, it remained within its framework.  Neither the United States nor Britain would 
accept France’s unilateral action to alter the verdict at Versailles that the Rhineland and the 
Ruhr would remain German.  Both nations, as they had at Versailles, viewed it in their 
interests that Germany return to a level of prosperity that would allow it to pay reparations 
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and be reintegrated into the European system fostering a general recovery.  The threat of 
future military occupation as sanction for reparation defaults almost vanished as the powers 
of the Reparation Commission were reduced.  Reparations would be once again reduced to 
an economic issue and not the means of enhancing France’s security agenda.  The time table 
established at Versailles for the ending of German commercial concessions to France was 
adhered to when Stresemann diplomacy warded off France’s weak efforts to extend them.  A 
workable agreement on the withdrawal of the French military from the Ruhr within one year 
was reached.  Hughes correctly judged that the need for French acceptance of an agreement 
and the preservation of Herriot’s political viability outweighed the need for Stresemann and 
Marx to satisfy the political posturing of the German Nationalists and limited MacDonald’s 
efforts to extract further concessions from Herriot.  
 Herriot, who had opposed the policies of Poincaré, fought to preserve French interests, 
but at the same time, also recognized the destructiveness of the Ruhr conflict to France as 
well as to Germany.  He was acutely aware of the need for France to recover from the 
emotional and financial strains of the war and the Ruhr crisis.  He also sought to repair the 
damaged relations with Britain and reduce the virulence of the French German relationship.  
Herriot’s attitude facilitated the success of the conference, and it is questionable whether 
Poincaré could have received better terms at London in the face of Anglo-American 
opposition.   France would receive its much needed reparations and a period of rest to heal its 
wounds.   
 Britain would inherit the problems of managing the settlement, but that would be the 
price of resuming its desired role of serving as the balance of power in Europe while 
attending to its Imperial needs.  Its task would be eased by the economic involvement of the 
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United States in the recovery of Europe.  For the United States the conference was highly 
successful.  It avoided the issue of war debts.  It achieved its goal for economic engagement 
of Europe through private investment without American political involvement.  It was a 
diplomatic success that assured the Republican victory in the 1924 elections.   
 The American relationship with Germany would also be changed. The relationship would 
be one of the normal relations between two states, rather than one of Germany turning to 
America as supplicant in crisis.  Stresemann’s goal for German recovery funded by 
American wealth was realized as American loans and investments poured into Germany.  
While the immediately following years were not completely “golden,” Germany’s 
constitutional structure survived and it had an opportunity to recover from its years of crisis.     
 Most importantly the Dawes Plan and London settlement changed the international 
atmosphere of the immediate post war years.  Problems remained, but the sense of general 
disillusionment with possibilities of diplomacy faded.  The settlement also allowed for the 
bitter feelings resulting from the war to lessen.  People of each nation could entertain the 
possibility that their hopes for a more peaceful and prosperous future could be realized.  With 
France receiving German reparation payments made possible by American loans and 
investments in Germany, the question of reparations ceased to threaten the peace and 
stability of Europe.  The nature of international diplomacy changed.  The divergent national 
interests of each nation which had been often self-contradictory coalesced into a more 
common purpose of managing the political problems of French security and German 
revisionism pursued by Stresemann through diplomacy.  This was a significant 
accomplishment and any assessment of the diplomacy of the early years of the 1920's should 
be in the context of its own times and not the events and contingencies of the 1930's which 
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unraveled the system.  
 The German-American relationship, as it developed between 1921 and 1925, provided 
the crucial link to the resolution of the European post war crisis and transformed the 
European system which originated out of the Versailles settlement.  In the process, German-
American relations were changed.  Germany would no longer have to turn to the United 
States as a supplicant in crisis.  During the last half of the 1920's American investments and 
loans would pour into Germany, albeit in excessive amounts.  This new American 
involvement with Germany would serve to underwrite the “golden years” of the Weimar 
Republic and all its promise.  
 The Great Depression would end the European recovery.  Hitler’s rise to power and the 
resulting shift in German policy from one of peaceful revision within the system of 
Versailles to one of aggressive German expansionism would force America once more into 
war - a war actively sought by Hitler’s Germany.   Learning the lesson from the European 
crisis following the First World War, the United States would this time remain engaged with 
Europe and Germany.  American aid would help restore Germany following its defeat and it 
would serve as the protector of West Germany from encroachment by Soviet Russia.  When 
the Soviets withdrew from East Germany, it would be America that would advocate a united 
Germany despite the misgiving of France and Great Britain.   Today German-American 
relations are in a period of flux as Germany has to decide how to balance its relationship with 
the United States with its commitment of the European Union.  Yet German-American 
relationship, forged with such difficulty in the early years of the Weimar Republic, remains 
strong.  This relationship continues to be important for both Germany and America, as well 
as to Europe as a whole and is well worthy of continued study.   
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